Misconstruing 'Multivariate' & Metafunctional Inconsistencies

Martin (1992: 156):

NEGOTIATION was approached from both a multivariate and covariate perspective in Chapter 2.  The notion of constituency between exchange and move was developed to account synoptically for sequences of up to five moves.  These moves are mutually predicting as set out in their constituency structures.  In [3:100] the initiation expects a response and the response presumes its initiation:

[3:100]

K2 Who won?
K1 — Ben did.

Blogger Comment:

[1] This confuses multivariate structures (of a rank) with constituency (rank hierarchy).  The constituency relation between exchange and move is the relation between levels in a rankscale.  A multivariate structure, on the other hand, is 'a configuration of elements each having a distinct function with respect to the whole' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 331).

Further, as Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 384) point out:

… the relationships among the elements in a multivariate structure can be characterised as segmental from an experiential point of view but as prosodic from an interpersonal point of view and as cumulative from a textual one.

That is, on the SFL model, the relation between elements in the multivariate structure realising interpersonal systems, like NEGOTIATION, are prosodic.  Since this is a proposition Martin elsewhere (1992: 549) supports, Martin is here inconsistent with his own model.

[2] To be clear, the notion of 'covariate structure' derives from Lemke (1985).  In Lemke (1988: 159) he acknowledged that 'covariate' is not a type of structure:

My own 'covariate structure' (Lemke 1985), which includes Halliday's univariate type, is for the case of homogeneous relations of co-classed units, and should perhaps be called a 'structuring principle' rather than a kind of structure.

[3] To be clear, these are merely statements about two alternative features in a closed system.

The Analysis Of Text [3:88]: An Attempt To Hide A Theoretical Inconsistency

Martin (1992: 147):

The reference structure of [3:88] is presented in Fig. 3.14. … The two participants in possessive nominal groups are aligned with their respective chains with a dotted line showing that the identity of the participant realised in the Thing is recoverable via the participant by which it is possessed (e.g. his bed in [3:88i]).  Where the Thing participant has already been identified (as with his pet frog in 3:88xxvii]), it is shown as well as presuming preceding items in this chain.  Note that the analyses of reference structure consist only of phoric items and any non-phoric items they presume; non-phoric items which are not included since they do not enter into semantic dependencies related to participant identification.  In [3:88] only four minor participant chains, the glass, the rock, the reindeer and the baby frogs are introduced non-phorically.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is inconsistent with both Martin's own model and SFL theory, according to which, a participant is realised by a nominal group, not the Thing (bed) of a nominal group.

[2] This is inconsistent with both Martin's own model and SFL theory, according to which, a participant is realised by a nominal group, not the Deictic (his) of a nominal group.  The function of the inconsistency is to hide the fact that Martin's model, in mistaking nominal groups (e.g. his bed) for reference items (e.g. his), necessarily leads to the nominal groups Tommy, he and his bed all realising the same identity.

[3] To be clear, Martin has, to this point, used the term 'phoric nominal group'.  In switching to the term 'phoric item', Martin signals that he is aware of the problem that arises from mistaking a nominal group for a reference item, and hopes to hide that fact from the reader.

[4] Trivially, unknown to Martin, there is a fifth minor participant chain that fits his criterion:

a hollow tree

↑

the tree

Confusing Metafunctions And ConfusingTypes Of Cohesion

Martin (1992: 139):

To illustrate this [i.e. "constructing participants by referring to them"] consider the range of responses possible in [3:77]:

			PRESUMED AS
[3:77]	She saw them building a new school
i.	— If you say so.	— Do you think so?	locution/idea
ii.	— Who told you that?	— I can't believe that.	locution/idea
iii.	— That's impossible / It's not possible.		fact
iv.	— That's hard work / It's hard work.		act
v.	— That's what we needed / It's what we needed.		thing

Response v illustrates the pattern considered to this point: reference between participants — that and it presume a phenomenon, realised earlier as a new school.  In response iv however, that and it presume a macro-phenomenon — the act of building a new school…  .  Response iii takes this one step further, presuming a metaphenomenon — the fact that she saw them building a new school: cf. It's not possible [[that she saw them building a new school]].  In ii that also presumes she saw them building a new school as a metaphenomenon — but this time as a projected locution or idea, not a fact.  That contrasts with so in i; as Halliday (1985:234) points out, with verbal processes the distinction is between quoting (that) and reporting (so), whereas with mental processes the opposition is between assertion (that) and postulation (so).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses the experiential function of that and it (participant) with the textual function of that and it (reference item).  The reference relation obtains between the reference item and the referent.

[2] To be clear, the reference items that and it do not refer to the referent whose experiential function is Thing (school), but to that which functions as the Goal (a new school) of an embedded clause serving as Phenomenon: macrophenomenon.

[3] Here Martin creates an inconsistency by switching from the experiential function of the referent to the experiential function of the reference item.  In doing so, he misconstrues the function of each referent, Verbiage and Phenomenon, as projected clauses, locution and idea, respectively.

[4] Here Martin mistakes an instance of substitution (so) for a reference item, and analyses the ideational function of the substitute, rather than what he believes to be the referent.

[5] This is misleading, since, as Halliday (1985: 234) points out, the distinction is between that and so is the distinction between reference and substitution, respectively.  He then goes on to explain why reference is typically used for quotes, and why substitution is used for reports, before concluding:

In verbal processes, therefore, he said that simply attests to his production of the wording, whereas he said so raises the issue of whether what he said is in fact the case.

[6] To be clear, what Halliday (1985: 234) actually wrote was as follows:

Giving Priority To Structure And Form Instead Of System And Function

Martin (1992: 135):

This distribution of phoric items across different elements of nominal group structure makes it very difficult to capture the relevant textual generalisations at the level of grammar.  The structure of pronominal, proper and common nominal groups is very divergent (cf. he, Professor Emeritus J C Smith, that fellow I met last week) for good experiential and interpersonal reasons.  But all three types of group may be presuming in the same way and need to be classed together as far as textual meaning is concerned.  The same point can be made with respect to relevance phoricity: Deictics, Numeratives and Epithets are generated by quite different nominal group systems, but from the point of view of textual meaning all can presume supersets.

Blogger Comments:

[1] On the one hand, the "distribution of phoric items across different elements of nominal group structure" is irrelevant to "textual generalisations at the level of grammar" since reference is not a system of the nominal group.  On the other hand, viewing the grammar in terms of structure is at odds with SFL theory, in which priority is given to the view from above, which, in terms of axis, is to system rather than structure.

[2] Given that Martin's model is concerned with 'reference as semantic choice', and that reference is a grammatical system, "the relevant generalisations at the level of grammar" are already provided the theorists whose work Martin sources; see, for example, Halliday (1985).

[3] Here again Martin gives priority to the view 'from below' in terms of axis, structure over system, and supplements this with the view 'from' below' in terms of the rank scale, by classifying nominal groups in terms of the word classes that realise them (pronoun, proper noun, common noun).  That is, Martin's view is neither systemic not functional, being concerned instead with structure and form.

[4] Here again Martin confuses reference items with one of the grammatical domains in which they occur, the nominal group, and completely ignores the other grammatical domain: the adverbial group.

On "Whether Possessive Deictics Are The Deixis Of The Participant They Possess"

Martin (1992: 132-3):

The issue then is whether possessive Deictics are the deixis of the participant they possess.  Is the possessed participant identified through its possessor, or does the possessive Deictic neutralise the participant's phoricity (as with the neutralised reference in the grammar of little texts)?  Du Bois' data indicates [sic] that a frog of his or a friend of John's do not alternate with his frog or John's friend to introduce participants (1980:243-245); pending further investigation this suggests that the interpretation of possessive Deictics as the deixis of the participants they possess is correct.  Accordingly, possessive nominal groups will only be coded once for phoricity below, even though they realise two participants.  This is after all literally what the grammar of the English nominal group argues: "recover the identity of the possessed participant here through its possessor".

Blogger Comments:

[1] The notion of a "possessed participant" confuses clause participant with nominal group Thing.  A possessive Deictic modifies the Thing of a nominal group.  The entire nominal group realises a participant, even in Martin's restricted definition of participant.

[2] This misunderstands deixis.  To be clear, a possessive Deictic structurally realises features of the system of nominal group DEIXIS.

[3] The notion of "the participant's phoricity" confuses the Thing of a nominal group, misunderstood as a clause participant, with the items that make phoric reference.  This confusion derives from misinterpreting textual reference as ideational denotation, as explained in many previous posts.

[4] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Du Bois (1980: 243-5), who is concerned with possession being expressed either through verbs or noun phrases:

For clothes as for body parts, no descriptive mode initial mentions bear possessive adjectives — that is, a shirt of his does not occur — or otherwise indicate possession in the noun phrase. In virtually all cases possession is already expressed (have) or implied (have on, etc.) in the verb or preposition. In other words, when a "human" frame element (a body part or item of clothing) is mentioned, possession will ordinarily be expressed in one way or another. If the descriptive mode is selected, the verb serves to express possession, but if the narrative mode is selected, possession must be expressed in the noun phrase.

[5] Given the above, this is a non-sequitur, inferred from a misrepresented citation, in support of a misunderstanding of deixis.

[6] This confuses nominal groups with reference items.

[7] Such nominal groups realise only one participant, even on Martin's definition of participant (as nominal group functioning as Medium or Agent).

[8] There is nothing "literal" about a grammar "arguing".

[9] This confuses nominal groups with reference items, and Things with participants, and presents the confusion as a quote, as if it were a widely accepted maxim.

On Possessive "Pronouns" In Deictic Position

Martin (1992: 132):

Possessive pronouns in Deictic position, function like embedded nominal groups to realise a participant different from that coded through the Numerative ^ Epithet ^ Classifier ^ Thing structure.  Like embedded groups, these possessive pronouns function in place of the deixis that would otherwise be associated with the group.  This raises the problem of how to interpret the phoricity of the participant realised through the Thing in possessive groups like his frog, John's friend and so on.  Halliday and Hasan (1976: 70) and Halliday (1985: 160) treat possessive pronouns as a type of specific deixis, alongside the, this, that, these and those.

This seems to imply that the identity of the frog and the friend in his frog and John's friend is being coded as recoverable, alongside the identity of his and John.  His frog in other words does not mean 'a frog of his' nor does John's friend mean 'a friend of John's'; where the latter meanings are intended then the expressions one of his frogs or one of John's friends would have to occur.  Du Bois (1980:243) concurs, arguing that "his is similar to the in that it demands (presupposes) identifiability, but different in that it supplies some extra information that may help make the identification possible".

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses ideational denotation ('realise a participant') with the interpersonal function (deixis) with the textual function (reference) of possessive adjectives (confused with pronouns).  In SFL theory, the entire structure of a (ranking) nominal group realises one participant.

[2] To be clear, possessive adjectives function as the Deictic of the nominal group.  Deictics aren't associated with nominal groups, they are part of its structure.

[3] On the one hand, "participant realised through the Thing" confuses clause participant with nominal group Thing — even in terms of Martin's definition of participant as nominal group functioning as Medium or Agent.  On the other hand, the notion of a Thing being phoric confuses ideational denotation with textual reference.

[4] This non-sequitur demonstrates the degree to which Martin fails to understand the model of reference (and deixis) in Halliday & Hasan (1976) and Halliday (1985).  The nominal groups his frog and John's friend include only one potential reference item, his, whose identity is signalled as recoverable elsewhere.  Neither frog, nor John's, nor friend functions as a reference item signalling identifiability; on the contrary, each provides an identity.  The confusion again arises from misinterpreting textual reference as ideational denotation.

[5] This demonstrates the absurdity that arises from these misunderstandings SFL theory.  In these instances, the same meaning is realised through different wordings (Deictic vs Qualifier).

[6] On the one hand, this is a non-sequitur from a falsehood that is invalidly inferred from a non-sequitur that is invalidly inferred from Halliday and Hasan (1976: 70) and Halliday (1985: 160).  On the other hand, it is falsified by every instance of an X of Y's ever spoken or written.

[7] This is misleading, since it is entirely spurious.  Du Bois (1980:243) has nothing whatsoever to say on this matter.  What Du Bois (1980: 243) actually says is:

 

The "extra information" Du Bois refers to is, as Halliday & Hasan (1976: 71) explain, the person signalled by the possessive Deictic, in comparison with the definite article, which has no content.

On "The Problem Of Realising More Than One Participant In A Nominal Group"

Martin (1992: 131-2):

Finally the problem of realising more than one participant in a nominal group needs to be addressed.  Clear cases involved nominal groups embedded in the Deictic and Qualifier functions and can be passed over quickly here; for example three participants, John, Mary and the friend, are realised in a group like John's friend who Mary had never met.

Blogger Comments:

This continues the confusion between clause participant and nominal group Thing. To be clear, only ranking nominal groups realise (direct) participants. Embedded nominal groups, such as those realising the Deictics or Qualifiers of nominal groups, do not realise participants.

To be clear, in SFL theory, the nominal group John's friend who Mary had never met potentially realises one participant (in a process), but it doesn't realise a participant unless it is construed as such in a ranking clause.

On Nominal Groups In Idioms Not Realising A Participant

Martin (1992: 130):

An example of an idiom containing a nominal group not realising a participant was introduced among the examples relevant to [neutralised] reference above: flash in the pan fizzles.  The idiom preserves the Deictic the precisely because it is collocationally frozen; the nominal group is not relevant to participant identification because "the pan" is not a participant in the text.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This continues the confusion between clause participant and nominal group Thing.  To be clear, only ranking nominal groups realise participants.  Embedded nominal groups, such as those realising Qualifiers of nominal groups, do not realise participants.  This is not restricted to idioms.

[2] To be clear, the participant in this instance is the Actor flash in the pan.

flash in the pan	fizzles
Actor	Process: material

The participant is realised by a nominal group whose Thing is flash:

flash	in the pan
Thing	Qualifier

The Qualifier of the nominal group is realised by a prepositional phrase whose Range is realised by a nominal group whose Thing is pan:

in	the pan
minor Process	Range the pan Deictic Thing

[3] This is tautology presented as argument: the Deictic is preserved in the idiom because it is frozen in the idiom.

[4] This continues the confusion between nominal group deixis and reference.  To be clear, the nominal group is not relevant to textual reference, because reference is not a system of the nominal group.

What is relevant to textual reference is that the pan includes the determiner the whose demonstrative reference is homophoric (self-specifying).

[5] This continues the misunderstanding of textual reference as ideational denotation.

Confusing Tracking With Identifying And Misrepresenting English Grammar

Martin (1992: 96-7):

At issue here are differences having to do with the way in which participants are tracked. … The basic contrast between English and Tagalog as far as participant identification is concerned is illustrated in the first clause: Hinalikan ng babae ang bata 'The woman kissed the child'.  In English the rôles of the woman and child are marked by word order (Subject ^ Finite/Predicator ^ Complement) at clause rank and by active voice in the verbal group.  In Tagalog on the other hand word order in the clause does not realise experiential meaning.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This foreshadows one of the major confusions in this chapter: the tracking of participants with the identifying of participants.  In SFL terms, the former takes an experiential perspective, and is concerned with tracking the various transitivity rôles of a given instantial participant (by discourse analysts).  The latter takes a textual perspective, and is concerned with the cohesive function of reference: the marking of elements as identifiable (by speakers); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 623).

[2] To be clear, Subject ^ Finite/Predicator ^ Complement is a structural sequencing of interpersonal functional elements at clause rank. Each of these elements is realised by a class of group, each of whose functional elements is realised by a class of word.

[3] To be clear, the relevant VOICE system here is at clause rank, and its features are [operative] vs [receptive].

[4] Martin's claim here is that, in English, "word order" — see [2] — realises experiential meaning.  This is manifestly untrue, as can be demonstrated by considering any operative clauses with the same interpersonal structure that do not configure the same realisations of experiential meaning, such as:

she	did	like	strawberries
Subject	Finite	Predicator	Complement
Senser	Process: mental		Phenomenon

strawberries	did	please	her
Subject	Finite	Predicator	Complement
Phenomenon	Process: mental		Senser

the police	will	cross	the picket line
Subject	Finite	Predicator	Complement
Actor	Process: material		Scope

the police	will	explode	the bomb
Subject	Finite	Predicator	Complement
Initiator	Process: material		Actor