Confusing Textual Reference With Interpersonal Deixis

Martin (1992: 134):

There may be good experiential reasons for doing this.  Pre-Numeratives for example make mass nouns countable (e.g. three boxes of jam) and count nouns "massable" (e.g. a flock of geese).  And having split participants in two, independent deixis selections may be taken up in each nominal group: some boxes of that jam I like, a flock of those geese we saw.  Where deixis is made explicit in both nominal groups, they are best taken as realising two participants and coded twice for phoricity; where deixis is not coded in the second group and the group is presumed as a single participant, this is hardly necessary (e.g. a strong cup of tea, this kind of beer, etc.).

Blogger Comments:

[1] Trivially, extended Numeratives do not make count nouns "massable".  In a flock of geese, both nouns are count nouns.

[2] As previously explained, in such nominal groups, it is not that a participant is split in two, but that two different nouns serve as experiential Thing and logical Head.

[3] To be clear, it is the determiner that serves as interpersonal Deictic that potentially also serves as a textual reference item.  As previously explained, the notion of a nominal group realising two participants, each "coded for phoricity" arises from confusing non-structural textual reference with structural interpersonal deixis of the nominal group.

On "Whether Possessive Deictics Are The Deixis Of The Participant They Possess"

Martin (1992: 132-3):

The issue then is whether possessive Deictics are the deixis of the participant they possess.  Is the possessed participant identified through its possessor, or does the possessive Deictic neutralise the participant's phoricity (as with the neutralised reference in the grammar of little texts)?  Du Bois' data indicates [sic] that a frog of his or a friend of John's do not alternate with his frog or John's friend to introduce participants (1980:243-245); pending further investigation this suggests that the interpretation of possessive Deictics as the deixis of the participants they possess is correct.  Accordingly, possessive nominal groups will only be coded once for phoricity below, even though they realise two participants.  This is after all literally what the grammar of the English nominal group argues: "recover the identity of the possessed participant here through its possessor".

Blogger Comments:

[1] The notion of a "possessed participant" confuses clause participant with nominal group Thing.  A possessive Deictic modifies the Thing of a nominal group.  The entire nominal group realises a participant, even in Martin's restricted definition of participant.

[2] This misunderstands deixis.  To be clear, a possessive Deictic structurally realises features of the system of nominal group DEIXIS.

[3] The notion of "the participant's phoricity" confuses the Thing of a nominal group, misunderstood as a clause participant, with the items that make phoric reference.  This confusion derives from misinterpreting textual reference as ideational denotation, as explained in many previous posts.

[4] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Du Bois (1980: 243-5), who is concerned with possession being expressed either through verbs or noun phrases:

For clothes as for body parts, no descriptive mode initial mentions bear possessive adjectives — that is, a shirt of his does not occur — or otherwise indicate possession in the noun phrase. In virtually all cases possession is already expressed (have) or implied (have on, etc.) in the verb or preposition. In other words, when a "human" frame element (a body part or item of clothing) is mentioned, possession will ordinarily be expressed in one way or another. If the descriptive mode is selected, the verb serves to express possession, but if the narrative mode is selected, possession must be expressed in the noun phrase.

[5] Given the above, this is a non-sequitur, inferred from a misrepresented citation, in support of a misunderstanding of deixis.

[6] This confuses nominal groups with reference items.

[7] Such nominal groups realise only one participant, even on Martin's definition of participant (as nominal group functioning as Medium or Agent).

[8] There is nothing "literal" about a grammar "arguing".

[9] This confuses nominal groups with reference items, and Things with participants, and presents the confusion as a quote, as if it were a widely accepted maxim.

On Possessive "Pronouns" In Deictic Position

Martin (1992: 132):

Possessive pronouns in Deictic position, function like embedded nominal groups to realise a participant different from that coded through the Numerative ^ Epithet ^ Classifier ^ Thing structure.  Like embedded groups, these possessive pronouns function in place of the deixis that would otherwise be associated with the group.  This raises the problem of how to interpret the phoricity of the participant realised through the Thing in possessive groups like his frog, John's friend and so on.  Halliday and Hasan (1976: 70) and Halliday (1985: 160) treat possessive pronouns as a type of specific deixis, alongside the, this, that, these and those.

This seems to imply that the identity of the frog and the friend in his frog and John's friend is being coded as recoverable, alongside the identity of his and John.  His frog in other words does not mean 'a frog of his' nor does John's friend mean 'a friend of John's'; where the latter meanings are intended then the expressions one of his frogs or one of John's friends would have to occur.  Du Bois (1980:243) concurs, arguing that "his is similar to the in that it demands (presupposes) identifiability, but different in that it supplies some extra information that may help make the identification possible".

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses ideational denotation ('realise a participant') with the interpersonal function (deixis) with the textual function (reference) of possessive adjectives (confused with pronouns).  In SFL theory, the entire structure of a (ranking) nominal group realises one participant.

[2] To be clear, possessive adjectives function as the Deictic of the nominal group.  Deictics aren't associated with nominal groups, they are part of its structure.

[3] On the one hand, "participant realised through the Thing" confuses clause participant with nominal group Thing — even in terms of Martin's definition of participant as nominal group functioning as Medium or Agent.  On the other hand, the notion of a Thing being phoric confuses ideational denotation with textual reference.

[4] This non-sequitur demonstrates the degree to which Martin fails to understand the model of reference (and deixis) in Halliday & Hasan (1976) and Halliday (1985).  The nominal groups his frog and John's friend include only one potential reference item, his, whose identity is signalled as recoverable elsewhere.  Neither frog, nor John's, nor friend functions as a reference item signalling identifiability; on the contrary, each provides an identity.  The confusion again arises from misinterpreting textual reference as ideational denotation.

[5] This demonstrates the absurdity that arises from these misunderstandings SFL theory.  In these instances, the same meaning is realised through different wordings (Deictic vs Qualifier).

[6] On the one hand, this is a non-sequitur from a falsehood that is invalidly inferred from a non-sequitur that is invalidly inferred from Halliday and Hasan (1976: 70) and Halliday (1985: 160).  On the other hand, it is falsified by every instance of an X of Y's ever spoken or written.

[7] This is misleading, since it is entirely spurious.  Du Bois (1980:243) has nothing whatsoever to say on this matter.  What Du Bois (1980: 243) actually says is:

 

The "extra information" Du Bois refers to is, as Halliday & Hasan (1976: 71) explain, the person signalled by the possessive Deictic, in comparison with the definite article, which has no content.

On Nominal Groups Realising Attributes But Not Realising Participants

Martin (1992: 130):

In addition there are four TRANSITIVITY functions, typically realised by nominal groups, which do not necessarily realise participants: Attribute, Range and Circumstances [sic] of Extent and Role.

Attributes describe or classify participants; they are realised by adjectives, indefinite nominal groups or attitudinal superlatives.  Their indefinite deixis in contexts where they are describing participants that have already been introduced gives away the fact that they are not realising a participant themselves:

[3:67]  He         was        silly/a silly man/the silliest thing
            Carrier  Process  Attribute

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin has defined 'participant' in terms of nominal groups functioning as the Agent or Medium of a clause.  This definition already excludes Attribute, Scope (Range) and all circumstances.

Moreover, it also excludes all the other Range functions: Behaviour, (emanating) Phenomenon, Verbiage, Attribute, (decoding) Value, as well as all the Beneficiary functions: Client, Recipient, Receiver.

[2] To be clear, in SFL theory, Attributes are participants.  An Attribute is the class to which an entity (the Carrier participant) is ascribed (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 267).

[3] This is only exceptionally true.  In almost all cases, superlatives feature in identifying clauses, not attributive clauses.

[4] This confuses interpersonal deixis with textual reference.  Non-specific Deictics serve no reference functions.

[5] This confuses ideational denotation with textual reference.

[6] This is a non-sequitur, even in Martin's terms (ideational denotation).  Consider the following:

At the party, Jim met Anne.  Anne was a lecturer.

In the first clause the participant Anne is introduced. In the second clause, the Attribute a lecturer realises the same participant.

On Indefinite Nominal Groups Under The Scope Of Negation Not Realising A Participant

Martin (1992: 130):

Indefinite nominal groups under the scope of negation were also considered above, where it was pointed out that they do not provide referents for presuming groups.  The reason for this is that they do not introduce participants to a discourse:

[3:66] He didn't see anyone there.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, indefinite nominal groups do not include reference items.  The confusion arises from mistaking interpersonal deixis for textual reference.

[2] This is demonstrably false, even in its own terms.  Consider the following:

He didn't see any colleagues in the public bar, but soon found them in the beer garden.

In this unremarkable example, the indefinite nominal group any colleagues introduces a participant to a discourse, which then provides a referent for the personal reference item them.

Using Writing Pedagogy To Imply Theory Validation

Martin (1992: 129):

Notes ii, iii, iv, v, vi and viii index the text as that of a young writer.  The problems referred to in ii and viii are almost certainly graphological in origin; but the others point to immature use of the IDENTIFICATION system, given the genre (recount of personal experience…) and mode (written — see Chapter 7 below).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the problem cited in ii is the lack of deixis in I saw Rhinocerous.  As the capitalisation suggests, the writer was unsure as to whether this was a proper name.  On this basis, the problem is thus not "graphological in origin".  On the other hand, the problem cited in viii is the misspelling of 'it' as I.  As the word 'it' is correctly spelt elsewhere, this was clearly a momentary error, rather than an instance of deficient graphological potential.

[2] To be clear, of these four "problems", the only instance that could be regarded as "immature" use of textual reference is the problem cited in vi , wherein the anaphoric reference of it is to feeding instead of 'food'.

Of the remaining three "problems", two are shortcomings in Martin's analysis.  The "problem" cited in iii, and I saw the tiger, is Martin's failure to recognise the anaphoric reference of the to the title at the zoo, and the "problem" cited in iv, and this man was feeding him is the same failure to recognise the anaphoric reference of this to the title at the zoo.

On the other hand, the "problem" cited in v is the switch from he to it in referring to the tiger.  This switch may just reflect the realisation of the female writer that her previous assumption that the tiger is male may be mistaken.  On this basis, the second reference can be seen as self-correction.

∞

In other words, the "problems" cited by Martin cannot be seen as either graphological in origin, or (in all but one case) as 'immature' use of reference (misconstrued as IDENTIFICATION); moreover, two of the "problems" arise only because of Martin's inability to recognise reference relations.

It might also be observed that the focus here on writing pedagogy distracts attention away from the question of the theoretical utility of Martin's IDENTIFICATION system.

Text [3:1] — Problems With Martin's 'Semantics Of Reference' Analysis [8]

Martin (1992: 127, 128):

The nominal groups in [3:1] are listed below. Each is coded for the IDENTIFICATION choices made and the type of reference to the context where these choices are phoric. The analysis will be annotated for purposes of discussion, rather than presented in detail.

NOMINAL GROUP	REFERENCE (terminal features)	RETRIEVAL (where phoric)
a baby gorilla	presenting…unmarked	—
my (mum)*	presuming…interlocutor	anaphoric

viii. My mum, like other nominal groups with a possessive Deictic, realises two participants (see discussion in 3.4.1 below); however the possessive functions as the deixis for the participant it modifies, and so reference and retrieval are coded only once, for my.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, Martin's 'presenting' reference is neither reference nor textual; instead, it labels the first instantiation of an experiential participant in a text. The confusion is one of metafunction.

[2] This again mistakes interpersonal deixis for textual reference. To be clear, only non-interactant (3rd person) pronouns and determiners function as personal reference items, since these alone mark identifiability. The identities of the interactants (1st & 2nd person) are given by their rôles in the speech event (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 606). The confusion is one of metafunction.

[3] To be clear, in SFL theory, my mum realises one participant, Sayer.  The interpersonal possessive Deictic my indicates the subset of the Thing of the nominal group realising the participant.

[4] See the critique of this discussion, 'Participants and nominal groups' (pp129-34), for the misunderstandings on which the preceding claim is made.

[5] This demonstrates the confusion between interpersonal deixis and textual reference that runs through this entire chapter.  The confusion is one of metafunction.

Text [3:1] — Problems With Martin's 'Semantics Of Reference' Analysis [3]

Martin (1992: 127, 128):

The nominal groups in [3:1] are listed below. Each is coded for the IDENTIFICATION choices made and the type of reference to the context where these choices are phoric. The analysis will be annotated for purposes of discussion, rather than presented in detail.

NOMINAL GROUP	REFERENCE (terminal features)	RETRIEVAL (where phoric)
I	presuming…interlocutor	anaphoric
a Hippopotamus	presenting…unmarked	—
I	presuming…interlocutor	anaphoric
him	presuming…noninterlocutor	anaphoric
he	presuming…noninterlocutor	anaphoric
he	presuming…noninterlocutor	anaphoric
I	presuming…interlocutor	anaphoric
I	presuming…interlocutor	anaphoric
the tiger	presuming…undirected	bridging*

iii. The identity of the tiger can be taken as implied by the field — the zoo.  Rhinocerous and the Hippopotamus mentioned earlier in the text; however the writer is inconsistent, bridging the tiger here, but introducing the Hippopotamus, gorilla and baby gorilla with presenting groups; a more mature writer would probably have introduced the tiger with a presenting group as well.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This again mistakes interpersonal deixis for textual reference.  To be clear, only non-interactant (3rd person) pronouns and determiners function as personal reference items, since these alone mark identifiability.  The identities of the interactants (1st & 2nd person) are given by their rôles in the speech event (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 606).  The confusion is one of metafunction.

[2] This mistakes interpersonal deixis for textual reference.  The non-specific Deictic 'one' does not mark 'day' as identifiable.  The confusion is one of metafunction.

[3] This is Martin's rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) personal reference, misunderstood, and relocated from lexicogrammar to his discourse semantic stratum.

[4] Here the demonstrative reference is anaphoric to the title at the zoo.

[5] As previously explained, "bridging" is a confusion of reference and lexical cohesion, rebranded, and relocated to Martin's stratum of discourse semantics.

[6] This is writing pedagogy masquerading as linguistic theory.