Martin's Stratification Of The Content Plane [New]

Martin (1992: 19-20):

Stratification of this kind can be usefully compared with expansions of descriptive power in other models where an increase in abstraction need not involve a focus on larger units (e.g. the syntax, semantics, pragmatics stratification associated with formal syntax, truth functional semantics and speech act theory; see Levinson 1983) or where a focus on larger units may not involve an increase in abstraction (eg. extending the scale of rank at the level of grammar to include units larger than the clause as in tagmemics; see for example Longacre 1976, 1979). The model developed to this point is outlined in Fig. 1.12. 

The solidary (or "natural") relationship between discourse semantics and lexicogrammar is noted in the model and contrasted with the experientially arbitrary relationship between content and expression form.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this demonstrates the extent to which Martin — who (p390) misunderstands strata as modules — does not understand the notion of stratification in SFL Theory. On the one hand, the size of units is irrelevant to levels of abstraction (strata), as demonstrated by:

• the information unit (lexicogrammar) being co-terminous with the tone group (phonology);
• the sequence (semantics) being co-terminous with the clause complex (lexicogrammar);
• the figure (semantics) being co-terminous with the clause (lexicogrammar); and
• the element (semantics) being co-terminous with the group or phrase (lexicogrammar).

Moreover it is these correspondences between semantic and grammatical units that makes a systematic account of grammatical metaphor possible, and it is the absence of these correspondences in Martin's discourse semantics that undermines any systematic attempt to account for metaphor.

On the other hand, any stratification that is not based on levels of symbolic abstraction, is not stratification is the SFL sense of the term.

[2] This is potentially misleading. The only innovation in Figure 1.12 is the word 'discourse' positioned before the word 'semantics'. The reader could be forgiven for falsely thinking that the stratification of the content plane in SFL Theory was Martin's innovation, rather than Halliday's.

[3] This is potentially misleading. The reader could be forgiven for falsely thinking that the natural ("solidary") vs arbitrary distinction between interstratal relations was Martin's observation, rather than Halliday's. Halliday (1985: xvii):

Why The Argument For A 'Discourse' Semantic Stratum Is Invalid [Augmented]

Martin (1992: 19):

The impetus for stratification provided by semantic motifs, grammatical metaphor and cohesion gives rise to a model in which the discourse semantics both generalises across grammatical resources and accounts for relations between as well as within clause complexes.  The discourse semantics is thus more abstract than, and deals with larger units than, lexicogrammar.

 Blogger Comments:

[1] Only one of the three purported rationâles, grammatical metaphor, provides a valid reason for stratifying the content plane; but grammatical metaphor does not justify a stratum of discourse semantics — merely a stratum of semantics, as in Halliday's original model.  See here.

As already explained in an earlier post, the discussion of semantic motifs confuses delicacy with stratification, and proposes a higher stratum system (attitude) that would be in an incongruent relation with a grammatical subsystem of process types (behavioural, mental and relational).  See here.

The discussion of cohesion provides no reasons for reconstruing cohesion as belonging to a higher level of symbolic abstraction.  The argument rests on separating cohesion from grammar — a false dichotymy — and the false claim: "the main problem with this treatment is that it fails to bring out the continuity of between the structural [taxis] and non-structural [cohesive] resources".  See here.  Note that, even if this were true, it would not justify relocating cohesion at a higher level of symbolic abstraction.

[2] This again confuses delicacy ("generalises") with stratification (symbolic abstraction).  The grammar is "generalised" by its least delicate systems.  A semantics is more symbolically abstract than lexicogrammar, not more general.

[3] Relations between and within clause complexes are already accounted for by the cohesive resources of the grammar.

[4] This has not been demonstrated.  The discourse semantics is not "thus" more abstract than the grammar, because neither generalisation nor syntagmatic extension is the same as symbolic abstraction.

[5] The proposed unit for the discourse semantic system of the textual metafunction, identification, is the participant (op cit: 325), which is smaller than the clause, and inconsistent with SFL theory in terms of metafunction, since the participant is an experiential, not textual, function. 

Similarly, the proposed unit for the discourse semantic system of the experiential metafunction, ideation, is the message part (op cit: 325-6), which is congruently realised by a lexical item, and so is also smaller than the clause. And the term, 'message part', is similarly inconsistent with SFL Theory in terms of metafunction, since the message is a semantic unit that is textual, not experiential, in metafunction.

Moreover, the size of units is irrelevant as a criterion for levels of symbolic abstraction (stratification).

Conclusion:  The case for establishing a 'discourse semantic' stratum has not been made by any of the three purported rationâles.