Misrepresenting The Potential Of Ellipsis To Negotiate Attitude [New]

Martin (1992: 45):

Significantly, attitude is not realised through the Mood function in English, unlike MODALISATION and MODULATION which can be expressed through modal verbs and adjuncts. For this reason ellipsis in English does not facilitate the negotiation of attitude — the attitude to be graded is commonly realised in the Residue itself. 

It thus follows from the grammar that how a speaker feels is less commonly negotiated through pair parts in dialogue than is inclination, obligation, probability and usuality and that where it is negotiated, MODALISATION and MODULATION are typically being negotiated as well since the Mood element is normally present (cf. Yes he is rather above).

Blogger Comments:

[1] The argument here is:

Premiss: attitude is realised in the Residue not the Mood element
Conclusion: ellipsis does not facilitate the negotiation of attitude

To be clear, this is a false conclusion invalidly argued from a false premiss. The premiss is false because attitude can be realised in the Mood element as well as the Residue, as demonstrated by:

The conclusion is false because ellipsis can "facilitate the negotiation of attitude", as demonstrated by exchanges like:

Is he scrupulously honest?

— No, he isn't scrupulously honest.

— Yes, he is scrupulously honest

The argument is invalid because the location of attitude in the clause, has no bearing on whether or not ellipsis can "facilitate the negotiation of attitude".

[2] To be clear, this does not follow from the grammar, see [1] above. Moreover, it is bare assertion, unsupported by evidence from corpora.

[3] The argument here is:

Premiss: the Mood element is normally present.
Conclusion: MODALISATION and MODULATION are typically being negotiated.

To be clear, this argument is invalidated by clauses that normally feature a mood element, but don't typically negotiate modality, such as:

The reason why Martin thinks that all negotiation is the negotiation of modality is that he (p39) misunderstands modality as including positive and negative polarity, rather than just the space between them.

The Line Between Exclamations and Statements [New]

Martin (1992: 43-5):

This raises the question of how to draw the line between Exclamations and Statements. On the one hand, exclamatives have affirmative syntax (Subject^Finite) and so are definitely negotiable; at the same time, declarative clauses may encode reaction through attitudinal adjuncts (e.g. regrettably) or through group rank systems (e.g. can't stand and silly bugger). The strategy developed here will be to treat attitudinal minor clauses and exclamatives as Exclamations:

Exclamation [minor/exclamative]     What a fooI!/What a fool he's been!

Response to Exclamation                  — Quite so.

and to include other MOOD classes only where attitude is explicitly graded in a response:

Statement [declarative]      He's been such a fool.

Acknowledge Statement     — Oh, has he?

But:

Exclamation [declarative]     He's been such a fool.

Response to Exclamation     — Absolutely.

The relevant section of the MOOD network needs to be adjusted as follows, incorporating the feature [exclamative] and adding the feature [affirmative] to generalise across the Subject^Finite st[r]ucture in both exclamative and declarative clauses.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, exclamations and statements are speech functions at the level of semantics, whereas exclamatives and declaratives are mood types at the level of lexicogrammar. The "line between" exclamations and statements is semantic, not lexicogrammatical.

[2] To be clear, "encoding reaction through attitudinal adjuncts" is irrelevant here because it does not distinguish either speech functions or mood types. For example:

Exclamation [realised as exclamative]     What a fool he's been!

Acknowledgement                                       — Regrettably so.

Statement [realised as declarative]      He's been such a fool.

Acknowledgement                                   — Regrettably so

[3] On the one hand, this is a non-sequitur, since it is not entailed as a conclusion by the preceding propositions. On the other hand, the realisation of exclamations (semantics) as exclamative clauses or by minor clauses (lexicogrammar) is Halliday's model; see Halliday (1985: 84-5; 1994: 84, 95).

[4] To be clear, this is a statement, not an exclamation. The exclamatory response absolutely has no bearing on the speech function of this initiating clause, since it can be used to respond to either statements or exclamations, as well as questions (yes/no), commands and offers.

[5] To be clear, this MOOD network does not address the "line between exclamations and statements", the question raised at the beginning of this section, and does not address the realisation of exclamations as either exclamative or minor clauses, not least because it does not include minor clauses as an option.

Greetings and Calls [New]

Martin (1992: 42):

Minor clauses lack Subject, Finite and Predicator functions, so the question of negotiating MODALISATION and MODULATION does not directly arise. This raises the question of the function of minor clauses as interacts. For one thing, minor clauses are used to initiate two types of adjacency pair: Greetings and Calls. Greetings (subsuming leave-takings) are found at the beginning and end of conversations, making way for or closing down negotiations:

Greeting                             G'day.

Response to Greeting       — G'day.

Calls summon the attention of potential negotiators where this attention has not been secured or has wandered:

Call                                     Bill.

Response to Call               — What?

Both Calls and Greetings can be realised through major clauses, although these are for the most part lexicalised formulas: How's it going?, Nice weather we're having!, We'll be seeing you., Got a minute?, Listen to this. etc.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously observed, MODALISATION and MODULATION are only potentially "negotiated" in clauses that feature MODALISATION and MODULATION, and not all exchanges involve negotiation.

[2] To be clear, this question had already been answered by Halliday in Dimensions of Discourse Analysis (1985), where minor clauses were said to realise minor speech functions: exclamations, calls, and greetings. Here Martin once again misleads the reader into thinking that this is his original thinking.

Misrepresenting Nonfinite Clauses [New]

Martin (1992: 42):

With nonfinite clauses, meaning is presented not so much as having been negotiated as non-negotiable: the clauses have been nominalised, and thereby taken out of the realm of potential interacts and into that of things (cf. They watched Manly winning/the game/their favourite player).

Blogger Comments:

This seriously misunderstands nonfinite clauses. Although his MOOD network (Fig 2.6) contrasts nonfinite clauses with dependent and embedded clauses, Martin here presents an embedded nonfinite clause, while, at the same time, ignoring the possibility of nonfinite dependent clauses.

To be clear, nonfinite clauses may be ranking (dependent) or embedded, and it is only embedded nonfinite clauses that are nominalised to served as the Head or Postmodifier of a nominal group. Examples of ranking dependent clauses include:

• The hairy coat holds a layer of air close to the skin, insulating the body against changes in the outside temperature. [elaboration]
• We used to go away at the weekend, taking all our gear with us. [extension]
• Bacteria can also aid chemical precipitation of calcite by making the water more alkaline. [enhancement: manner]
• This view was not empirically based, having arisen from an a priori philosophy. [enhancement: cause]

See Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 468, 475, 485).

Dependent Clauses, Speech Function And Negotiability [New]

Martin (1992: 41-2):

Hypotactically dependent clauses may turn out to be better taken from a discourse perspective as an intermediate case (between embedded and independent clauses) — quantative [sic] studies might well show them to be more negotiable than embedded clauses, though less likely to be responded to than independent ones. Note in this connection that when projection is used to express modality metaphorically (Halliday 1985a:336), it is the structurally dependent clause that is in fact being negotiated:

I think he'll be there. (meaning 'maybe he'll be there'.)

— Will he? (more likely than Oh, do you?)

This need not of course block the 'sardonic' interlocutor from negotiating the projecting clause as if it deserved a congruent reading:

"I'm inclined to think—" said I.

"I should do so," Sherlock Holmes remarked impatiently.

I believe that I am one of the most long-suffering of mortals; but I'll admit that I was annoyed at the sardonic interruption. "Really, Holmes," said I severely, "you are a lit[t]le trying at times." (Doyle 1981:769)

Pending quantitative investigation of these patterns, hypotactically dependent clauses will be grouped with embedded ones as in the network above. The most negotiable clause type in this category involves dependent elaboration as these clauses can be tagged:

α Sherlock put Watson down,

= β which was mean, wasn't it?

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously observed, Martin is here trying to determine the grammatical unit that realises speech function, but is instead concerned with arguability ("negotiability"), which is a separate issue from speech function. Embedded and some dependent clauses may be presented as unarguable, but that does not necessarily entail that they do not realise a statement, question, command or offer. For example, in this hypotactic complex:

I asked if you like Joy Division

the dominant clause realises a statement, while the dependent clause realises question, as demonstrated by its paratactic agnate:

I asked "do you like Joy Division?"

[2] To be clear, thirty years on, these quantitative investigations remain undone.

[3] To be clear, this needs to be accounted for in the model, not just mentioned and forgotten.

[4] Strictly speaking, despite the relative pronoun which, the expansion relation in this instance is extension, rather than elaboration, since

• the dependent clause adds to the meaning of the dominant clause, rather than describes it;
• the paratactic agnate of the dependent clause is and that was mean, wasn't it?;
• it does not involve tone concord, since the unmarked tones would be tone3 and tone1.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 468):

There is one group of non-defining relative clauses that strictly speaking would belong with extension rather than elaboration; for example,

||| She told it to the baker’s wife, || who told it to the cook. |||

Here the who stands for ‘and she’ and the clause is semantically an additive: the agnate paratactic variant would be ... and she told it to the cook. …

Note that such instances are not characterised by tone concord.

Misrepresenting The Interpersonal Function Of Independent, Dependent And Embedded Clauses [New]

Martin (1992: 41):

These classes can be interpreted semantically as follows. Independent clauses negotiate MODALISATION and MODULATION — speakers typically work towards consensus as far as grading probability, usuality, inclination and obligation are concerned. Dependent and embedded clauses on the other hand code meanings as already negotiated — the responses in the following example are to the main clause, not the clause embedded in it (Did you love the beer? not Did you try the beer?):

I loved the beer I tried last time.

— Did you?

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because it is not true. On the one hand, speakers do not necessarily "work towards consensus" in any respect, let alone with respect to MODALISATION and MODULATION, as demonstrated, for example, by discussions on academic email lists. On the other hand, not all independent clauses feature either type of MODALITY, as demonstrated by Martin's own example:

I loved the beer I tried last time.

— Did you?

[2] To be clear, dependent and embedded clauses present speech functions as presumed, regardless of whether or not the meanings have been "already negotiated".

[3] To be clear, the embedded clause realises a statement which can be "negotiated" as follows:

I loved the beer I tried last time.
— I didn't realise you tried it last time.

Martin's MOOD Network For Clauses Realising SPEECH FUNCTION [New]

Martin (1992: 40-1, 91n):

The MOOD network underlying this definition is presented below, along with examples of realisations for terminal features. [Ventola's 1988a criticisms of the unit proposed will be taken up in 2.3 below.] 

² The I/T superscript notation shows that dependent/embedded clauses are declarative by default; according to this network projected proposals have both nonfinite (I asked him to come) and dependent (I asked him if he could come) realisations.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this MOOD network falsely proposes that all dependent and embedded clause are finite. This is falsified by Martin's own example I noticed you making a small one which features a nonfinite embedded clause. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 171):

Whether they are dependent or downranked, ‘bound’ clauses may be either ‘finite’ or ‘non-finite’.

As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 23-4) explain:

A major clause is either indicative or imperative in MOOD; if indicative, it has a Finite (operator) and a Subject. An indicative clause is either declarative or interrogative (still in MOOD); if declarative, the Subject comes before the Finite. An interrogative clause is either yes/no type or WH-type; if yes/no type, the Finite comes before the Subject; if WH-type, it has a Wh element.

[2] To be clear, Martin is concerned here with determining the grammatical unit that realises a proposition or proposal, despite the fact that Halliday had already identified the unit as the clause in its interpersonal guise. Martin has determined that only clauses "selecting independently for mood" realise these major speech functions, but falsely claims that this excludes dependent and embedded clauses; see previous post.

Essentially, Martin here confuses speech function with arguability. Dependent and embedded clauses can realise propositions and proposals; it's just that, in such forms, they are presented as less arguable than propositions and proposals realised by ranking independent clauses.

[3] This is misleading, because it is untrue. To be clear, this network says nothing whatsoever about projected proposals. Moreover, non-finite vs dependent is a false dichotomy: both projected clauses are dependent, the first being non-finite, the second finite. Note also that the non-finite projected clause is simply to go, because, in both projection nexuses, him serves as the Receiver of the projecting clause I asked him.

Misrepresenting Speech Function And Mood [New]

Martin (1992: 40):

The question of how many layers of meaning to recognise raises the problem of units: just what unit is it to which speech function is being assigned? Is for example the response Yes, I would, thank-you, but make it a small one. one speech act or two (or more)? Given what has been stressed to this point about the grammar making available resources for structuring dialogue the most appropriate unit would appear to be a clause selecting independently for MOOD. This rules out the embedded and hypotactically dependent clauses illustrated below:

They loved the team that won. (defining relative)

They defeated whoever they met. (nominalised wh clause)

They watched Manly winning. (act)

It pleased them that Balmain lost. (fact)

They wondered if they'd win. (hypotactic projection)

They won, which surprised them. (hypotactic expansion)

But it does admit paratactically dependent clauses, which do select independently for MOOD. Note the variation in MOOD possible after but, showing that the but is introducing a new move:

Yes, I would, thank-you, but make it a small one.

Yes, I would, thank-you, but I'd like a small one.

Yes, I would, thank-you, but could you make it a small one?

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, Martin misunderstands all strata as "layers of meaning" (even phonology!), because he confuses strata (meaning-wording-sounding) with semogenesis ("all strata make meaning").

[2] This is a non-sequitur. The number of strata ("layers of meaning") has no bearing on "the problem of units", since the latter is only concerned with one stratum, irrespective of the number of strata.

[3] To be clear, Halliday (1985: 68) "assigns" speech function to the clause as interact or exchange.

[4] To be clear, this instance involves two major speech functions:

Yes, I would [statement]
but make it a small one [command] 

[5] Although it is true that such clauses are presented as presumed rather than negotiable (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 172), embedded and dependent clauses can realise speech functions, and can "select independently" for MOOD. For example, in:

Did anyone see [[ if the policeman shot him ]]? 

the ranking interrogative clause realises a question, whereas the rankshifted declarative clause realises a statement; and in:

Was anyone here || when the policeman shot him? 

the dominant interrogative clause realises a question, whereas the dependent declarative clause realises a statement. Other combinations are, of course, possible, as demonstrated by the imperative clause realising a command and declarative clause realising a statement in:

Don't shoot every policemen just because one of them is a murderer.

Moreover, in an exchange, an interlocutor can respond to a dominant clause, dependent clause, or embedded clause:

Robin said that Lise saw Tom cheating at cards.

— He said no such thing! (reply to dominant clause)

— She couldn't have! (reply to dependent clause)

— But he wasn't! (reply to embedded 'act' clause)

Confusing Semogenesis And Stratification

Martin (1992: 40):

It should also be noted in passing that in the model being developed here both grammar and discourse semantics make meaning. Levinson (1983: 290) comments that the first move in the following text is both "a question and an offer, as indicated by the response".

Would you like another drink?

— Yes, I would, thank-you, but make it a small one.

This is just what would have been predicted by the model developed to this point. Grammatically the first move is a demand for information (interrogative) while semantically it offers goods (Offer); both MOOD and SPEECH FUNCTION contribute a layer of meaning to the clause.

Blogger Comments:

 [1] It is true that both grammar and semantics make meaning — making meaning is semogenesis.  However, this is quite distinct from the stratification of content plane as meaning (semantics) and wording (lexicogrammar), which construes two levels of symbolic abstraction in an intensive (elaborating) identifying relation.

[2] Grammatically, the first move is an interrogative, which is a congruent realisation of a demand for information (question) at the level of semantics.  However, this interrogative clause realises an offer.  Offers are not grammaticised in the mood system and are realised by interrogatives, declaratives or imperatives, depending on the tenor (context) being realised.

[3] This requires clarification.  The mood of a clause, at the level of wording (lexicogrammar), realises speech function, at the level of meaning (semantics).  The meaning of a clause consists of the semantic choices that the grammatical choices realise.  The clause itself is at the level of wording, not meaning.