Falsely Claiming That The Content Plane Was Not Stratified Before Martin (1992) [New]

Martin (1992: 15-6):

As we know, human languages elaborate these two strata in various ways: removing their experiential bias by adding foot and tone group ranks to the phonology, enabling the periodic and prosodic patterning characterising textual and interpersonal meaning; incorporating metafunctional layering in the grammar, of the different types discussed above; systematising combinations of words (groups) and reduced clauses (phrases) giving rise to an intermediate rank of group/phrase in the grammar (see Halliday 1985a:159); introducing morphology (eg. Hudson 1973), adding a rank below the word; providing for clause linkage (see Chapter 4) and so on. This raises the question of the point at which the grammar and phonology become saturated? When is stratification necessary within the content plane, especially given the extravagant approach to grammar pursued by systemic linguists as outlined above? Extravagant as systemic functional grammars are, they do run out of steam.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1]  This confuses language with metalanguage. To be clear, it wasn't human languages that elaborated these two strata in these specific ways but Halliday in his Systemic Functional theory of language.

[2]  This also confuses language with metalanguage. To be clear, any "experiential bias" is in theories of language that don't distinguish the different metafunctional modes of meaning.

[3] To be clear, the notion of a stratum becoming "saturated" or "running out of steam" is nonsensical, and derives from Martin's misunderstanding of the dimensions of SFL Theory as modules (pp 55, 77-8, 90, 268-9, 390, 488). The strata represent different views on language in terms of different levels of symbolic abstraction: 

• the semantic stratum is language viewed as meaning,
• the lexicogrammatical stratum is language viewed as wording
• the phonological stratum is language viewed as sounding.

Accordingly, all wording is located on the lexicogrammatical stratum, no matter how "saturated" it gets, and, since it alone is concerned with all of wording, no other stratum can be of assistance if it "runs out of steam".

[4] This is very misleading indeed, because here Martin falsely claims that the content plane is not already stratified into semantics and lexicogrammar, and that he will be the one to do so. Importantly, Martin knows that the content plane is already stratified, because it is explicitly stated in the principal source of his ideas: Halliday & Hasan (1976: 5):

Moreover, the earlier notion of grammatical metaphor depends on the content plane being stratified into semantics and lexicogrammar, and Martin uses Halliday's semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION, rebranding it as his NEGOTIATION.

If John Bateman's review of Martin's English Text is any guide, then Martin has been successful in this deception. See

• On The Theoretical Value Of Martin's Stratification Of The Content Plane
• On "Martin's" Solidary Relationship Between Grammar And Semantics

Confusing Levels Of Symbolic Abstraction [New]

Martin (1992: 15):

The solution, referred to by Hjelmslev (1961) as the essential genius of human language, involves combining sounds in sequence to distinguish meanings. This immediately provides a stratified model with two ranks in the phonology, phoneme (distinct sounds) and syllable (distinct combinations of sounds) and one in grammar, the word (distinct meanings). At this point a second language can be proposed, lexese, in which there is a one to one relation between meanings and words.

As far as we know, evolved systems on the model of lexese do not occur. Once again, their limitations are obvious. They would require humans to remember an inordinately large number of words; and they have the further important limitation that no-one could mean something they hadn't already heard. The logical way out of systems of this kind is once more a combinatorial one — adding on a grammar than organises sequences of words. This brings us to something more closely resembling human language, at least as it is modelled in Hjelmslevian terms — a two strata system, with a minimum of two ranks on each stratum and an non-biunique (and therefore in principle arbitrary) relation between sound and meaning. This kind of two strata system is outlined in Fig. 1.11.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Hjelmslev (1961) is concerned with expression and content; see [6] below.

[2] To be clear, the word, as grammatical form, is not meaning. The word realises meaning.

[3] This is a false conclusion to draw. To be clear, the one-to-one relation in this scenario is between wording and sounding, not between meaning and wording.

[4] To be clear, a language like lexese could not occur, because it requires grammatical form to emerge prior to the meaning it realises.

[5] To be clear, this does not resemble human language, because it is model in which words have no meanings.

[6] This is misleading, because it is not true. Hjelmslev's two levels are content and expression, whereas as Martin's are grammar and phonology. Where Hjelmslev's model includes meaning (in content), Martin's model does not.

On the one hand, this reflects Martin's misunderstanding of stratification, mistaking every stratum as a stratum of meaning; see later posts. On the other hand, it serves a rhetorical purpose, since Martin will later claim that he is filling a gap in SFL Theory by proposing a stratum of discourse semantics above the stratum of grammar, ignoring the fact that SFL Theory has always had a stratum of semantics above the stratum of grammar; see e.g. the primary source of Martin's model: Halliday & Hasan (1976: 5).

Misunderstanding Levels Of Symbolic Abstraction [New]

 Martin (1992: 14, 28n):

The strategy adopted here will be to review the arguments for distinguishing content and expression form, before pursuing the problem of stratifying the content plane.

To begin, consider a language called phonese, in which there is a one to one relation between sounds and meanings, such as that "spoken" by animals and young humans in the proto-language phase⁵ (Halliday 1975, Painter 1984). In such a language we have a very simple system of signs. Formulated systemically, it consists of a system with a list of features. The labelling of features in a system of this kind is a moot point; since content and expression are fused, either "semantic" or "phonetic" labels can be used.⁶ In Fig. 1.10 fused labels interfacing with both content and expression substance are employed; the language modelled there consists of six signs, with a bi-unique relation between meaning and sound.

 

⁵ Halliday, but not Painter, actually models the proto-language phase as a two strata system; Painter's mono-stratal characterisation is preferred here.

⁶ In traffic-light-ese this is the problem of labelling terms as [stop/speed up/go] or [red/yellow/green].

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, on the model of Saussure, and its development by Hjelmslev (1961: 58), a sign necessarily entails two levels of symbolic abstraction: signifier/expression and signified/content. In SFL terms, the signifier/expression (Token) realises the signified/content (Value).

[2] This is misleading. Such a system involves a system of content features, together with realisation statements that specify the expression of each content choice.

[3] This is a very serious misunderstanding. Content and expression are not semiotically "fused", since they are different levels of abstraction. If only content features are used, then their means of expression are not specified; if only expression features are used, then the meanings they expressed are not specified.

[4] In Figure 1.10, content and expression features are mistakenly juxtaposed, as if they were of the same level of symbolic abstraction. The problem is easily rectified, and made consistent with SFL Theory, by placing the phonetic symbols in realisation statements; e.g. ➘ [ba] etc. But the problem here is not the absence of a symbol in a representation; it is Martin's failure to understand the most fundamental notion of semiotic systems: different levels of symbolic abstraction, and as will be seen, this pervades Martin's work.

Misrepresenting Agency As A Recursive System [New]

Martin (1992: 13, 12):

In addition to the experiential, interpersonal and textual metafunctions just considered, Halliday has in addition proposed a fourth metafunction, the logical. Systemically the logical metafunction comprises recursive systems (such as TENSE, PROJECTION and AGENCY in English; see Halliday 1985a), which tend to be associated across languages with experiential meaning. Structurally logical meaning is realised as another kind of particulate structure — but this time as part/part rather than part/whole. … These complementary perspectives are outlined in Fig. 1.9. 

 

The relationship between the metafunctions, realisation principles and types of structural [sic] is summarised in Table 1.3.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, recursive systems are realised by the iterative structures of the logical metafunction. Of the systems cited by Martin, the system of TENSE is realised by an iterative logical structure, and the system of PROJECTION is one system within the recursive systems of the clause complex and verbal group complex; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 410, 438, 589). The system of AGENCY, on the other hand, is not a recursive system, and is not realised by an iterative structure; Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 355):

The 'open-endedness' of ergative structure, whereby agency can be added in analytical causative constructions (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 352) is effected by the recursive system that is realised by the iterative structure of the verbal group complex. Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 579-80):

[2] To be clear, this confuses formal constituency (nominal group consisting of words) with function structure (the relations between functional elements). In both experiential and logical structures of the nominal group, the structure is the relation between the functions of the constituents (parts). Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 85) characterise the experiential as segmental, and the logical as iterative:

Misrepresenting Information Distribution [New]

 Martin (1992: 11-2):

Thirdly, constituency representation is also poorly adapted to textual meaning, which tends to structure clauses and groups in such a way as to highlight first and last position. The English clause for example uses first position to highlight the speaker's angle on the experience being constructed while last position is hearer oriented, highlighting information that is in some respect new. The systems of THEME and INFORMATION can thus be seen as assigning peaks of prominence to the beginning and end of the English clause; this textual patterning assigns a periodic texture to English discourse as it unfolds. Halliday's analysis of THEME and INFORMATION structure is presented in Fig. 1.7, followed by a more iconic form of representation highlighting clause texture as a rhythmic pulse.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] As Halliday (1985: 169) explains:

The textual meaning of the clause is expressed by what is put first (the Theme); by what is phonologically prominent (and tends to be put last – the New, signalled by information focus); and by conjunctions and relatives which if present must occur in initial position. Thus it forms a wave-like pattern of periodicity that is set up by peaks of prominence and boundary markers.

Importantly, INFORMATION is not a system of the clause, and an information unit only coincides with the clause in the unmarked case. Moreover, in these unmarked cases, the New only occurs last in the unmarked case. The New can occur anywhere in the clause, or not at all (as is the case of the first clause in He said he didn't know).

As will be seen, Martin falsely assumes that New information always occurs in the Rheme of a clause, which is one of the factors that undermines his model.

[2] To be clear, the term 'texture' has a specific meaning in SFL Theory: the property of being a text, which is derived 'from the fact that it functions as a unity with respect to its environment' (Halliday & Hasan 1976: 2).

Preparing To Argue 'From Below' And Misunderstanding 'Cumulative' [New]

Martin (1992: 10, 28n):

Structural arguments for metafunctional diversity are of particular relevance here in light of the proposals for discourse structures to be developed in Section 1.5 below. Halliday's (1979a) suggestion is that experiential meanings predispose particulate forms of realisation, interpersonal meanings prosodic ones and textual meanings periodic² ones.

² Halliday (1979) actually refers to periodic structures as culminative ones; the term periodic is preferred here because of the misleading association between culmination and final position.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, arguing for metafunctional diversity on the basis of structure is arguing 'from below', which is the direct opposite of the perspective taken in SFL Theory, where priority is given to the view 'from above'. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 49):

Giving priority to the view ‘from above’ means that the organising principle adopted is that of system: the grammar is seen as a network of interrelated meaningful choices. In other words, the dominant axis is the paradigmatic one: the fundamental components of the grammar are sets of mutually defining contrastive features. Explaining something consists not in stating how it is structured but in showing how it is related to other things: its pattern of systemic relationships, or agnateness …

[2] To be clear, in the field of linguistics, the term 'culminative' is not associated with final position, but with prominence, which in SFL Theory, is a resource of the textual metafunction. The notion of 'culminative function' is from the phonology of Trubetskoy (1960):

the function carried out by those characteristics (features) of sounds in speech that permit the listener to apprehend the number of words, or syntagmas, in a sentence. The unit containing the element of sound that performs the culminative function is called the culmination, for example, the culmination of a syntagma. The culminative function in German, for example, is performed by the primary stress. Stress, pitch, and other prosodic elements usually carry out the culminative function.

Blurring The Distinction Between Function (Structure) And Form (Rank Scale) [New]

Martin (1992: 5-6):

Fig. 1.2 represents the clause as a bundle of features, realised by the structural sequence Finite^Subject^Predicator.

Note that structures of this kind contain both function (e.g. Finite; initial upper case) and class labels (e.g. clause; lower case, enclosed in square brackets). These structures, like the systems which underlie them, are further organised along a scale of rank, which reduces the number of levels between clause and morpheme required in analysis (see Hudson 1967/1981). Making use of a different set of functions (from Halliday 1985a), implying a different set of options, this labelling and bracketing is further illustrated in Fig. 1.3. Three ranks are included (i.e. clause, group and word), but word structure is not shown.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading. In SFL Theory structures are relations between functions. The string of formal units of various classes is known as a syntagm.

[2] This is also potentially misleading. The rank scale is a way of modelling formal constituency, such that a clause consists of groups and phrases, which consist of words, which consist of morphemes. Functions are assigned to constituents of a unit, such as groups and phrases of a clause, and it is the relations between these functions that constitute the structure of the (higher ranked) unit.

[3] See Halliday (1985: 22-30) on ranked constituent analysis (minimal bracketing, function labelling) vs immediate constituent analysis (maximal bracketing, class labelling).

Misconstruing Realisation And Instantiation [Augmented]

Martin (1992: 5):

As noted above, system is related to process through the concept of realisation — realisation formalises the instantiation of the system in process. … These realisation statements relate system to structure; the statements in Fig. 1.1 are summarised and then glossed to clarify their reading in Table 1.1.

Blogger Comments:

[1] System is related to structure through the concept of realisation — not to the process of instantiation.

[2] Realisation doesn't "formalise" the instantiation of the system in process.  Realisation is an intensive identifying relation (token-value) between levels of symbolic abstraction, as between strata and between axes; instantiation is an intensive attributive relation (token-type) between actual instances of the system and the overall system of potential (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 14-5, 145).  See also here.