Misconstruing The Absence Of Reference As "Presenting" Reference

Martin (1992: 102):

As far as participant identification is concerned the central oppositions have to do with reminding and relevance phoricity. With nominal groups, redundancy phoricity has to do with recovering experiential meaning, not participant identity, and so can be set aside here. The core reference paradigm is thus:

	[presenting]	[presuming]
[comparison]	a smaller frog	the smaller frog
[–]	a frog	the frog

Formulated systemically as in Fig. 3.2 this gives the simultaneous systems [presenting/presuming] and [comparison/–]. Presenting reference signals that the identity of the participant in question cannot be recovered from the context; presuming reference signals that it can. Presenting reference is thus strongly associated with first mention and presuming reference categorically associated with second mention. The [comparison/–] system makes reference to the identity of related participants optional.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, "reminding and relevance phoricity" are Martin's rebrandings of Halliday's co-reference and comparative reference, respectively.

[2] To be clear, "redundancy phoricity" is Martin's rebranding of Halliday's ellipsis–&–substitution, misunderstood as a subtype of reference.

[3] To be clear, (the recovery of) the identity of participants is (the recovery of) experiential meaning.  Given this confusion, and his dependence on Du Bois (1980), Martin may be locating 'the identity of participants' outside language; that is, treating meaning as transcendent of semiotic systems, contra the epistemological foundation on which SFL is based.

[4] Having mistaken ellipsis–&–substitution for a type of reference, Martin now excludes it from his model of 'reference as semantic choice' — on mistaken criteria.

[5] This again confuses the referent — in this case, a potential reference point — with the reference item.  Halliday (1994: 309):

A participant or circumstantial element introduced at place in the text can be taken as a reference point for something that follows.

To be clear, in SFL theory, "presenting reference" is not reference, by definition, if it there is no marking of an identity as recoverable elsewhere.

[6] To be clear, "presuming reference", whether [comparison] (comparative reference) or [–] (personal or demonstrative co-reference) can also be cataphoric, and so, contrary to Martin's bare assertion, also "associated with first mention".

[7] To be clear, given that "presenting reference" is not reference, the [comparison/–] system is another rebranding of Halliday's distinction between comparative reference and co-reference (personal and demonstrative).

[8] To be clear, of the four examples, only the frog appears in the text ([3:88]) on which 'most of the examples are based' (p99).  If a smaller frog and the smaller frog are interpreted as including cohesive reference items, then, in terms of SFL theory, the former makes comparative anaphoric reference (smaller), and the latter makes both demonstrative anaphoric co-reference (the) and comparative anaphoric reference (smaller).

Importantly, because Martin mistakes the nominal group in which a reference item appears for the reference item itself, he only attributes one (cross-classified) referential function to each nominal group.  As a consequence, the two reference markers in the smaller frog — the and smaller — are conflated into one function, and the one (genuine) reference marker in a smaller frog — smaller — is miscategorised, in terms of Martin's own definition, as "presenting" ('not recoverable from context') rather than "presuming".

Misconstruing Phonology As Grammatical Ellipsis–&–Substitution Misunderstood As Semantic Reference

Martin (1992: 101):

Redundancy Phoricity – 

VERBAL SUBSTITUTION & ELLIPSIS 

[3:13]   Has he found his pets?
             — He has done his dog, but I don't think he's found his frog. 

CLAUSE SUBSTITUTION & ELLIPSIS

[3:14]   Has he found his pets?
             — I think so.

TONICITY 

[3:15]   Did he bring home a frog?
             — //1 He brought home a baby frog //

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, as explained in previous posts, "redundancy phoricity" is Martin's rebranding of Halliday's ellipsis–&–substitution, misunderstood as a type of reference.

[2] Here Martin adds to the confusion above ([1]), by further confusing:

• content plane (cohesion) with expression plane (tonicity)*, and
• a non-structural system (cohesion) with a structural system (tonicity).

This example is even inconsistent with Martin's own definition of "redundancy phoricity" (p100), since it features neither ellipsis nor substitution.

This example is even inconsistent with Martin's claim that the tonic (baby) is marking "redundancy phoricity", since the relation is represented as obtaining between frog and frog.


* Further inconsistent, even with these inconsistencies, Martin elsewhere (p401) misrepresents the textual content realised by tonicity and tonality, information, as located on the expression plane (phonology).

Misconstruing Logico-Semantic Cause As Comparative Reference

Martin (1992: 101):

Relevance Phoricity – 

CIRCUMSTANCE OF MANNER & EXTENT 

[3:10]   The boy ran quickly for a few yards;
             but his dog ran farther and faster. 

CONJUNCTION 

[3:11]   The frog ran away
             so the boy went to find it.

CONTINUITY 

[3:12]   The boy felt worried
             and his dog did too.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, "relevance phoricity" is Martin's rebranding of Halliday's comparative reference.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 632-3 ):

Whereas personals and demonstratives, when used anaphorically, set up a relation of co-reference, whereby the same entity is referred to over again, comparatives set up a relation of contrast. In comparative reference, the reference item still signals ‘you know which’; not because the same entity is being referred to over again but rather because there is a frame of reference — something by reference to which what I am now talking about is the same or different, like or unlike, equal or unequal, more or less.

[2] Here Martin confuses a structural hypotactic relation of cause between clauses (logical metafunction) with a non-structural relation of cohesive conjunction (textual metafunction), and misinterprets the conjunctive Adjunct (so) as a comparative reference item, with the preceding clause as its referent.

[3] Here Martin misinterprets a conjunctive Adjunct (too) — itself misunderstood as a marker of continuity, see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 603-5) — as a comparative reference item, with the preceding clause in the nexus of paratactic addition as its referent.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 472)

Paratactic additions are often accompanied by cohesive expressions serving as conjunctive Adjuncts such as too, in addition, also, moreover, on the other hand.

Misidentifying Both The Reference Item And The Referent

Martin (1992: 100-1):

Aside from nominal groups, systems depending items [sic] on their context in terms of recoverable information are found throughout the grammar, and can be itemised as follows … :

Reminding Phoricity – 

CIRCUMSTANCE OF LOCATION 

[3:8]   The boy reached the pond.
           There he found his frog. 

FACTS 

[3:9]   The boy couldn't find his frog.
           It worried him that he couldn't.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This continues the confusion of reference items with the nominal groups in which they occur.

[2] This continues the misrepresentation of a textual relation (reference) as a logical relation (dependency).

[3] This continues the confusion between co-text (Martin's "context") and context (the culture as a semiotic system with language as its expression plane).

[4] To be clear, the recoverable 'information' is the identity presented as recoverable by the reference item.

[5] Note that, despite this, when Martin argues for the stratal location of his system of IDENTIFICATION, he only considers nominal groups.

[6] Note that both examples are Martin's constructions.  Neither features in text [3:88].

[7] To be clear, "reminding phoricity" is Martin's rebranding of Halliday's co-reference.

[8] This confuses the experiential domain (Location) of a reference item with the textual function of a reference item.

[9] This confuses the experiential domain (fact) of a reference item with the textual function of a reference item.  But more importantly, it misidentifies both the reference item and the referent.  The reference item is it, not it … that he couldn't and the referent is that he couldn't, not the boy couldn't find his frog.  Moreover, the reference is cataphoric and structural, and so neither anaphoric nor cohesive; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 625ff).

	Martin	Halliday
reference item	It … that he couldn't	It
referent	The boy couldn't find his frog	that he couldn't

Confusing Semantic Relations (Reference) With Grammatical Relations (Ellipsis–&–Substitution)

Martin (1992: 100):

… at clause rank, as noted in Chapter 2, substitution and ellipsis signal interpersonal, and thereby experiential meaning as recoverable …

Blogger Comments:

[1] This mistakes a non-structural cohesive system, ellipsis–&–substitution, for a structural system of a rank unit.

[2] This mistakes one type of cohesion, ellipsis–&–substitution, for a sub-type of a distinct type of cohesion, reference.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 635):

Reference is a relationship in meaning. When a reference item is used anaphorically, it sets up a semantic relationship with something mentioned in the preceding text; and this enables the reference item to be interpreted, as either identical with the referent or in some way contrasting with it. 

Another form of anaphoric cohesion in the text is achieved by ELLIPSIS, where we presuppose something by means of what is left out. Like all cohesive agencies, ellipsis contributes to the semantic structure of the discourse. But unlike reference, which is itself a semantic relation, ellipsis sets up a relationship that is not semantic but lexicogrammatical — a relationship in the wording rather than directly in the meaning. … 

Sometimes an explicit indication may be given that something is omitted, by the use of a substitute form;

Misconstruing A Textual Relation (Reference) As A Logical Relation (Dependency)

Martin (1992: 100):

This means that in principle a nominal group may depend on three distinct aspects of its context, as in [3:7]:

[3:7]   The boy found two frogs.
           One was smaller than the other.
           The boy took the smaller one home.

There, the smaller one depends on two frogs for the recovery of experiential content of its Head (redundancy phoricity); it as well depends on the other for recovery of the participant compared to it in terms of size (relevance phoricity); and it depends on one where the identity of the smaller frog was first established (reminding phoricity).

Blogger Comments:

This illustration accumulates the misunderstandings ([1] and [4]) and rebrandings ([5], [6] and [7]) of the foregoing discussion, and adds two further confusions ([2] and [3]).

[1] Here again the nominal group in which a reference item occurs is mistaken for the reference item, with the result that reference is misunderstood as a relation between nominal groups.

[2] The new confusion that is smuggled in here, without supporting argument, is the misinterpretation of the relation between the reference item and the referent as one of dependency.  That is to say, a textual relation is misconstrued as a logical relation.  The theoretical inconsistency is thus one of metafunction.

[3] Here Martin misinterprets his subtypes of phoricity (reference and substitution) as aspects of "context".  That is, he confuses the type of relation (phoricity) with the type of referent ("context").

[4] Here Martin uses 'context' to mean co-text, or more precisely, the instantial system being established in the unfolding of the text (logogenesis).  Previously, Martin has used 'context' to also mean the material setting, and in the final chapter he reinterprets context — in the SFL sense of the culture as a semiotic system — as varieties of language (register and genre).

[5] To be clear, Martin's 'redundancy phoricity' is his rebranding of cohesive substitution, misunderstood as a type of reference.

[6] To be clear, Martin's 'relevance phoricity' is is his rebranding of comparative reference.

[7] To be clear, Martin's 'reminding phoricity' is his rebranding of co-reference, personal or demonstrative.

Rebranding Co-Reference, Comparative Reference And Substitution As Reminding, Relevance And Redundancy Phoricity

Martin (1992: 100):

English nominal groups not only code all three types of phoricity, but combine them freely; for example:

the bigger frog     reminding + relevance

the big one           reminding + redundancy

a bigger one         relevance + redundancy

the bigger one      reminding + relevance + redundancy

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, this misattributes the function of reference items to the structure of the domain in which they appear, in this instance: nominal groups.

[2] Not one of the four examples is from text [3:88] — each is a constructed example, isolated without co-text. It is therefore impossible to know whether the demonstrative reference of the is cohesive (anaphoric), structural (cataphoric) or neither (exophoric/homophoric).

[3] As previously explained, Martin's "reminding phoricity" is merely a rebranding of personal and demonstrative reference (Halliday & Hasan 1976), which Halliday & Matthiessen (2004, 2014) characterise as two types of co-reference.

[4] As previously explained, Martin's "relevance phoricity" is merely a rebranding of comparative reference (Halliday & Hasan 1976).

[5] As previously explained, Martin's "redundancy phoricity" is a rebranding of ellipsis–&–substitution (Halliday & Hasan 1976), a non-referential cohesive system which he misconstrues as a type of reference.

Misconstruing Ellipsis–&–Substitution As Reference And Rebranding It As "Redundancy Phoricity"

Martin (1992: 99-100):

Finally, [the third type of information that needs to be recovered from the context] redundancy phoricity is concerned not with tracking the identity of participants but with signalling (in the context of nominal groups) that experiential meaning needs to be recovered from the context. This is realised through substitution and ellipsis (for a full account see Halliday & Hasan 1976: 91-111 & 147-166):

REDUNDANCY PHORICITY ('you know my experiential content')

[3:5]  The boy found his frog

          and brought home a baby one too.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This again confuses the recoverable identity ("types of information") with a purported type of reference ("redundancy phoricity").

[2] This again confuses tracking participants with the presentation of elements as identifiable (reference).

[3] This characterisation of "redundancy phoricity" is indistinguishable from the characterisation of "reminding phoricity" (Halliday's co-reference), since it is merely a restatement of the latter in which 'experiential meaning' has been substituted for 'identity':

It signals that the identity of the participant being realised is recoverable. (p99)

[4] This misconstrues ellipsis–&–substitution as a type of reference and rebrands it as "redundancy phoricity".  That is, Martin confuses two distinct types of cohesion.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 635) explain the difference between the two types:

Another form of anaphoric cohesion in the text is achieved by ELLIPSIS, where we presuppose something by means of what is left out. Like all cohesive agencies, ellipsis contributes to the semantic structure of the discourse. But unlike reference, which is itself a semantic relation, ellipsis sets up a relationship that is not semantic but lexicogrammatical — a relationship in the wording rather than directly in the meaning. … Ellipsis marks the textual status of continuous information within a certain grammatical structure. … Sometimes an explicit indication may be given that something is omitted, by the use of a substitute form;

To be clear, Martin provides no example of ellipsis realising "redundancy phoricity".

Rebranding Comparative Reference As 'Relevance Phoricity'

Martin (1992: 99-100):

The second type [of information that needs to be recovered from the context], relevance phoricity, signals that the identity of one or more participants related to the participant being realised is recoverable. In nominal groups this is realised through comparative and superlative constructions (for nominal group structure see Halliday 1985: 159-169):

RELEVANCE PHORICITY ('you know the identity of related participants')

[3:5]  The boy found the frog.

          There was another frog too.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This again confuses the recoverable identity ("types of information") with a purported type of reference ("relevance phoricity").

[2] This is merely anaphoric comparative reference, rebranded as 'relevance phoricity'.   Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 632-3) explain:

Whereas personals and demonstratives, when used anaphorically, set up a relation of co-reference, whereby the same entity is referred to over again, comparatives set up a relation of contrast. In comparative reference, the reference item still signals ‘you know which’; not because the same entity is being referred to over again but rather because there is a frame of reference – something by reference to which what I am now talking about is the same or different, like or unlike, equal or unequal, more or less. Comparative reference items function in nominal and adverbial groups; and the comparison is made with reference either to general features of identity, similarity and difference or to particular features of quality and quantity.

[3] To be clear, superlatives do not realise comparative reference ("relevance phoricity").

[4] To be clear, as already explained, reference is not a function of nominal group structure.  The nominal group and the adverbial group are the domains in which comparative reference items occur.  Reference is cohesive, not structural.

Rebranding Co-Reference As 'Reminding Phoricity'

Martin (1992: 99):

By definition then, phoric items require that information be recovered from the context.  There are three main types of information that need to be recovered, and nominal groups may depend on their context with respect to any one, or any one of the three.  The first type, reminding phoricity, has been illustrated in the IDENTITY RECOVERABLE column of Table 3.2.  It signals that the identity of the participant being realised is recoverable …

REMINDING PHORICITY ('you know my identity')

[3:4]  The little boy had a frog in a jar.

          It ran away.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'phoricity' — a term coined by Du Bois (1980) — is Martin's rebranding of cohesive reference (Halliday & Hasan 1976).  'Phoric items' are reference items, misunderstood as the nominal groups in which reference items appear, as a result of Martin confusing nominal group deixis with reference.

[2] To be clear, reference items do not "require that information be recovered from the context".  As Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 625) put it:

Endophoric reference means that the identity presumed by the reference item is recoverable from within the text itself — or, to be more precise, from the instantial system of meanings created as the text unfolds.

[3] As previously explained here, Martin confuses semiotic context (the culture as semiotic system) with both co-text — as in this case — and the material setting.  In the final chapter, he confuses context with two perspectives on functional varieties of language: register and genre.

[4] To be clear, the "type" of information is the identity presumed by the reference item.

[5] To be clear, reference items (misunderstood as nominal groups) do not "depend on their context".  The identity presumed by the reference item is recoverable from the instantial system of the unfolding text.

[6] This confuses the recoverable identity ("types of information") with a purported type of reference ("reminding phoricity").

[7] This is merely anaphoric co-reference, personal and demonstrative, rebranded as 'reminding phoricity'; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 626-8).

[8] This is merely anaphoric personal co-reference, rebranded as 'reminding phoricity'; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 626-8).

Confusing Frege's Reference (Bedeutung) With Halliday's Reference

Martin (1992: 98-9):

Comparing Tables 3.1 and 3.2, it can be noted that there are correlations between phoric and non-phoric groups and first and subsequent mention: all non-phoric groups for example are associated with first mention.  But several participants in [3:1] are realised phorically at first mention: e.g. the writer (I), the zoo (the zoo), the tiger (the tiger) and the mum (Mum).  A number of these are perfectly appropriate and will be taken up in 3.3.3 below (for a thorough discussion of the correlations between phoric/non-phoric items and first/subsequent mention in a related narrative context, see Du Bois 1980).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This continues Martin's confusion of reference items with the nominal groups in which they appear, as a result of confusing cohesive reference with nominal group deixis, as demonstrated in previous posts.

[2] Here Martin invalidates his own model, in terms of theoretical consistency, by unwittingly confusing two different senses of linguistic reference, from two different traditions.  The sense of 'reference' used by Du Bois is the Bedeutung of Gottlob Frege (1892), as demonstrated by this quote from Du Bois (1980: 208-9):

Having used the term referential on several occasions, it will be well to specify the particular meaning I attach to it.

(2) A noun phrase is referential when it is used to speak about an object as an object, with continuous identity over time.

The object here may be a physical object or an objectified concept; it may be specifically known or it may be unknown; it may exist in the real world or in some hypothetical world; there may be one or more than one object. As long as a noun phrase is used to speak about such objects and the objects are conceived of as having continuity of identity, the noun phrase is referential.

That is, Du Bois is concerned with the use of noun phrases to refer to extralinguistic "objects", physical or conceptual.  This is the view of meaning as 'transcendent' of semiotic systems.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 415-6):

We can identify two main traditions in Western thinking about meaning (see Halliday, 1977):

(i) one oriented towards logic and philosophy, with language seen as a system of rules;
(ii) one oriented towards rhetoric and ethnography, with language seen as resource. …

These external differences are associated with internal differences as well.

(i) First, the orientations differ with respect to where they locate meaning in relation to the stratal interpretation of language:

(a) intra-stratal: meaning is seen as immanent — something that is constructed in, and so is part of, language itself. The immanent interpretation of meaning is characteristic of the rhetorical-ethnographic orientation, including our own approach. 

(b) extra-stratal: meaning is seen as transcendent — something that lies outside the limits of language. The transcendent interpretation of meaning is characteristic of the logico-philosophical orientation.

Many traditional notions of meaning are of the second kind — meaning as reference, meaning as idea or concept, meaning as image. These notions have in common that they are 'external' conceptions of meaning; instead of accounting for meaning in terms of a stratum within language, they interpret it in terms of some system outside of language, either the 'real world' or another semiotic system such as that of imagery.

Confusing Nominal Groups With Reference Items

Martin (1992: 98-9):

The basic discourse option organising Table 3.2 has to do with phoricity (from endophoric, exophoric, homophoric, anaphoric, cataphoric).  The nominal groups in [3:1] have been organised semantically into phoric and non-phoric classes according to whether their grammar signals the identity of the participant they realise as recoverable or not.

Table 3.2. Coding recoverability in [3:1]

IDENTITY NOT RECOVERABLE	IDENTITY RECOVERABLE
indefinite article:	pronoun:
	I. I, I, I, I, I, I, me, me, my mum, him, it ['the tiger']
a Hippopotamus…………………...	he, he, him
a gorilla……………………………	I(t)
a baby gorilla
a watch
	demonstrative:
	this man
	definite article:
	the zoo, the zoo the tiger
	proper name:
	Mum

Blogger Comments:

[1] Martin here neglects to acknowledge that the term 'phoricity' comes from his major source, Du Bois (1980: 226), who coined it as a cover term for the types of reference in Cohesion In English (Halliday & Hasan 1976).   Its use by Martin here is merely a rebranding of Halliday's 'reference' — the Greek-derived morpheme 'phor-' and the the Latin-derived morpheme '-fer-' are cognates.

[2] As previously demonstrated, in SFL terms, Martin's focus on "definiteness" confuses nominal group deixis (non-specific vs specific) with cohesive reference (identifiability).  As a result, he mistakes entire nominal groups for reference items, as shown in Table 3.2, attributing phoricity to nominal groups instead of reference items, and leading to the absurdity of interpreting Mum as a reference item.  The analysis of reference, below, from Halliday (1994: 317), makes a clear distinction between reference items and the nominal groups in which they figure:

[3] The intrusion of the word 'semantically' is an unwarranted and misleading fudge in Martin's argument for a discourse semantic model of reference. Table 3.2 is a classification of grammatical units ('nominal groups') according to grammatical criteria ('whether their grammar signals the identity of the participant they realise as recoverable or not').