Showing posts with label Du Bois. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Du Bois. Show all posts

Thursday, 14 May 2015

A Fatal Theoretical Flaw And Misrepresenting Du Bois (1980)

Martin (1992: 142):
As noted in 3.1 above, first mentions of participants in discourse are commonly phoric.  Exophoric and homophoric first mention is quite common; parts and possessions are typically introduced via possessive Deictics; and bridging is favoured where the identity of a participant can be indirectly presumed.  As DuBois (1980:254) comments, "the definite article is the unmarked member of the pair.  When consciousness is not focussed on the task of introducing characters, it is the unmarked the which is uttered, whether or not the initial mention is in fact identifiable."  It may be that Dubois' data has been biassed in this way by its re-telling context — that of speakers recounting the plot of a short film they have just seen.  But it's certainly true that the principle of introducing participants phorically where possible is a very general one across a wide range of English texts.


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, by this, Martin simply means that the first occurrence of an instantial participant is usually realised by a nominal group whose Deictic is realised by the definite article (phoric = Martin's presuming reference) rather than the indefinite article (non-phoric = Martin's presenting reference).

[2] It will be seen that, in Martin's model, where the identification is between participants, possessive Deictics wrongly identify possessors with possessions, as demonstrated by:
Jim gets a lot of things wrong, and so do his students.
Here Jim and his students, on Martin's model, are necessarily identified as the same participant. This demonstrates most clearly the absurd consequences that arise from mistaking nominal groups for reference items.

[3] As previously demonstrated, Martin's "bridging" confuses lexical cohesion with reference.

[4] On the one hand, this deliberately misrepresents Du Bois (1980: 254), whose view on the relative frequencies of definite and indefinite articles in this regard derives from a corpus of one million words: 
In either such case (premature introduction or late introduction), the initial mention receives the definite article instead of the expected indefinite article. This suggests that the definite article is the unmarked member of the pair. When consciousness is not focussed on the task of introducing characters, it is the unmarked the which is uttered, whether or not the initial mention is in fact identifiable. There are other reasons to consider the unmarked, among them sheer frequency. In a corpus of one million words of written English, the definite article was by far the most common word, with 69,971 occurrences; whereas the indefinite article (a ~ an) had only 26,984 occurrences (Kucera and Francis, 1967:5).
On the other hand, it should be pointed out that Martin adopted the same strategy as Du Bois (1980), in as much as the data for this chapter — text [3:88] (p147) — is a child's retelling of a published story.  A significant difference, however, is that, in almost every case in the chapter's exposition, Martin has ignored this text and instead used his own constructed examples involving characters from that text.

Thursday, 7 May 2015

On "Whether Possessive Deictics Are The Deixis Of The Participant They Possess"

Martin (1992: 132-3):
The issue then is whether possessive Deictics are the deixis of the participant they possess.  Is the possessed participant identified through its possessor, or does the possessive Deictic neutralise the participant's phoricity (as with the neutralised reference in the grammar of little texts)?  Du Bois' data indicates [sic] that a frog of his or a friend of John's do not alternate with his frog or John's friend to introduce participants (1980:243-245); pending further investigation this suggests that the interpretation of possessive Deictics as the deixis of the participants they possess is correct.  Accordingly, possessive nominal groups will only be coded once for phoricity below, even though they realise two participants.  This is after all literally what the grammar of the English nominal group argues: "recover the identity of the possessed participant here through its possessor".

Blogger Comments:

[1] The notion of a "possessed participant" confuses clause participant with nominal group Thing.  A possessive Deictic modifies the Thing of a nominal group.  The entire nominal group realises a participant, even in Martin's restricted definition of participant.

[2] This misunderstands deixis.  To be clear, a possessive Deictic structurally realises features of the system of nominal group DEIXIS.

[3] The notion of "the participant's phoricity" confuses the Thing of a nominal group, misunderstood as a clause participant, with the items that make phoric reference.  This confusion derives from misinterpreting textual reference as ideational denotation, as explained in many previous posts.

[4] This is misleading, because it misrepresents Du Bois (1980: 243-5), who is concerned with possession being expressed either through verbs or noun phrases:
For clothes as for body parts, no descriptive mode initial mentions bear possessive adjectives — that is, a shirt of his does not occur — or otherwise indicate possession in the noun phrase. In virtually all cases possession is already expressed (have) or implied (have on, etc.) in the verb or preposition. In other words, when a "human" frame element (a body part or item of clothing) is mentioned, possession will ordinarily be expressed in one way or another. If the descriptive mode is selected, the verb serves to express possession, but if the narrative mode is selected, possession must be expressed in the noun phrase.
[5] Given the above, this is a non-sequitur, inferred from a misrepresented citation, in support of a misunderstanding of deixis.

[6] This confuses nominal groups with reference items.

[7] Such nominal groups realise only one participant, even on Martin's definition of participant (as nominal group functioning as Medium or Agent).

[8] There is nothing "literal" about a grammar "arguing".

[9] This confuses nominal groups with reference items, and Things with participants, and presents the confusion as a quote, as if it were a widely accepted maxim.

On Possessive "Pronouns" In Deictic Position

Martin (1992: 132):
Possessive pronouns in Deictic position, function like embedded nominal groups to realise a participant different from that coded through the Numerative ^ Epithet ^ Classifier ^ Thing structure.  Like embedded groups, these possessive pronouns function in place of the deixis that would otherwise be associated with the group.  This raises the problem of how to interpret the phoricity of the participant realised through the Thing in possessive groups like his frog, John's friend and so on.  Halliday and Hasan (1976: 70) and Halliday (1985: 160) treat possessive pronouns as a type of specific deixis, alongside the, this, that, these and those.
This seems to imply that the identity of the frog and the friend in his frog and John's friend is being coded as recoverable, alongside the identity of his and John.  His frog in other words does not mean 'a frog of his' nor does John's friend mean 'a friend of John's'; where the latter meanings are intended then the expressions one of his frogs or one of John's friends would have to occur.  Du Bois (1980:243) concurs, arguing that "his is similar to the in that it demands (presupposes) identifiability, but different in that it supplies some extra information that may help make the identification possible".

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses ideational denotation ('realise a participant') with the interpersonal function (deixis) with the textual function (reference) of possessive adjectives (confused with pronouns).  In SFL theory, the entire structure of a (ranking) nominal group realises one participant.

[2] To be clear, possessive adjectives function as the Deictic of the nominal group.  Deictics aren't associated with nominal groups, they are part of its structure.

[3] On the one hand, "participant realised through the Thing" confuses clause participant with nominal group Thing — even in terms of Martin's definition of participant as nominal group functioning as Medium or Agent.  On the other hand, the notion of a Thing being phoric confuses ideational denotation with textual reference.

[4] This non-sequitur demonstrates the degree to which Martin fails to understand the model of reference (and deixis) in Halliday & Hasan (1976) and Halliday (1985).  The nominal groups his frog and John's friend include only one potential reference item, his, whose identity is signalled as recoverable elsewhere.  Neither frog, nor John's, nor friend functions as a reference item signalling identifiability; on the contrary, each provides an identity.  The confusion again arises from misinterpreting textual reference as ideational denotation.

[5] This demonstrates the absurdity that arises from these misunderstandings SFL theory.  In these instances, the same meaning is realised through different wordings (Deictic vs Qualifier).

[6] On the one hand, this is a non-sequitur from a falsehood that is invalidly inferred from a non-sequitur that is invalidly inferred from Halliday and Hasan (1976: 70) and Halliday (1985: 160).  On the other hand, it is falsified by every instance of an X of Y's ever spoken or written.

[7] This is misleading, since it is entirely spurious.  Du Bois (1980:243) has nothing whatsoever to say on this matter.  What Du Bois (1980: 243) actually says is:
 
The "extra information" Du Bois refers to is, as Halliday & Hasan (1976: 71) explain, the person signalled by the possessive Deictic, in comparison with the definite article, which has no content.

Tuesday, 5 May 2015

Misunderstanding The Interpersonal Function Of Embedding

Martin (1992: 123):
Esphora is a very common way of introducing participants to a text; … Du Bois (1980:224-225) suggests that this strategy is used when a Qualifier gives enough information to identify a participant and when that information is "not particularly noteworthy" (i.e. not worth negotiating and so embedded; see Chapter 2 above).

Blogger Comments:

[1] The claim Du Bois (1980: 223-224) makes is:
One cannot introduce an unknown woman into a conversation with the sentence
(55) The woman Bill married last night was nasty to him
in part because the new information contained in the relative clause is too noteworthy to be presupposed.
To be clear, this is a bare assertion, unsupported by evidence from corpora, and more prescription than description.

[2] On the one hand, Martin here misunderstands 'noteworthy' as "negotiation worthy", and on the other hand, he misunderstands the interpersonal function of embedding rank units, which is to remove them from the line of negotiation (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 171), not to present them as not worth negotiating.

Sunday, 3 May 2015

Misunderstanding The Function Of Personal Reference Items

Martin (1992: 111):
Where names are either not available or inappropriate, signs will be selected that have not been tagged for specific individuals.  Where number, gender and case are sufficient to identify the participant in question, personal pronouns will be used (excluding the generalised pronoun one, which is not phoric): I, me, mine, my; we, us, ours, our; you, yours, your; he, him, his; she, her, hers, her; they, them, theirs, their; it, its.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here the notion of reference is again that of the transcendent orientation to meaning in Martin's source, Du Bois (1980), where language is held to refer to independently existing labels outside language.  This is not reference in the SFL sense, and its orientation to meaning is inconsistent with the immanent orientation on which all of SFL theory is founded.  Moreover, in this instance, it misunderstands the textual function of reference items, since it misattributes their use to the unavailability or inappropriateness of personal names. 

[2] This misunderstands the function of personal co-reference items.  They do not identify a participant (experiential metafunction); they present the identity of an element as recoverable (textual metafunction).

[3] Trivially, possessive adjectives are not pronouns.

[4] To be clear, the pronoun one can function as a reference item, as when it refers to the speaker or addressee.

Confusing Textual Reference With 'Transcendent' Reference

Martin (1992: 110):
Names are phoric and when the identity of the participant to which they refer is not recoverable participant identification breaks down.  Note the attested repair in [3:31] as the speaker realises her addressee is not a member of the community that can uniquely identify John (data from Guenter Plum; see Plum 1988):
[3:31] …Friends of my parents had a beagle and John hadn't seen a beagle (that's my husband) so he went and looked at one… 


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, names are not "phoric" in the sense of textual reference, but in the sense of language referring to things (meanings) outside language.  This is the view of meaning as transcendent, the view of Martin's source, Du Bois (1980), which is epistemologically inconsistent with the view of meaning as immanent, the view of SFL theory.

[2] To be clear, in text [3:31], that makes anaphoric demonstrative co-reference to John, and he makes anaphoric personal co-reference to John. The notion of John 'referring' is the misunderstanding of textual reference identified above in [1].

Confusing Nominal Group Deixis With Reference

Martin (1992: 104-5):
Where specific reference is co-selected with presenting, the question of how many members of a class is relevant, giving rise to the [total/partial] opposition.  The pronominal and nominal realisations of these features are displayed in the following paradigm (throughout this section sm will be used to refer to unstressed some; using foot notation /∧some/.


pronominal
nominal
total
everything
every bee

everyone
every boy

everybody




partial
something
a bee/sm bees

someone
a boy/sm boys

somebody





anything
any bee/bees

anyone
any boy/boys

anybody




Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses the experiential meaning of a potential referent with the textual means of referring (the system of reference).

[2] 'Presenting reference' does not involve textual reference.  Martin's model of reference confuses the 'immanent' perspective on reference of SFL with the 'transcendent' perspective on reference in Du Bois (1980), where reference is to extra-linguistic objects and concepts. See Misconstruing The Absence Of Reference As "Presenting" Reference.

[3] This confuses the total vs partial determiners serving as non-specific Deictic in the interpersonal system of nominal group DEIXIS (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 366, 368) with the textual system of  cohesive reference.