Martin (1992: 197):
Degrees of probability are also possible with purposives, but there are only two values, high/median and low:
PURPOSIVE: DESIRE: MODALITY POSSIBLE[4:74] We'll enterin case we win.
PURPOSIVE: DESIRE: MODALITY CERTAIN/PROBABLE[4:75] We'll enterso that we'll win.
Blogger Comments:
[1] This confuses the logico-semantic relation of cause with interpersonal modality values.
[2] This confuses the logical meaning of purpose, because intention Q so action P with desire.
[3] Although this is intended to demonstrate a difference in 'purposives', the logico-semantic relation of cause: purpose is not a feature of either clause nexus.
The logico-semantic relation in the first 'purposive' clause nexus is cause: reason. The logical meaning is Q because P. Winning is construed as the reason for entering, not the purpose of entering: we'll enter because we might win. (Hence the interpretation as low probability).
The logico-semantic relation in the second 'purposive' clause nexus is cause: result. The logical meaning is because P so result Q. Winning is construed as the result of entering, not the purpose of entering: we'll enter with the result that we'll win. (Hence the interpretation as high/median probability).
[See Halliday and Matthiessen (1999: 245) for why tying the relator to the effect in cause: result sequences typically implies intentionality.]
The upshot is that the two 'purposive' clause nexuses differ in terms of type of cause — neither of which is purpose.
The logico-semantic relation in the first 'purposive' clause nexus is cause: reason. The logical meaning is Q because P. Winning is construed as the reason for entering, not the purpose of entering: we'll enter because we might win. (Hence the interpretation as low probability).
The logico-semantic relation in the second 'purposive' clause nexus is cause: result. The logical meaning is because P so result Q. Winning is construed as the result of entering, not the purpose of entering: we'll enter with the result that we'll win. (Hence the interpretation as high/median probability).
[See Halliday and Matthiessen (1999: 245) for why tying the relator to the effect in cause: result sequences typically implies intentionality.]
The upshot is that the two 'purposive' clause nexuses differ in terms of type of cause — neither of which is purpose.
