Misrepresenting Multivariate Structure [New]

Martin (1992: 22):

Throughout his work on English grammar Halliday has used univariate structure to model logical meaning and multivariate structures to model experiential, interpersonal and textual meaning (the problems prosodic and periodic realisation cause for interpersonal and textual multivariate representations notwithstanding). In fact, only experiential meaning is ideally suited to multivariate representation. Halliday recognises two types of univariate structure, hypotactic and paratactic. With hypotaxis, the recurring variables have unequal status; with parataxis they have equal status. The contrast between multivariate and these two types of univariate structure is exemplified below, following Halliday (1985a):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is not so much that Halliday has used these structure types to model different metafunctional meanings, but that he has proposed that the each metafunction favours a specific type of structural realisation.

[2] This is misleading, because it is demonstrably untrue. A multivariate structure is 'a configuration of elements each having a distinct function with respect to the whole' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 30). Clearly, textual and interpersonal structures satisfy this definition, since, textually, Theme and Rheme each have a distinct function with respect to the whole structure, as do, interpersonally, Subject, Finite, Predicator, Complement and Adjunct.

[3] To be clear, it is the units in a unit complex that have unequal (hypotaxis) or equal (parataxis) status.

Confusing Formal Constituency With Function Structure [New]

Martin (1992: 21-2):

Note that from a syntagmatic perspective this amounts to another grouping of metafunctions, complementary to that in Fig. 1.8 above; in Fig. 1.14 the logical metafunction is opposed to the three others (as in Halliday 1978a: 131).

The tension between Fig. 1.8 and Fig. 1.14 as far as realisation is concerned is summarised in Fig. 1.15.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Reminder (p12):

 

[2] This is misleading, because Figure 1.15 misunderstands the difference between logical structure and experiential structure as the difference between part–part relations and part–whole relations. To be clear, part–whole relations characterises the rank scale of forms, not experiential function structure. For example, a clause (whole) consists of groups (parts), each of which realises some function (Theme, Subject, Actor etc.).

Structure, on the other hand, refers to the relations between functional elements, not relations between formal parts and wholes. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 84, 451):

It is the relation among all these [functions] that constitutes the structure. …

Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.

In any case, having recounted these distinctions between structures according to metafunction, Martin ignores them in his discourse semantic model, as previously explained, making his work inconsistent with SFL theory in this respect, as well.

Metafunctional Structure Types In Discourse Semantics [New]

Martin (1992: 21-2):

In Section 1.3.2 above three highly generalised types of structure were introduced, the particulate, prosodic and periodic, and correlated with the ideational, interpersonal and textual metafunctions respectively. Particulate, prosodic and periodic realisation is an important motif, and one that will be taken up in various places throughout English Text, especially in Chapters 6 and 7. At this point however it is necessary to return to earlier work by Halliday (1981b) on univariate and multivariate structure. 

In this work Halliday is concerned to distinguish the kinds of structure generated by the logical metafunction (univariate structures) from those realising experiential, interpersonal and textual meaning (multivariate structures). Univariate structures as defined as structures involving a single variable, which recurs one or more times. Multivariate structures on the other hand involve more than one variable, with each variable occurring only once. 

This is the distinction between open ended projecting structures such as Ford thought Marvin wanted Zaphod to tell Trillian that ... (α 'β 'y "δ — univariate) and closed structures such as Ford bored Marvin (Phenomenon^Process^Senser — multivariate). 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. Martin (1992) largely ignores these metafunctional structure types, except in discussing genre, which is not distinguished in terms of metafunction. Instead, Martin's discourse semantics models 

• interpersonal meaning in terms of constituency (exchanges consisting of moves), not prosody;
• textual meaning as covariate structure: reference chains of participants, not periodicity;
• experiential as covariate  structure: lexical strings of message parts, not as particulate.

From the perspective of SFL Theory, Martin's use of Lemke's (1985) notion of 'covariate structure' corresponds to non-structural cohesive relations. Lemke (1987) later conceded that what he termed 'covariate structure' was not, in fact, a type of structure.

[2] To be clear, Halliday (1981b) was actually first published in 1965 as a Working Paper, before Halliday had formulated Systemic Functional Theory. It was Halliday's first exploration of the distinction between univariate and multivariate structure — focusing on univariate structure — and contains statements that are inconsistent with the distinction as it later developed in SFL Theory. For example, in this paper, (p230), a Head°Modifier structure is classified as multivariate, rather than univariate.

Similarly, Halliday's pre-Systemic claim (p229) that, in multivariate structures, a variable occurs only once is clearly contradicted in SFL Theory by 

• clauses with more than one Agent (experiential),
• clauses with more than one Adjunct (interpersonal), and 
• information units (textual) with more than one Given, as in Given^New^Given.

[3] This is potentially misleading, since 'open vs closed' does not reliably define the difference between univariate and multivariate structure, as demonstrated by the relatively open-ended multivariate experiential structure of a clause like Arthur made Ford make Marvin make Zaphod tell Trillian. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 353):

Misconstruing Stratification [Revised]

Martin (1992: 20-1, 29n):

An alternative projection (from Martin and Matthiessen 1991¹²) of these three strata, incorporating the additional axes of rank and metafunction is outlined in Fig. 1.13. 

There, the strata are presented as concentric circles, which helps to capture the sense in which discourse semantics addresses patterns of lexicogrammatical patterns and lexicogrammar in turn addresses patterns of phonological ones.¹³ Within strata, description is further organised through layering (simultaneous metafunctions) and constituency (ranks). This projection also has the advantage of backgrounding the content/expression duality deriving from Hjelsmlev and underpinning Fig. 1.12. Somewhat more sympathetic then to Firth than to Hjelmslev, the model can be read as three meaning making levels, with the meanings made by smaller circles progressively recontextualised by larger ones.

¹² The concentric circle projection was initially designed by Halliday.
¹³ What Lemke (1984) generalises as the principle of metaredundancy.

 Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Figure 1.13 only illustrates rank and metafunction for the lexicogrammatical stratum, not the discourse semantic stratum, and, in any case, only the interpersonal system of Martin's discourse semantics involves rank. The other discourse semantic systems do not feature a rank scale, because they are Halliday & Hasan's lexicogrammatical systems of textual cohesion, misunderstood and rebranded as Martin's textual, logical and experiential systems.

Trivially, in SFL Theory, rank and metafunction are not axes, if only because axes — the paradigmatic and syntagmatic— are related in terms of realisation, which ranks and metafunctions are not. The rank scale is a constituent hierarchy, and the metafunctions are simultaneous dimensions of system and structure.

[2] Trivially, the circles are co-tangential, not concentric.

[3] To be clear, this again demonstrates that Martin does not understand strata as levels of symbolic abstraction. A stratum is not concerned with "addressing" patterns of patterns at a lower rank, if only because there are no "patterns" in a system of potential. A pattern at a given stratum presupposes an activation of the system, the process of instantiation, entailing patterns of feature selection. Such a pattern is thus located at the instance pole of the cline of instantiation, and a pattern of instantiation patterns is thus located at a point above the text on the cline, such as text type. In short, Martin has here confused stratification with instantiation.

[4] It is not clear why this backgrounding should be an advantage, given the important distinction that Martin has just made opposing the arbitrary relation between content and expression with the solidary relation between content strata. Reminder:

[5] The truth of this claim can be assessed by comparing Figure 1.13 with Firth's model of linguistic levels. Firth (1962: 30):

[6] This confuses semogenesis (meaning making) with stratification (levels of symbolic abstraction). The model of stratification, three co-tangential circles, does not construe three levels of meaning, but three levels of symbolic abstraction in meaning making: semantics (meaning), lexicogrammar (wording) and phonology (sounding).

Accordingly, this is not a matter of meanings made by lower strata recontextualised by meanings made by higher strata. Instead, lower strata realise higher strata.  Sounding realises wording; wording realises meaning.

[7] This is potentially misleading. Lemke construes the relation between strata as one of redundancy, with metaredundancy meaning a redundancy on that redundancy; see See Halliday (2003 [1987]: 425-6). So, in terms of Martin's model, metaredundancy is 

• the relation of discourse semantics to the redundancy of lexicogrammar and phonology, or
• the relation of the redundancy of discourse semantics and lexicogrammar to phonology.

Patterns of patterns, on the other hand, are a matter of instantiation, not stratification, as explained in [3] above.