Martin (1992: 412, 413):
Interpersonal metaphors were introduced in Chapter 2 in connection with congruent and metaphorical realisations of SPEECH FUNCTION in MOOD. Assessments of probability, usuality, inclination and obligation also display a range of diversified realisation. Some examples of interpersonal grammatical metaphors are reviewed in Table 6.19…
Blogger Comments:
[1] See relevant critique here.
[2] The congruent realisations of modalisation are those of implicit manifestation: the subjective orientation being realised as a finite modal operator (e.g. will) and the objective orientation as a modal Adjunct (e.g. probably, usually). In Table 6.19, the latter are misconstrued as metaphorical instead of congruent.
The metaphorical realisations of modalisation are those of explicit manifestation: the subjective orientation being realised as a projecting cognitive mental clause (e.g. I think…) and the objective orientation as an attributive clause with a factual Carrier (e.g. it's probable…, it's usual…). See Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 613ff).
[3] As Epithet, these serve as Attribute in metaphorical realisations of objective orientation (e.g. it's possible…, it's usual…). In congruent realisations, they can function as Post-Deictic in a nominal group (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 612).
[3] As Epithet, these serve as Attribute in metaphorical realisations of objective orientation (e.g. it's possible…, it's usual…). In congruent realisations, they can function as Post-Deictic in a nominal group (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 612).
[4] Some nominalised forms can serve as an objective orientation of modalisation, such as in all probability, but they are intermediate between explicit and implicit manifestation, and so intermediate between metaphorical and congruent. See Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 615-6).
[5] The verbs suggest and predict, serving as relational processes, are not metaphorical realisations of probability and usuality.
[6] There is no usuality counterpart for the probability metaphor I think. Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 619):
there are no systematic forms for making the subjective orientation explicit in the case of usuality or inclination (i.e. no coded expressions for 'I recognise it as usual that…' or 'I undertake for … to …'.[7] The conjunction groups if and provided that — both of which express the expansion relation of positive condition — are not metaphorical realisations of probability and usuality.
