Mistaking Manner For Extent And Confusing Circumstances With Comparative Reference Items

Martin (1992: 154):

Comparative adverbs realise relevance phoricity; they function as Circumstances [sic] of Extent and Manner in clause structure and presume events.  Both relevant events and supersets of events are presumed.  The network of oppositions is outlined in Fig. 3.16; typical realisations are shown in the network and illustrated in [3:94] through [3:99].

Extent [quantity:difference]
[3:94]

Ben ran five miles;
Carl ran farther.

Manner [quality:semblance]
[3:95]

Ben ran very fast;
Carl didn't run as fast.

Extent [quantity:difference:superset]
[3:96]

The runners ran long distances;
Carl ran farthest.

Manner [quality:difference:superset]
[3:97]

The sprinters ran fast heats;
Ben didn't run fastest.

Extent [quantity:purposive]
[3:98]

You had to set a record to place;
Ben ran fast enough.

Manner [quality:purposive]
[3:99]

You had to run a record time to win;
Carl ran too slow.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'relevance phoricity' is Martin's rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) comparative reference, misunderstood and relocated from non-structural lexicogrammar (cohesion) to structural discourse semantics.

[2] This mistakes circumstances of Extent and Manner (clause rank experiential functions) for comparative reference items (a non-structural textual functions).  Moreover, it will be seen below that none of the examples provided are instances of Extent.

To be clear, the grammatical domains of comparative adverbs that function as reference items are the nominal group and the adverbial group.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 633):

[3] The notion of "presuming events" — Martin is not referring here to the verbal group function 'Event' — demonstrates that Martin has little understanding of the principles underlying comparative reference.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: ) explain:

Whereas personals and demonstratives, when used anaphorically, set up a relation of co-reference, whereby the same entity is referred to over again, comparatives set up a relation of contrast. In comparative reference, the reference item still signals ‘you know which’; not because the same entity is being referred to over again but rather because there is a frame of reference – something by reference to which what I am now talking about is the same or different, like or unlike, equal or unequal, more or less.

[4] In addition to being devised on the basis of the above-mentioned theoretical misunderstandings, a number of further problems with the network in Figure 3.16 Phoric circumstances of extent and manner can be identified.

• The system has no entry condition; the entry condition for IDENTIFICATION is 'participant', so including the entry condition would have exposed the theoretical inconsistency of having types of circumstance ('manner/extent') as a more delicate feature.
• None of the features in the network have been argued for in the text, let alone validated on the basis of evidence.  On the contrary, they have merely been attached to the six examples as labels.
• The more delicate features are distinctions in experiential meaning (quantity, quality, purposive), and the undefined term 'superset' derives from misconstruing ordinatives (last) and superlatives (fastest, farthest) as serving a comparative function.

[5] To be clear, these realisations are neither structural realisations (the dimension of axis) nor lexicogrammatical realisations (the dimension of stratification); they are merely examples of items that are said to serve the particular feature.

[6] To be clear, none of these is an instance of Extent.  The experiential function of farther, farthest and fast enough is Manner.

[7] To be clear, superlatives (farthest, fastest) do not function as comparative reference items.

[8] Here Martin misinterprets clause complexes as single clauses, and claims that the respective circumstances (fast enough, too slow) "presume" the respective purpose clauses (to place, to win).  However, in terms of cohesion, these are both instances of ellipsis, as restoring the elided items makes plain:

||| You had to set a record || to place. |||
|| Ben ran fast enough [[to place]]. || 

||| You had to run a record time || to win. |||
|| Carl ran too slow [[to win]]. ||

In terms of Martin's own model, these are instances of redundancy phoricity, not relevance phoricity — redundancy phoricity being Martin's rebranding of ellipsis-&-substitution, misunderstood as a type of reference, and relocated from non-structural lexicogrammar to structural discourse semantics.

Confusing Circumstances Of Location With Demonstrative Reference Items

Martin (1992: 153-4):

3.6 Location And Manner

Because the point of departure for this chapter has been participant identification, closely related IDENTIFICATION systems realised through demonstrative and comparative adverbs have not yet been considered.  The demonstrative adverbs function as Circumstances [sic] of Location in clause structure (e.g. Come here.) or as Qualifiers in nominal groups (e.g. that guy there); they are realised by here, there, now and then.  Each involves reminding phoricity, presuming location in space or time.  They function both exophorically and endophorically; and where endophoric here and there may presume text (see Halliday and Hasan 1976: 74-75).  The paradigm of oppositions is a simple one, exemplified in [3:90] through [3:93] below.

	PROXIMATE	DISTANT
TIME	here	there
SPACE	now	then

[3:90]

I'm at work;
bring it here.

[3:91]

He's a bit off.
— You're right there.

[3:92]

It's past noon;
do it now.

[3:93]

I got a computer in 88;
writing was harder before then.

Blogger Comments:

[1] On the one hand, Location and Manner are experiential functions, not textual functions.  On the other hand, Martin's network for this discussion, Fig. 3.16, is instead concerned with Extent and Manner, and does not account for Location.

[2] As previously demonstrated, throughout this chapter on 'reference as semantic choice', Martin misinterprets textual reference as ideational denotation — where the ideational denotation, also contrary to SFL theory, is of meanings transcendent of language.

[3] To be clear, Martin's unit of IDENTIFICATION, the entry condition to his system of IDENTIFICATION is 'participant'.  The switch to circumstances here thus creates a fundamental inconsistency in the model that is not addressed.  Martin's network for this discussion, Fig. 3.16, lacks an entry condition to disguise this anomaly.

[4] To be clear, given that the 'point of departure for this chapter has been participant identification', the reason for excluding nominal groups like that guy there from that discussion does not ring true. 

[5] Contrary to Martin's claim, the temporal demonstratives do not refer.  Halliday (1985: 294):

The temporal demonstratives now and then also function as cohesive items, but conjunctively rather than referentially.

[6] To be clear, 'reminding phoricity' is Martin's rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) co-reference, demonstrative and personal.

[7] This confuses experiential location with textual location.  As reference items, here and there only refer endophorically, anaphorically or cataphorically.  Examples provided by Halliday (1985: 294) include:

So here's a question for you.  How old did you say you were?

… she said: "but it wouldn't be all the better his being punished".  "You're wrong there, at any rate," said the Queen.

[8] Martin's paradigm is actually just part of the larger set of systematic distinctions devised by Halliday (1985: 295), reproduced in Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 629) as:

 

[9] Trivially, these terms are in reverse order.

[10] To be clear, this is not a referential use of here.  See [7] above.

[11] As mentioned above in [5], temporal demonstratives do not refer, but can function in another cohesive system, conjunction.  In Martin's second example, [3:93], this is the function of the conjunctive Adjunct before then.  In Martin's first example, [3:92], however, now simply serves as a circumstantial Adjunct.

Eight Problems With Martin's Nine Notes To His Analysis Of Text [3:89]

Martin (1992: 151):

Information presumed through text reference and extended reference is not shown in the diagram, but is taken up in the following notes; information indirectly presumed by another time, last time and lighter (in [3:89:xxii]) is similarly treated. …

1.  Both of the potential participants (the sacks and the sugar) in this Pre-Numerative structure are presumed in [3:89].
2.  that presumes the projection that the sacks were much lighter than they were before as a fact (text reference).
3.  that again presumes the same projection as a fact (text reference).
4.  Another time is another setting in time marker, presuming the previous episode via bridging.
5.  Last time — again, setting in time, bridging from the previous episode.
6.  lighter — than they were in xviii; involving bridging as the relevant information about the sacks' weight was implicit there.
7.  it presumes he went in the stream as an act (extended reference).
8.  that presumes the projection that the sacks got ver heavy as a fact (text reference).
9.  that presumes an indefinite amount of information here as a fact — minimally clauses xxxii through xxv, but probably the whole story, especially if xxxii and xxxviii are taken as Coda as far as narrative structure is concerned (see Chapter 7 below).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This might be taken to suggest that this diagrammatic technique is an inadequate means of representing reference chains.

[2] To be clear, these "potential participants" are the Head (sacks) and Thing (sugar) of the nominal group realising the actual participant (Goal) some sacks of sugar.

[3] To be clear, only sacks serves in the (extended) Numerative structure; sugar serves as Thing.

[4] To be clear, Martin's distinction between participant reference and text reference clearly demonstrates that participant reference means Frege's reference: the ideational denotation of meanings outside the text.

[5] To be clear, the reference here is comparative, and made by the reference item another.  Martin's rebranding of comparative reference is 'relevance phoricity', which is overlooked here.

[6] As previously explained, Martin's "bridging" is a confusion of grammatical reference and lexical cohesion.

[7] To be clear, the nominal group last time, which serves as a circumstance, not participant, contains no reference items.

[8] To be clear, here lighter is an instance of lexical cohesion, repeating an item in [xiv] that makes structural cataphoric comparative reference: lighter than they were before.

Eight Problems With Martin's Six Notes To His Analysis Of Text [3:88]

Martin (1992: 150):

1.  the glass jar — the first example of addition in the text; the presumed information is neither directly recoverable nor implied.
2.  the next morning — in narrative, setting in time often involves relevance phoricity of this kind, bridging from the setting in time here by lying in bed asleep.
3.  the window — bridged from laying at the bottom of his bed, implying a room with a window.
4.  the woods — apparently bridged from came out; introducing this participant non-phorically was not felt appropriate by most children (cf. there was a woods out the back and…)
5.  the next minute — setting in time bridging as in note 2 above.
6.  the water — the second example of addition in the text; the identity of this participant is not recoverable from the co-text.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL theory, these are instances of homophoric demonstrative reference, which is not cohesive, made by the reference item the.

[2] As previously explained, this sense of "addition" is derived from confusing the experiential construal of participants with the textual reference to referents. The theoretical inconsistency is one of metafunction.

[3] To be clear, in SFL theory, these are circumstances (Location: time), not participants.

[4] To be clear, there is no "relevance phoricity here".  As previously explained, 'relevance phoricity' is Martin's rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) comparative reference, and the next morning includes no comparative reference items.

[5] As previously explained, Martin's "bridging" is a confusion of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) reference and lexical cohesion, both misunderstood.

[6] Even if this made sense, lying in bed asleep does not appear in the text.

[7] If laying at the bottom of his bed implies "a room with a window", the linguistic explanation for the implication lies in the cohesive use lexical relations: bed and window are co-meronyms of 'bedroom' (a hyponym of 'room' and a meronym of 'house', 'hotel, 'motel' etc.).

[8] It is understandable if most children felt there was a woods inappropriate, since a is singular, whereas woods is plural.  The appropriate form, in this instance, would be either 'a wood' or 'woods'.

The Analysis Of Text [3:88]: An Attempt To Hide A Theoretical Inconsistency

Martin (1992: 147):

The reference structure of [3:88] is presented in Fig. 3.14. … The two participants in possessive nominal groups are aligned with their respective chains with a dotted line showing that the identity of the participant realised in the Thing is recoverable via the participant by which it is possessed (e.g. his bed in [3:88i]).  Where the Thing participant has already been identified (as with his pet frog in 3:88xxvii]), it is shown as well as presuming preceding items in this chain.  Note that the analyses of reference structure consist only of phoric items and any non-phoric items they presume; non-phoric items which are not included since they do not enter into semantic dependencies related to participant identification.  In [3:88] only four minor participant chains, the glass, the rock, the reindeer and the baby frogs are introduced non-phorically.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is inconsistent with both Martin's own model and SFL theory, according to which, a participant is realised by a nominal group, not the Thing (bed) of a nominal group.

[2] This is inconsistent with both Martin's own model and SFL theory, according to which, a participant is realised by a nominal group, not the Deictic (his) of a nominal group.  The function of the inconsistency is to hide the fact that Martin's model, in mistaking nominal groups (e.g. his bed) for reference items (e.g. his), necessarily leads to the nominal groups Tommy, he and his bed all realising the same identity.

[3] To be clear, Martin has, to this point, used the term 'phoric nominal group'.  In switching to the term 'phoric item', Martin signals that he is aware of the problem that arises from mistaking a nominal group for a reference item, and hopes to hide that fact from the reader.

[4] Trivially, unknown to Martin, there is a fifth minor participant chain that fits his criterion:

a hollow tree

↑

the tree

The Re-Initiation Of Generic Reference Chains

Martin (1992: 145-6):

Finally, a comment on generic chains.  The second paragraph of [3:16] above has been extended to illustrate the way in which these chains are re-initiated each time a non-phoric nominal group is used to realise the generic group in question.  The group cool deserts does this twice in the extended version of [3:16].  Recalling that the is not phoric in generic groups, this is a common textual pattern.

[3:16]

…Cool deserts are found further polewards in the deep interiors of large continents like Eurasia or where mountains form rain-shadows, which keep out rain bearing winds that might otherwise bring wet conditions… [For much of the year they may not look like deserts because they are lightly covered with snow.  But the snow is not very deep and because it does not melt and run off gives a false impression of how wet cool deserts are.  In winter they simply save whatever precipitation they get.  Cool deserts can in fact be every bit as dry as the Sahara and some of them are even drier.]

This means that as far as reference structure is concerned, [3:16] includes three independent chains, all realising the same generic participant.  Since cool deserts is not a phoric group, it cannot be shown to depend on previous realisations of this participant; but the chains can be aligned directly under one another by way of showing that the same participant is being realised, though not continuously presumed.  This strategy brings out the experiential similarity between generic and specific chains alongside their textual differences.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, the distinction between generic and specific reference, which Martin (1992: 103) defines as: 

Generic reference is selected when the whole of some experiential class of participants is at stake rather than a specific manifestation of that class …

though labelled as a relation of delicacy (generic vs specific), confuses part-whole relations ('whole') with token-type relations ('manifestation of a class'), the former, the extending logical relation of composition, the latter, an elaborating logical relation of instantiation; see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 145-6).

[2] The claim here is that a nominal group breaks a reference chain of the participant it realises simply because it doesn't include a reference item itself.  Even in terms of Martin's model, where a reference chain is a chain of nominal groups denoting the same identity, this is is nonsensical, since the presence or absence of the has no bearing on the identity of the participant being realised.

In terms of SFL theory, each of the six highlighted personal reference items in [3:16] — they they they they them— makes anaphoric reference to cool deserts.

[3] This again misunderstands ideational denotation ("realising participants") as textual reference.

[4] This is manifestly untrue.  Whenever the appears in a "generic" nominal group, such as the cool deserts, it is either homophoric, anaphoric or cataphoric (including Martin's "esphoric", as in the cool deserts we talked about earlier).

[5] This is a bare assertion, made without evidence from corpora, based on a falsehood; see [4].

[6] To be clear, no argument has been made for why a reference chain can be interpreted as a structure.  In the source of Martin's ideas, Hasan (1985: 84), such cohesive chains are not presented as structures.  Moreover, a structure is the internal syntagmatic organisation of a unit, such as the Theme^Rheme structure of a clause, whereas Martin's structure is a succession of related units (participants).

[7] This again mistakes nominal groups ("phoric") for reference items.

Misrepresenting Halliday & Hasan On Reference

Martin (1992: 145):

Except for structural cataphora (esphora), the chains are neutral with respect to grammatical structure; semantic dependency is noted between between items irrespective of clause or sentence boundaries.  The analysis of reference contrasts in this respect with that exemplified in Halliday and Hasan (1976: 340-55), which looks at cohesive ties between, not within, sentences. Here , as far as participant identification is concerned, the discourse structure of [3:85], [3:86] and [3:87] is treated as identical.

[3:85]

The boy was tired.
However, he kept looking.

[3:86]

Although the boy was tired,
he kept looking.

[3:87]

The boy kept looking in spite of his fatigue.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is doubly misleading; see two earlier misleading statements in this regard (p19) here and here.

Firstly, in SFL theory, reference is, of course, "neutral with respect to grammatical structure" because, as a system of cohesion, it is not a structural relation.  Halliday & Hasan (1976: 8, 14):

Cohesive relations have in principle nothing to do with sentence boundaries. … Cohesion as we have said is not a structural relation; hence it is unrestricted by sentence boundaries …

Secondly, the reason why the text analyses in Halliday & Hasan (1976: 340-55) focus on referential relations between sentences was clarified by them (1976: 9), as already quoted by Martin (p19):

it is the intersentence cohesion that is significant, because that represents the variable aspect of cohesion, distinguishing one text from another.

The two sentences that immediately follow this excerpt in Halliday & Hasan (ibid.) — but which Martin omitted — are:

But this should not obscure the fact that cohesion is not, strictly speaking, a relation 'above the sentence'.  It is a relation to which the sentence, or any other form of grammatical structure, is simply irrelevant.

The reader can decide whether Martin's misrepresentation of Halliday & Hasan is merely accidental, or, rather, deliberate and strategic.

[2] To be clear, nowadays in SFL, the sentence is construed as a graphological unit rather than a lexicogrammatical one.

[3] To be clear, in the source of Martin's ideas, Halliday & Hasan (1976), all three texts display instances of anaphoric personal co-reference, contrary to the false implication of Martin.

[4] As previously demonstrated for another example, this analysis is inconsistent with Martin's model of participant identification as a relation between nominal groups.  On Martin's model, the relation obtains between the boy and his fatigue, which demonstrates the absurdity that results from mistaking nominal groups for reference items.

A Misleading Analysis Of "Instantial Reference"

Martin (1992: 144-5):

Finally instantial reference needs to be considered. Where the ideational resources of the grammar (identifying clauses or nominal group apposition) are used to identify participants, the dependency line connecting them in reference chains can be assigned the valence INST.  Instantial reference often has the effect of conjoining chains, as in [3:84] below.

[3:84]

The boy was looking for his frog

he eventually found one

but he didn't realise

it was his frog.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, Martin's notion of "instantial reference" is his misunderstanding of Hasan's (1984, 1985) 'instantial semblance', which is a type of lexical cohesion, not reference.  Hasan (1985: 81):

All lexical cohesive devices discussed above are general in nature.  For example, the relation of synonymy between lady and woman is a general fact of English.  There are cohesive devices that are entirely specific to a single text, for example, those of INSTANTIAL SEMBLANCE as in all my pleasures are like yesterdays (Hasan 1984).

To be clear, all co-reference, personal (he, her, its etc.) and demonstrative (the, this, those etc.), is necessarily instantial.

[2] To be clear, the reference in this text constructed by Martin is as follows:

• the: demonstrative homophoric
• his: personal anaphoric to the boy
• he: personal anaphoric to the boy
• he: personal anaphoric to the boy
• it: personal anaphoric to one and cataphoric to his frog
• his: personal anaphoric to the boy

There is no "conjoining" of reference chains; but see [3] below.

[3] There are three serious problems with Martin's analysis.

Firstly, the analysis violates Martin's own model, which treats reference as a (structural) relation between nominal groups realising participants. On this basis, the first and last items in the chain should be his frog, not his.  However, such an analysis would expose a serious flaw in the model, since his frog and he are different participants.

Secondly, the analysis misrepresents a relation of lexical cohesion (the repetition of frog) as an instance of reference.  This can be seen as an attempt to hide the flaw in the model, identified in the previous paragraph.

Thirdly, it misrepresents the "instantial" reference — the cataphoric reference of it to his frog — as an anaphoric reference of frog to it.

Redundancy Phoricity: A System With No Structural Realisation

Martin (1992: 144):

Note that redundancy phoricity is not taken as contributing to the structure of reference chains, since it is not concerned with presuming the identity of participants, but simply with presuming some aspect of their experiential meaning.  Substitution and ellipsis at group rank is thus more appropriately treated as an aspect of lexical cohesion…

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, redundancy phoricity is Martin's rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) cohesive system of substitution and ellipsis, misunderstood as a type of reference, and relocated from lexicogrammar to Martin's discourse semantics stratum.

[2] To be clear, here Martin proposes a system (paradigmatic axis) that has no structural realisation (syntagmatic axis).

[3] This is misleading, because it is manifestly untrue, since the substitution and ellipsis is of wording, not experiential meaning (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 635-6).  Moreover, the elements subject to substitution and ellipsis are identified in terms of the interpersonal metafunction (ibid.).  So, in terms of Martin's discourse semantics as 'meaning beyond the clause', this is neither meaning nor beyond the clause.

[4] On the one hand, as the terms 'group rank' and 'lexical cohesion' make clear, this is lexicogrammar misrepresented as discourse semantics.  On the other hand, Martin recommends treating redundancy phoricity as the discourse semantic counterpart of grammatical reference (IDENTIFICATION) when the ellipsis–&–substitution occurs at clause rank, but as the discourse semantic counterpart of lexical cohesion (IDEATION) when the ellipsis–&–substitution occurs at group rank.

∞

Main Points:

• redundancy phoricity is not the semantic counterpart of reference;
• redundancy phoricity has no structural realisation;
• redundancy phoricity is not meaning beyond the clause.

Martin claims:

• substitution and ellipsis at clause rank is grammatical reference (his IDENTIFICATION);
• substitution and ellipsis at group rank is lexical cohesion (his IDEATION).

Reminding Phoricity, Relevance Phoricity And Bridging Clarified

Martin (1992: 144):

It remains to propose a notation for distinguishing relevance from reminding phoricity and direct presumption from bridging.  Reminding phoricity and direct presumption can be taken as the unmarked cases, requiring no special notation; relevance phoricity and bridging can then be marked as valences on the dependency line connected [sic] presuming to presumed.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, relevance phoricity is Martin's rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) comparative reference, misunderstood and relocated from lexicogrammar to Martin's discourse semantics stratum.

[2] To be clear, reminding phoricity is Martin's rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) demonstrative and personal reference, misunderstood and relocated from lexicogrammar to Martin's discourse semantics stratum.

[3] To be clear, Martin's bridging is a confusion of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) lexicogrammatical systems of reference and lexical cohesion, proposed as a discourse semantic system.

Participant Chains Of Non-Participants

Martin (1992: 143):

Cataphoric reference almost always presumes text, rather than participants; this can be entered into the participant chain where room is available, or simply indexed to the relevant portion of the text being analysed.

Blogger Comments:

On the one hand, the notion of a participant chain is invalidated by any 'links' in that chain that are not participants.  

On the other hand, given that participants are part of the text, the distinction between 'text' and 'participant' discloses that Martin conceives of participants as meanings outside the text (Frege's Bedeutung or 'referent') rather than as meanings in the semantic sense (Frege's Sinn or 'sense').  This is inconsistent with the epistemological foundation of SFL theory, whereby all meaning is conceived of as immanent, within semiotic systems, rather than transcendent of them.

Identifying 'The Cat' With 'Her Dinner'

Martin (1992: 142):

Where chains are initiated exophorically or homophorically this raises the question of how to analyse subsequent mentions of the same participant.  The most economical strategy is to code the first member of the chain as exophoric or homophoric and subsequent realisations as anaphoric.  It then follows from the way the chain initiating item is coded that the rest of the realisations in the chain are interpretable as both anaphoric and exophoric or homophoric as well.  This strategy is illustrated for [3:80] and [3:81] below.

[3:80]

Pass me that one, will you?
— Here, take it.
You've been drooling over it for more than an hour.

[3:81]

Is the cat in?
— Yes, she's upstairs;
get her dinner out, will you?

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses ideational denotation (construing a participant) with textual reference (referring to a participant).

[2] This confuses ideational denotation (realising a participant) with textual reference (referring to a participant).

[3] This demonstrates the absurdity that results from mistaking nominal groups for reference items.  Here Martin's model identifies the participant her dinner with the participant the cat.  In SFL theory, it is the reference item her that refers anaphorically to the cat.

A Fatal Theoretical Flaw And Misrepresenting Du Bois (1980)

Martin (1992: 142):

As noted in 3.1 above, first mentions of participants in discourse are commonly phoric.  Exophoric and homophoric first mention is quite common; parts and possessions are typically introduced via possessive Deictics; and bridging is favoured where the identity of a participant can be indirectly presumed.  As DuBois (1980:254) comments, "the definite article is the unmarked member of the pair.  When consciousness is not focussed on the task of introducing characters, it is the unmarked the which is uttered, whether or not the initial mention is in fact identifiable."  It may be that Dubois' data has been biassed in this way by its re-telling context — that of speakers recounting the plot of a short film they have just seen.  But it's certainly true that the principle of introducing participants phorically where possible is a very general one across a wide range of English texts.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, by this, Martin simply means that the first occurrence of an instantial participant is usually realised by a nominal group whose Deictic is realised by the definite article (phoric = Martin's presuming reference) rather than the indefinite article (non-phoric = Martin's presenting reference).

[2] It will be seen that, in Martin's model, where the identification is between participants, possessive Deictics wrongly identify possessors with possessions, as demonstrated by:

Jim gets a lot of things wrong, and so do his students.

Here Jim and his students, on Martin's model, are necessarily identified as the same participant. This demonstrates most clearly the absurd consequences that arise from mistaking nominal groups for reference items.

[3] As previously demonstrated, Martin's "bridging" confuses lexical cohesion with reference.

[4] On the one hand, this deliberately misrepresents Du Bois (1980: 254), whose view on the relative frequencies of definite and indefinite articles in this regard derives from a corpus of one million words: 

In either such case (premature introduction or late introduction), the initial mention receives the definite article instead of the expected indefinite article. This suggests that the definite article is the unmarked member of the pair. When consciousness is not focussed on the task of introducing characters, it is the unmarked the which is uttered, whether or not the initial mention is in fact identifiable. There are other reasons to consider the unmarked, among them sheer frequency. In a corpus of one million words of written English, the definite article was by far the most common word, with 69,971 occurrences; whereas the indefinite article (a ~ an) had only 26,984 occurrences (Kucera and Francis, 1967:5).

On the other hand, it should be pointed out that Martin adopted the same strategy as Du Bois (1980), in as much as the data for this chapter — text [3:88] (p147) — is a child's retelling of a published story.  A significant difference, however, is that, in almost every case in the chapter's exposition, Martin has ignored this text and instead used his own constructed examples involving characters from that text.

Mistaking Nominal Groups For Reference Items

Martin (1992: 141-2):

Again, the dependency relations in the chain are worked out in accordance with the principle that anaphoric items are related backwards once to the item last realising or presuming the information they presume; thus [in 3:79] the boy in the fifth clause and the dog in the sixth are shown to presume they in the fourth.

[3:79]

The boy and the dog woke up
and saw that the frog was missing.
with the boy leading the way [sic]

They headed off for the woods,
with the boy leading the way
and the dog following behind him.

Blogger Comments:

This continues the mistaking of nominal groups for reference items, on the basis of theoretical misunderstandings previously identified in this chapter review.  In the fourth clause of this text constructed by Martin, the reference item they makes anaphoric personal co-reference to first-mentioned boy and dog.  In the fifth clause, it is the reference item the that makes anaphoric demonstrative co-reference to first-mentioned boy, and in the sixth clause, it is the reference item the that makes anaphoric demonstrative co-reference to first-mentioned dog.