Wednesday, 18 May 2016

Misunderstanding Orders Of Experience

Martin (1992: 514-6):
it is important to stress that the [mode] distinctions drawn here are semiotic, not material ones.*  It is obviously just as possible to write dialogue (drama) as it is to sit monologuing with a friend; similarly both dialogue and stream of consciousness appear in books, but both types of meaning are radically different from their surrounding semiosis.  The physical channel itself is not the point of mode.  Mode is a semiotic construct and functions in our culture as a resource for constructing interaction.  It is difficult to label mode features without slipping into realism.  The network above is nevertheless a system of meaning, not a classification of modern technologies of communication (which in the model being developed here would be the responsibility of field).
* Endnote #15 (p589):
Hasan (1985/9: 58) distinguishes between medium (semiosis) and channel (substance) to make a closely related point.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL theory, mode is a dimension of context, and context is the culture construed as a semiotic system.  The rest of this quote demonstrates that Martin does not understand what it means to construe mode as semiotic, rather than material, as will be explained below.

[2] This is misleading on two counts.  Firstly, Martin's glosses of Hasan's medium vs channel as semiosis vs substance misrepresents Hasan's model.  As dimensions of mode, both are semiotic systems.  Secondly, by claiming (falsely) that Hasan makes a related point to the one Martin is making, Martin gives the false impression that his (mis)understanding is aligned with, and supported by, Hasan's work.

[3] This distinction is presented as if it demonstrates the way in which mode distinctions are semiotic rather than material — presumably because different modes can be associated with the same material setting.  

However, there is an important distinction being neutralised here — between different orders of experience.  "Monologuing" with a friend is first-order experience, whereas a dialogue between characters in a drama is second-order experience with respect to its author and his friend.

[4] The notion of "monologuing with a friend" — rather than dialoguing — suggests either that the friend doesn't get a word in, or that each speaker is talking past the other, creating entirely separate texts.  This is not the first time that Martin has misunderstood the distinction between monologue and dialogue; evidence here.

[5] The distinction between "dialogue and stream of consciousness in books" and "their surrounding semiosis" is between different orders of experience.  "Their surrounding semiosis" is first-order experience, whereas "dialogue and stream of consciousness in books" is second-order experience with respect to "their surrounding semiosis".

[6] Here Martin is purporting to demonstrate that mode is semiotic rather than material.  However, the two examples he provides involve distinctions in orders of experience, and are presented inconsistently.  The first example neutralises the difference between them (see [3] above), whereas the second example acknowledges the difference without recognising the nature of the difference (see [5] above).

[7] More accurately, mode is a dimension of culture as a semiotic system.

[8] More accurately, mode enables both field and tenor (context), just as textual meaning enables both ideational and interpersonal meaning (semantics), and textual wording enables both ideational and interpersonal wording (lexicogrammar).


More broadly, SFL maintains that all experience is construed as meaning.  For there to be meaning, there must be experience available for construal.

[10] The system of mode is a semiotic system, but, in terms of stratification — the levels of symbolic abstraction — it is a system of context (culture), not meaning (semantics).

[11] Field is the ideational dimension of context: the field of activity and the subject matter with which it is concerned — 'what’s going on, and what is it about?' (Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 320).  A classification of modern technologies of communication, on the other hand, is the ideational meaning that realises a field.

Tuesday, 17 May 2016

Misunderstanding Bakhtin's 'Dialogic' And 'Heteroglossic'

Martin (1992: 513):
This dialogic* perspective on writing is outlined in Fig. 7.7.
*Endnote #13 (p589):
Dialogic is used here in opposition to monologic referring to the extent to which the text involves turn-taking.  This is not to be confused with Bakhtin's use of the term to refer to texts as heteroglossic, weaving together several discourses.

Blogger Comment:

This misunderstands Bakhtin's terms 'dialogic' and 'heteroglossic'.  The glossary provided in Bakhtin (1981: 428, 426) clarifies each term and the distinction between them:
HETEROGLOSSIA
The base condition governing the operation of meaning in any utterance. It is that which insures the primacy of context over text. At any given time, in any given place, there will be a set of conditions — social, historical, meteorological, physiological — that will insure that a word uttered in that place and at that time will have a meaning different than it would have under any other conditions; all utterances are heteroglot in that they are functions of a matrix of forces practically impossible to recoup, and therefore impossible to resolve. Heteroglossia is as close a conceptualisation as is possible of that locus where centripetal and centrifugal forces collide; as such, it is that which a systematic linguistics must always suppress.

DIALOGISM
Dialogism is the characteristic epistemological mode of a world dominated by heteroglossia. Everything means, is understood, as a part of a greater whole — there is a constant interaction between meanings, all of which have the potential of conditioning others. Which will affect the other, how it will do so and in what degree is what is actually settled at the moment of utterance. This dialogic imperative, mandated by the pre-existence of the language world relative to any of its current inhabitants, insures that there can be no actual monologue. One may, like a primitive tribe that knows only its own limits, be deluded into thinking there is one language, or one may, as grammarians, certain political figures and normative framers of "literary languages" do, seek in a sophisticated way to achieve a unitary language. In both cases the unitariness is relative to the overpowering force of heteroglossia, and thus dialogism.

Blurring Distinctions

Martin (1992: 510-1):
Two-way visual context [contact?] means that any attendant semiosis that is realised visually can be brought into play (kinesics, proxemics, the social action in which the speaker/listener dyad is engaged and so on).  This increases the potential for a text to depend on its material context, as part of the accompaniment to what is going on.

Blogger Comment:

This confuses two distinct notions in SFL theory:
  1. the rôle of language as constitutive or ancillary (mode), and
  2. the relevance of the material setting in manifesting the (semiotic) context of situation.

Halliday (2007 [1991]: 278):
The setting, on the other hand, is the immediate material environment. This may be a direct manifestation of the context of situation, and so be integrated into it: if the situation is one of, say, medical care, involving a doctor and one or more patients, then the setting of hospital or clinic is a relevant part of the picture. But even there the setting does not constitute the context of situation …

Monday, 16 May 2016

Not Acknowledging Hasan As Intellectual Source

Martin (1992: 510):
In effect, mode is the semiotic construction of communication technology. As far as interpersonal space is concerned, what is critical is the way in which various channels of communication affect the kind of interaction that is possible between speaker and listener. This is conditioned by the kind of feedback that is possible, depending on whether or not the speaker and listener can see each other and at the same time whether or not they can hear each other.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, communication technology provides the material means of expanding the semiotic system of mode.

[2] The unacknowledged source of these ideas is Hasan (1985/9: 58):
The second factor to be considered under mode is that of PROCESS SHARING.  Is the addressee able to share the process of text creation as it unfolds, or does the addressee come to the text when it is a finished product?  Here again, there are degrees of process sharing from the most active — as in dialogue — to the most passive — as in a formal lecture.  The degree to which process sharing can occur is closely related to CHANNEL. … The first channel I will call PHONIC, the second GRAPHIC.

At the memorial to honour the life and work of Ruqaiya Hasan, Martin accused Hasan — falsely — of not having acknowledged her sources.  Evidence here.

Sunday, 15 May 2016

Misunderstanding Mode

Martin (1992: 509-10):
Experientially mode mediates the semiotic space between action and reflection. Exemplifying again from [4:2], for the most part this text is constitutive of its field, which it generalises as an abstract procedure.  For this reason the processes are for the most part timeless (i.e. simple present tense in English) and the participants involve generic or generalised reference.  From [4:17tt] however, through to [4:17bbb], the text shifts its mode and becomes dependent on another text — the imaginary representation of the showing area on the coffee table to which the speaker refers exophorically: here, that way, like that, over there.  Correspondingly, the tense shifts as well, from simple present to present in present (is standing), as it has occasionally elsewhere in the text ([4:2e, h, j, z, gg]).  The text in other words becomes more dependent on its contextmore a part, and less purely constitutive of what is going on.  Putting this in general terms, mode mediates contextual dependency — the extent to which a text constructs or accompanies its field.

17.
tt.

So, if your judge is standing here,

uu.

we walk away from him that way.
18
vv.

That is [[so the judge can get the hind movement of your dog]].
19.
ww.

Then we usually walk sideways like that

xx.

so as he can see [[the dog moving all over]]

yy.

and then we walk back to the judge

zz.

so as he can see the front movement.
20.
aaa.

After that he usually tells you

bbb.

to wait over there


Blogger Comments:

[1] The notion that mode "mediates" is mistaken and leads to multiple confusions, as shown in previous posts.  To be clear, one of the dimensions of mode is the cline from language in action to language in reflection (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 354).

[2] The text does not "generalise" its field as an abstract procedure.  In terms of mode (Martin's genre) the text is a recount of a (concrete) procedure.  In terms of field, the subject matter of the text is dog shows.

[3] A text does not 'shift its mode' when it is accompanied by gestures.  A spoken text ± gestures is a spoken text.

[4] The spoken text is not dependent on the gestures that accompany it.  The truth is the exact opposite: it is the gestures that are dependent on the spoken text for their interpretation.  The independence of the spoken text is demonstrated by the intelligibility of the written version — exophoric references notwithstanding.

[5] This claim is not supported by the data.  Of the three instances of exophoric reference, the tense changes only once: in the first.

[6] This misconstrues synonymy (part /constitutive) as antonymy (more a part /less constitutive).

Saturday, 14 May 2016

Misconstruing A Dialogic Response As Monologue

Martin (1992: 509):
Interpersonally, mode mediates the semiotic space between between monologue and dialogue.  Text [4:2] for example begins as a conversation (What do you have to do… — Well…) but unfolds as a monologue [4:2c-hhh].  The interview genre in other words involves changes in mode — from dialogue to monologue and back to dialogue again. As is typical of textual meaning the changes manifest themselves as a kind of wave.  Putting this in general terms, mode mediates NEGOTIATION

[4:2]
Question:

1.
a.

What do you have to do in the showing area,


b.

with the dog on the lead?

Response

2.
c.

Well, you always walk


d.

with the dog on the left-hand side,


e.

the reason being is [[the judge is standing in the centre of the ring]].

3.
f.

So, therefore, you need to get yourself between your dog and the judge.

4.
g.

The dog (!) must be able to see the dog at all times.

5.
h.

So, usually when a class is going into the ring,


i.

the first thing he does is:





Blogger Comments:

[1] Mode does not "mediate"; see previous critique.  Monologue and dialogue are opposing features in the system of mode, (textual metafunction, context stratum); negotiation is Martin's interpersonal system on the discourse semantics stratum.

[2] The claim here is that whenever an interviewer asks a question of an interviewee, the text is dialogic, but when the interviewee answers, the text is monologic.  This confuses responses in a dialogue — though not questions — with monologue.  A dialogue is a conversational exchange between two or more people, whereas a monologue is the text of a single speaker.

Friday, 13 May 2016

Misrepresenting Mode

Martin (1992: 509):
As with textual meaning in general, mode is concerned with symbolic reality — with texture. Since symbolic reality (i.e. text/process) has the function of constructing social reality, mode is oriented to both interpersonal and experiential meaning. It thus mediates the rôle played by language along two dimensions.


Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is the textual metafunction that is concerned with symbolic reality (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 7-8, 398, 512, 532).

[2] Symbolic reality is neither texture nor text/process.  Texture is the quality of being a text; text/process is the unfolding of the text at the instance pole of the cline of instantiation during logogenesis.

[3] Symbolic reality does not have the function of constructing social reality.  Moreover, the term 'social reality' blurs the distinction between the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions. The ideational metafunction construes a natural reality; the interpersonal metafunction enacts an intersubjective reality.  Symbolic reality is a second-order reality with regard to natural and intersubjective reality (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 398).

[4] Mode is not oriented to interpersonal and experiential meaning.  The textual metafunction is both enabling and second-order with regard to the interpersonal and ideational metafunctions.

[5] Mode does not mediate the rôle played by language along two dimensions (interpersonal and experiential).  The textual metafunction is both enabling and second-order with regard to the interpersonal and ideational metafunctions.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398):
The textual metafunction is second–order in the sense that it is concerned with semiotic reality: that is, reality in the form of meaning.  This dimension of reality is itself constructed by [the] other two metafunctions: the ideational, which construes a natural reality, and the interpersonal, which enacts an intersubjective reality. … The function of the textual metafunction is thus an enabling one with respect to the rest; it takes over the semiotic resources brought into being by the other two metafunctions and as it were operationalises them …
This second–order enabling nature of the textual metafunction is seen both at the level of context, where mode (the functions assigned to language in the situation) is second–order in relation to field and tenor (the ongoing social processes and interactant rôles), and the level of content — the semantics and the lexicogrammar, where the systems of THEME and INFORMATION, and the various types of cohesion, are second–order in relation to ideational and interpersonal systems of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, and the rest.

Thursday, 12 May 2016

Misidentifying Metafunctions

Martin (1992: 508):
Mode refers to the rôle language is playing in realising social action.  Within register, it is the projection of textual meaning, and so is realised primarily through the textual metafunction in language.  Mode thus puts major systems such as TONALITY and TONICITY in phonology, and THEME and INFORMATION (clause), DEIXIS (nominal group), TENSE (verbal group) and SUBSTITUTION and ELLIPSIS (clause and group) in the grammar at risk, and because of their textual orientation impacts on all systems at the level of discourse semantics (NEGOTIATION, IDENTIFICATION, CONJUNCTION and IDEATION).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin's 'register' is a misconstrual of culture (context) as a functional variety of language (register).  In SFL theory, mode is the "projection" of the textual metafunctional principle onto context, in modelling culture as a semiotic system, not the projection of textual meaning.

[2] Information is not a system of the clause.  It is a system of the information unit (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 115).

[3] Deixis is not a textual system of the nominal group.  It is an interpersonal system (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 387).  Deixis functions textually in the cohesive system of reference.

[4] Tense is not a textual system of the verbal group.  Tense is realised by the logical structure of the verbal group (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 398).

[5] Strictly speaking, substitution-&-ellipsis is not a system of the clause and group.  Rank systems are structural.  As a system of cohesion, it is non-structural.  The clause and the group are domains in which it operates.

The other cohesive systems — reference, conjunction and lexical cohesion — are also relevant here, but omitted because Martin has misconstrued them as discourse semantic systems of various metafunctions: identification (textual), conjunction (logical) and ideation (experiential), respectively.

[6] This exemplifies Martin's confusion between text as a semantic unit, and the textual metafunction as a dimension of semiosis.  See [5] above.

Wednesday, 11 May 2016

Two Problems With The Fifth Justification For A Genre Stratum

Martin (1992: 507):
(v) Finally, and critically, there is the question of genre agnation.  The argument here is that social processes are related in ways which complement the valeur determined by looking at them from the perspective of field, mode and tenor alone.  Combinations of field, mode and tenor choices in other words enter into relationships with each other which are more than the sum of their parts; to some extent, genres have a life of their own (see 7.3.2 below).  This argument can only be pursued by formulating networks for field, mode, tenor and genre and demonstrating that the genre network consists of different kinds of opposition to the field, mode and tenor ones.  Consequently, exemplification will be reserved until after the presentation of preliminary field, mode and tenor options below.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The claim here is that text types (genres) are insufficiently identified by the contextual features of field, tenor and mode — which Martin misconstrues as register — and require further specification through systems of a stratum that is more abstract than the culture as semiotic system, but which specifies text structure, which in SFL theory, is located two levels below, at the level of semantics, within language, rather than context.

Further critical analysis "will be reserved" until the networks are presented that claim to demonstrate "that the genre network consists of different kinds of opposition to the field, mode and tenor ones".

[2] To be consistent with Martin's argument, this claim should have been that genres are more than the sum of combinations of field, tenor and mode.

Tuesday, 10 May 2016

Two Problems With The Fourth Justification For A Genre Stratum

Martin (1992: 506):
(iv) Distinguishing genre and register makes it easier to account for differences between the sequential unfolding of text as process and the notion of activity associated with field.  Depending on mode, texts may or may not unfold in the same sequence as the activities they accompany or discuss.  Live commentary on a football match has a different structure to newspaper accounts of the game; the commentary starts at the beginning of the match, the news story with its result.  The commentary and news story differ in staging, and therefore in genre; but they are alike in terms of field — they both reflect the sequence of activities which comprised the game.  Unhooking field from staging makes it possible to show how texts of these kinds are alike and different at the same time.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Martin's "distinguishing genre and register" translates into SFL theory as distinguishing text type and context (field tenor and mode), respectively.  Text type is a point of content plane variation on the cline of instantiation; it is register viewed from the instance pole.  Context is the culture as semiotic system, that is realised in language.  In Martin's model, therefore, a point of content plane variation on the cline of instantiation is construed as a stratum that is realised by the culture as semiotic system.  That is, language is realised by context — an inversion of the stratification hierarchy.

[2] This is already possible without "distinguishing genre and register".  In SFL theory, context (field, tenor and mode) is realised in semantics.  Similar fields are realised by similar ideational meanings; different modes are realised by different textual meanings, including different information flow patterns.

Monday, 9 May 2016

Eight Problems With The Third Justification For A Genre Stratum

Martin (1992: 506):
(iii) Making genre rather than register variables responsible for generating schematic structure makes it easier to handle changes in experiential, interpersonal and textual meaning from one stage to another in a text.  There are many text types where this occurs: a teacher may shift fields to explain a point by analogy; a salesperson will manipulate tenor in order to close a sale; sports commentators shift rhythmically from play to play description to critique and evaluation.  Underlying registergenre can be used to predict these changes, stage by stagewhile at the same time accounting for a text's overall coherence.  Halliday and Hasan's (1976: 23) observation about coherent texts being "consistent in register" cannot in other words be interpreted literally as "the same register throughout"; rather the text must be motivated by its register, changes in which can in turn be motivated by genre.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The use of 'generating' here confuses semogenesis with the realisation relation between the paradigmatic and syntagmatic axes.  The relation of system to structure on a given stratum is one of realisation; system is a higher level of symbolic abstraction than structure.  Generation, on the other hand, is the unfolding of text, logogenesis, at the instance pole of the cline of instantiation.  This is a departure from previous confusions of semogenesis and realisation, which involve the realisation relation between strata, rather than axes.

[2] To be clear, by 'register variables' Martin means the metafunctional systems of context: field, tenor and mode.

[3] The claim here is that contextual changes of field, tenor and mode during the logogenesis of texts are easier to "handle" if the text structure of text types (genres) is modelled as a higher level of symbolic abstraction than the culture as semiotic system. The problems with this model include:
  • one aspect of semantics, text structure, is removed from semantics and relocated to a level even more abstract than context (the culture as a semiotic);
  • the stratification model is reversed: semantics (text structure) is realised by context (field, tenor and mode);
  • cultural context (field, tenor, and mode — misconstrued as register) is modelled as the interface between two levels of language, in Martin's model: between genre and discourse semantics.
[4] Martin's claim that his higher stratum (genre) underlies his lower stratum (register) betrays his misunderstanding of stratification.

[5] This again reverses the relation between strata.  Contextual changes of field, tenor and mode during the logogenesis are realised in changes in text structure at the level of semantics.

[6] The coherence of a text is not accounted for by an incoherent model.

[7] This is misleading in a way that suits Martin's argument.  The interpretation is not Halliday and Hasan's, though Martin's use of quotation marks invites this attribution.

[8] In addition to all the above-mentioned inconsistencies, this presents the relation between strata as one of motivation rather than realisation.  That is, it misconstrues an intensive (elaborating) identifying relation as a circumstantial (enhancing: cause) identifying relation.