On The Ineffability Of Interpersonal Texturing

Martin (1992: 412):

Unlike ideational metaphors, interpersonal metaphors are not so much concerned with packaging information as Theme or New as with what Halliday has described as modal responsibility (1985: 76-8), 1984/1988: 39-45) — they arrange the Mood functions which are appropriate for particular interacts.  Because of its ineffability this interpersonal texturing needs to be explored in context.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Like ideational metaphors, interpersonal metaphors are also concerned with providing alternative groupings of quanta of information, as when modality and speech function are incongruently realised through interpersonal projection (I think, I urge); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 626-7).

[2] To be clear, modal responsibility is carried by the Subject.  As part of identifying the Subject from a trinocular perspective, Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 119) write:

From above, it is that which carries the modal responsibility; that is, responsibility for the validity of what is being predicated (stated, questioned, commanded or offered) in the clause.

The Mood element, on the other hand, functions as the nub of the proposition. Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 120):

Hence the Mood element has a clearly defined semantic function: it carries the burden of the clause as an interactive event. So it remains constant, as the nub of the proposition, unless some positive step is taken to change it…

[3] This is an uncomprehending reference to Halliday's 1984 paper On The Ineffability Of Grammatical Categories.  The word ineffable can also be used attitudinally:

“What ineffable twaddle!” I cried, slapping the magazine down on the table; “I never read such rubbish in my life.”

— Dr. John H. Watson to Sherlock Holmes in Arthur Conan Doyle's A Study In Scarlet

Misrepresenting Metaphors Of Mood

Martin (1992: 413):

Table 6.19. Congruent and metaphorical realisations of interpersonal meanings [4]
mood
proposal:
congruent	command	imperative	come here
	offer	Shall/can I.............	come over
metaphorical	command	obligation	you should…
	offer	inclination	I would…
	command	projection: desire	would you like…
	offer	modulated reaction	I’d love…

Blogger Comments:

[1] In terms of the realisation of speech function by mood choice, the congruent/metaphorical distinction does not obtain for offers, because offers are not grammaticalised in the mood system. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 115):

Offers, in English, are not grammaticalised in the mood system; that is, while the other categories, statements, questions and commands, have corresponding mood categories in the grammar (declarative, interrogative and imperative) offers do not. They may be realised by any of the mood categories; for example:

declarative: I can do the laundry.

interrogative: Shall I do the laundry?

imperative: Let me do the laundry!

Significantly, the indicative clauses realising offers are modulated; they select for an imperative modality of readiness or obligation.

[2] The potential metaphor of mood in each of these instances would be the incongruent realisation of a command (semantics: speech function) in the grammar as indicative mood — declarative and interrogative — instead of imperative mood.

Misconstruing Metaphors Of Mood

Martin (1992: 413):

Table 6.19. Congruent and metaphorical realisations of interpersonal meanings [3]
mood
proposition:
congruent	statement	declarative	He’s here
	question	interrogative	Is he here?
metaphorical	statement	probability	It may be that…
	question	usuality	It is usual that…
	statement	projection	I reckon…
	question	projection	Don’t you think…

Blogger Comments:

[1] Interpersonal metaphors of mood involve

• a speech function (semantics) being realised by a projecting clause (grammar), as in I urge you to… or 
• a speech function (semantics) being realised by an incongruent mood choice (grammar), as when a command is realised by indicative instead of imperative mood; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 626-35).

[2] Interpersonal metaphors involving probability and usuality are metaphors of modality, not metaphors of mood.

[3] This instance of modality combines the congruent grammatical realisation (implicit subjective may) with the metaphorical (explicit objective it's x that).

[4] This is a metaphorical grammatical realisation of modality (modalisation: usuality; explicit objective orientation).

[5] This is a metaphorical grammatical realisation of modality (modalisation: probability; explicit subjective orientation).

Misconstruing Congruent Obligation As Metaphorical Inclination

Martin (1992: 413):

Table 6.19. Congruent and metaphorical realisations of interpersonal meanings [2]
modulation		inclination	obligation
congruent	Modal verb	may	must
metaphorical	Verb complex	be allowed to	be obliged to
	causative Process	allow (x) to do	oblige (x) to do
	Epithet	permissable	necessary
	Thing	permission	necessity
	projecting Process	(I) recommend	(I) insist
	conjunction	in case	so

Blogger Comments:

[1] The congruent realisations of modulation are those of implicit manifestation: the subjective orientation being realised as a finite modal operator (e.g. will, should) and the objective orientation involving a hypotactic verbal group complex (e.g. willing to x, supposed to x); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 513, 517).  Halliday (1994: 82) also lists modal Adjuncts of readiness and obligation.

The metaphorical realisations of modulation are those of explicit manifestation.  For obligation, the subjective orientation is realised as a projecting desiderative mental clause (e.g. I want…) and the objective orientation as an attributive clause with a factual Carrier (e.g. it's expected…).  See Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 613ff).

[2] These are neither inclination nor metaphorical.  Verbal group complexes featuring allowed to x realise implicit objective obligation of low value; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 620-1).

[3] These are congruent, not metaphorical, realisations.  Verbal group complexes featuring obliged to x realise implicit objective obligation of high value.

[4] As Epithet, these serve as Attribute in metaphorical realisations of objective orientation (e.g. it's permissible…, it's necessary…).  In congruent realisations, they can function as Post-Deictic in a nominal group (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 317, 612).  However, permissible expresses low value obligation, not inclination (in contrast to the high value obligation of necessary.)

[5] Some nominalised forms can serve as an objective orientation of modulation, such as as a matter of necessity, but they are intermediate between explicit and implicit manifestation, and so intermediate between metaphorical and congruent.  See Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 615-6). However, permission expresses low value obligation, not inclination (in contrast to the high value obligation of necessity.)

[6] Neither of these functions as a metaphorical (explicit subjective) realisation of modulation.  On the one hand, there is no inclination counterpart for the probability metaphor I think (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 619).  On the other hand, the explicit subjective realisation of modulation is realised by a clause featuring a desiderative mental Process, whereas insist serves as a verbal Process (cf. demand).

[7] The conjunction groups in case and so — both of which can express causal-condition expansion relations — are not metaphorical realisations of inclination and obligation.

Misconstruing Modal Adjuncts As Interpersonal Metaphor

Martin (1992: 412, 413):

Interpersonal metaphors were introduced in Chapter 2 in connection with congruent and metaphorical realisations of SPEECH FUNCTION in MOOD.  Assessments of probability, usuality, inclination and obligation also display a range of diversified realisation.  Some examples of interpersonal grammatical metaphors are reviewed in Table 6.19…

Table 6.19. Congruent and metaphorical realisations of interpersonal meanings [1]
modalisation		probability	usuality
congruent	Modal verb	may	will
metaphorical	Modal Adjunct	possibly	usually
	Epithet	possible	usual
	Thing	possibility	tendency
	relational Process	(suggest)	(predict)
	projecting Process	(I) reckon	(I) predict
	conjunction	if	provided that

Blogger Comments:

[1] See relevant critique here.

[2] The congruent realisations of modalisation are those of implicit manifestation: the subjective orientation being realised as a finite modal operator (e.g. will) and the objective orientation as a modal Adjunct (e.g. probably, usually).  In Table 6.19, the latter are misconstrued as metaphorical instead of congruent.

The metaphorical realisations of modalisation are those of explicit manifestation: the subjective orientation being realised as a projecting cognitive mental clause (e.g. I think…) and the objective orientation as an attributive clause with a factual Carrier (e.g. it's probable…, it's usual…).  See Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 613ff).

[3] As Epithet, these serve as Attribute in metaphorical realisations of objective orientation (e.g. it's possible…, it's usual…).  In congruent realisations, they can function as Post-Deictic in a nominal group (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 612).

[4] Some nominalised forms can serve as an objective orientation of modalisation, such as in all probability, but they are intermediate between explicit and implicit manifestation, and so intermediate between metaphorical and congruent.  See Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 615-6).

[5] The verbs suggest and predict, serving as relational processes, are not metaphorical realisations of probability and usuality.

[6] There is no usuality counterpart for the probability metaphor I think. Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 619):

there are no systematic forms for making the subjective orientation explicit in the case of usuality or inclination (i.e. no coded expressions for 'I recognise it as usual that…' or 'I undertake for … to …'.

[7] The conjunction groups if and provided that — both of which express the expansion relation of positive condition — are not metaphorical realisations of probability and usuality.