Using A Middle Clause To Illustrate Agency

Martin (1992: 488):

The way in which modal responsibility is mapped onto agency may well be a life and death matter, as text [6:53] shows.  Superintendent Harding is explaining why an innocent Aboriginal man has been shot to death during a commando style police raid (in connection with a search for a suspect who has wounded two policemen).  In contrast to the paper's headline, the Superintendent textures the gun as responsible for the killing.

‘Uptight’ police kill man in raid
[6: 53]	(Superintendent Harding)
	a	A struggle took place
	b	and the officer was reacting
	c	to keep the peace
	d	and stop himself or others being hurt.
	e	The gun then discharged.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The clause in question is middle, not effective; there is no agency:

the gun	then	discharged
Medium Actor		Process: material

[2] In terms of "experiential responsibility", the gun was not construed as an Agent by the speaker.  In terms of modal responsibility, as Subject, the gun is the element that the speaker makes responsible for the validity of what he is saying.

the gun	then	discharged
Subject	(conjunctive Adjunct)	Finite	Predicator

Note that according to Martin's misinterpretation of modal responsibility, it is the gun that is the "participant at risk".

[3] In SFL theory, 'texture', the property of being a text, is created by the textual metafunction.  Here it is misapplied to the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions — agency and modal responsibility, respectively.

Misconstruing Modal Responsibility As Speaker At Risk

Martin (1992: 486-7):

This interplay of embedding, taxis and MOOD was exploited in text [6:30] to focus modal responsibility on the sitting member, as analysed above. … So while the member is textured as modally responsible, he is never experientially responsible. Where he could be, in the congruent version of [6:30g] for example, he is realised as the possessor of a nominalised modulation:

My responsibility is to make sure that the life style we enjoy is maintained and improved.

(— Is it?)

… Mapping interpersonal responsibility onto experiential responsibility (i.e. agency) as in the congruent version of [6:30g] places the member rather more at risk:

I must make sure that the life style we enjoy is maintained and improved.

(— Must you?)

It is for this political consideration that the text is structured as an interpersonal massage, rather than an experiential message.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In the said analysis, the modal responsibility of the Subject (metalanguage) was confused with an instance of responsibility in the text (language) projected by the speaker.  Evidence here.

[2] In SFL theory, 'texture', the property of being a text, is created by the textual metafunction.  Here it is misapplied to the interpersonal metafunction — modal responsibility.

[3] Because modal responsibility is interpersonal meaning, the experiential agency of the Subject has no bearing on the interpersonal meaning.  The difference between the two versions of [6:30g] is that in the first, my responsibility carries the responsibility for the the validity of the proposition, whereas, in the second, I (the speaker) carries the responsibility for the the validity of the proposition.  In neither version is the member "at risk" — because that's not what modal responsibility means.

[4] To be clear, in SFL theory, 'message' refers to the semantic unit of the textual metafunction — not the experiential — that is realised in the lexicogrammar as the thematic structure of the clause. 

Using Embedding To Argue About Hypotaxis

Martin (1992: 486):

Subjects in embedded clauses are not however modally responsible, as can be seen from the fact that embedded clauses cannot be  tagged or queried.  Both the tag and the response in [6:51] for example refer unambiguously to the test, not the drug.

[6:51]	(embedding)
	The test proved [[the drug killed her]], didn’t it?
	— Yes it did.

With hypotaxis, the situation is more equivocal; the tag and response in [6:52] may refer either to the test or the drug, although the tag is much more likely to refer to the alpha clause than the beta:

[6:52]	(hypotaxis)
	The test suggested that the drug may have killed her, didn’t it?
	— It did.

So while hypotactically dependent clauses are still negotiable, the Mood element is less likely to be replayed than that of the alpha clause, and their Subject can accordingly be considered less at risk than those of ranking a [alpha?] clauses.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Text [6:52], like text [6:51], involves embedding, not hypotaxis.  It is the Subject of this clause simplex that is picked up by the pronoun in the Mood Tag.

the test	suggested		[[that the drug may have killed her]]	didn’t	it
Token/Identified	Process: identifying		Value/Identifier
Subject	Finite	Predicator	Complement	Finite	Subject
Mood		Residue		Mood Tag

Cf. the receptive agnate: That the drug may have killed her was suggested by the test, wasn't it?

[[that the drug may have killed her]]	was	suggested	by the test	wasn’t	it
Value/Identifier	Process: identifying		Token/Identified
Subject	Finite	Predicator	Adjunct	Finite	Subject
Mood		Residue		Mood Tag

See, for example, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 269, 277, 285).

[2] Here the meaning of Subject, modal responsibility, is misconstrued as meaning "at risk".  In SFL theory, the Subject 'is the element the speaker makes responsible for the validity of what he is saying' (Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 83).

The Argument That "Verbal Processes Are Fundamentally Metaphorical In Nature"

Martin (1992: 483):

This text ([6:50]) is also organised by means of meta-proposals and meta-propositions which refer explicitly to the ongoing negotiation (functioning like the look proposals in [6:48] above). … These meta-proposals and meta-propositions could be interpreted as a type of textual metaphor (the dynamic equivalent of Francis's 1985 A-nouns).  This would however be to argue that verbal processes are fundamentally metaphorical in nature, rather than an ongoing classification of verbal behaviour as part of the experiential world.  When used to orchestrate rather than report on dialogue, this interpretation does not seem too far-fetched.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Meta-proposals and meta-propositions, as proposals and propositions, are language in its interpersonal guise, not its textual guise.  As such, they enact the interpersonal exchange.  They do not organise the text; instead, the textual metafunction organises them.

[2] There are two principal reasons why meta-proposals and meta-propositions can not be treated as a type of textual metaphor:

1. Meta-proposals and meta-propositions are interpersonal meanings, not textual meanings;
2. There is no such thing as textual metaphor (see previous arguments here and here).

[3] To interpret meta-proposals and meta-propositions as textual metaphor is not to argue that verbal processes are fundamentally metaphorical in nature.  This is because to interpret some interpersonal meanings as textual metaphor is not to argue that some experiential meanings are metaphorical.

[4] This seriously misunderstands grammatical metaphor.  Grammatical metaphor is the incongruent realisation of meaning (semantics) in wording (lexicogrammar).  Verbal processes — like anything else — can only be metaphorical by contrast with a congruent realisation.

[5] The alternatives presented here are that verbal processes are either:

• metaphorical, or
• construals of experience.

Grammatical metaphors involving verbal processes are ideational metaphors. Ideational metaphors are reconstruals of experience. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 241):

They constitute a resource for reconstruing experience along certain lines, redeploying the same categories that have evolved in the congruent mode of construing experience.

[6] Even if verbal processes were used to orchestrate text, to interpret them as "fundamentally metaphorical" — especially as opposed to construals of experience — would demonstrate a serious misunderstanding of SFL theory.

Confusing Metafunctions, Misunderstanding Modal Responsibility And Misinterpreting Data

Martin (1992: 477-8):

Text [6:50] is taken from Halliday's (1982) analysis of de-automatisation and interpersonal metaphor in Priestley's An Inspector Calls.  … The participants at risk in [6:50] include the Inspector and members of the Birling family (Mrs Birling, Birling, Sheila) except Gerald, but not the woman they have wronged.  Taking the congruent unpacking of interpersonal metaphor outlined in Table 6.27 as a baseline, the woman wronged is made modally responsible on four occasions ([6:50r, s, nn, qq] — and [6:50nn, qq] are dependent clauses); she is realised four times as often in the Residue. The family (except Gerald) and the Inspector on the other hand are modally responsible as often as not.

Table 6.27. Congruent realisations of interpersonal metaphors in [6:30]
	as subject [modally responsible]	as residue [not modally responsible]
Inspector	d,e,f,g,h,i,y,aa,bb,cc,dd,hh,ii,jj,yy	t,u,x,z,bb,cc
Gerald	rr,ss	c,d,e,f,g,rr,tt
Mrs Birling	j,k,l,m,n,o,p,q,t,u,v,w,x,uu,ww,xx	k,l,v,uu,vv,ww
Birling	z,ee,mm	ff,hh,ii,jj
Sheila	oo,pp,vv	kk
[we ‘Birlings’]	a,b,c,ll,ll
[you ‘parents’]	zz	zz
woman	r,s,nn,qq,d,e,f,g,h,i,o,p,q,	mm,nn,rr,ss,uu,ww

Blogger Comments:

[1] The interpersonal meaning of Subject, modal responsibility, is here misconstrued as experiential meaning: "participants at risk".

[2] This confuses the interlocutors in the play with the pronoun Subjects of the clauses they project.  The words Mrs Birling, (Mr) Birling and Sheila do not serve as the Subject of any of the clauses in the play.  In this discussion of interpersonal meaning, the pronouns are being interpreted experientially, instead of interpersonally.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 525):

If the ideational metafunction is language in its "third person" guise, the interpersonal is language in its “first and second person” guise; the interaction of a ‘me’ and a ‘you’. The ‘me’ and the ‘you’ are of course constructed in language; they have no existence outside the social semiotic. Once constructed, me and you become a part of experience and can be referred to alongside the him, the her and the it; but note that (unlike the interpersonal meaning, which does not change) their ideational meaning changes every time there is a change of speaker (this is what makes me and you so difficult for children to learn).

[3] This contradicts the analysis in Table 6.27, which claims that 'Gerald' serves as Subject twice. Actually, in Martin's terms, 'Gerald' serves as Subject three times: in [b] as I, in [rr] as Gerald, and in [ss] as the ellipsed Subject.

[4] This contradicts the analysis in Table 6.27, which claims that 'the woman they have wronged' serves as Subject thirteen times, and the sentence that follows which claims that she serves as Subject four times.

[5] This contradicts the analysis in Table 6.27, which claims that 'the woman they have wronged' serves as Subject thirteen times.  Actually, in Martin's terms, 'the woman they have wronged' serves as Subject only twice: in [r, qq] as she.

[6] This contradicts the analysis in Table 6.27, which claims that 'the woman they have wronged' serves as Subject thirteen times, and in the Residue six times.  4 x 13 ≠ 6.

[7] This contradicts the analysis in Table 6.27, which claims that

• 'Inspector' serves as Subject fifteen times, but in the Residue only six times (15–6);
• 'Mrs Birling' serves as Subject sixteen times, but in the Residue only six times (16–6);
• 'Sheila' serves as Subject three times, but in the Residue only once (3–1).