The Argument For Comparison As A Major Logical Category

Martin (1992: 203):

Taking into account these textual patterns and the fact that a similar/different opposition is basic to all other discourse semantic systems, comparison will be set up as a major category of conjunctive relation here.  The congruence of the like/unlike opposition across discourse systems is shown below. 

Table 4.11 Contrast and similarity across discourse semantic systems
	“LIKE”	“UNLIKE”
CONJUNCTION	similarity	contrast
IDENTIFICATION	semblance	difference
IDEATION	synonymy	antonymy
NEGOTIATION (Halliday 1985: 69)	accept undertake acknowledge answer	reject refuse contradict disclaim

Blogger Comment:

[1] As demonstrated in previous critiques, the analysis of 'these textual patterns' is compromised by the logical error of confusing different/unlike with contrastive/adversative.

[2] The opposition of similar/different and of like/unlike demonstrates the semantic distinction between adversative (opposition) and dissimilar (different/unlike) — dissimilar is one of the elements in opposition.

[3] Difference is the basis of semiosis itself, not just discourse semantic systems.  Similarity is the basis of agnation, including metaphorical agnation.

Conclusion:  The argument for setting up comparison as a major category of conjunctive relations rests on two misunderstandings:

1. confusing enhancement: manner: comparison with extension: addition: adversative, and
2. presenting a fundamental feature of all semiosis as specific to discourse semantic systems.

Confusing Dissimilar (Enhancement) With Adversative (Extension)

Martin (1992: 202-3):

Consider now a modified version of this part of the interview:

[4:94] a. With the bigger breeds of dog, they're stood on the ground.

          b. With the smaller breeds such as Dachshunds, they're stood on the table.

          c. Likewise breeds with similar stature like the Corgis, all the Toy-breeds, and this type of thing are tabled,

          d. so as the judge can handle them more easily.

This text focusses on similarity as well as difference.  Lexical cohesion (the co-hyponymy of Dachshunds with Corgis and Toy-breeds and the repetition of table (table, tabled), comparative reference (similar stature) and an explicit conjunction (likewise) make the comparison clear.

Halliday and Hasan (1976) treat the contrastive relation in [4:94: a–b] as closely related to concession (under the general adversative category) and the similarity in [4:94: b–c] as a kind of additive.  Halliday (1985) on the other hand treats contrast as related to additive relations under the heading extension and similarity as closely related to temporals and causals under the heading enhancement. …

These interpretations fail to bring out the very similar ways in which IDENTIFICATION and IDEATION participate in the realisation of both contrast and similarity (as exemplified in [4:84sic] above…

Blogger Comment:

This continues the category error of conflating different (dissimilar) with contrastive (adversative).  The logical meaning of dissimilar is N is not like M, whereas the logical meaning of adversative is X and conversely Y.  In SFL theory, the logical relation of dissimilar is a subtype of manner, within enhancement, whereas the logical relation of adversative is a subtype of addition, within extension.  That is, dissimilar and adversative belong to different major categories within expansion.

Confusing Enhancement (Manner: Comparison) With Extension (Adversative Addition)

Martin (1992: 202):

Within the framework of systemic functional approaches to discourse, comparative relations are the most controversial category to be developed here; … they are not treated as a major category of logical relation by either Halliday and Hasan [1976] or Halliday [1985].  To explore this question, it will be useful to return to text [4:2].

[4:2] p. With the bigger breeds of dog, they're stood on the ground,
        q. because it's easier for the judge to handle them.
       r. With the smaller breeds of dog, such as Corgis, all the Toy-breeds, Dachshunds and this type of thing we — as our turn comes,
        s. we stand our dog on the table.

As noted in Section 4.1 above, there is a clear relationship of contrast between p–q and r–s.  This is coded through the comparative reference (bigger vs smaller) and the lexical cohesion (most clearly ground vs table); and the contrast is highlighted by the marked Themes in p and r.  As noted in 4.2.4 above the contrast could have been made explicit in [4:2] with a conjunction such as but.

Blogger Comment:

[1] This confuses two distinct logical relations, whose meanings are N is like M and X and conversely Y.  In SFL theory, the former is classified as enhancement: manner: comparison, and the latter as extension: additive: adversative ('but').

[2] This fundamental confusion is one factor that explains why this approach is "controversial", not least because it undermines the logical validity of what follows.

Misconstruing Positive Condition As Concessive

Martin (1992: 200):

Concessive conditionals can be further subclassified according to the universality of the contingency denied.  Single, alternative and universal concessive contingency is illustrated below:

CONDITIONAL/CONCESSIVE: SINGLE

[4:81]  Even if we get that judge again

            we'll win. 

CONDITIONAL/CONCESSIVE: ALTERNATIVE

[4:81]  Whether we get that judge again or not

            we'll win. 

CONDITIONAL/CONCESSIVE: UNIVERSAL

[4:81]  Whichever judge we get

            we'll win.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Neither the 'alternative' nor the 'universal' agnate involves the logical relation of condition: concessive — if P then contrary to expectation Q.  Both involve the logical relation of positive condition — if P then Q.  Winning is not contrary to expectation under either condition.

[2] This confuses enhancement (condition) with extension (alternation).  Here the logical relation of extension: alternation — X or Y — is realised in the clause nexus forming the condition (whether … or not).

[3] Therefore, the difference between the three conditionals is not "according to the universality of the contingency denied".

Misconstruing Adversative Extension As 'Concessive Purpose'

Martin (1992: 199):

The hypotactic proportionalities can be exemplified as follows:

NON-CONCESSIVE : CONCESSIVE :: 

(MANNER)

Ben improved his time by training hard :

Ben didn't improve his time even by training hard :: 

(CONSEQUENCE)

Ben improved his time because he trained hard :

Ben didn't improve his time even though he trained hard :: 

(CONDITION)

Ben will improve his time if he trains hard :

Ben won't improve his time even if he trains hard :: 

(PURPOSE)

Ben can train hard in order to improve his time :

Ben can train hard without improving his time

Blogger Comments:

In SFL theory, the logical meaning of condition: concessive is if P then contrary to expectation Q.  It may be ordered concession^consequence or consequence^concession.

[1] The logical relation here does not involve manner: means — N is by means of M.  A manner agnate would be Ben didn't improve his time by means of training hard.  The logical relation here is simply condition: concessive as in Ben didn't improve his time even though he trained hard.

[2] The logical relation here does not involve cause: reason (Martin's 'consequence') — because P so result Q.  A reason agnate would be because he trained hard Ben didn't improve his time.  The logical relation here is simply condition: concessive.

[3] The logical relation here does not involve cause: purpose — because intention P so action Q.  The logical relation here is not even a type of enhancement, but the type of extension termed addition: adversative — X and conversely Y — as in the paratactic agnate Ben can train hard and not improve his time.

Misconstruing Concession As Manner

Martin (1992: 198-9):

It remains to consider concessive relations, which will be taken here as crossclassifying manner, consequence, condition and purpose rather than as a fifth consequential category.  The reason for this is that concessives function as a kind of "anti-modulation", cancelling the potentiality or obligation which would otherwise enable or determine the consequential relation between events.

The opposition is illustrated for manner relations in [4:79] and [4:80]; in [4:79] entering the right shows was enough to win, but in [4:80] the enablement is cancelled — entering the right shows was not sufficient to win.

MANNER

[4:79]  By entering the right shows,

            we won. 

MANNER/CONCESSION

[4:80]  Even by entering the right shows,

            we didn't win.

 Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, the logical relation of concession is a type of condition, with the logical meaning of if P then contrary to expectation Q.  As such, it does not cross-classify the other enhancement relations, as demonstrated more fully in tomorrow's posting.

[2] This confuses the logical relation of concessive condition with the interpersonal system of modality.

[3] This confuses interpersonal modality ("enablement") with sufficient conditions — here contrasted with insufficient conditions rather than necessary conditions.

[4] The logical relation here does not involve manner: means — N is by means of M.  A manner agnate would be we didn't win by means of entering the right shows.  The logical relation here is simply condition: concessive as in we didn't win even though we entered the right shows.

Misconstruing A Dependent Clause As A Postmodifier In An Adverbial Group

Martin (1992: 198):

Consequence is also commonly realised referentially, through esphoric comparison as in [4:78]:

[4:78]  We prepared so well [[that we won]].

Blogger Comments:

[1] The clause that we won is not embedded.  Instead, it is a ranking dependent clause in a nexus where the logical relation is cause: result; because P (we prepared so well), so result Q (we won).

we	prepared	so well	that	we	won
a			x b (cause: result)
Actor	Process: material	Manner: quality		Actor	Process: material

[2] The wording so well that we won does not construe comparison (for which, see Halliday & Matthiesen 2004: 357-8).  Adverbial groups with an embedded clause as a Post-modifier which do construe comparison are those like the following:

better	[[than we needed]]
Head	Post-modifier

as in:

we	prepared	better [[than we needed]]
Actor	Process: material	Manner: quality

[3] Consequence is not realised referentially in the instance intended to demonstrate same.  Instead, cause: result is realised as a logical relation between two ranking clauses.

Misconstruing Manner As A Cause-Effect Relation

Martin (1992: 198):

Both manner (whereby, thereby) and consequence (/ ^ so that /) have realisations which apparently make the Effect dependent, but which do not allow the beta-clause to be realised first in the clause complex:

MANNER

[4:76]  We prepared well

            thereby managing to win. 

CONSEQUENCE

[4:77]  We prepared well

            / ^ so that / in the end we won.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The logical relation of manner does not involve an effect of a cause.  The conjunction thereby, however can realise both manner and cause: reason/result.

[2] In both SFL theory and formal logic, the term 'consequence' is used with condition (if P then Q), not with cause: reason/result (because P so result Q). 

Misconstruing Reason And Result As Purpose

Martin (1992: 197):

Degrees of probability are also possible with purposives, but there are only two values, high/median and low:

PURPOSIVE: DESIRE: MODALITY POSSIBLE

[4:74]  We'll enter

            in case we win. 

PURPOSIVE: DESIRE: MODALITY CERTAIN/PROBABLE

[4:75]  We'll enter

            so that we'll win.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses the logico-semantic relation of cause with interpersonal modality values.

[2] This confuses the logical meaning of purpose, because intention Q so action P with desire.

[3] Although this is intended to demonstrate a difference in 'purposives', the logico-semantic relation of cause: purpose is not a feature of either clause nexus.

The logico-semantic relation in the first 'purposive' clause nexus is cause: reason.  The logical meaning is Q because P.  Winning is construed as the reason for entering, not the purpose of entering: we'll enter because we might win. (Hence the interpretation as low probability).

The logico-semantic relation in the second 'purposive' clause nexus is cause: result.  The logical meaning is because P so result Q.  Winning is construed as the result of entering, not the purpose of entering: we'll enter with the result that we'll win.  (Hence the interpretation as high/median probability).

[See Halliday and Matthiessen (1999: 245) for why tying the relator to the effect in cause: result sequences typically implies intentionality.]

The upshot is that the two 'purposive' clause nexuses differ in terms of type of cause — neither of which is purpose.

Confusing Condition With Probability

Martin (1992: 197):

Inclusive conditionals can be further divided into factual and counterfactual; with counterfactuals the beta-clause [omitted verb] an additional secondary [past] tense.

COUNTERFACTUAL

[4:70]  If we had prepared well,

we would have won.

Factual conditionals choose among high, median and low modalisation, according to the probability of the Cause taking place:

FACTUAL: MODALITY POSSIBLE

[4:71]  If we enter

           we'll win. 

FACTUAL: MODALITY PROBABLE

[4:72]  Provided we enter

           we'll win. 

FACTUAL: MODALITY CERTAIN

[4:73]  As long as we enter

           we'll win.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses the logico-semantic relation of condition with the truth values of the meanings realised by the clauses conditionally related in a nexus.

(In formal logic, a counterfactual conditional — in contradistinction to a material conditional — is a subjunctive conditional containing an if-clause which is contrary to fact.)

[2] This confuses the logico-semantic relation of condition with interpersonal modality values.  Within that error, it wrongly claims that the beta-clauses of three clause nexuses differ in probability values.  In terms of logical meaning, each nexus is simply if P then Q.

If the nexuses had differed in modalisation values, the 'factual conditionals' would've looked something like the following, with the modalisation values enacted in the alpha-clauses:

If/Provided/As long as we enter, we'll possibly win

If/Provided/As long as we enter, we'll probably win

If/Provided/As long as we enter, we'll certainly win

 [3] Because the logico-semantic relation is condition, rather than cause: reason, there is no cause-effect relation construed in these clause nexuses.

If the logico-semantic relation had been reason, there would've been a cause-effect relation construed in the clause nexuses.

Misconstruing Condition And Purpose

Martin (1992: 196-7):

But with conditionals, the Effect may or may not be desirable; if and unless do not code it as one or the other:

[4:66] If you go that way,

           you'll get there by six/you'll get lost. 

[4:67] Unless you go that you [way]

           you'll get there by six/you'll get lost.

Purposives on the other hand always code the Effect as desired or feared.  In [4:68] Ben will be read as wanting to get lost, and as not wanting to get there by six in [4:69].

[4:68] Ben went that way

           so that he'd get lost. 

[4:69] Ben went that way

           for fear of getting there by six.

In other words, fear and desire are implicit in [4:66] and [4:67], but can be read in where the context indicates they are needed to make sense of the conditional meanings made explicit.  Fear and desire on the other hand are grammaticalised in [4:68] and [4:69].

Blogger Comments:

[1] Clauses related by the logico-semantic relations of condition and purpose do not construe a cause-effect relation.  Condition means if P then Q, purpose means because intention Q so action P.  It is reason/result — because P so result Q — that construes a cause-effect relation.

[2] Because the logical meaning of purpose involves intention, not desire and fear, desire and fear are not grammaticalised in clauses logically related by cause: purpose.

[3] Because the logical meaning of condition does not involve desire and fear— cf if it has three sides, it is a triangle — desire and fear are irrelevant to the discussion of clauses logically related by condition.

Misconstruing Negative Vs Positive Purpose

Martin (1992: 195-6):

Contingent relations make a distinction between conjunctions incorporating negative polarity (unless and lest) and those which don't.  The relevant proportionalities and relevant paradigm are as follows:

UNLESS : IF…NOT ::

LEST : SO THAT…WILL + NOT 

unless Ben plays you'll lose :

if Ben doesn't play you'll lose :: 

Ben'll play lest you lose :

Ben will play so that you won't lose

But the opposition between "positive" and "negative" values has a different meaning in the context of conditional relations from that in purposives. … With purposives, the opposition is between [desire] and [fear].  So that encodes a inclination to achieve the Effect, lest an inclination to avoid it:

DESIRE

[4:62]  He went that way

            so that he'd get there by six.

FEAR

[4:63]  He went that way

            lest he lose his way. (less archaically: for fear of losing his way.)

Blogger Comments:

[1] Because it is a category error to construe the logical meaning of purpose, because intention P, so action Q as 'desire (for Effect)', it is also a category error to construe the negative agnate as 'fear (of Effect)'.

[2] This confuses the logical and interpersonal metafunctions.  Just as the logical relation of purpose is distinct from the interpersonal feature inclination, so too is the negative agnate.

[3] Compounding the previous confusion, the terms 'achieve' and 'avoid' distinguish the positive and negative poles of inclination in terms of conation, instead of dis/inclination.

[4] The logical meaning of purpose does not include the relation of cause and effect.  In the 'purpose' nexus she cast a spell to ward off evil spirits, warding off evil spirits is the purpose, but not the effect of casting a spell.  Cause and effect appear in complexes where clauses are related by cause: reason (or cause: result).

Misconstruing Negative Vs Positive Condition

Martin (1992: 195-6):

Contingent relations make a distinction between conjunctions incorporating negative polarity (unless and lest) and those which don't.  The relevant proportionalities and relevant paradigm are as follows:

UNLESS : IF…NOT ::

LEST : SO THAT…WILL + NOT 

unless Ben plays you'll lose :

if Ben doesn't play you'll lose :: 

Ben'll play lest you lose :

Ben will play so that you won't lose

But the opposition between "positive" and "negative" values has a different meaning in the context of conditional relations from that in purposives.  With conditionals, the opposition is between exclusion and inclusion (or non-exclusive) to be precise).  Unless means 'if and only if not';  if on the hand does not preclude the possibility of additional modalised Causes:

EXCLUSIVE

[4:60]  Unless you go that way ['as long as you don't]

            you'll be there by six.

            (It's the only way you can go wrong.) 

INCLUSIVE

[4:61]  If you go that way

            you'll be there by six.

            (But you could also go the back way.)

Blogger Comment:

In SFL theory, as in formal logic, the logical meaning of positive condition is if P then Q and the logical meaning of negative condition is simply if not P then Q — not "if and only if not":

• If Ben doesn't play, you'll lose. 
• If you don't go that way, you'll be there by six.

The opposition of 'exclusive vs non-exclusive' is irrelevant to the logical opposition of positive and negative condition.

See also if and only if.

Misrepresenting Reason As Purpose

Martin (1992: 194):

The distinction between condition and purpose has to do with modulation again. Purposives contain an additional modulation of inclination, associated with the Effect (the Effect is desired). This can be brought out by comparing hypotactic and paratactic realisations of the purposive relation; these proportionalities also reveal another peculiarity of purposive relations, namely that desire for Effect commences before the Cause — wanting to win, get there on time and give the opposition a chance are the motivation for, not the results of, training hard, driving fast and skating slowly in the examples below (with all other consequential relations the Cause is temporally anterior):

we trained hard so that we'd win :

we wanted to win, and so we trained hard :: 

we drove fast in order to get there on time :

we were keen to get there on time and so we drove fast :: 

we skated slowly to give them a chance :

we were willing to give them a chance and so we skated slowly

Blogger Comments:

This is the second of two critiques of this extract.

[1] Contrary to the claim, none of the paratactic clause complexes involves the logical relation of cause: purpose.  In all three, the relation is cause: reason (see Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 411).  This can be demonstrated by substituting and therefore for and so:

we wanted to win, and therefore we trained hard
we were keen to get there on time and therefore we drove fast
we were willing to give them a chance and therefore we skated slowly

The proportionality is thus hypotactic purpose : paratactic reason.

The paratactic clauses, therefore, unlike the hypotactic clauses, do construe a cause^effect relation.

[2] In each of the three paratactic clause complexes (of cause: reason), 'desire' is a feature of the clause construing the cause.  That is, the "desire for Effect" does not "commence before" the Cause.

Misconstruing The Distinction Between Condition And Purpose

Martin (1992: 194):

The distinction between condition and purpose has to do with modulation again.  Purposives contain an additional modulation of inclination, associated with the Effect (the Effect is desired).  This can be brought out by comparing hypotactic and paratactic realisations of the purposive relation; these proportionalities also reveal another peculiarity of purposive relations, namely that desire for Effect commences before the Cause — wanting to win, get there on time and give the opposition a chance are the motivation for, not the results of, training hard, driving fast and skating slowly in the examples below (with all other consequential relations the Cause is temporally anterior):

we trained hard so that we'd win :

we wanted to win, and so we trained hard :: 

we drove fast in order to get there on time :

we were keen to get there on time and so we drove fast :: 

we skated slowly to give them a chance :

we were willing to give them a chance and so we skated slowly

Blogger Comments:

This is the first of two critiques of this extract.

[1] This confuses the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions.  The distinction between the logical categories of condition and purpose is logical, not interpersonal (modulation).  In SFL theory, as elsewhere, the logical meaning of condition is if P then Q whereas the logical meaning of purpose is because intention Q so action P.

[2] Logically, neither condition nor purpose involve a cause-effect relation.  In SFL theory, the cause-effect relation — because P so result Q — is construed logically by cause: reason and cause: result.

[3] This misconstrues the purpose relation — because intention Q so action P — as desire.  The semantic distinction between intention and desire is demonstrated by the contrast between he intends to get his tooth extracted today and he wants to get his tooth extracted today.

Misconstruing Condition And Purpose As Cause–Effect

Martin (1992: 193-4):

Alongside being modulated through obligation, causal relations may be modalised.  With both condition and purpose the relation between Cause and Effect is a contingent one; and in both cases the Effect is irrealis — there is a possibility, a probability or a certainty that it will be determined by the Cause, but as the meanings are made it has not yet ensued.  This is the opposition between [4:57] and [4:58-9].

CONSEQUENCE (Effect realis)

[4:57] Cause     Because we trained hard,

           Effect     we won. 

CONDITION (Effect irrealis)

[4:58] Cause     If we'd trained hard,

           Effect     we'd have won. 

PURPOSE (Effect irrealis)

[4:59] Cause     We trained hard,

           Effect     so that we'd win.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses enhancement (ideational metafunction) with modality (interpersonal metafunction).  Cause is language in the rôle of construing experience, whereas modalisation is language in the rôle of acting on each other.  The probability of a construed causal relation is expressed using the interpersonal system of modalisation, as in genes possibly/probably/certainly determine behaviour. The (interpersonal) modalisation values are not features of (ideational) causal relations.

[2] Neither condition nor purpose can be logically construed as cause and effect.  The logical meaning of condition is 'if P then Q' and the logical meaning of purpose is 'because intention Q so action P'.  Cause and effect, on the other hand, is the logical meaning of reason and result: 'because P so result Q'.  For why conditional statements are not statements of causality, see also here.

[3] The logical relation here is reason, not consequence.  This is shown by the expression of the logical relation in the dependent clause ('because'), just as condition is shown by the expression of the logical relation in the dependent clause ('if') and purpose is shown the expression of the logical relation in the dependent clause ('so that').

The use of the term 'consequence' here is inconsistent with its use in both SFL theory and formal logic, where it is a term used for conditional — not causal — relations.

Misconstruing Manner As Cause

Martin (1992: 193):

With [manner] relations, the relationship between events is modulated through "potentiality"; we won by training hard means that the Cause (preparing well) enabled the Effect (winning). With other consequential relations the connection between events is modulated through "obligation": we won because we trained hard means that the Cause determined the Effect. This is the "natural logic" of the distinction between sufficient and necessary conditions:

we won by training hard (among other things) :

we trained hard enough to win (but we lost) ::

we won because we trained hard :

we trained hard enough to make sure we won 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses the ideational metafunction (expansion) with the interpersonal metafunction (modality).

[2] This is a fundamental category error.  Manner is not cause and effect.  In the clause complex, training hard is construed as the manner: means by which we won, but not as the cause.  Manner and cause are semantically distinct.  For example, the manner of the wind blowing is semantically distinct from the cause of the wind blowing.

[3] It is a category error to construe the distinction between manner and cause as the distinction between sufficient and necessary conditions.  See yesterday's post or the discussion on necessity and sufficiency in formal logic here.

Using 'Condition' To Unite 'Cause' And 'Manner' As 'Consequential'

Martin (1992: 193):

Within consequential relations the basic opposition is between how and why.

MANNER (sufficient conditions)

[4:55] How did you win?

— By training hard.

CAUSE (necessary conditions)

[4:56] Why did you win?

— Because we trained hard.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is a fundamental category error.  Cause ('why') and manner ('how') are logically distinct categories.  The error is compounded by subsuming both under 'consequential', a feature of a third logical type: condition.

[2] It is a category error to construe the distinction between manner and cause as the distinction between sufficient and necessary conditions.  

A sufficient condition for some state of affairs S is a condition that, if satisfied, guarantees that S obtains.  A necessary condition for some state of affairs S is a condition that must be satisfied in order for S to obtain.

The manner training hard is not a condition that guarantees we did win.
The cause we trained hard is not a condition that must be satisfied for we did win.

See also necessary and sufficient causes here.

Confusing Ideational Cause And Interpersonal Modulation

Martin (1992: 193):

Like temporal relations, external consequential relations are oriented to the activity sequences constituting fields; but the connections between events are "modulated" in such a way that one event is seen as enabling or determining the other rather than simply preceding it.  All consequential relations have the experiential structure Cause · Effect.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses the ideational system of enhancement with the interpersonal system of modality.  The ideational metafunction is concerned with the construal of experience as meaning, whereas the interpersonal metafunction is concerned with the enactment of the self as meaning. These are distinct complementary functions in the SFL model.

[2] Here again an experiential structure is proposed for a logical structure at the level of discourse semantics.

Seeing Metafunctions As Alternatives Rather Than Complementary

Martin (1992: 189-90):

There are a number of variations on as soon as, which shade into diversified realisations involving Circumstances and IDENTIFICATION.  These include the moment that, the minute that, the second that and so on.  This borderline area of realisation between the systems of IDENTIFICATION and CONJUNCTION will not be pursued here.  Halliday & Hasan (1976: 230-1)and Halliday (1985: 308) suggest incorporating the "circumstantial" realisations into the account of CONJUNCTION to bring out proportionalities such as the following:

instead : instead of that ::

as a result : as a result of that ::

in consequence : inconsequence of that

etc.

But pursuing this is really a matter of perspective.  From the point of view of IDENTIFICATION these expressions are phoric and combine with experiential clause systems to link clauses in a text; from the point of view of CONJUNCTION they are only minimally distinct from realisations involving conjunctions alone.  It may be that Halliday and Hasan and Halliday are suggesting many of the realisations involving IDENTIFICATION are now congruent (that is, no longer processed as grammatical metaphors); this would be one reason for including them as part of the system of CONJUNCTION in the discourse semantics.

Blogger Comments:

This is intended as an argument for determining which metafunction wordings such as the moment that, the minute that, the second that belong to — either to the textual discourse system of IDENTIFICATION or to the logical discourse system of CONJUNCTION.  This is the same error as asking which metafunctional system a prepositional phrase belongs to, rather than asking what function it is performing with regard to each metafunction.

Rebranding Grammar As Discourse Semantics

Martin (1992: 185):

External temporal relations are strongly oriented to the activity sequences constituting fields.  Most of these relations (excepting co-extensive simultaneous ones) have the experiential structure Anterior · Posterior, where Anterior names the event which begins before the Posterior.

At primary delicacy the opposition is between [successive] relations, where the Anterior does not continue beyond the beginning of the Posterior, and [simultaneous] relations, where the two events overlap to some extent.  This is the opposition between after and while in [4:24] and [4:25]:

SUCCESSIVE
[4:24] After we walk the ring with our dog,
          we just wait. 

SIMULTANEOUS
[4:25] While the judge is handling the dog,
          we hope that it will stand nice and steady.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here an experiential structure is proposed for a logical structure — a clause nexus.

[2] The temporal relations exemplified are between clauses in clause complexes.  The grammatical categories are:

• same time                     A meanwhile B
• different time: later        A subsequently B
• different time: earlier     A previously B

¶ In modelling logical relations between clauses, this is simply rebranding Halliday's grammar as Martin's discourse semantics.

Confusing The Logical And Experiential Metafunctions

Martin (1992: 184):

As in Martin (1983) the point of departure for the analysis presented here will be the hypotactic clause complex.  It is in this area that English makes the most delicate experiential distinctions as far as logico-semantic relations between clauses are concerned.

Blogger Comments:

In SFL theory, the logico-semantic relations between clauses in clause complexes fall within the logical, not experiential, component of the ideational metafunction.

Misconstruing Internal And External Relations

Martin (1992: 183):

The distinction between internal and external relations, though clear in principle, is in some cases hard to draw, either because it doesn't matter as in [4:15] above, or because certain relations, such as the concessive, are themselves interpersonal enough in orientation that they fudge the distinction being drawn between organising text and constructing field.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, the distinction between internal and external relations is not the distinction between organising text and constructing field.

In the case of logical relations between clauses, the distinction between internal and external relations is the distinction between the beta clause relating to the enactment of the proposition (interpersonal meaning) of the alpha clause and the beta clause relating to the figure (experiential meaning) that the alpha clause represents (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 419).  For a semantic perspective on interpersonally oriented sequences (realised by clause complexes), see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 123-4).

In the case of temporal conjunction in textual cohesion, the distinction between internal and external relations is the distinction between the temporal unfolding of the discourse (interpersonal time) and the temporal sequence of the processes referred to (experiential time), respectively (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 545).

Field, on the other hand, is the ideational dimension of context, the culture viewed as a semiotic system that is realised in language.  Field is thus realised by the ideational features of language, including those construals of experience that are logically expanded or cohesively conjuncted by internal and external relations.

The "construction" of field during logogenesis is thus the construal of the ideational dimension of context through the instantiation of the ideational meanings that realise the field.

[2] Concessive conditional relations between clauses in complexes are logical in metafunction; concessive conditional relations between messages in cohesive conjunction are textual in metafunction.  The meanings they realise are distinct from any interpersonal meanings also being realised.

Confusing The Logical And Textual Metafunctions And Misconstruing Elaboration As Enhancement

Martin (1992: 182):

The centrality of the internal/external distinction to an adequate account of the discourse semantics of logical relations is the main factor distinguishing Halliday's (1985) classification of expansion from that being developed here.  The internal/external opposition does not play a part in Halliday's (1985) discussion because his focus is on the clause complex in relation to the rest of the grammar, rather than in relation to cohesion and text structure.  In particular, a good deal of his elaboration category is reinterpreted here as simply the internal face of comparative similarity rather than as a major logico-semantic category in its own right.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The main factor distinguishing Halliday's (1985) model and Martin's (1992), apart from the fact that Halliday's model is original and Martin's model is a reworking of Halliday's, is that Martin's model ignores the metafunctional distinction between logico-semantic relations between clauses (logical) and conjunctive cohesion (textual).  Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 538-9):

… logico-semantic relations are confined to the internal organisation of each clause complex: the clause complex is the most extensive domain of relational organisation. The cohesive system of conjunction has evolved as a complementary resource for creating and interpreting text. It provides the resources for marking logico-semantic relationships that obtain between text spans of varying extent, ranging from clauses within clause complexes to long spans of a paragraph or more.

[2] In SFL theory, internal relations may obtain in logical relations between clauses in complexes, and in conjunctive cohesion, the non-structural resource of the textual metafunction for marking textual transitions.  On internal logical relations between clauses, Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 419) write:

… the enhancing relation may be internal rather than external; that is, the beta-clause may relate to the enactment of the proposition or proposal realised by the alpha-clause rather than to the figure that it represents. For example, if it is not too personal an inquiry, what limits do you set… means ‘if it is not…, I ask you…’; that is, the condition is on the act of questioning, not on the content of the question.

 On internal relations in conjunctive cohesion, Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 545) write:

Many temporal conjunctives have an ‘internal’ as well as an ‘external’ interpretation; that is, the time they refer to is the temporal unfolding of the discourse itself, not the temporal sequence of the processes referred to. In terms of the functional components of semantics, it is interpersonal not experiential time.

[3] This is a serious category error — enhancement and elaboration are distinct logico-semantic types.  As a transphenomenal fractal type manifest at different scales across various domains, comparison is a subtype of the enhancement category manner.

[4] As a transphenomenal fractal type manifest at different scales across various domains, elaboration is a major logico-semantic category, contrasting with extension and enhancement within expansion.  For example, the distinction between 'intensive', 'possessive' and 'circumstantial' relational processes, identifying and attributive, is the distinction between elaboration, extension and enhancement, respectively.

Confusing Textual Relations With Construals Of Experience

Martin (1992: 181):

In other modes, where language is constitutive of what is going on, the distinction between external and internal relations is vital.  The temporal organisation of such texts will be quite different from that of the institutional events to which they refer and internal relations will prove critical in signalling this textual organisation.

Blogger Comments:

This again confuses the ideational metafunction with the textual metafunction.  External temporal conjunctive relations do not refer to 'institutional events'.  External temporal relations, like internal conjunctive relations, are concerned with textual organisation: they are cohesive resources for marking textual transitions between messages or groups of messages.  These relations between messages are distinct from the construals of experience thus conjuncted.

Confusing Conjunctive Relations With Conjuncted Messages

Martin (1992: 180-1):

The distinction between external and internal is probably clearest with temporal relations.  External relations are used to display the activity sequences in which people engage as members of various institutions.  Internal relations on the other hand attend to text-time — time in relation to what is being said, not what is being done.  In certain registers, especially those where language accompanies what is going on institutionally, text time and field time are so much in tune that the internal/external distinction is not that important.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses the ideational metafunction with the textual metafunction.  External temporal conjunctive relations do not 'display the activity sequences in which people engage as members of various institutions'.  External temporal relations, like all conjunctive relations, are cohesive resources for marking textual transitions between messages or groups of messages.  These relations are distinct from the messages thus related.

[2] In SFL theory, 'text time' is the temporal dimension of logogenesis; 'field' is the ideational dimension of context, the semiotic system that has language as its expression plane.  As a text unfolds during logogenesis, so too does the instance of context (field, tenor and mode) that the text realises.

Misinterpreting Internal And External Conjunctive Relations

Martin (1992: 180):

Internal relations in other words structure semiosis; external ones code the structure of the world.  A less materialistic interpretation, drawing on the semiotic approach to context to be developed in Chapter 7, could be framed along the following lines.  This would treat external relations as by and large oriented to field — they encode the institutional organisation of our culture.  Internal relations on the other hand are oriented to genre (including the conversational structure realising genre in dialogic modes) — they encode the organisation of text as it is formulated to construct our culture.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is an incorrect reading of the distinction between external and internal conjunctive relations in SFL theory.  As cohesive relations, both are text-forming resources of the lexicogrammar that are concerned with marking textual transitions between whole messages or groups of whole messages (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 583).  External conjunctive relations involve textual relations between 'external phenomena' — that is: between experiences construed as meanings — whereas internal conjunctive relations involve textual relations that are internal to the communication situation itself.

[2] A materialistic interpretation of internal and external conjunctive relations is thus a misinterpretation, not least because the textual metafunction is concerned with semiotic reality.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398):

The textual metafunction second–order in the sense that it is concerned with semiotic reality: that is, reality in the form of meaning. This dimension of reality is itself constructed by [the] other two metafunctions: the ideational, which construes a natural reality, and the interpersonal, which enacts an intersubjective reality. … The function of the textual metafunction is thus an enabling one with respect to the rest; it takes over the semiotic resources brought into being by the other two metafunctions and as it were operationalises them …

[3] In SFL theory, context is construed in semiotic terms: as a connotative semiotic system with language as its expression plane. On the other hand, Martin (1992: 33, 39-40, 121, 122) instead uses the term 'context' to refer to the (semiotic) co-text and the material setting.

[4] External conjunctive relations are a resource of the textual metafunction.  The textual metafunction at the level of context is the system of MODE, whereas FIELD is the ideational dimension of context.

[5] In SFL theory, institutions are situation types.  That is, theoretically they are located halfway down the cline of instantiation at the level of context.  Thus they differ by probabilities in the context systems of FIELD, TENOR and MODE — not just field.

[6] Genre, in the sense of the different rôles that language plays, is a system of MODE at the level of context — not a stratum of context.

Genre, in the sense of text type, is a point on the cline of instantiation.  It is register viewed from the instance pole of the cline.

In SFL theory, therefore, genres are registers that vary according to different feature probabilities in the system of MODE — that is, in terms of the textual metafunction.