Misconstruing 'A Realises B' As 'A Makes B Material'

Martin (1992: 378):

As noted in Chapter 1, to say that A realises B is to say: (i) A manifests B (i.e. makes B material); (ii) A constitutes B (i.e. makes B come to be); (iii) A reconstitutes B (i.e. continually renovates B, however gradually); and (iv) A symbolises B (i.e. is a metaphor for B).  Unfortunately the grammar of English can focus on only one aspect of this realisation spectrum at a time, and the part which has usually been grammaticalised in this chapter is realisation i. A (lexicogrammar) manifests B (field). 

It should go without saying however with respect to the system/process model developed here that points (ii), (iii) and (iv) are always relevant. … Realisation then is a technical concept embracing all these meanings.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This was not noted in Chapter 1.

[2] To say A realises B is to say that A and B are in a relation of symbolic identity, such that A is less abstract than B.  Moreover, the identity encodes B by reference to A, and decodes A by reference to B.

encoding

A	realises	B
Identifier	Process: relational: identifying: intensive: symbol	Identified
Token		Value

decoding

A	realises	B
Identified	Process: relational: identifying: intensive: symbol	Identifier
Token		Value

For example, in wording realises meaning, the identity encodes meaning by reference to wording, and decodes wording by reference to meaning.

[3] Obviously, what the grammar can or cannot 'focus on' has no bearing on the theoretical definition of realisation.

[4] This is a misuse of the word 'grammaticalised'.  The theoretical notion of realisation has not been 'made grammatical' or 'integrated into a system of grammar' in this chapter.

[5] In SFL theory, lexicogrammar does not "manifest field" or "make field material".  (Lexicogrammar, like field, is semiotic, not material.)  Lexicogrammar realises semantics, and semantics realises context, the ideational dimension of which is field.  Or to take metaredundancy into account: lexicogrammar realises the realisation of context in semantics; or: the realisation of semantics in lexicogrammar realises context.  See Halliday (1992) How Do You Mean?.

[6] Preferably, this should not be said at all, for the simple reason that it isn't true, as this and subsequent posts demonstrate.

Misrepresenting Field And Misconstruing Interstratal Realisation

Martin (1992: 378):

Throughout this chapter, much more attention has had to be paid to register variables than in Chapter 2, 3 and 4.  The discussion of IDEATION was undertaken with a view to textually mediating the realisation of field in lexicogrammar.  During any such consideration of the realisation of one level of meaning in another, it needs to be kept in mind that as a theoretical construct realisation is not directional.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misrepresents field — tenor and mode were not discussed — as a register variable instead of contextual variable.  No argument has been made for reinterpreting context as register; the claim has merely been repeated over and over.*  The many reasons why modelling context as register is inconsistent with the meaning of both concepts will be outlined in the critique of Chapter 7: Context.

[2] Texts don't "mediate" realisation.  Texts are instances of a systemic potential that is stratally organised in terms of realisation.

[3] 'The realisation of field in lexicogrammar' misrepresents stratification.  Field is realised in semantics, not lexicogrammar; it is semantics that is realised in lexicogrammar.  However, since Martin's 'field' is actually semantic, there is an unintentional truth here.

[4] This continues the misunderstanding of stratification arising from confusing it with semogenesis, as previously explained.  In SFL theory, the strata construe different levels of symbolic abstraction, only one of which, semantics, is the level of meaning.  This is distinct from 'meaning-making' or semogenesis.

[5] Realisation is a relation of identity between two levels of symbolic abstraction — one higher (the Value), one lower (the Token).  The lower Token (e.g. lexicogrammatical stratum) realises the higher Value (e.g. semantic stratum); the higher Value is realised by the lower Token.

—

*As Aldous Huxley (1991 [1932]: 38) described 'hypnopædia' in Brave New World:

Sixty-two thousand four hundred repetitions make one truth.

Multiplying A Misunderstanding Of The External Vs Internal Distinction

Martin (1992: 377-8):

The proportionalities among these "external" and "internal" aspects of IDEATION, IDENTIFICATION  and CONJUNCTION are as follows:

organising field :	organising text ::
message part relation :	meta-message relation ::
participant reference :	text reference ::
external conjunction :	internal conjunction

Blogger Comment:

[1] This continues the misunderstanding of the distinction between internal and external expansion relations, and exports the misunderstanding to other proposed discourse semantic systems.

Internal relations are those that are internal to the exchange, obtaining between propositions (interpersonal) rather than figures (experiential).  A memorable example of an internal relation, deployed logically in a clause complex, is the line from Monty Python's Life Of Brian:

If it's not a personal question, are you a virgin?

Martin confuses internal relations with those that are, in SFL terms, textually cohesive — though not consistently — as these pages demonstrate.

[2] The systems of ideation, identification and conjunction are said to be developed as the discourse semantic counterparts of lexical cohesion, reference and conjunction in the lexicogrammar.  In SFL, all three lexicogrammatical systems are types of cohesion, the non-structural resource of the textual metafunction, and so are all 'meta' in the sense of being concerned with the organisation of the ideational and the interpersonal meanings in the creation of text.

[3] Although participant reference is presented as a resource of the textual metafunction at the level of discourse semantics, it is here presented as 'organising' (i.e. in SFL: construing) the ideational dimension of context.  As previously demonstrated, this relates to mistaking cohesive relations for covariate structures, which in turn leads to confusing the system of referring with the elements ("participants") referred to.

Claiming That Conjunctive Relations Are Realised By Nouns

Martin (1992: 377):

This use of messages and message parts in a kind of meta-discursive relation to preceding and subsequent meanings in text is not unlike the function of text reference or that of internal conjunction.  Indeed, meta-message relations often work in conjunction with demonstratives and closely resemble text reference; and internal conjunctive relations are often realised through what Francis calls A-nouns.

TEXT REFERENCE
[5:54]  Ben lost in straight sets; it really upset him. 

A-NOUN
[5:55]  Ben lost in straight sets; that result really upset him. 

INTERNAL CONJUNCTION
[5:56]  Ben lost in straight sets; in that respect I hardly recognised him.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The 'meta' aspect here relates to the second-order status of the textual metafunction in relation to the ideational and interpersonal metafunction.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398):

The textual metafunction second–order in the sense that it is concerned with semiotic reality: that is, reality in the form of meaning. This dimension of reality is itself constructed by [the] other two metafunctions: the ideational, which construes a natural reality, and the interpersonal, which enacts an intersubjective reality. … The function of the textual metafunction is thus an enabling one with respect to the rest; it takes over the semiotic resources brought into being by the other two metafunctions and as it were operationalises them …

This second–order enabling nature of the textual metafunction is seen both at the level of context, where mode (the functions assigned to language in the situation) is second–order in relation to field and tenor (the ongoing social processes and interactant rôles), and the level of content — the semantics and the lexicogrammar, where the systems of theme and information, and the various types of cohesion, are second–order in relation to ideational and interpersonal systems of transitivity, mood, and the rest. 

[2] In each of the three examples, cohesive relations are effected through reference items: it (personal), that (demonstrative).

[3] This continues the confusion of cohesive conjunction with "internal" conjunction.  Here the cohesive conjunctive relation marking the textual transition is enhancement: matter: positive (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 543).

[4] By definition, conjunctive relations — the textual deployment of types of expansion — are not realised by nouns.  There is no conjunctive relation in the example given ([5:55]), internal or otherwise.

[5] This misconstrues the noun result as an A-noun (Francis 1985).  All the A-nouns listed were names of projections, and so second-order construals (construals of construals of experience).  The noun result is not the name of a projection; it is simply a first-order construal of experience.

Confusing Three Distinct Notions Of "Predicting" Discourse

Martin (1992: 377):

Predicting and referring to discourse is not simply a function of lexical items.  Nuclear configurations are also used in this way; for example:

Before I begin, let me say…

I'll stop here for questions…

I'll conclude by summarising…

Before going on to Chapter 6…

etc.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The use of the term 'predicting' in this chapter confuses three distinct meanings.  Here it is used in sense of a speaker referring to what is to come in the discourse.  Previously it was used in the sense of instantial probabilities (selecting one lexical item 'predicts' certain others will likely follow).  In the first instance, it was used in the sense of a hearer expecting an oncoming proposition — as in the example Becker's double faulting was unexpected in the field (p323).

[2] None of the nuclear configurations exemplifying the claim are identified.

Three Minor Clarifications

Martin (1992: 376-7):

Carter also reports on Francis's (1985) study of what she terms anaphoric nouns (A-nouns).  These are used in conjunction with anaphoric reference items to refer to preceding discourse. … Carter (1987: 80) lists the following examples of Francis's A-nouns.  All, it can be noted, are grammatical metaphors, reflecting the fact that congruent English reconstructs discourse as a rhetorical process, not as a product or thing.

retrospective
Examples from Francis (A-nouns)
accusation	consideration	interpretation	report
admission	criticism	judgement	repudiation
allegation	declaration	observation	retort
answer	definition	point	revelation
argument	denial	prediction	statement
assumption	description	proposal	stipulation
belief	diagnosis	proposition	suggestion
challenge	estimate	reading	threat
complaint	evidence	reasoning	theory
conclusion	examination	reference	viewpoint
confession	hypothesis	refusal

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, these 'anaphoric nouns' are nominalisations that name types of verbal and mental projections.  Any anaphoric function is realised by the reference item that marks its identity as recoverable in the preceding discourse. 

[2] The congruent construes experience; the metaphorical reconstrues experience.

[3] In SFL theory, 'discourse as process' is theorised as logogenesis: the unfolding of text through the instantiation of potential.

Misconstruing Instantiation Probability As The Opposite Of Anaphoric Reference

Martin (1992: 375):

One type of lexical relation which has not received sufficient attention here is that whereby message parts either predict subsequent discourse patterns or refer backwards to what has already been written or said.  Winter (1977) proposes a set of 108 Vocabulary 3 items which predict ensuing discourse patterns, especially conjunctive relations.  Winter's point is that using an item like convergence in a sentence predicts that some kind of comparison will follow.

Bloggers Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, this type of 'prediction' during logogenesis is modelled as instantiation probabilities of register.

[2] In SFL theory, discourse patterns are modelled in terms of logogenesis: as logogenetic patterns.

[3] In SFL theory, referring 'backwards to what has already been written or said' is modelled as anaphoric reference.  It is a distinct system from cohesive lexical relations.  Referring backwards is not the opposite of predicting forwards.

[4] In SFL theory, 'using an item' is modelled as the process of instantiation: selecting features and activating realisation statements — during logogenesis, the unfolding of text.

A Convoluted Non-Sequitur

Martin (1992: 375):

The discourse system of lexical relations then is like NEGOTIATION in that message parts, like moves, are not in themselves phoric; both systems are however associated with redundancy as opposed to relevance or reminding phoricity because of the way in which both message parts and moves may be realised through SUBSTITUTION and ELLIPSIS in lexicogrammar.

Blogger Comments:

The claim here is that the experiential and interpersonal discourse semantic systems are both associated with a type of phoricity because units of both systems may be realised by the non-structural textual system of substitution–&–ellipsis at the level of lexicogrammar — in contradistinction to the fact that, in SFL theory, phoricity is an aspect of reference rather than substitution–&–ellipsis.

Construing A Scale From Hyponym To Ellipsis (Via Word Classes)

Martin (1992: 373-4):

While message parts are not in themselves phoric, they may be realised phorically, through the systems of SUBSTITUTION and ELLIPSIS at group rank in lexicogrammar.  These systems have been presented in detail in Halliday and Hasan (1976) and their discussion has been assumed throughout English Text.  It is important to review here however the continuity between nominal and verbal ellipses and substitutes and the taxonomic cline from general superordinate to more specific hyponymic items.  This grading is outlined in Table 5.27 and illustrated for nominal and verbal realisations of message parts below (see especially Halliday and Hasan 1976: 106 & 129).  Hasan (1985: 74) generalises these relationships under the heading co-classification.

Table 5.27. General to specific grading of substitution, ellipsis and taxonomic relations
	nominal	verbal
ellipsis	–	–
substitution	one, ones	do, do so
pro-noun/verb	one, thing	do, happen
general noun/verb	thing, person, stuff etc.	do, take, make etc.
superordinate	ship (air/space/sailing)	attack
é ê	boat	race
	sail-boat	sail
	yacht	manœuvre
hyponym	12-metre	tack

Blogger Comments:

[1] The claim here is that units of the experiential metafunction on the discourse semantics stratum, message parts, can be realised on the lexicogrammatical stratum, at group rank, as phoric, by the system of substitution–&–ellipsis, one of the types of cohesion, a resource of the textual metafunction.  That is, experiential semantics is realised "phorically" by textual lexicogrammar, by a system does not involve phoricity.  Phoricity is an aspect of another system of textual cohesion: reference.

[2] This confuses two distinct resources of textual cohesion: substitution–&–ellipsis and lexical cohesion.  The former is the textual deployment of interpersonal relations, the latter is the textual deployment of experiential relations.

[3] This is not a grading from general to specific.  An omitted element is not more general that a substituted element, etc.  Moreover, the grades are not ranks on a one-dimensional scale, but are a mixture of categories of different types, with classes of grammatical form, noun and verb, wedged in between two different types of cohesive relations: substitution–&–ellipsis and a type of lexical cohesion (hyponymy), with the latter relation forming part of the scale.

[4] Halliday and Hasan (1976: 106) is Table 5: The forms of one, and related items in a section on nominal substitution; and Halliday and Hasan (1976: 129) is Table 6: The forms of do in a section on verbal substitution.  Neither supports Martin's claim for a grading from ellipsis to hyponym.

[5] In discussing cohesive devices (textual metafunction), Hasan (1985: 74) distinguishes co-classification from co-referentiality (identity of reference) as follows:

In this type of meaning relation, the things, processes, or circumstances to which A and B refer belong to an identical class, but each end of the cohesive tie refers to a distinct member of this class.