Thursday, 10 December 2015

Misconstruing 'A Realises B' As 'A Reconstitutes B'

Martin (1992: 338):
It [this chapter] has also attempted to renovate (point (iii) above) linguists' interpretation of grammar and meaning by configuring the grammar as Agent in a material process with meaning as the Medium produced: grammar makes meaning (cf. learning how to mean, making meaning, meaning making resource etc.).


Blogger Comments:

[1] Here a statement about how the theorist has gone about modelling language is presented as an example of a relation in the model itself (i.e. realisation).


[2] In 'point (iii) above', A realises B is interpreted as A reconstitutes B, which is, in turn, glossed as A continually renovates B.  In such an interpretation, the intensive identifying process of A realises B:


A
realises
B
Token
Process: relational: intensive: symbol
Value

is misconstrued as an assigned attributive relational process:

A
continually
renovates (‘makes new’)
B
Agent/Attributor
Manner: quality
Process: relational: attributive: intensive
Range/Attribute
Medium/Carrier

In SFL theory, instead of characterising realisation, this is more a statement about the relation between the instance and the system: the notion that in logogenesis, through instantiation, each instance alters system probabilities.  Halliday (2008: 119):
Each instance minutely perturbs the probabilities of the system. Any part of the system may remain stable over long periods of time; but the system as a whole is metastable: it persists by continually evolving within its overall eco-social environment.
Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 555) 
Historical change in language is typically a quantitative process, in which probabilities in systems at every level are gradually nudged in one direction or another, now and again becoming categorical so that some systemic upheaval takes place. Each instantiation of a tense form, say, whenever someone is speaking or writing in English, minutely perturbs the probabilities of the system …

[3] This continues the confusion of semogenesis (making meaning) with stratification (realising meaning) — a confusion which makes Martins' model of stratification theoretically untenable.

stratification: intensive identifying relational process

grammar
realises
meaning
Token
Process: relational: intensive: symbol
Value

semogenesis: creative abstract material process

grammar
makes
meaning
Agent
Process:
Medium
Actor
material: creative
Goal

Note that this material process does not exemplify the relational process of 'point (iii) above'.

Wednesday, 9 December 2015

Misconstruing 'A Realises B' As 'A Makes B Come To Be'

Martin (1992: 378):
Clearly this chapter has meant a number of things that have never been meant before; it has been involved in constructing the field of lexical relations (point (ii) above) as much as realising immanent meanings that have been previously construed.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As the critiques of this chapter demonstrate, there are valid reasons why these things 'have never been meant before'.  This chapter is purported to model experiential semantics, but instead:
  • confuses two lexicogrammatical dimensions: lexical cohesion (textual metafunction) and lexis (delicacy),
  • confuses semantics with context (field),
  • models experiential structure as logical and interpersonal relations between units that are defined according to a misapplication of expansion relations.
[2] In 'point (ii) above', A realises B is interpreted as A constitutes B, which is, in turn, glossed as A makes B come to be.  In such an interpretation, the intensive identifying process of A realises B:

A
realises
B
Token
Process: relational: intensive: symbol
Value

is misconstrued as the caused existential process A makes B come to be:

A
makes
B
come to be
Creator
Process
Existent
existential

In SFL theory, this gloss is closer in meaning to the process of instantiation, where potential is actualised ('made actual'). However, instantiation is not an interstratal relation.

[3] The notion of 'realising immanent meanings that have been previously construed' relates to the distinction, in logogenesis, between recycling already codified meanings and constructing new ones.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 24):
The production of discourse by an individual speaker or writer can be seen as a dialectic between these two semiotic activities: between (i) recycling elements, figures and sequences that that individual has used many times before, and so for him or her are already fully codified, and (ii) constructing new ones that are being codified for the first time (and some of which may remain codified for future use — especially with a child who is learning the system).

Tuesday, 8 December 2015

Misconstruing 'A Realises B' As 'A Makes B Material'

Martin (1992: 378):
As noted in Chapter 1, to say that A realises B is to say: (i) A manifests B (i.e. makes B material); (ii) A constitutes B (i.e. makes B come to be); (iii) A reconstitutes B (i.e. continually renovates B, however gradually); and (iv) A symbolises B (i.e. is a metaphor for B).  Unfortunately the grammar of English can focus on only one aspect of this realisation spectrum at a time, and the part which has usually been grammaticalised in this chapter is realisation i. A (lexicogrammar) manifests B (field). 
It should go without saying however with respect to the system/process model developed here that points (ii), (iii) and (iv) are always relevant. … Realisation then is a technical concept embracing all these meanings.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This was not noted in Chapter 1.

[2] To say A realises B is to say that A and B are in a relation of symbolic identity, such that A is less abstract than B.  Moreover, the identity encodes B by reference to A, and decodes A by reference to B.

encoding
A
realises
B
Identifier
Process: relational: identifying: intensive: symbol
Identified
Token
Value

decoding
A
realises
B
Identified
Process: relational: identifying: intensive: symbol
Identifier
Token
Value

For example, in wording realises meaning, the identity encodes meaning by reference to wording, and decodes wording by reference to meaning.

[3] Obviously, what the grammar can or cannot 'focus on' has no bearing on the theoretical definition of realisation.

[4] This is a misuse of the word 'grammaticalised'.  The theoretical notion of realisation has not been 'made grammatical' or 'integrated into a system of grammar' in this chapter.

[5] In SFL theory, lexicogrammar does not "manifest field" or "make field material".  (Lexicogrammar, like field, is semiotic, not material.)  Lexicogrammar realises semantics, and semantics realises context, the ideational dimension of which is field.  Or to take metaredundancy into account: lexicogrammar realises the realisation of context in semantics; or: the realisation of semantics in lexicogrammar realises context.  See Halliday (1992) How Do You Mean?.

[6] Preferably, this should not be said at all, for the simple reason that it isn't true, as this and subsequent posts demonstrate.

Monday, 7 December 2015

Misrepresenting Field And Misconstruing Interstratal Realisation

Martin (1992: 378):
Throughout this chapter, much more attention has had to be paid to register variables than in Chapter 2, 3 and 4.  The discussion of IDEATION was undertaken with a view to textually mediating the realisation of field in lexicogrammar.  During any such consideration of the realisation of one level of meaning in another, it needs to be kept in mind that as a theoretical construct realisation is not directional.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misrepresents field — tenor and mode were not discussed — as a register variable instead of contextual variable.  No argument has been made for reinterpreting context as register; the claim has merely been repeated over and over.*  The many reasons why modelling context as register is inconsistent with the meaning of both concepts will be outlined in the critique of Chapter 7: Context.

[2] Texts don't "mediate" realisation.  Texts are instances of a systemic potential that is stratally organised in terms of realisation.

[3] 'The realisation of field in lexicogrammar' misrepresents stratification.  Field is realised in semantics, not lexicogrammar; it is semantics that is realised in lexicogrammar.  However, since Martin's 'field' is actually semantic, there is an unintentional truth here.

[4] This continues the misunderstanding of stratification arising from confusing it with semogenesis, as previously explained.  In SFL theory, the strata construe different levels of symbolic abstraction, only one of which, semantics, is the level of meaning.  This is distinct from 'meaning-making' or semogenesis.

[5] Realisation is a relation of identity between two levels of symbolic abstraction — one higher (the Value), one lower (the Token).  The lower Token (e.g. lexicogrammatical stratum) realises the higher Value (e.g. semantic stratum); the higher Value is realised by the lower Token.

—

*As Aldous Huxley (1991 [1932]: 38) described 'hypnopædia' in Brave New World:
Sixty-two thousand four hundred repetitions make one truth.