Reducing Expansion To Conjunctive Relations

Martin (1992: 408):

Metaphorical realisations of conjunctive relations were discussed in detail in Chapter 4 above (Section 4.2.1) in connection with the diversified realisation of the discourse system.  A simplified outline of the scope of this diversification is outlined in Table 6.16.

Table 6.16. Congruent and metaphorical realisations of conjunction
Conjunctive relation:		consequential	temporal
congruent	cohesive conjunction	therefore	next
	paratactic conjunction	so	then
	hypotactic conjunction	because	before
metaphorical	phrasal Process	due to	on
	Process	cause	follow
	Thing	reason	sequel

Blogger Comments:

[1] As demonstrated in previous posts, Martin's discourse semantic system of conjunction, though construed as a logical system, confuses textual and logical deployments of the system of expansion. It also greatly underplays the pervasiveness and importance of expansion in the construal of experience.

In SFL theory, expansion, like projection, is a transgrammatical semantic domain, in the sense that it is manifested across a range of grammatical environments.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 597):

… the environments of manifestation can be differentiated in terms of

(i) metafunction — textual (conjunction), logical (interdependency; modification) and experiential (circumstantiation; process type: relational), and

(ii) rank — clause and group/phrase [and below]. …

Collectively they thus construe expansion as a semantic system.  This means that for any given type of expansion we want to express, we have at our disposal a range of resources.

[2] In SFL theory, the semantic element that construes relations of expansion is the relator. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 267-8) explain the reason why they are liable to appear as minor processes, processes, qualities and things:

Relators construe the highly generalised logico-semantic relations of expansion that join figures into sequences: elaborating, extending, enhancing. […] these relationships of expansion pervade very many regions of the semantic system: they are manifested in the organisation of figures of being, in the types of circumstantial element that occur within a figure, in the taxonomy of ‘things’, and elsewhere, as well as of course in their ‘home’ region of the construal of sequences, as links between one figure and another.  This led us to characterise the categories of expansion as "transphenomenal" and "fractal": transphenomenal in the sense that they re-appear across the spectrum of different types of phenomena construed by the ideational system; and fractal in the sense that they serve as general principles of the construal of experience, generating identical patterns of organisation of variable magnitude and in variable semantic environments.

It is these characteristics of relators that make them particularly liable to migrate: to be displaced metaphorically from their congruent status (as paratactic and hypotactic conjunctions) and to appear in other guises in other locations — as minor processes (in circumstantial elements), as processes, as qualities and as things.

[3] To be clear, this is a minor Process, an element of the experiential function structure of a prepositional phrase.

Misrepresenting Ideational Metaphor As An Interaction Of Logical & Experiential Metaphors

Martin (1992: 407):

Logical and experiential metaphors interact as what might be termed ideational metaphors when external conjunctive relations, typically consequential ones, are realised metaphorically.  This interaction produces a high level of abstraction in text, making it inaccessible to large sections of the community.  A good example of this process is found in [6:23k].  There, two experiential metaphors, the enlargement of Australia's steel–making capacity and the demands of war are causally connected by the logical metaphor owed.

[6:23k] The enlargement of Australia’s steel-making capacity, and of chemicals, rubber, metal goods and motor vehicles all owed something to the demands of war. 

Recoded congruently as a clause complex, this clause translates as follows:

[6:24]	a.	alpha	Australia could make more steel, chemicals, rubber, metal goods and motor vehicles
	b.	beta	partly because (people) demanded them
	c.	gamma	to fight the war.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, ideational metaphor is not the interaction of experiential and logical metaphors. Ideational metaphor occurs, for example, when

• a semantic sequence is realised grammatically by something other than a clause complex,
• a semantic figure is realised grammatically by something other than a clause,
• a semantic element is realised by something other than its congruent group/phrase (e.g. process as nominal group instead of verbal group, relator as verbal group instead of conjunction group).

See Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 227ff).

[2] The text does not exemplify the interaction of experiential and logical metaphors.  From a semantic perspective, it exemplifies the general tendency in ideational metaphor to move from the logical to experiential being–&–having.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 293):

… the general tendency in the metaphorical move away from the congruent is away from the logical towards the experiential; and within the experiential towards the domain of participants in figures of being & having.

[3] As the congruent rendering (almost) demonstrates, the metaphorical grammatical realisation is a consequence of a semantic figure being realised by (all of) a nominal group.

congruent: figure as clause

Australia	produced	more steel, chemicals, rubber, metal goods and motor vehicles
Actor	Process: material	Goal

metaphorical: figure as nominal group

The	enlargement	[of Australia’s steel-making capacity, and of chemicals, rubber, metal goods and motor vehicles]
Deictic	Thing	Qualifier

Claiming That Location Circumstances Realise Relations Between Clauses

Martin (1992: 407):

Conversely, experiential meaning may be realised metaphorically with no necessary effect on conjunctive relations. Clause g-j in text [6:23] all have incongruent Subjects at the same time as temporal relations between the clauses are realised congruently as circumstantial phrases (i.e. setting in time: between 1937 and 1945, in the post-war years, by 1954-5). 

[6:23]	g	Between 1937 and 1945 the value of industrial production almost doubled.
	h	This increase was faster than otherwise would have occurred.
	i	The momentum was maintained in the post-war years
	j	and by 1954-5 the value of manufacturing output was three times that of 1944-5.

Blogger Comments:

[1] From the perspective of SFL theory, there are no instances of conjunctive relations in the four clauses. There are, however, two instances of complexes related by paratactic extension (g, j), both realised by the conjunction and.

[2] To be clear, it is not the (interpersonal) Subjecthood of these elements that is incongruent, but the realisations of ideational meaning in the grammar: figure as nominal group (g, j), Process as Thing (h, i).

[3] The circumstances of Location: time do not realise temporal relations between clauses.  As circumstances of Location, they each construe 'the location of the unfolding of the process in space–time' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 265).  A temporal relation between clauses in a clause complex is realised by a conjunction group.  The cohesive conjunction of (groups of) messages is effected through conjunctive Adjuncts.

[4] In discussing grammatical metaphor, it is semantics (meaning) that is congruently or metaphorically realised in lexicogrammar (wording); so it theoretically inconsistent to couch this in terms of temporal relations between grammatical units (clauses).  In discourse semantics, such temporal relations obtain between messages, the unit of the logical metafunction, whereas in SFL theory, they obtain between figures in a sequence.

[5] To be clear, this is shorthand for circumstances of Location (realised by prepositional phrases).

Misrepresenting Ideational Metaphor

Martin (1992: 406-7):

Logical and experiential metaphor are in principle independent of each other. Conjunctive relations may be realised metaphorically without necessarily involving metaphorical processes qualities or participants as well.  The first clause in text [6:22] nominalises cause (a number of reasons) with no repercussions for grammatical metaphor in the rest of the clause (cf. I think there should be Governments for several reasons).  It is internal conjunctive relations that lend themselves to "independent" metaphorical realisation in this way.

[6:22:a] I think Governments are necessary at different levels for a number of reasons.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, the two types of grammatical metaphor are ideational and interpersonal (Halliday 1994: 343), though ideational metaphor is sometimes referred to as experiential metaphor (e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 285, 400)).

[2] In SFL theory, conjunctive relations are types of expansion deployed lexicogrammatically by the textual metafunction.  That is, they are grammatical realisations of textual meaning.

In contrast, as previously demonstrated, Martin's system of conjunction confuses this textual deployment of expansion with the logical deployment of expansion (between grammatical units in complexes) and relocates the confusion to discourse semantics.

But there is a deeper theoretical problem here.  Because, as previously demonstrated, Martin's system of conjunction is, for the most part, not theorised in a manner that is consistent with the meaning of the expansion categories, it sets up incongruent relations between strata in cases where there is no grammatical metaphor.  For example, Martin (1992: 203) analyses the conjunctive relation in

Whereas usually we win, this time we lost 

as external comparison: contrast, even though, grammatically, the logical relation is extension: addition: adversative.

That is, on Martin's model, a logical relation of external comparison: contrast at the level of discourse semantics is realised as a logical relation of extension: addition: adversative at the level of lexicogrammar.  The relation between meaning and wording is thus incongruent.  Given that incongruent realisations are metaphorical, on Martin's model this would be an instance of grammatical metaphor.

[3] The first clause in text [6:22] is I think.

I	think	Governments	are	necessary	at different levels	for a number of reasons
a		‘b
Senser	Process	Carrier	Process	Attribute	Location	Cause: Reason

[4] The notion of 'repercussions for grammatical metaphor' is irrelevant.  In the second clause, reasons is metaphorically construed as a Thing of a nominal group serving as the Range of a minor Process of a prepositional phrase serving as a circumstance of Cause: reason.  That is, what is congruently realised as a minor Process — for, because of — is metaphorically realised as the Range: minor Process of that minor Process.  This provided, in this instance, the possibility of quantification by an indefinite Numerative.

for	a number of reasons
minor Process	Range

a number of	reasons
Numerative Deictic Thing	Thing

[5] 'Internal conjunctive relations' don't 'lend themselves to "independent" metaphorical realisations' for two reasons.  First, internal conjunctive relations obtain through the deployment of expansion types by the textual metafunction at the level of lexicogrammar, whereas the type of metaphorical relations here are between ideational semantics and lexicogrammar.  Second, the notion of "independent" metaphorical realisations rests on the false distinction of logical versus experiential metaphor.

Mistaking Ideational Metaphor For Metaphor

Martin (1992: 406):

All of the metaphorical examples presented in Table 6.15 involve nominalisation, the predominant semantic drift of grammatical metaphor in modern English.  Since nouns are fundamentally the output of experiential grammar this entails as well a skewing of all meaning towards the experiential.  Construing meaning as a thing in other words means construing text as material object — as a material part of the social reality it is simultaneously engaged in constructing (ideationally) and intruding upon (interpersonally).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is manifestly untrue.  The example in the table proposed as textual metaphor, this point, is clearly not a nominalisation.

[2] Nominalisation is a resource for ideational metaphor.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 656):

Nominalising is the single most powerful resource for creating grammatical metaphor. By this device, processes (congruently worded as verbs) and properties (congruently worded as adjectives) are reworded metaphorically as nouns; instead of functioning in the clause, as Process or Attribute, they function as Thing in the nominal group.

There are two motifs in the semantic drift of ideational metaphor.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 263-4):

It is possible to distinguish two predominant motifs in the phenomena characterised here: one major or primary and one minor or secondary one. (i) The primary motif is clearly the drift towards ‘thing’.  (ii) The secondary motif is what appears as a tendency in the opposite direction: the move from ‘thing’ into what might be interpreted as a manifestation of ‘quality’ (qualifying, possessive or classifying expansions of the 'thing').

[3] Nouns are not "fundamentally the output of experiential grammar".  Nouns are form not function.  Nouns realise elements of all metafunctions.

[4] Nominalisation does not entail "a skewing of all meaning toward the experiential".  Nominalisation is a resource for creating ideational metaphor.  The meanings that are incongruently realised in wording are (already) ideational meanings.  In ideational metaphor, the drift is from the logical to the experiential.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 293):

… the general tendency in the metaphorical move away from the congruent is away from the logical towards the experiential; and within the experiential towards the domain of participants in figures of being & having.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 642):

Within the ideational metafunction, the general effect of this realignment in the semantic system is a shift from the logical to the experiential — an experientialisation of experience. Thus logical sequences of figures are reconstrued as experiential configurations of elements.

[5] 'Construing meaning as thing' does not mean "construing text as material object"(!).  The reconstrual of experience through ideational metaphor objectifies our experience.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 548):

Grammatical metaphor objectifies our experience, transforming its being and happening into things; in so doing, it privileges order, since experience can now be categorised into classes and hierarchies of classes, which are significantly more determinate than the processes and properties favoured by the grammar in its congruent form.

[6] In SFL theory, the ideational metafunction is the dimension of language in its rôle of construing experience, not "constructing social reality".  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 7):

The ideational metafunction is concerned with construing experience — it is language as a theory of reality, as a resource for reflecting on the world.

The interpersonal metafunction is the dimension of language in its rôle of enacting interpersonal relations.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 7):

The interpersonal metafunction is concerned with enacting interpersonal relations through language, with the adoption and assignment of speech rôles, with the negotiation of attitudes, and so on — it is language in the praxis of intersubjectivity, as a resource for interacting with others.

∞

Further clarifications:

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 264):

… the drift towards ‘thinginess’ is the culminating and most clearly articulated form of a shift which can be characterised in more general terms as a shift towards the experiential — towards that mode of construing experience that is most readily organised into paradigmatic sets and contrasts. Things are more easily taxonomised than qualities, qualities than processes, and processes more easily than circumstances or relations. Since the ‘noun-ness’ is being used to construe phenomena that start out as something else than a noun, metaphors will inevitably be abstract.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 265, 267): 

… by construing any phenomenon of experience as a thing, we give it the maximum potential for semantic elaboration. … the more structure that is to be imposed on experience the more pressure there is to construe it in the form of things.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 267):

But things are merely the end-point of the metaphoric scale… . Processes, though more constrained than things, still have more semantic potential than relators: they accommodate categories of time and phase, among others, and are construed in open lexical sets, whereas relators for closed systems. So there is pressure there too, to metaphorise conjunctions into verbs: then, so, because, before, therefore becoming follow, result, cause, anticipate, prove. (Circumstances are something of a special case because most of them already contain participants in minor, subsidiary processes — prepositional phrases in the grammar.) But it remains true that things are the most susceptible of being classified and organised into taxonomies; hence the primary motif of grammatical metaphor is that of construing a world in the form of things.

Taking A Monostratal Approach To Grammatical Metaphor

Martin (1992: 406):

Table 6.15. Examples of grammatical metaphor across metafunctions
metafunction	congruent	metaphorical
ideational:
logical
conjunctive relation	therefore	reason
experiential
process	advance	advancement
interpersonal
assessment	might	possibility
textual
reference	he	this point

Blogger Comments:

[1] From a lexicogrammatical perspective ('from below'), grammatical metaphor is an incongruent grammatical realisation of meaning, as, in the case of ideational metaphor, when a Process (semantics) is realised by a Thing (lexicogrammar).  From a semantic perspective ('from above'), grammatical metaphor creates a junctional construct: the meanings of both the metaphorical and congruent grammatical realisations, as in the meaning of advancement as 'process thing'.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 271): 

Thus grammatical metaphor is a means of having things both ways. … A[n] element that is metaphorised does not lose its original status. Its construction is not triggered by its being associated with any new semantic feature. If it has a new semantic feature this is a result of the metaphorising process. … It has become a ‘junctional’ construct, combining two of the basic properties that the grammar evolved as it grew into a theory of experience.

Halliday (2008: 96):

The effect of this semantic junction is to create virtual phenomena which exist on the semiotic plane. Thus motion and heat are virtual entities; cause and follow (“come after in time”) are virtual processes; while heat resistance is a virtual class of a virtual entity resistance. Such virtual phenomena are critical for the construction of theory;

This table does not present a semantic perspective of grammatical metaphor, and does not present it from a grammatical perspective as a relation between content strata.

[2] In SFL theory, the noun 'reason' is an incongruent grammatical realisation of the meaning 'expansion: enhancement: cause: reason', a type of enhancement within the semantic system of expansion.  In SFL theory (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 600), therefore realises expansion: enhancement: cause: reason, but through the textual system of cohesive conjunction.  However, in Martin's discourse semantics (p179), therefore realises 'consequential: consequence', through the logical system of conjunction.

[3] Martin's discourse semantics does not provide 'process' as an experiential system or feature — see Figure 5.23 p320 — and the experiential unit of meaning is simply 'message part' (p325).  That is, the discourse semantic model provides no distinct semantic category by which to determine congruent (advance) and metaphorical (advancement) realisations in the grammar.

[4] Martin's discourse semantics does not provide '(modal) assessment' as an interpersonal system; see Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 608-12).  That is, the discourse semantic model provides no system of features by which to determine congruent and metaphorical realisations of low values of probability in the grammar.

Further, the metaphorical realisation provided here is the nominalisation possibility (a noun of modalisation). Interpersonal metaphors of modality are actually the explicit subjective and objective forms, such as, in the case of low probability: I think… and it's possible….  Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 624):

The explicitly subjective and explicitly objective forms of modality are all strictly speaking metaphorical, since all of them represent the modality as being the substantive proposition. Modality represents the speaker’s angle, either on the validity of the assertion or on the rights and wrongs of the proposal; in its congruent form, it is an adjunct to a proposition rather than a proposition in its own right.

[5] In SFL theory, as previously explained, there is no textual metaphor.  Leaving this minor detail aside, here the grammatical system of cohesive reference is identified as providing the example of textual metaphor, rather than the discourse semantic system of identification.  But in any case, no semantic category is provided that is said to be realised in the grammar congruently as he and metaphorically as this point.

∞

Note that grammatical metaphor was cited as one of the three motivations for theorising a discourse semantics stratum.  See previous post here.

Misrepresenting Grammatical Metaphor

Martin (1992: 406):

Like discourse systems, grammatical metaphor is sensitive to metafunction and it is possible to recognise different types of metaphor according to the kinds of meaning they interface.  Examples of ideational (logical and experiential), interpersonal and textual metaphors have been introduced at various points in English Text; an example of each type of metaphor is presented in Table 6.15.  The role of each in interfacing discourse semantics and lexicogrammar is taken up in more detail below.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, grammatical metaphor involves, in the first instance, an incongruent relation (of realisation) between meaning (semantics) and wording (lexicogrammar) — which is why it's called grammatical metaphor — demonstrating that it was theorised on the basis on a stratified content plane.

[2] In SFL theory, grammatical metaphor involves either the incongruent realisation of ideational meaning in wording, or the incongruent realisation of interpersonal meaning in wording.  It does not involve the incongruent realisation of textual meaning in wording.  On the other hand, grammatical metaphor is itself a manifestation of the second-order nature of the textual metafunction.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398-9):

Grammatical metaphor is a ‘second-order’ use of grammatical resources: one grammatical feature or set of features is used as a metaphor for another feature or set of features; and since features are realised by structures, one grammatical structure comes to stand for another.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 401):

But ideational grammatical metaphors typically have a discourse function of this kind; they are as it were pressed into service by the textual metafunction, to provide alternative groupings of quanta of information.

[3] To be clear, logical and textual metaphors have not yet been identified 'at various points in English Text'.  Up to this point in the text, only interpersonal metaphor (p39, pp50-1) and experiential metaphor (pp327-329) have been discussed, as verified by the index.

Misconstruing Contextual Systems And 'Text Forming Resources'

Martin (1992: 405):

At this stage however all that needs to be stressed is that contextual systems are a critical component of any culture's text forming resources.  The notion of text cannot be understood unless linguistic text forming resources are interpreted against the background of (or better, as redounding with) contextual ones.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, contextual systems are not a component of a culture's text forming resources.  Contextual systems model culture as a semiotic system, and do so in terms of all metafunctions: ideational (field), interpersonal (tenor) and textual (mode).  The 'text forming resources', on the other hand, are linguistic systems of the textual metafunction.

[2] The 'linguistic text forming resources' — those of the textual metafunction — realise the system of mode, the textual dimension of context.

[3] To be clear, the meaning of 'redound' here — previously quoted from Halliday in Thibault (1987: 619)  — is 'construes and is construed by'.  So a theoretically consistent interpretation would be that the text forming resources construe and are construed by the contextual system of mode.

Misconstruing Types Of Language As More Abstract Than Language

Martin (1992: 405):

The notion of context will be developed in somewhat different directions in Chapter 7 below, where context of situation and context of culture will be construed as a series of connotative semiotics (named register, genre and ideology).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is one of the most far-reaching misunderstandings of SFL theory in the entire book.  In SFL theory, 'context' is a semiotic system that is realised in language; it is the culture conceived as a connotative semiotic.  The terms 'register' and 'genre', on the other hand, refer to functional varieties of language itself; registers and genres are not more abstract than language — they are language.

The distinction between register and context is clearly stated in the work most cited by Martin. Halliday & Hasan (1976: 22):

The linguistic features which are typically associated with a configuration of situational features — with particular values of field, mode and tenor — constitute a REGISTER.  The more specifically we can characterise the context of situation, the more specifically we can predict the properties of a text in that situation.

[2] The relation between context of situation and context of culture is instantiation, whereas relations between stratified semiotic systems is realisation.  Turning the theory back on itself, instantiation is an intensive attributive relation, whereas realisation is an intensive identifying relation.  This means it is fundamentally flawed to construe context of situation and context of culture (instantiation) 'as a series of connotative semiotics' (realisation) — even before relabelling them as types of language (register and genre).