Misrepresenting Cohesive Harmony

Martin (1992: 488-9):

Looked at from the point of view of field and embracing the ineffable, the semantics of these texturing processes can be glossed, albeit metaphorically, as follows.  Cohesive harmony locates a text within a particular field or sub-field.  As a measure of coherence cohesive harmony argues that the more meanings are experientially related to each other in a text in similar ways, the more coherent the text is.  A maximally coherent text is thus defined as one in which the same event is repeated over and over again, as in a recount of the operation of a robot on a factory floor.  Since this kind of activity sequence is not worth talking about, the experiential texture associated with coherence never amounts to simple repetition.  But in some sense, the more focussed the field, the more coherent cohesive harmony analysis will show a text to be.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Martin's notion of field is theoretically inconsistent and self-inconsistent in two distinct ways, as shown in previous posts.  On the one hand, field is confused with semantics (e.g. 'activity sequences' in the text); on the other, field, a dimension of context (culture as a semiotic) is misconstrued as a dimension of register (a sub-potential of language).

[2] In the words of Conan Doyle's Dr. John H. Watson: "What ineffable twaddle!"

[3] Cohesive harmony is not a "texturing process".  Hasan's cohesive harmony refers to the synergy between meanings of the textual metafunction and those of the ideational metafunction (construing experience) and, potentially, the interpersonal metafunction (enacting the self in social relations).  Texture, the quality of being a text, arises from the resources of the textual metafunction.

[4] This confuses metafunctions.  It is not the experiential relations between meanings that measure the coherence of a text.  As Hasan (1985: 94) makes clear:

Variation in coherence is a function of variation in the cohesive harmony of a text. … Cohesive harmony is an account of how the two functions [textual and experiential] find their expression in one significant whole.

[5] This confuses the ideational metafunction (repeated events) with the textual metafunction, the source of coherence.

[6] This is a contradiction in terms.  Texture is achieved through the resources of the textual metafunction.  The experiential metafunction is concerned with the construal of experience.

A Short Summary Of Some Of The Misunderstandings Of Chapter 6

Martin (1992: 488):

The basic strategy adopted to explore this question [how do modules of the semiotic model interface?] was to look closely at the interaction of reference chains and lexical strings with specific lexicogrammatical and phonological variables — specifically TRANSITIVITY rôles, Theme, New and Subject.  The texture deriving from these four types of interaction was discussed under the headings of cohesive harmony, method of development, point and modal responsibility.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses the content plane (New information) with the expression plane (phonology).

[2] The term and concept of 'texture' come from Halliday & Hasan (1976).  Texture is the property of being a text, and is created by the textual metafunction.  Here it is misapplied to the experiential metafunction (TRANSITIVITY rôles) and the interpersonal metafunction (Subject).

[3] The term and concept of 'cohesive harmony' come from Hasan (1984, 1985).  Martin misunderstands and misrepresents Hasan's model and critiques these as if they were her model.  See the evidence in previous posts here, here, here, and here.

[4] The term and concept of 'method of development' come from Fries (1981).  Martin's 'method of development' is writing pedagogy masquerading as linguistic theory.  He rebrands 'topic sentence' as 'hyper-Theme' — a term taken from Daneš (1974) but redefined — and 'introductory paragraph' as 'macro-Theme'.

[5] The term and concept of 'point' come from Fries (1981).  Martin's 'point' is, again, writing pedagogy masquerading as linguistic theory.  He rebrands  'paragraph summary' as 'hyper-New', and 'text summary' as 'macro-New'.

[6] The term and concept of 'modal responsibility' come from Halliday (1985), where it is the meaning of 'Subject': that on which the validity of a proposition or proposal rests.  Martin first misunderstands 'modal responsibility', in proposals, as 'the constituent responsible for seeing that goods are exchanged or a service performed' (p461).  He then misinterprets the meaning of Subject from a discourse perspective, in terms of exchange resolution (p462), as 'what is at stake' (p464) and as 'participant at risk' (p477).

Misconstruing Strata As Modules

Martin (1992: 488):

In this chapter a brief sketch of some of the ways in which discourse semantics interacts with lexicogrammar and phonology has been presented.  The problem addressed is a fundamental concern of modular models of semiosis — namely, once modules are distinguished, how do they interface?  What is the nature of the conversation among components?

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, the relation between strata, such as semantics and lexicogrammar, is realisation, which is an intensive identifying relation.  That is, strata are levels of symbolic abstraction, and as such, complementary perspectives.  The notion that different levels of abstraction can interact derives from a misunderstanding of strata as modules.

[2] The chapter discussed a lexicogrammatical function (New information) realised by a phonological system (tonicity), rather than phonology itself.  Moreover, New information — despite being misconstrued as phonology — was further misrepresented as an element of the clause (instead of the information unit).

[3] SFL theory is not a modular model of semiosis, and this misunderstanding is one source of the serious global theoretical errors in Martin's discourse semantic model.

Modules are distinct units that can be combined with others to make more complex structures. That is, a modular model is one whose organising principles are association and composition, which, in terms of expansion, are types of extension. The overarching organising principle of SFL theory, on the other hand, in terms of expansion, is elaboration. Elaboration is the organising principle of:

• systemic delicacy,
• stratification (along with identity),
• axial relations (along with identity),
• the cline of instantiation (along with ascription).

Extension is an organising principle of system network wiring (conjunctive 'and' and disjunctive 'or') and the rankscale of forms (composition).

In short, strata are not modules, not components, and the relation between them — realisation — is not one of extension, but one of elaboration and symbolic identity.

Using A Middle Clause To Illustrate Agency

Martin (1992: 488):

The way in which modal responsibility is mapped onto agency may well be a life and death matter, as text [6:53] shows.  Superintendent Harding is explaining why an innocent Aboriginal man has been shot to death during a commando style police raid (in connection with a search for a suspect who has wounded two policemen).  In contrast to the paper's headline, the Superintendent textures the gun as responsible for the killing.

‘Uptight’ police kill man in raid
[6: 53]	(Superintendent Harding)
	a	A struggle took place
	b	and the officer was reacting
	c	to keep the peace
	d	and stop himself or others being hurt.
	e	The gun then discharged.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The clause in question is middle, not effective; there is no agency:

the gun	then	discharged
Medium Actor		Process: material

[2] In terms of "experiential responsibility", the gun was not construed as an Agent by the speaker.  In terms of modal responsibility, as Subject, the gun is the element that the speaker makes responsible for the validity of what he is saying.

the gun	then	discharged
Subject	(conjunctive Adjunct)	Finite	Predicator

Note that according to Martin's misinterpretation of modal responsibility, it is the gun that is the "participant at risk".

[3] In SFL theory, 'texture', the property of being a text, is created by the textual metafunction.  Here it is misapplied to the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions — agency and modal responsibility, respectively.

Misconstruing Modal Responsibility As Speaker At Risk

Martin (1992: 486-7):

This interplay of embedding, taxis and MOOD was exploited in text [6:30] to focus modal responsibility on the sitting member, as analysed above. … So while the member is textured as modally responsible, he is never experientially responsible. Where he could be, in the congruent version of [6:30g] for example, he is realised as the possessor of a nominalised modulation:

My responsibility is to make sure that the life style we enjoy is maintained and improved.

(— Is it?)

… Mapping interpersonal responsibility onto experiential responsibility (i.e. agency) as in the congruent version of [6:30g] places the member rather more at risk:

I must make sure that the life style we enjoy is maintained and improved.

(— Must you?)

It is for this political consideration that the text is structured as an interpersonal massage, rather than an experiential message.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In the said analysis, the modal responsibility of the Subject (metalanguage) was confused with an instance of responsibility in the text (language) projected by the speaker.  Evidence here.

[2] In SFL theory, 'texture', the property of being a text, is created by the textual metafunction.  Here it is misapplied to the interpersonal metafunction — modal responsibility.

[3] Because modal responsibility is interpersonal meaning, the experiential agency of the Subject has no bearing on the interpersonal meaning.  The difference between the two versions of [6:30g] is that in the first, my responsibility carries the responsibility for the the validity of the proposition, whereas, in the second, I (the speaker) carries the responsibility for the the validity of the proposition.  In neither version is the member "at risk" — because that's not what modal responsibility means.

[4] To be clear, in SFL theory, 'message' refers to the semantic unit of the textual metafunction — not the experiential — that is realised in the lexicogrammar as the thematic structure of the clause. 

Using Embedding To Argue About Hypotaxis

Martin (1992: 486):

Subjects in embedded clauses are not however modally responsible, as can be seen from the fact that embedded clauses cannot be  tagged or queried.  Both the tag and the response in [6:51] for example refer unambiguously to the test, not the drug.

[6:51]	(embedding)
	The test proved [[the drug killed her]], didn’t it?
	— Yes it did.

With hypotaxis, the situation is more equivocal; the tag and response in [6:52] may refer either to the test or the drug, although the tag is much more likely to refer to the alpha clause than the beta:

[6:52]	(hypotaxis)
	The test suggested that the drug may have killed her, didn’t it?
	— It did.

So while hypotactically dependent clauses are still negotiable, the Mood element is less likely to be replayed than that of the alpha clause, and their Subject can accordingly be considered less at risk than those of ranking a [alpha?] clauses.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Text [6:52], like text [6:51], involves embedding, not hypotaxis.  It is the Subject of this clause simplex that is picked up by the pronoun in the Mood Tag.

the test	suggested		[[that the drug may have killed her]]	didn’t	it
Token/Identified	Process: identifying		Value/Identifier
Subject	Finite	Predicator	Complement	Finite	Subject
Mood		Residue		Mood Tag

Cf. the receptive agnate: That the drug may have killed her was suggested by the test, wasn't it?

[[that the drug may have killed her]]	was	suggested	by the test	wasn’t	it
Value/Identifier	Process: identifying		Token/Identified
Subject	Finite	Predicator	Adjunct	Finite	Subject
Mood		Residue		Mood Tag

See, for example, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 269, 277, 285).

[2] Here the meaning of Subject, modal responsibility, is misconstrued as meaning "at risk".  In SFL theory, the Subject 'is the element the speaker makes responsible for the validity of what he is saying' (Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 83).