Confusing Metafunctions, Misunderstanding Modal Responsibility And Misinterpreting Data

Martin (1992: 477-8):

Text [6:50] is taken from Halliday's (1982) analysis of de-automatisation and interpersonal metaphor in Priestley's An Inspector Calls.  … The participants at risk in [6:50] include the Inspector and members of the Birling family (Mrs Birling, Birling, Sheila) except Gerald, but not the woman they have wronged.  Taking the congruent unpacking of interpersonal metaphor outlined in Table 6.27 as a baseline, the woman wronged is made modally responsible on four occasions ([6:50r, s, nn, qq] — and [6:50nn, qq] are dependent clauses); she is realised four times as often in the Residue. The family (except Gerald) and the Inspector on the other hand are modally responsible as often as not.

Table 6.27. Congruent realisations of interpersonal metaphors in [6:30]
	as subject [modally responsible]	as residue [not modally responsible]
Inspector	d,e,f,g,h,i,y,aa,bb,cc,dd,hh,ii,jj,yy	t,u,x,z,bb,cc
Gerald	rr,ss	c,d,e,f,g,rr,tt
Mrs Birling	j,k,l,m,n,o,p,q,t,u,v,w,x,uu,ww,xx	k,l,v,uu,vv,ww
Birling	z,ee,mm	ff,hh,ii,jj
Sheila	oo,pp,vv	kk
[we ‘Birlings’]	a,b,c,ll,ll
[you ‘parents’]	zz	zz
woman	r,s,nn,qq,d,e,f,g,h,i,o,p,q,	mm,nn,rr,ss,uu,ww

Blogger Comments:

[1] The interpersonal meaning of Subject, modal responsibility, is here misconstrued as experiential meaning: "participants at risk".

[2] This confuses the interlocutors in the play with the pronoun Subjects of the clauses they project.  The words Mrs Birling, (Mr) Birling and Sheila do not serve as the Subject of any of the clauses in the play.  In this discussion of interpersonal meaning, the pronouns are being interpreted experientially, instead of interpersonally.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 525):

If the ideational metafunction is language in its "third person" guise, the interpersonal is language in its “first and second person” guise; the interaction of a ‘me’ and a ‘you’. The ‘me’ and the ‘you’ are of course constructed in language; they have no existence outside the social semiotic. Once constructed, me and you become a part of experience and can be referred to alongside the him, the her and the it; but note that (unlike the interpersonal meaning, which does not change) their ideational meaning changes every time there is a change of speaker (this is what makes me and you so difficult for children to learn).

[3] This contradicts the analysis in Table 6.27, which claims that 'Gerald' serves as Subject twice. Actually, in Martin's terms, 'Gerald' serves as Subject three times: in [b] as I, in [rr] as Gerald, and in [ss] as the ellipsed Subject.

[4] This contradicts the analysis in Table 6.27, which claims that 'the woman they have wronged' serves as Subject thirteen times, and the sentence that follows which claims that she serves as Subject four times.

[5] This contradicts the analysis in Table 6.27, which claims that 'the woman they have wronged' serves as Subject thirteen times.  Actually, in Martin's terms, 'the woman they have wronged' serves as Subject only twice: in [r, qq] as she.

[6] This contradicts the analysis in Table 6.27, which claims that 'the woman they have wronged' serves as Subject thirteen times, and in the Residue six times.  4 x 13 ≠ 6.

[7] This contradicts the analysis in Table 6.27, which claims that

• 'Inspector' serves as Subject fifteen times, but in the Residue only six times (15–6);
• 'Mrs Birling' serves as Subject sixteen times, but in the Residue only six times (16–6);
• 'Sheila' serves as Subject three times, but in the Residue only once (3–1).

Misconstruing Semiotic Validity As Social Success

Martin (1992: 476):

Instead the Subject codes the modally responsible participants (including the metaphorical interpersonal "participant" a vital responsibility and two further nominalisations the earlier conflict–the latter); these are at risk not because they contrast with each other but because they are alternatives to potential Subjects in the Residue. The argument can be changed completely by promoting these to Subject position, as outlined below.  The main result of this transformation is that the success of the propositions no longer depends on the American armed forces; these are demoted from modal responsibility and no longer seen to be at risk.

Blogger Comments:

[1] A participant is a construal of experience.  This demonstrates that Martin is here misconstruing interpersonal meaning as experiential meaning.

[2] Here the meaning of Subject, modal responsibility, is misconstrued as "meaning at risk".  It is the proposition that is arguable, and the validity of the proposition rests on the Subject.

[3] Here the validity of propositions is misconstrued as "the success of the propositions", presumably in the sense of 'closing negotiation' (p462).  This follows from misconstruing modal responsibility as a type of social responsibility incumbent on the interlocutors, as explained in previous posts.

Blurring Metafunctions

Martin (1992: 474, 476):

Although it is harder to unpick the meaning of Subject in written monologue [than in spoken mode] from the meaning of Theme and Given, texts such as [6:36] above which realise their method of development through marked Themes demonstrate the significance of modal responsibility in this mode. …

Unlike Theme, Subject selection in [6:36] does not reflect the text's contrastive method of development.

Blogger Comment:

The meanings of these grammatical functions are metafunctionally distinct.  The meaning of Subject is interpersonal (modal responsibility) whereas the meanings of Theme (point of departure of the message) and Given (recoverable information) are textual.  Because 'method of development' is a concern of the textual metafunction, Subject selection is irrelevant to a text's method of development.

Misunderstanding The Metafunctions

Martin (1992: 465):

Interpersonal resources for negotiation are foregrounded in the following sketch from Monty Python's first movie.  Interlocutor A has paid for an argument, which he defines in ideational terms: An argument is a connected series of statements intended to establish a proposition; what he receives instead is simply interpersonal — contradiction: the automatic gainsaying of any statement the other person makes.  This underlines the fact that negotiation is more than interaction; it is about interlocutors accommodating ideational meaning.

Blogger Comments:

[1] (True to form) Monty Python's 'argument sketch' did not appear in the first "movie" And Now For Something Completely Different — a re-filming of some sketches from the 1st and 2nd series of the BBC television programme, Monty Python's Flying Circus, for U.S. cinema release in 1971. The argument sketch didn't appear until the 3rd episode of the 3rd series, broadcast in November 1972. 

[2] The distinction between these two definitions of 'argument' in the text is not a metafunctional one. Experientially, they are both figures of being–&–having realised by identifying relational clauses, and interpersonally, they are both propositions: statements realised by declarative clauses. As propositions, they demonstrate the meaning of Subject as modal responsibility.

well	an argument	isn’t	just	contradiction
	Subject	Finite	mood Adjunct: intensity: counterexpectancy: limiting	Complement
	Mood			Residue

an argument	is	a connected series of statements intended to establish a proposition
Subject	Finite	Complement
Mood		Residue

argument	is	an intellectual process
Subject	Finite	Complement
Mood		Residue

contradiction	is	just	the automatic gainsaying of any statement the other person makes
Subject	Finite	mood Adjunct: intensity: counterexpectancy: limiting	Complement
Mood			Residue

For each clause, the responsibility for the validity of what is predicated is carried by the Subject. The responsibility for the validity of an argument is a connected series of statements intended to establish a proposition is carried by its Subject an argument; the responsibility for the validity of contradiction is just the automatic gainsaying of any statement the other person makes is carried by its Subject contradiction.

[3] Negotiation isn't about "interlocutors accommodating ideational meaning". This misunderstands the metafunctions. Meaning is simultaneously ideational, interpersonal and textual. Negotiation is concerned with meaning in its interpersonal guise. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 525):

Choosing a particular speech function is, obviously, only one step in a dialogue; what the grammar creates, through the system of “mood”, is the potential for arguing, for an ongoing exchange of speech rôles among the interactants in a conversation. The mood system, together with other systems associated with it, constructs a great range of speech functional variation; and since in principle any ideational meaning can be mapped on to any interpersonal meaning, this makes it possible to construe any aspect of experience in dialogic form. 

Confusing Subject With Validity

Martin (1992: 464):

Seen in these terms negotiation involves resolving an exchange by replaying its Mood function (possibly fine tuning through tone), adjusting its POLARITY, MODALITY or TENSE, or substituting its Subject or part of its Residue; alternatively the initiating proposal or proposition has to be replaced and negotiation started all over again.  The interlocutor initiating the exchange tries to facilitate this by centring meanings at risk in the Mood; it is this facilitation process that explains the pattern of Subject choice in dialogue — the Subject, in other words, is what is at stake.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is the Mood block, the Subject and Finite, that makes a proposition arguable. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 212):

The ‘nub of the argument’ is realised by the Subject of clause and the Finite fixes it … in relation to the now of speaking.

[2] In considering the clause in its interpersonal semantic guise, as a move in an exchange, what's "at stake" or "at risk" — that is, what is arguable — is not the Subject, but the validity of the proposition or proposal.  The Subject is the element on which this modal responsibility rests; the validity of a proposition is stated or questioned with respect to the Subject.

Misconstruing Modal Responsibility In Terms Of Exchange Resolution

Martin (1992: 462):

The challenge here is to interpret the meaning of Subject from a discourse perspective, by looking at the way in which discourse structures interact with Subject selection.  The best context for examining this interaction is dialogue, since negotiation provides the appropriate interpersonal context.  As noted in Chapter 2, in the unmarked case, negotiation is aimed at closure; interlocutors work around an obligatory K1 or A1 move which will resolve the exchange.  It follows from this that the interlocutor initiating the exchange will arrange propositions and proposals in such a way that they can be "naturally" resolved.

Blogger Comment:

This misconstrual of modal responsibility — the meaning of Subject — follows directly from Martin's (p461) misinterpretation of the Subject of proposals:

The meaning of Subject is glossed in terms of modal responsibility. This meaning is most transparent in proposals, where regardless of voice, the Subject is the constituent responsible for seeing that goods are exchanged or a service performed.

Applied to propositions, this becomes:

• the Subject is the constituent responsible for seeing that information is exchanged.

In the excerpt above, this social responsibility for interlocutors seeing that information is exchanged becomes a responsibility for interlocutors seeing that exchanges are resolved.

Again, this confuses the material order of experience (interlocutors) with the semiotic order of experience (the linguistic content that they project).

Confusing Metafunctions And Axes

Martin (1992: 462):

The challenge here is to interpret the meaning of Subject from a discourse perspective, by looking at the way in which discourse structures interact with Subject selection.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses metafunctions.  Subject is an interpersonal function whereas discourse semantics has been demonstrated here to be largely a misunderstanding of Halliday and Hasan's model of lexicogrammatical cohesion, a non-structural resource of the textual metafunction.  The meaning of Subject is interpersonal, not textual.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 528):

The “textual” metafunction is the name we give to the systematic resources a language must have for creating discourse: for ensuring that each instance of text makes contact with its environment. The “environment” includes both the context of situation and other instances of text.

[2] This confuses axes, and therefore levels of symbolic abstraction, since syntagmatic structures realise paradigmatic selections.

[3] As has been previously demonstrated here, the discourse "structures" reworked from Halliday and Hasan's model of lexicogrammatical cohesion are not structures, but cohesive relations.

Misconstruing Subject And Theme

Martin (1992: 461):

The concept of modal responsibility is less obvious in propositions, and the meaning of Subject is hard to isolate because of the fact that in English declaratives and interrogatives Subject conflates with unmarked topical Theme.  However, it is clear in contexts where marked Themes are used to scaffold a text's method of development that Subject selection is in principle independent of Theme selection.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is not true.  The concept of modal responsibility is no less obvious in propositions.  In propositions, modal responsibility is responsibility for the validity of what is being stated or questioned (rather than offered or commanded, as in proposals).

[2] The meaning of Subject is modal responsibility.  The identity of Subject is "isolated" by Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 149) as follows:

In fact the Subject in English has got a distinct identity, as we have pointed out; its identity can be established if we adopt a trinocular perspective, as suggested by the stratificational model of language. 

(i) From below, it is that nominal element (nominal group or nominalised phrase or clause) that is picked up by the pronoun in the mood tag. 

(ii) From round about, it is that which combines with the Finite (operator) to form the Mood element in the clause; it is also that which constitutes the unmarked Theme if the mood is declarative, and which switches place with the Finite if the mood is yes/no interrogative. 

(iii) From above, it is that which carries the modal responsibility: that is, responsibility for the validity of what is being predicated (stated, questioned, commanded or offered) in the clause.

[3] The conflation of Subject with Theme in the unmarked case in declarative clauses has no bearing on the meaning or identity of Subject.  Subject is an interpersonal function (modal responsibility of the clause as exchange), whereas Theme is a textual function (point of departure of the clause as message).

[4] Subject does not conflate with unmarked topical Theme in declarative clauses.  This wording betrays Martin's misunderstanding of un/marked Theme.  If Theme conflates with Subject in declarative clauses, then the Theme is said to be unmarked (whereas if it conflates with Adjunct or Complement, it is said to be marked).  Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 73, 74):

In a declarative clause, the typical pattern is one in which Theme is conflated with Subject; … We shall refer to the mapping of Theme on to Subject as the unmarked Theme of a declarative clause. The Subject is the element that is chosen as Theme unless there is good reason for choosing something else. 

A Theme that is something other than the Subject, in a declarative clause, we shall refer to as a marked Theme. The most usual form of marked Theme is an adverbial group … or prepositional phrase … functioning as Adjunct in the clause. Least likely to be thematic is a Complement, which is a nominal group that is not functioning as Subject — something that could have been a Subject but is not … . Sometimes even the Complement from within a prepositional phrase functions as Theme … .

[5] Whatever the context, Subject selection is independent of Theme selection — regardless of whether the functions are conflated or not.  Subject selection is an interpersonal choice — one which identifies where the responsibility for the validity of the predication lies.  Theme selection is a textual choice — one which identifies the element that is highlighted as the point of departure for what follows in the message.

Misconstruing Modal Responsibility As Social Responsibility

Martin (1992: 461):

Halliday (1984/1988: 43-45; 1985: 76-78) stresses the fact that Subject is a meaning making function in the English clause, alongside the textual functions Theme and New or experiential functions such as Actor and Goal.  The meaning of Subject is glossed in terms of modal responsibility.  This meaning is most transparent in proposals, where regardless of voice, the Subject is the constituent responsible for seeing that goods are exchanged or a service performed.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 148n):

… in our systemic-functional account of English, Subject is interpreted metafunctionally as an interpersonal grammatically [sic] category; but like other such categories, e.g. Theme and Actor, Subject is both grammatical and semantic at the same time – the notion of ‘modal responsibility’.

[2] This confuses semogenesis (making meaning) with stratification (wording realising meaning).

[3] New is a functional element of the information unit, not of the clause.

[4] Modal responsibility is the view of Subject 'from above' — from semantics. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 149):

From above, [the Subject] is that which carries the modal responsibility: that is, responsibility for the validity of what is being predicated (stated, questioned, commanded or offered) in the clause.

[5] The Subject is not "the constituent responsible for seeing that goods are exchanged or a service performed".  This social responsibility between interlocutors is not (semiotic) modal responsibility.  Modal responsibility is responsibility for the validity of the proposal or proposition.  The validity of a proposal is commanded or offered with respect to the Subject; the validity of a proposition is stated or questioned with respect to the Subject; see for example Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 242).

Not Understanding Interstratal Realisation

Martin (1992: 460):

In Chapters 1 and 5 it was noted that one essential interpretation of "A realises B" in functional linguistics is that A is symbolically related to B — relationships between levels (beyond that between content and expression form) are natural.  The discussion of Theme and New in clauses, paragraphs and texts presented to this point in sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 illustrates clearly the symbolic way in which text can be said to be realised by clause.  Clause grammar is a metaphor for text structure; patterns of interaction between discourse semantics and lexicogrammar echo the textual organisation of the clause.  It is in this sense that a functional grammar is a critical resource for textlinguistics.

Blogger Comments:

This demonstrates most clearly that Martin (1992) does not understand the meaning of 'realisation' in the architecture of SFL theory.

[1] The clause A realises B construes an intensive identifying relation between A and B, such that A is the Token (the lower level of abstraction) and B is the Value (the higher level of abstraction).  Like verbs such as express, signify, spell, stand for, mean, the verb realise serves as a Process construing a symbolic identifying relation; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 238; 2014: 269).

[2] The clause A realises B does not specify whether the relation of symbolic identity between levels is natural or otherwise.

A	realises	B
expression	realises	content
phonology	realises	lexicogrammar
lexicogrammar	realises	semantics
Token	Process: intensive: symbol	Value

[3] In terms of stratification, 'text' refers to the highest unit of the semantic stratum, and 'clause' refers to the highest unit of the lexicogrammatical stratum.  The semantic stratum (meaning) is realised by the lexicogrammatical stratum (wording).  The 'symbolic way' that 'text is realised by clause' is just this interstratal relation.

[4] The claim here is that clause rank lexicogrammar (textual metafunction) is a metaphor (incongruent realisation) of text structure.

[5] In terms of the architecture of SFL theory, 'patterns of interaction between discourse semantics and lexicogrammar' are patterns of realisation relations between the systems of each stratum.  Thus, the claim here is actually that patterns of interstratal realisation of discourse semantics in lexicogrammar reflect the Theme^Rheme structure of the clause.

[6] The reason why a functional grammar is a critical resource for textlinguistics is actually because of the relation between text and system: instantiation.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 658):

A text is meaningful because it is an actualisation of the potential that constitutes the linguistic system; it is for this reason that the study of discourse (‘text linguistics’) cannot properly be separated from the study of the grammar that lies behind it.

Halliday (2008: 192):

The system and the text are not two different phenomena: what we call the “system” of a language is equivalent to its “text potential”. Analysing discourse means, first and foremost, relating the text to the potential that lies behind it.

Misconstruing A Grammatical Reference Item As An Accumulation Of New Information

Martin (1992: 459):

Hyper- and macro-News, like hyper- and macro-Themes are more prominent in written than spoken English.  However, just as marked Themes were shown to functional [sic] in parallel ways to hyper-Themes in spoken mode, so extended reference can be shown to function in parallel ways to hyper-News.  Two excerpts from text [4:2] are re-presented below to illustrate this point.  This in [4:2ff & ii] and that in [4:2aaa & ccc] are used to accumulate the actions in the activity sequences that have gone before in a way which complements their scaffolding with marked Themes as discussed in 6.3.2.  Extended reference is in other words to hyper-New as marked Theme is to hyper-Theme:

Synoptic : Dynamic ::

(WRITTEN : SPOKEN ::)

hyper-Theme : marked Theme ::

hyper-New : extended reference

Blogger Comments:

[1] In text [4:2], or any other text, the grammatical items this and that do not "accumulate" (or summarise) previous New information.  As instances of anaphoric demonstrative reference, they refer back to earlier information, which may have been presented as Given and/or New.

[2] For Martin, activity sequences in the text are misconstrued as field, the ideational dimension of context, and this, in turn, is misconstrued as register.

[3] Glossing Martin's terms, these proportionalities become:

• an anaphoric demonstrative reference item in spoken mode is to
• a paragraph summary in written mode as
• a marked Theme of a clause in spoken mode is to
• a topic sentence in written mode.

When An Abstract Is A Summary And A Summary Is An Introduction

Martin (1992: 458):

The consideration of macro-Theme and macro-New in Matthiessen and Halliday's paper points to the difference between what are often referred to as an abstract and a summary. A[n] abstract is essentially a dislocated macro-New (typically "Theme marked" at a text's beginning or published elsewhere); it presents the essence of what can be learned by reading the text the abstract functions as macro-New for.  A summary on the other hand is more like a dislocated macro-Theme (often "Rhematic" at the end of a text or published elsewhere); it provides an outline of what can or has been read, re-scaffolding by way of review.

Blogger Comments:

[1] On this model, the difference between an abstract and a summary is that an abstract is a summary and a summary is an introductory paragraph; see the next two points, below.

[2] Glossing the term macro-New as 'text summary' (p454), this becomes:

A[n] abstract is essentially a dislocated text summary; it presents the essence of what can be learned by reading the text the abstract functions as text summary for.

[3] Glossing the term macro-Theme as 'introductory paragraph' (p437), this becomes:

A summary on the other hand is more like a dislocated introductory paragraph; it provides an outline of what can or has been read, re-scaffolding by way of review.

[4] An abstract or summary that is published elsewhere, rather than as part of the text in question, though related (intertextually), is not part of the logogenesis of the actual text it abstracts or summarises, and so does not function as its macro-New or macro-Theme.