Martin (1992: 21-2):
Note that from a syntagmatic perspective this amounts to another grouping of metafunctions, complementary to that in Fig. 1.8 above; in Fig. 1.14 the logical metafunction is opposed to the three others (as in Halliday 1978a: 131).
The tension between Fig. 1.8 and Fig. 1.14 as far as realisation is concerned is summarised in Fig. 1.15.
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[1] Reminder (p12):
[2] This is misleading, because Figure 1.15 misunderstands the difference between logical structure and experiential structure as the difference between part–part relations and part–whole relations. To be clear, part–whole relations characterises the rank scale of forms, not experiential function structure. For example, a clause (whole) consists of groups (parts), each of which realises some function (Theme, Subject, Actor etc.).
Structure, on the other hand, refers to the relations between functional elements, not relations between formal parts and wholes. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 84, 451):
It is the relation among all these [functions] that constitutes the structure. …
Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.
In any case, having recounted these distinctions between structures according to metafunction, Martin ignores them in his discourse semantic model, as previously explained, making his work inconsistent with SFL theory in this respect, as well.
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