Misunderstanding Levels Of Symbolic Abstraction [New]

 Martin (1992: 14, 28n):

The strategy adopted here will be to review the arguments for distinguishing content and expression form, before pursuing the problem of stratifying the content plane.

To begin, consider a language called phonese, in which there is a one to one relation between sounds and meanings, such as that "spoken" by animals and young humans in the proto-language phase⁵ (Halliday 1975, Painter 1984). In such a language we have a very simple system of signs. Formulated systemically, it consists of a system with a list of features. The labelling of features in a system of this kind is a moot point; since content and expression are fused, either "semantic" or "phonetic" labels can be used.⁶ In Fig. 1.10 fused labels interfacing with both content and expression substance are employed; the language modelled there consists of six signs, with a bi-unique relation between meaning and sound.

 

⁵ Halliday, but not Painter, actually models the proto-language phase as a two strata system; Painter's mono-stratal characterisation is preferred here.

⁶ In traffic-light-ese this is the problem of labelling terms as [stop/speed up/go] or [red/yellow/green].

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, on the model of Saussure, and its development by Hjelmslev (1961: 58), a sign necessarily entails two levels of symbolic abstraction: signifier/expression and signified/content. In SFL terms, the signifier/expression (Token) realises the signified/content (Value).

[2] This is misleading. Such a system involves a system of content features, together with realisation statements that specify the expression of each content choice.

[3] This is a very serious misunderstanding. Content and expression are not semiotically "fused", since they are different levels of abstraction. If only content features are used, then their means of expression are not specified; if only expression features are used, then the meanings they expressed are not specified.

[4] In Figure 1.10, content and expression features are mistakenly juxtaposed, as if they were of the same level of symbolic abstraction. The problem is easily rectified, and made consistent with SFL Theory, by placing the phonetic symbols in realisation statements; e.g. ➘ [ba] etc. But the problem here is not the absence of a symbol in a representation; it is Martin's failure to understand the most fundamental notion of semiotic systems: different levels of symbolic abstraction, and as will be seen, this pervades Martin's work.