Strategically Misrepresenting The Relation Between Speech Function And Mood [New]

Martin (1992: 34):

Following Halliday (1984a) the semantic inventory of interacts outlined above can now be expanded into four pairs, which will be referred to provisionally, following work in ethnomethodology (e.g. Schegloff & Sacks 1973), as "adjacency pairs":

The grammar then makes available resources for tying an initiation to a response (ellipsis and substitution) and for orienting the exchange to goods and services or information and to giving or demanding (declarative, interrogative and imperative). These resources do not however stand in any biunique relation with a particular move in dialogue, so two levels of analysis are needed to relate system and text.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday (1985: 69) provides two types of response, expected vs discretionary, with different terms for the expected responses of offers (acceptance), commands (undertaking) and questions (answer), stipulating that only the last of these is essentially a verbal response:

[2] To be clear, ignoring the fact that there may be no verbal response to offers, commands and statements, and so no adjacency pairs, the tying of an initiation to a response by ellipsis-&-substitution is a cohesive tie, which is a resource of the textual, not the interpersonal metafunction. See Halliday (1985: 295-302).

[3] This is misleading. The grammatical MOOD selections (declarative, interrogative and imperative) realise selections in semantic SPEECH FUNCTION systems of COMMODITY (goods-&-services vs information) and INITIATING ROLE (giving vs demanding). 

However, if Martin had used the word 'realise', it would have disclosed the fact that the content plane had already been stratified by Halliday — a fact he is trying to keep from the reader — since realisation is the relation between strata.

[4] This is misleading. With the exception of offers, there is a "biunique" relation between SPEECH FUNCTION selections (semantics) and MOOD selections (grammar) except in the case of interpersonal metaphor. It is grammatical metaphor that motivates the stratification of the content plane into semantics and lexicogrammar (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 237), which is the main reason why Halliday stratified the content plane before Martin came along to try and take the credit.

Using A Textual Grammatical System To Argue For An Interpersonal Semantic System [New]

Martin (1992: 33-4):

Furthermore, as can be seen from the examples above, the relevance of the co-text is also grammaticalised in English. The relevant systems have to do with clause ellipsis and substitution and are described in detail in Halliday and Hasan (1976). There are two major patterns to be considered. The first can be established with respect to the more general MOOD functions Mood (including Subject, Finite and Mood Adjuncts) and Residue (including Predicator, Complement and other Adjuncts) and illustrated as follows:

Get me the new one, please. — Allright, I'll get it for you.

Get me the new one, please. — Allright, I will Residue.

Get me the new one, please. — Allright Mood Residue.

The first response (Allright, I'll get it for you.) is full, though potentially elliptical. The second (Allright, I will.) ellipses the Residue. The third (Allright.) ellipses both Residue and Mood functions. Alternatively, the Mood and Residue functions together may be substituted with so or not.

Will he make it? — Maybe so.

Will she win it? — Perhaps not.

The second pattern is found in the environment of wh interrogatives of both the first order and second order (echo) types; again, both elliptical and potentially elliptical structures are found:

Which is the new one? — This one's the new one.

Which is the new one? — This one.

This is the new one. — Which one's the new one?

This is the new one. — Which one?

As before, there is no one to one relation between grammatical class and discourse function. Responses may be either elliptical or not, as illustrated. In addition, elliptical clauses may initiate dialogue, with ellipsed information typically recoverable from the non-verbal context:

//2 Coming? // — Yes, I am.

//1 Leaving now. // — Oh, are you?

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is nonsensical. The "relevance of the co-text" cannot be "grammaticalised". Grammaticalisation is essentially a move from the lexical end of lexicogrammar to the grammatical end, as when 'content words' become 'function' words.

[2] To be clear, Martin is here arguing that there is no 'one to one relation' between interpersonal semantics and interpersonal lexicogrammar. This would require demonstrating that there is no 'one to one relation' between the selection of SPEECH FUNCTION features and their realisation in the selection of MOOD features. However, instead, Martin presents only textual systems of the grammar, ellipsis-&-substitution, and does so without regard to the semantic systems they realise. 

Moreover, Martin cannot relate ellipsis-&-substitution to his interpersonal semantics because he subsumes ellipsis-&-substitution within his textual system of IDENTIFICATION (p100-1),  his rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's cohesive reference.

[3] Again, Martin misunderstands grammatical functions — here: ellipsis-&-substitution — as grammatical classes (forms).

Confusing Context With Co-Text And Material Setting [Revised]

Martin (1992: 33):

Evidence for the fact that the different grammatical classes are performing a related discourse function comes from their context: from their co-text — the inclusion of please and the reply allright; and from the context of situation, where one might well observe goods being exchanged.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here again Martin misunderstands grammatical functions (MOOD system features) as grammatical classes.

[2] Here Martin confuses the SFL notion of context — the culture as a semiotic system — with the co-text (language) and the material setting of the speech event.

Martin later (p495) adds to the confusion by reinterpreting 'context of situation' as register, so that the claim here would become, nonsensically, that 'register is where one might well observe goods being exchanged'.

To be clear, 

• the context of situation is an instance of the culture as a semiotic system, and so of the semiotic order of experience;
• "where we might observe goods being exchanged" is the material setting of the interlocutors, and so of the material order of experience; and
• register is a functional variety of language which, in SFL Theory, is modelled as the midpoint on the cline of instantiation of language, not a system of context.

Misrepresenting Stratal Relations [New] (Was: 'Confusing The Textual And Interpersonal Metafunctions')

Martin (1992: 33):

This is an important step as far as interpreting dialogue is concerned since there is no simple relation between general grammatical classes and the rôle they play in structuring a conversation. The most commonly discussed example of this is the realisation of demands for goods and services. Each class considered so far, for example imperative, declarative and interrogative MOOD, can be used to code a Command.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this important step is to stratify an already stratified content plane by relabelling Halliday's work as Martin's discourse semantics; see the previous post.

[2] On the one hand, this misrepresents grammatical functions — imperative, declarative and interrogative MOOD — as grammatical classes (of form). On the other hand, and more importantly, it is misleading, because it is not true, since, in the absence of grammatical metaphor, the "simple relation" is:

• the MOOD feature 'imperative' realises the SPEECH FUNCTION feature 'command',
• the MOOD feature 'declarative' realises the SPEECH FUNCTION feature 'statement', and
• the MOOD system feature 'interrogative' realises the SPEECH FUNCTION feature 'question'.

[3] To be clear, the semantic feature 'command' is realised congruently by the grammatical feature 'imperative', but incongruently by the features 'declarative' of 'interrogative', the latter being instances of interpersonal metaphor.

Misrepresenting Stratification [Revised]

Martin (1992: 32-3):

Offers and Commands are grouped together by Halliday as proposals, Statements and Commands as propositions:

Semantically oriented labels of this kind highlight the meaning of the grammatical terms (in this case, their typical function in dialogue) and are used throughout Halliday (1985) to focus on the grammar as a functionally organised meaning making resource (rather than as a syntax or set of forms).  No attempt is made to distinguish stratally between grammar and meaning; rather the grammar in [sic] infused with meaning, and a stratal distinction between grammar and semantics [is] systematically blurred.  In this book however, an attempt will be made to unpick the boundary between grammar and semantics in a systemic functional interpretation of English and Halliday's relabelling provides a point of departure for stratifying the content plane, along the lines suggested in Chapter 1.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, having falsely claimed in Chapter 1 that stratifying the content plane is his own initiative, rather than Halliday's, before him, Martin now has to disguise the fact Halliday's SPEECH FUNCTION is a semantic system.

[1] Martin's first deception here is to misrepresent Halliday's SPEECH FUNCTION features — offer, command, statement, question — as "semantically oriented labels" of grammatical terms instead of semantic features. This deception is aided by his not acknowledging the name of this semantic system, since doing so would distinguish it from the grammatical system of MOOD.

[2] Martin's second deception here is to misrepresent Halliday's semantic SPEECH FUNCTION features as being of the same stratum as grammatical elements such as Theme, Subject, Actor etc. .

[3] Martin's third deception is to use the previous two deceptions to falsely claim that Halliday (1985) blurs the stratal distinction between grammar (e.g. MOOD) and semantics (e.g. SPEECH FUNCTION). 

[4] Martin's fourth deception is to misrepresent the grammar as "infused with meaning", as if, again, grammar (wording) and semantics (meaning) were of the same stratum of symbolic abstraction. As Halliday (1985: xvii) makes clear, a functional grammar interprets wording by reference to what it means:

The relation between the meaning and the wording is not, however, an arbitrary one: the form of the grammar relates naturally to the meanings that are being encoded. A functional grammar is designed to bring this out; it is a study of wording, but one that interprets the wording by reference to what it means.

[5] Martin's fifth deception is to use the previous deceptions to misrepresent himself as the first to distinguish grammar and semantics.

[6] Martin's sixth and final deception is to misrepresent Halliday's SPEECH FUNCTION features — offer, command, statement, question — as Halliday's "relabelling" of his system of MOOD. This misrepresentation of Halliday's theorising then becomes the justification of Martin's own modus operandi, which is to relabel Halliday and Hasan's systems as his own. For example, Martin relabels

• Halliday's semantic SPEECH FUNCTION as Martin's discourse semantic NEGOTIATION,
• Halliday & Hasan's grammatical cohesive REFERENCE as Martin's discourse semantic IDENTIFICATION,
• Halliday & Hasan's grammatical cohesive CONJUNCTION as Martin's discourse semantic CONJUNCTION, and
• Halliday & Hasan's LEXICAL COHESION as Martin's discourse semantic IDEATION.

Misconstruing Register As Context [New]

 Martin (1992: 28):

Beyond this, as Halliday and Hasan note, the concept of cohesion is not in itself sufficient to define a text. Context is also critical and it is for this reason that Chapter 7 has been included in this volume to contextualise the work on discourse semantics developed in Chapters 2 through 6. Needless to say only a brief sketch of a model of the contexts in which English is used is provided at that stage. Since they have so often been misunderstood in this regard, we will close this introductory chapter with the following quotation from Halliday and Hasan (for further discussion of this point see Chapters 6 and 7 below).

The concept of COHESION can therefore be usefully supplemented by that of REGISTER, since the two together effectively define a TEXT. A text is a passage of discourse which is coherent in these two regards: it is coherent with respect to the context of situation, and therefore consistent in register; and it is coherent with respect to itself, and therefore cohesive. Neither of these two conditions is sufficient without the other, nor does the one by necessity entail the other. (Halliday and Hasan 1976: 23)

Blogger Comments:

Amusingly, here Martin accuses others of misunderstanding Halliday & Hasan's notion of context, while introducing a clarifying quote from them on the subject which he himself misunderstands.

To be clear, Martin mistakenly equates context and register, presumably on the basis of:

it is coherent with respect to the context of situation, and therefore consistent in register

despite the fact that on the previous page, Halliday & Hasan (1976: 22) make a clear distinction between context (situational features) and register (linguistic features):

The linguistic features which are typically associated with a configuration of situational features — with particular values of field, mode and tenor — constitute a register.

This simple misunderstanding invalidates Marin's model of context. For Martin, varieties of language — registers and genres — are context, not language. This is equivalent to claiming that varieties of climate — tropical, temperate etc. — are not climates, or that varieties of dog — cattle dog, sheep dog etc. — are not dogs. 

Martin On Cohesion, Coherence, Cohesive Harmony And Texture [New]

Martin (1992: 27):

Before going on to explore these systems it perhaps needs to be stressed that like Cohesion in English, English Text does not equate cohesion with coherence. Hasan's methodology for measuring coherence, cohesive harmony, will be introduced in Chapter 6, alongside other analyses which focus on patterns of interaction among discourse semantics systems and across strata. It is only by the end of Chapter 6 then that something approximating a comprehensive analysis of texture will have been achieved.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, here Martin is merely stating that he agrees with the sources of his work, Halliday & Hasan (1976) and Hasan (1989/1985) who, unlike Martin, originated and developed the notions of cohesion and coherence.

[2] It will be seen in the examination of Chapter 6 that Martin misrepresents Hasan's model of cohesive harmony in order to replace it with his own model. See the posts here.

[3] To be clear, Martin's notion of interactions among his metafunctional systems and across strata derives from his misunderstanding of metafunctions and strata as modules (p390).

[4] To be clear, in SFL Theory, 'texture' is the property of being a text (Halliday & Hasan 1976: 2) and it is created through the resources of the textual metafunction: the systems of COHESION, THEME and INFORMATION (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 650).

Martin, on the other hand, misunderstands texture as arising from the interaction of different metafunctions across different strata; see here, or here.

Martin's Experiential Discourse Semantic System Of IDEATION [New]

Martin (1992: 27):

Finally IDEATION attends to a variety of experiential relations among "lexical" items — hyponymy, antonymy, synonymy, meronymy and so on (the semantics of collocation if you will). The major influence on this chapter is once again Halliday and Hasan.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin's experiential discourse semantic system of IDEATION is far more than just "influenced" by Halliday & Hasan (1976). Martin's IDEATION, which he characterises (p271) as 'the company words keep', is Halliday & Hasan's system of lexical cohesion, misunderstood, relocated from the textual metafunction to the experiential, and from lexicogrammar to Martin's discourse semantics stratum, and rebranded as Martin's work. The metafunctional confusion is maintained by Martin's use of a textual sub-unit 'message part' — realised by a lexical item — as his experiential unit (p325).

[2] To be clear, here Martin gives early warning that he does not understand his intellectual source by misconstruing the paradigmatic lexical relations of hyponymy, antonymy, synonymy and meronymy as types of the syntagmatic relation of collocation. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 644) provide the following useful classification of the relevant lexical relations:

Martin's Logical Discourse Semantic System Of CONJUNCTION [New]

Martin (1992: 27):

CONJUNCTION focuses on logical meaning — on relations of addition, time, cause and comparison between messages, as these are variously realised through paratactic, hypotactic and cohesive conjunctions (or metaphorically within a clause; see Chapter 4 for details). Once again, this analysis is inspired by Gleason (1968) and by Halliday and Hasan (1976).

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Martin's logical discourse semantic system of CONJUNCTION is far more than just "inspired" by Halliday & Hasan (1976). It is a confusion of Halliday & Hasan's cohesive CONJUNCTION and Halliday's CLAUSE COMPLEXING, misunderstood and relocated from lexicogrammar to Martin's discourse semantics. That is, Martin confuses expansion features serving the textual metafunction (cohesive CONJUNCTION) with expansion features serving the logical metafunction (CLAUSE COMPLEXING). This confusion is maintained by Martin's use of Halliday's textual unit 'message' as his logical unit (p325).

The reason why Martin uses the relations of addition, time, cause and comparison instead of expansion and its most general subtypes elaboration, extension and enhancement is that these were the categories used in Martin's source, Halliday & Hasan (1976).

Moreover, because the logico-semantic relation of projection does not function cohesively, Martin's model of logical semantics omits the system of PROJECTION. That is, there is no semantic system to be realised lexicogrammatically by projection relations between units in unit complexes or metaphorically, for example, in circumstantial relational clauses such as the lecture covered topics in evolutionary biology.

Martin's Textual Discourse Semantic System Of IDENTIFICATION [New]

Martin (1992: 27):

IDENTIFICATION is a textual system concerned with tracking participants in discourse. At issue here is the way in which people, places and things are introduced in text and potentially referred to again once introduced (e.g. a robot...the android below). This work is based on Gleason's analysis of discourse structure within a stratificational framework (Gleason 1968) and Halliday and Hasan's (1976) description of referential cohesion.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin's IDENTIFICATION, which he characterises (p93) as 'reference as semantic choice' is Halliday & Hasan's cohesive reference, misunderstood, relocated from Halliday's lexicogrammar to Martin's discourse semantics, and rebranded as Martin's work.

The fundamental misunderstanding that invalidates the model is Martin's confusion of textual reference with 'reference' in the the sense of ideational denotation. It is this confusion that leads Martin to misconstrue an ideational unit, the participant, as his textual unit.

This also leads Martin to mistake nominal groups — that realise participants — for reference items, which then leads Martin to confuse reference with nominal group DEIXIS.

[2] Consistent with the metafunctional confusion noted above, Martin here provides an example of his experiential system, IDEATION, instead of his textual system, IDENTIFICATION.

Misrepresenting Halliday On Mood And Misunderstanding Ineffability And Stratification [New]

Martin (1992: 31-2):

To begin, consider two central MOOD systems, which classify English clauses as three basic types of interact (Fig. 2.1):

 

… Feature by feature, the appropriate structural realisations are:

 

Traditionally, these systems and structures have come to be viewed as formal ones — the basic syntax of the English clause. Halliday (1984a, 1985a) on the other hand suggests that these systems and structures require a richer interpretation, beyond form, in spite of the fact that the content of the terms is less than transparent (largely because of their antiquity; see Halliday 1984b/1988 on the ineffability of linguistic categories). 

Rather, the systems engender two fundamental oppositions: information as opposed to goods and services (indicative vs imperative) and giving (declarative) as opposed to demanding (interrogative). He accordingly proposes a semantic perspective on the grammatical labels along the following lines, fleshing out the paradigm with an additional category which is not grammaticalised in MOOD at the very general level of delicacy outlined above (the Offer), as in Table 2.1.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. To be clear, unacknowledged by Martin, this MOOD system and its structural realisations were originally devised by Halliday. For the full system, see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 162).

[2] This is misleading in two respects. On the one hand, because these systems and structures were devised by Halliday, they have not come to be viewed traditionally. On the other hand, Halliday's systems and structures have not come to be viewed as formal ones, since they model interpersonal functions of the English clause.

[3] This is misleading. Martin's juxtaposition of the 'adversative' on the other hand with Halliday reinforces the false impression that the MOOD system and its structural realisations were not originally devised by Halliday.

[4] On the one hand, this is misleading, since the MOOD system and its structural realisations are already "beyond form"; see [2]. On the other hand, the semantic interpretation of MOOD is not a "richer interpretation", but an interpretation at a higher level of symbolic abstraction. This is a foretaste of Martin's inability to understand stratification as levels of symbolic abstraction, as will demonstrated throughout this blog.

[5] To be clear, this is ineffable twaddle. By 'the ineffability of grammatical categories', Halliday (2002 [1984]: 303, 306) means that

The meaning of a typical grammatical category … has no counterpart in our conscious representation of things. … they do not correspond to any consciously accessible categorisation of our experience.

[6] To be clear, it is not so much that MOOD systems "engender" the SPEECH FUNCTION systems of COMMODITY (information v goods-&-services) and INITIATING ROLE (giving v demanding), but that selections of features in SPEECH FUNCTION systems on the stratum of semantics are realised selections of features in MOOD systems on the stratum of lexicogrammar.

Martin's Interpersonal Discourse Semantic System Of NEGOTIATION [New]

Martin (1992: 26-7):

NEGOTIATION is an interpersonal system concerned with discourse as dialogue. Given an exchange such as that presented below, an account will be developed which shows how a sequence of speech acts which we might gloss informally as question, nomination, answer and validation are syntagmatically related to each other and systemically related to other types of exchange. This work takes as its point of departure the work on classroom discourse developed by the Birmingham school (Sinclair and Coulthard 1975).

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, NEGOTIATION is Martin's only genuine semantic system, the other systems being rebrandings of Halliday & Hasan's lexicogrammatical systems of COHESION. However, NEGOTIATION is only "Martin's" system in the sense that it is his rebranding of Halliday's system of SPEECH FUNCTION, incorporating work carried out by Halliday's colleagues.

By the same token, NEGOTIATION is also Martin's only system that is realised by genuine structures, the others being, instead, cohesive relations misconstrued as Lemke's covariate structures, which Lemke has since (1989) conceded are not, in fact, a type of structure. However, despite being interpersonal structures, Martin models them in terms of constituency — e.g. exchanges consisting of moves — which is the favoured structure type of the experiential metafunction.

Negotiation As The Semantics Of Mood [New]

Martin (1992: 31):

This chapter is concerned with the semantics of MOOD in English (the grammatical description of MOOD proposed in Halliday 1976b:105-110 and Halliday 1985a will be assumed). Its basic concern will be to interpret MOOD from a discourse perspective as a resource for negotiating meaning in dialogue.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, in citing only Halliday's system of MOOD, Martin gives the misleading impression that Halliday has not already provided 'the semantics of MOOD' in his system of SPEECH FUNCTION; see, e.g., Halliday (1985: 68-71). Cf. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 136):

"The Purpose Of These Descriptions Is To Enhance, Not Supplant, Those Offered In Cohesion In English" [New]

Martin (1992: 26):

The purpose of these descriptions is to enhance, not supplant, those offered in Cohesion in English; English Text functions for the most part to recontextualise Halliday and Hasan's conception of cohesion from the perspective of discourse semantics. Their very rich descriptions of texture in English will not in general be recapitulated, but rather presumed. This is particularly true with respect to SUBSTITUTION and ELISIPIS [sic], which will barely be touched on at all (see Chapter 6 below for further discussion).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Halliday & Hasan (1976) analysed data and came up wth the theory of lexicogrammatical cohesion and its subtypes. Martin (1992), on the other hand, does not take data and come up with a theory of discourse semantics. Instead, he takes the hard won theorising of Halliday & Hasan and merely relabels (his misunderstanding of) it:

• lexicogrammatical cohesion is rebranded as discourse semantics,
• cohesive reference is rebranded as identification,
• cohesive conjunction is rebranded as conjunction (later 'connexion'), and
• lexical cohesion is rebranded as ideation.

By doing so, Martin gains institutional credit for the original intellectual work of Halliday & Hasan.

[2] To be clear, the reason why Martin was not able to reinvent Halliday & Hasan's ellipsis–&–substitution as discourse semantics is that it sets up a relationship that is lexicogrammatical, not directly semantic; see Halliday (1985: 296-7).

Confusing Stratification With Instantiation: Register And Genre [Revised]

Martin (1992: 26):

Finally, in Chapter 7, a model of context will be built up by sketching in the connotative semiotics of register, genre and ideology.

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Martin (p493) claims to be following Hjelmslev in his use of the notion of a connotative semiotic. However, for Hjelmslev (1943), a connotative semiotic is a semiotic system whose expression plane is a denotative semiotic system. Martin's model of context misunderstands Hjelmslev in two crucial respects.

Firstly, as will be seen, Martin misinterprets Hjelmslev's connotative semiotic as merely its content plane, excluding its expression plane, the denotative semiotic.

Secondly, as will be seen, Martin misinterprets functional varieties of a denotative semiotic, registers and genres of language, as connotative semiotics.

These basic theoretical inconsistencies invalidate Martin's model of stratified context.

In SFL Theory, register and genre (text type), as functional varieties of language, are modelled as language, not as context. This means that, as varieties, they are located at the midpoint on the cline of instantiation of language. Register is text type (genre), viewed from the system pole of the cline, whereas text type (genre) is register, viewed from the instance pole.

However, as will be seen, Martin's model of genre adds further to the theoretical inconsistencies by also encompassing the SFL notions of MODE (e.g. recount, anecdote etc.) and semantic structure (e.g. Orientation^Record^Reorientation).

Misrepresenting Texture [New]

Martin (1992: 26):

Chapter 6 then looks at the ways in which the discourse structures generated by these systems interact systematically with lexicogrammatical structures (the question of texture).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Martin's notion that the discourse semantic stratum and the lexicogrammatical stratum "interact" derives from his misunderstanding (e.g. p390) of strata as modules. Importantly, strata are not modules, but different levels of symbolic abstraction, and to claim that they interact is analogous to claiming that Hamlet and the actor playing him interact.

[2] To be clear, in SFL Theory 'texture' refers to the property of being a text (Halliday & Hasan 1976: 2), and it is created by the textual resources of the lexicogrammar: the systems of THEME, INFORMATION and COHESION (Halliday 1985: 313-4). That is, texture is not a question of semantic structures interacting with lexicogrammatical structures.

Discourse Semantic Systems: Metafunctional Inconsistencies [Revised]

Martin (1992: 26):

The chapters which follow are organised in the following way. Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 deal with the four central discourse systems constituting the discourse semantic stratum proposed: NEGOTIATION, IDENTIFICATION, CONJUNCTION and IDEATION respectively. These chapters are organised by metafunction: NEGOTIATION considers the discourse semantics of interpersonal meaning, IDENTIFICATION the discourse semantics of textual meaning, CONJUNCTION the discourse semantics of logical meaning, and IDEATION the discourse semantics of experiential meaning. 

 Blogger Comments:

[1] As will be demonstrated, Martin's interpersonal system of NEGOTIATION is his rebranding of Halliday's interpersonal system of SPEECH FUNCTION, and later developments of that system carried out by colleagues using Halliday's model. Of Martin's discourse semantic systems, it is the only genuine semantic system, the other three systems being his rebrandings of Halliday & Hasan's systems of cohesion, which are non-structural textual resources of the lexicogrammatical stratum.

[2] As will be demonstrated, Martin's textual discourse semantic system of IDENTIFICATION is his rebranding of Halliday's textual lexicogrammatical system of REFERENCE, confused with 'reference' in the sense of ideational denotation. That is, Martin's system confuses both strata and metafunctions.

[3] As will be demonstrated, Martin's logical discourse semantic system of CONJUNCTION is his rebranding of Halliday's textual lexicogrammatical system of COHESIVE CONJUNCTION, confused with Halliday's logical lexicogrammatical system of CLAUSE COMPLEXING. Again, Martin's system confuses both strata and metafunctions.

[4] As will be demonstrated Martin's experiential discourse semantic system of IDEATION is his rebranding of Halliday's textual lexicogrammatical system of LEXICAL COHESION, confused with his misapplications of Halliday's expansion relations to clause and group structure. Again, Martin's system confuses both strata and metafunctions.

Inconsistencies In The Notion Of 'Discourse Semantic Structure' [Augmented]

Martin (1992: 25-6):

Following Lemke (1985) [Ideology, Intertextuality and the Notion of Register], discourse semantic structures of this kind will be referred to as covariate.  Covariate structures are those in which a semantic interdependency is constructed between items (which may or may not be grammaticalised) and in which dependent items have the potential to themselves be depended on.  These structures are the principle resource used by the discourse semantics for constructing text (although multivariate and univariate structures are also found…). A summary of the types of structure considered to this point and their association with different strata is outlined in Fig. 1.16. In this model, covariate structures in which one item presumes another are referred to phoric; covariate structures in which information is not so presumed are referred to as expectant.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] Lemke (1988: 159) reinterprets his 'covariate structure' as a structuring principle, rather than a kind of structure:

My own 'covariate structure' (Lemke 1985), which includes Halliday's univariate type, is for the case of homogeneous relations of co-classed units, and should perhaps be called a 'structuring principle' rather than a kind of structure.

Martin includes Lemke (1988) in his list of references (p603).

[2] No argument has been offered to demonstrate that these discourse semantic 'structures' are structures.  It has been presumed throughout.  This is the logical fallacy known as 'begging the question':

The fallacy of petitio principii, or begging the question, is committed when a proposition which requires proof is assumed without proof.

[3] Interdependency is a system of the logical metafunction.  Here it is applied to systems of the textual metafunction — cohesion — which Martin reconstrues as the full range of metafunctions at a higher level of symbolic abstraction — discourse semantics.  Each move creates a serious theoretical inconsistency.  

A related inconsistency is the reconstrual of the interdependency relations, hypotaxis and parataxis, as the relations 'presumption' and 'expectancy', respectively, neither of which is a form of interdependency.

[4] In SFL, the resource for 'constructing text' is the textual metafunction, structural and non-structural, operating at all strata.  It is not restricted to one level of symbolic abstraction — 'discourse semantics' — nor is it the concern of the other metafunctions.  The interpersonal metafunction is concerned with enacting the self and relationships as meaning; the ideational metafunction is concerned with construing experience as meaning.

[5] Here a relation that has been explored through the lens of the logical metafunction — as hypotaxis — is given a label of a resource of the textual metafunction — phoric (reference) — and then proposed as a structural principle across all metafunctions at a level of symbolic abstraction above the lexicogrammar — discourse semantics.  Each move creates a serious theoretical inconsistency.

Blurring The Distinction Between Paradigmatic And Syntagmatic Lexical Relations [New]

Martin (1992: 25):

With ideational semantic relations of this kind, there is no need to propose a discourse Head. Consequently the relationship between expectant items will be modelled with an arrow-less inter-dependency line as outlined below… :

As with "hypotactic" semantic structures, these "paratactic" relationships may extend over any number of mutually expectant items to form lexical strings:

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, this is lexical cohesion, and its function is textual, not ideational.

[2] To be clear, the notion of 'expectancy' is an addressee-oriented rebranding of collocation, where the cohesive lexical relation is syntagmatic. Here Martin confuses it with hyponymy, where the cohesive lexical relation is paradigmatic; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 644).

[3] To be clear, hyponymic and superordinate relations between lexical items are types of the logico-semantic relation of elaboration, not interdependency. Interdependency is concerned with the equal or unequal status of units in a unit complex.

[4] See the previous post for the problems with these analyses.

Problems In Construing Cohesive Ties As Ideation Structure

Martin (1992: 24-5):

With IDEATION, a different type of discourse structure is found.  Consider the following proportionalities:

I'm a little tired of this robot :

but I'd love to try that android :: 

I'm not pleased with this robot :

but that model looks fine.

In these examples a semantic relationship is established between robot and android and between robot and model; but it is not one that depends on identity of reference as above (in both examples the related items refer to different participants).  Rather the cohesive tie is one that depends on taxonomic relations … android is a hyponym of robot in the first example; and model is a superordinate of robot in the second.  This type of semantic relation is more analogous with parataxis: the items related are mutually expectant — android is no more dependent on robot in the first example that robot is on android.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Again, no argument is put forward as to why these relations are structures.  They are presumed to be structures, and so the question to be addressed is merely 'what type?'.  This is the logical fallacy known as 'begging the question':

The fallacy of petitio principii, or begging the question, is committed when a proposition which requires proof is assumed without proof.

[2] Trivial point: model is not a superordinate of robot.  For model to be a superordinate of robot, robot would have to be a type of model, in the sense that lorikeet is a type of bird.   Here model is in a token-type relation with robot — it refers to an instance of the class robot.

[3] Taxonomic relations are not analogous with parataxis.  Taxonomic relations are relations between items within a scheme of classification (and subclassification), organised on the principle of either elaboration ('hyponymic') or extension ('meronymic').  Parataxis, in contrast, refers to forms in a complex being of equal status, with regard to interdependency.

[4] Again, a non-structural relation within the textual metafunction — the metafunction that organises the other metafunctions in the creation of texts — is being construed here as if it is a structure of the logical metafunction.  This theoretical inconsistency will be further compounded by Martin reconstruing this textual system, at the level grammar, as an experiential system, at the level of 'discourse' semantics.

Problems In Construing Cohesive Ties As Identification Structure

Martin (1992: 23-4):

Introducing/presuming oppositions of this kind are one resource for constructing discourse structure in text (for producing what Halliday and Hasan refer to as cohesive ties).  Read as texts, the proportionalities reviewed above display three structures of this kind:

a robot	a robot	a robot
á	á	á
it	the android	this model

What kind of structures are these?  If we try to relate structure of this kind to those we are familiar with from grammar, then they are more closely related to univariate structures than multivariate ones.  They are open-ended, with the same type of relation between elements potentially occurring over again and over again; a cohesive chain such as a robot-the android-it-it-the robot… in other words is more like a clause complex than a clause.  It is (semantic) interdependency that is relevant here, not constituency.

Within univariate structures, the analogy is with hypotaxis.  Presuming items are semantically dependent on the information they presume, with presumed information functioning as a kind of Head.

Blogger Comments:

[1] No argument is provided to support the claim that these relations are structures.  The relations are presumed to be structures and the question then is 'what type?'.  This is the logical fallacy known as 'begging the question':

The fallacy of petitio principii, or begging the question, is committed when a proposition which requires proof is assumed without proof.

[2] Again, android and model are related to robot by lexical cohesion (Martin's ideation) not reference (Martin's identification).  Anaphoric reference is realised only by the grammatical items it, the and this.  That is, two distinct types of cohesion are being confused for the purposes of establishing a model of 'discourse structure'.

[3] There are two immediate problems with using interdependency and univariate structures as a model of these relations.

The first problem is the theoretical inconsistency of construing what is purported to be a structure of the textual metafunction in terms of a principle and structure type of the logical metafunction.  Martin's identification is proposed to be a discourse semantic system of the textual metafunction.

The second problem is the absence of structure in these relations.  Univariate structures are structures because they involve units related by interdependency in unit complexes: clauses in clause complexes, and so on.  Nothing analogous to a unit complex is proposed here.  And, considering the first problem, anything corresponding to a unit complex would be a logical structure, not a textual one.

Inconsistency In Reconstruing Reference As Identification

Martin (1992: 23):

First, IDENTIFICATION.  Consider the following proportionalities:

There was a robot : It looked bored ::
There was a robot : The android looked bored ::
There was a robot : This model looked bored

The relevant opposition here is between introducing a participant (a robot) and presuming one (it, the android, this model).  In the examples, it, the android and this model assume that identity is recoverable from context, while a robot does not.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Martin's IDENTIFICATION is Halliday's cohesive system of REFERENCE, reconstrued as 'discourse semantics'.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 550-1):

The textual status at issue in the system of reference is that of identifiability: does the speaker judge that a given element can be recovered or identified by the listener at the relevant point in the discourse or not? If it is presented as identifiable, then the listener will have to recover the identity from somewhere else. If it is presented as non-identifiable, then the listener will have to establish it as a new element of meaning in the interpretation of the text.

[2] The reference items in the examples are the grammatical items it, the and this which refer anaphorically to a robot.  The lexical items android and model are related to robot by lexical cohesion (Martin's IDEATION), not by reference (Martin's IDENTIFICATION).  This inconsistency will contribute to undermining the argument for this type of 'discourse structure'.

Conflating Realisation With Instantiation [Revised]

Martin (1992: 23):

From the perspective of discourse semantics, however, these relationships [cohesive relations] can be construed as "structural", although clearly involving a structure of a non-grammatical kind.  This construal is important in order to understand the sense in which the discourse semantic unit text instantiates discourse semantic systems.

Blogger Comments:

[1] It will be demonstrated in later posts that cohesive relations are not 'structural' — except as a Humpty-Dumptyism.

[2] This is misleading. Whether or not cohesive relations are construed as structural, or not, is irrelevant to the instantiation of system as text. Here Martin confuses axial realisation with instantiation: the relation of system to structure with the relation of system (potential) to instance (text).

Misconstruing The Level Of Symbolic Abstraction Of Cohesion [Revised]

Martin (1992: 23):

Univariate structure at the rank of clause brings us to a grammatical frontier — the distinction between the clause complex and cohesion discussed in Section 1.4 above.  As noted, Halliday and Hasan refer to this frontier as non-structural; and from the perspective of lexicogrammar, this is just what they are — semantic relationships which transcend grammatical structure.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. The distinction between clause complexing and cohesion is not a grammatical frontier; it is a distinction within lexicogrammar: between the structural resources of logical metafunction and the non-structural resources of the textual metafunction.

As previously observed, Martin repeatedly misleads by misrepresenting Halliday & Hasan's cohesion as opposed to lexicogrammar, instead of within it, as a prelude to rebranding Halliday & Hasan's cohesion as his discourse semantics.

[2] Trivially, it is not this frontier — "the distinction between the clause complex and cohesion" — that is non-structural; but cohesion.

[3] Cohesive relations are also non-structural from the perspective of discourse semantics, as will be demonstrated in later posts.

[4] This is misleading on two counts. On the one hand, not all cohesive relations are semantic. Halliday (1985: 296):

But unlike reference, which is itself a semantic relation, ellipsis sets up a relationship that is not semantic but lexicogrammatical – a relationship in the wording rather than directly in the meaning.

On the other hand, cohesive relations do not transcend grammatical structure. Instead, grammatical structure is irrelevant to cohesion. Halliday & Hasan (1976: 9):

Misrepresenting Multivariate Structure [New]

Martin (1992: 22):

Throughout his work on English grammar Halliday has used univariate structure to model logical meaning and multivariate structures to model experiential, interpersonal and textual meaning (the problems prosodic and periodic realisation cause for interpersonal and textual multivariate representations notwithstanding). In fact, only experiential meaning is ideally suited to multivariate representation. Halliday recognises two types of univariate structure, hypotactic and paratactic. With hypotaxis, the recurring variables have unequal status; with parataxis they have equal status. The contrast between multivariate and these two types of univariate structure is exemplified below, following Halliday (1985a):

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is not so much that Halliday has used these structure types to model different metafunctional meanings, but that he has proposed that the each metafunction favours a specific type of structural realisation.

[2] This is misleading, because it is demonstrably untrue. A multivariate structure is 'a configuration of elements each having a distinct function with respect to the whole' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 30). Clearly, textual and interpersonal structures satisfy this definition, since, textually, Theme and Rheme each have a distinct function with respect to the whole structure, as do, interpersonally, Subject, Finite, Predicator, Complement and Adjunct.

[3] To be clear, it is the units in a unit complex that have unequal (hypotaxis) or equal (parataxis) status.

Confusing Formal Constituency With Function Structure [New]

Martin (1992: 21-2):

Note that from a syntagmatic perspective this amounts to another grouping of metafunctions, complementary to that in Fig. 1.8 above; in Fig. 1.14 the logical metafunction is opposed to the three others (as in Halliday 1978a: 131).

The tension between Fig. 1.8 and Fig. 1.14 as far as realisation is concerned is summarised in Fig. 1.15.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Reminder (p12):

 

[2] This is misleading, because Figure 1.15 misunderstands the difference between logical structure and experiential structure as the difference between part–part relations and part–whole relations. To be clear, part–whole relations characterises the rank scale of forms, not experiential function structure. For example, a clause (whole) consists of groups (parts), each of which realises some function (Theme, Subject, Actor etc.).

Structure, on the other hand, refers to the relations between functional elements, not relations between formal parts and wholes. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 84, 451):

It is the relation among all these [functions] that constitutes the structure. …

Note that, although it is the functions that are labelled, the structure actually consists of the relationships among them.

In any case, having recounted these distinctions between structures according to metafunction, Martin ignores them in his discourse semantic model, as previously explained, making his work inconsistent with SFL theory in this respect, as well.

Metafunctional Structure Types In Discourse Semantics [New]

Martin (1992: 21-2):

In Section 1.3.2 above three highly generalised types of structure were introduced, the particulate, prosodic and periodic, and correlated with the ideational, interpersonal and textual metafunctions respectively. Particulate, prosodic and periodic realisation is an important motif, and one that will be taken up in various places throughout English Text, especially in Chapters 6 and 7. At this point however it is necessary to return to earlier work by Halliday (1981b) on univariate and multivariate structure. 

In this work Halliday is concerned to distinguish the kinds of structure generated by the logical metafunction (univariate structures) from those realising experiential, interpersonal and textual meaning (multivariate structures). Univariate structures as defined as structures involving a single variable, which recurs one or more times. Multivariate structures on the other hand involve more than one variable, with each variable occurring only once. 

This is the distinction between open ended projecting structures such as Ford thought Marvin wanted Zaphod to tell Trillian that ... (α 'β 'y "δ — univariate) and closed structures such as Ford bored Marvin (Phenomenon^Process^Senser — multivariate). 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. Martin (1992) largely ignores these metafunctional structure types, except in discussing genre, which is not distinguished in terms of metafunction. Instead, Martin's discourse semantics models 

• interpersonal meaning in terms of constituency (exchanges consisting of moves), not prosody;
• textual meaning as covariate structure: reference chains of participants, not periodicity;
• experiential as covariate  structure: lexical strings of message parts, not as particulate.

From the perspective of SFL Theory, Martin's use of Lemke's (1985) notion of 'covariate structure' corresponds to non-structural cohesive relations. Lemke (1987) later conceded that what he termed 'covariate structure' was not, in fact, a type of structure.

[2] To be clear, Halliday (1981b) was actually first published in 1965 as a Working Paper, before Halliday had formulated Systemic Functional Theory. It was Halliday's first exploration of the distinction between univariate and multivariate structure — focusing on univariate structure — and contains statements that are inconsistent with the distinction as it later developed in SFL Theory. For example, in this paper, (p230), a Head°Modifier structure is classified as multivariate, rather than univariate.

Similarly, Halliday's pre-Systemic claim (p229) that, in multivariate structures, a variable occurs only once is clearly contradicted in SFL Theory by 

• clauses with more than one Agent (experiential),
• clauses with more than one Adjunct (interpersonal), and 
• information units (textual) with more than one Given, as in Given^New^Given.

[3] This is potentially misleading, since 'open vs closed' does not reliably define the difference between univariate and multivariate structure, as demonstrated by the relatively open-ended multivariate experiential structure of a clause like Arthur made Ford make Marvin make Zaphod tell Trillian. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 353):

Misconstruing Stratification [Revised]

Martin (1992: 20-1, 29n):

An alternative projection (from Martin and Matthiessen 1991¹²) of these three strata, incorporating the additional axes of rank and metafunction is outlined in Fig. 1.13. 

There, the strata are presented as concentric circles, which helps to capture the sense in which discourse semantics addresses patterns of lexicogrammatical patterns and lexicogrammar in turn addresses patterns of phonological ones.¹³ Within strata, description is further organised through layering (simultaneous metafunctions) and constituency (ranks). This projection also has the advantage of backgrounding the content/expression duality deriving from Hjelsmlev and underpinning Fig. 1.12. Somewhat more sympathetic then to Firth than to Hjelmslev, the model can be read as three meaning making levels, with the meanings made by smaller circles progressively recontextualised by larger ones.

¹² The concentric circle projection was initially designed by Halliday.
¹³ What Lemke (1984) generalises as the principle of metaredundancy.

 Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Figure 1.13 only illustrates rank and metafunction for the lexicogrammatical stratum, not the discourse semantic stratum, and, in any case, only the interpersonal system of Martin's discourse semantics involves rank. The other discourse semantic systems do not feature a rank scale, because they are Halliday & Hasan's lexicogrammatical systems of textual cohesion, misunderstood and rebranded as Martin's textual, logical and experiential systems.

Trivially, in SFL Theory, rank and metafunction are not axes, if only because axes — the paradigmatic and syntagmatic— are related in terms of realisation, which ranks and metafunctions are not. The rank scale is a constituent hierarchy, and the metafunctions are simultaneous dimensions of system and structure.

[2] Trivially, the circles are co-tangential, not concentric.

[3] To be clear, this again demonstrates that Martin does not understand strata as levels of symbolic abstraction. A stratum is not concerned with "addressing" patterns of patterns at a lower rank, if only because there are no "patterns" in a system of potential. A pattern at a given stratum presupposes an activation of the system, the process of instantiation, entailing patterns of feature selection. Such a pattern is thus located at the instance pole of the cline of instantiation, and a pattern of instantiation patterns is thus located at a point above the text on the cline, such as text type. In short, Martin has here confused stratification with instantiation.

[4] It is not clear why this backgrounding should be an advantage, given the important distinction that Martin has just made opposing the arbitrary relation between content and expression with the solidary relation between content strata. Reminder:

[5] The truth of this claim can be assessed by comparing Figure 1.13 with Firth's model of linguistic levels. Firth (1962: 30):

[6] This confuses semogenesis (meaning making) with stratification (levels of symbolic abstraction). The model of stratification, three co-tangential circles, does not construe three levels of meaning, but three levels of symbolic abstraction in meaning making: semantics (meaning), lexicogrammar (wording) and phonology (sounding).

Accordingly, this is not a matter of meanings made by lower strata recontextualised by meanings made by higher strata. Instead, lower strata realise higher strata.  Sounding realises wording; wording realises meaning.

[7] This is potentially misleading. Lemke construes the relation between strata as one of redundancy, with metaredundancy meaning a redundancy on that redundancy; see See Halliday (2003 [1987]: 425-6). So, in terms of Martin's model, metaredundancy is 

• the relation of discourse semantics to the redundancy of lexicogrammar and phonology, or
• the relation of the redundancy of discourse semantics and lexicogrammar to phonology.

Patterns of patterns, on the other hand, are a matter of instantiation, not stratification, as explained in [3] above.