Misconstruing Ideational Metaphor

Martin (1992: 408):

Text [6:22] is further revised to highlight metaphorical internal conjunctions as [6:25] below.  Internal relations are realised four times as nouns (for a number of reasons, another example, as a final point, as a result of these factors) and once as a verb (to begin).

[6:25]	metaphorical internal conjunction
	a.	I think Governments are necessary at different levels for a number of reasons.
	b.	They make laws, without which people would be killing themselves,
	c.	and help keep our economic system in order.
	d.	To begin, the Federal Government fixes up problems that occur in the community.
	e.	Another example is that the State Government looks after schools,
	f.	preventing vandalism and fighting.
	g.	As a final point the Local Government is important to look after rubbish:
	h.	otherwise everyone would have diseases.
	i.	As a result of these factors, Governments at several administrative levels are necessary.

Blogger Comment:

From the perspective of SFL theory, of the five purported instances of internal conjunction, there are only two genuine instances (to begin 'firstly'; as a final point 'finally').

Of the three with no conjunctive relations, the first involves ideational metaphor: relator as Thing (reasons) within a circumstance of Cause: reason (for a number of reasons); the second involves anaphoric comparative reference (another); and the third involves anaphoric demonstrative reference (these) within a circumstance of Cause: reason (as a result of these factors).

The general confusion here — apart from misconstruing these as logical metaphors — is that of mistaking the textual manifestation of expansion in lexicogrammar, cohesive conjunction, for the semantic system of expansion — as explained in previous posts.

for	a number of reasons
minor Process	Range

a number of	reasons
Numerative	Thing

Another example	is	[[that the State Government looks after schools]]
Value/Identified	Process: relational	Token/Identifier

Another	example
Deictic (anaphoric comparative reference)	Thing

As a result of these factors	Governments at several administrative levels	are	necessary
Cause: reason	Carrier	Process: relational	Attribute

as a result of	these factors
minor Process	Range

these	factors
Deictic (anaphoric demonstrative reference)	Thing

Reducing Expansion To Conjunctive Relations

Martin (1992: 408):

Metaphorical realisations of conjunctive relations were discussed in detail in Chapter 4 above (Section 4.2.1) in connection with the diversified realisation of the discourse system.  A simplified outline of the scope of this diversification is outlined in Table 6.16.

Table 6.16. Congruent and metaphorical realisations of conjunction
Conjunctive relation:		consequential	temporal
congruent	cohesive conjunction	therefore	next
	paratactic conjunction	so	then
	hypotactic conjunction	because	before
metaphorical	phrasal Process	due to	on
	Process	cause	follow
	Thing	reason	sequel

Blogger Comments:

[1] As demonstrated in previous posts, Martin's discourse semantic system of conjunction, though construed as a logical system, confuses textual and logical deployments of the system of expansion. It also greatly underplays the pervasiveness and importance of expansion in the construal of experience.

In SFL theory, expansion, like projection, is a transgrammatical semantic domain, in the sense that it is manifested across a range of grammatical environments.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 597):

… the environments of manifestation can be differentiated in terms of

(i) metafunction — textual (conjunction), logical (interdependency; modification) and experiential (circumstantiation; process type: relational), and

(ii) rank — clause and group/phrase [and below]. …

Collectively they thus construe expansion as a semantic system.  This means that for any given type of expansion we want to express, we have at our disposal a range of resources.

[2] In SFL theory, the semantic element that construes relations of expansion is the relator. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 267-8) explain the reason why they are liable to appear as minor processes, processes, qualities and things:

Relators construe the highly generalised logico-semantic relations of expansion that join figures into sequences: elaborating, extending, enhancing. […] these relationships of expansion pervade very many regions of the semantic system: they are manifested in the organisation of figures of being, in the types of circumstantial element that occur within a figure, in the taxonomy of ‘things’, and elsewhere, as well as of course in their ‘home’ region of the construal of sequences, as links between one figure and another.  This led us to characterise the categories of expansion as "transphenomenal" and "fractal": transphenomenal in the sense that they re-appear across the spectrum of different types of phenomena construed by the ideational system; and fractal in the sense that they serve as general principles of the construal of experience, generating identical patterns of organisation of variable magnitude and in variable semantic environments.

It is these characteristics of relators that make them particularly liable to migrate: to be displaced metaphorically from their congruent status (as paratactic and hypotactic conjunctions) and to appear in other guises in other locations — as minor processes (in circumstantial elements), as processes, as qualities and as things.

[3] To be clear, this is a minor Process, an element of the experiential function structure of a prepositional phrase.

Misrepresenting Ideational Metaphor As An Interaction Of Logical & Experiential Metaphors

Martin (1992: 407):

Logical and experiential metaphors interact as what might be termed ideational metaphors when external conjunctive relations, typically consequential ones, are realised metaphorically.  This interaction produces a high level of abstraction in text, making it inaccessible to large sections of the community.  A good example of this process is found in [6:23k].  There, two experiential metaphors, the enlargement of Australia's steel–making capacity and the demands of war are causally connected by the logical metaphor owed.

[6:23k] The enlargement of Australia’s steel-making capacity, and of chemicals, rubber, metal goods and motor vehicles all owed something to the demands of war. 

Recoded congruently as a clause complex, this clause translates as follows:

[6:24]	a.	alpha	Australia could make more steel, chemicals, rubber, metal goods and motor vehicles
	b.	beta	partly because (people) demanded them
	c.	gamma	to fight the war.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, ideational metaphor is not the interaction of experiential and logical metaphors. Ideational metaphor occurs, for example, when

• a semantic sequence is realised grammatically by something other than a clause complex,
• a semantic figure is realised grammatically by something other than a clause,
• a semantic element is realised by something other than its congruent group/phrase (e.g. process as nominal group instead of verbal group, relator as verbal group instead of conjunction group).

See Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 227ff).

[2] The text does not exemplify the interaction of experiential and logical metaphors.  From a semantic perspective, it exemplifies the general tendency in ideational metaphor to move from the logical to experiential being–&–having.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 293):

… the general tendency in the metaphorical move away from the congruent is away from the logical towards the experiential; and within the experiential towards the domain of participants in figures of being & having.

[3] As the congruent rendering (almost) demonstrates, the metaphorical grammatical realisation is a consequence of a semantic figure being realised by (all of) a nominal group.

congruent: figure as clause

Australia	produced	more steel, chemicals, rubber, metal goods and motor vehicles
Actor	Process: material	Goal

metaphorical: figure as nominal group

The	enlargement	[of Australia’s steel-making capacity, and of chemicals, rubber, metal goods and motor vehicles]
Deictic	Thing	Qualifier

Claiming That Location Circumstances Realise Relations Between Clauses

Martin (1992: 407):

Conversely, experiential meaning may be realised metaphorically with no necessary effect on conjunctive relations. Clause g-j in text [6:23] all have incongruent Subjects at the same time as temporal relations between the clauses are realised congruently as circumstantial phrases (i.e. setting in time: between 1937 and 1945, in the post-war years, by 1954-5). 

[6:23]	g	Between 1937 and 1945 the value of industrial production almost doubled.
	h	This increase was faster than otherwise would have occurred.
	i	The momentum was maintained in the post-war years
	j	and by 1954-5 the value of manufacturing output was three times that of 1944-5.

Blogger Comments:

[1] From the perspective of SFL theory, there are no instances of conjunctive relations in the four clauses. There are, however, two instances of complexes related by paratactic extension (g, j), both realised by the conjunction and.

[2] To be clear, it is not the (interpersonal) Subjecthood of these elements that is incongruent, but the realisations of ideational meaning in the grammar: figure as nominal group (g, j), Process as Thing (h, i).

[3] The circumstances of Location: time do not realise temporal relations between clauses.  As circumstances of Location, they each construe 'the location of the unfolding of the process in space–time' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 265).  A temporal relation between clauses in a clause complex is realised by a conjunction group.  The cohesive conjunction of (groups of) messages is effected through conjunctive Adjuncts.

[4] In discussing grammatical metaphor, it is semantics (meaning) that is congruently or metaphorically realised in lexicogrammar (wording); so it theoretically inconsistent to couch this in terms of temporal relations between grammatical units (clauses).  In discourse semantics, such temporal relations obtain between messages, the unit of the logical metafunction, whereas in SFL theory, they obtain between figures in a sequence.

[5] To be clear, this is shorthand for circumstances of Location (realised by prepositional phrases).

Misrepresenting Ideational Metaphor

Martin (1992: 406-7):

Logical and experiential metaphor are in principle independent of each other. Conjunctive relations may be realised metaphorically without necessarily involving metaphorical processes qualities or participants as well.  The first clause in text [6:22] nominalises cause (a number of reasons) with no repercussions for grammatical metaphor in the rest of the clause (cf. I think there should be Governments for several reasons).  It is internal conjunctive relations that lend themselves to "independent" metaphorical realisation in this way.

[6:22:a] I think Governments are necessary at different levels for a number of reasons.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, the two types of grammatical metaphor are ideational and interpersonal (Halliday 1994: 343), though ideational metaphor is sometimes referred to as experiential metaphor (e.g. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 285, 400)).

[2] In SFL theory, conjunctive relations are types of expansion deployed lexicogrammatically by the textual metafunction.  That is, they are grammatical realisations of textual meaning.

In contrast, as previously demonstrated, Martin's system of conjunction confuses this textual deployment of expansion with the logical deployment of expansion (between grammatical units in complexes) and relocates the confusion to discourse semantics.

But there is a deeper theoretical problem here.  Because, as previously demonstrated, Martin's system of conjunction is, for the most part, not theorised in a manner that is consistent with the meaning of the expansion categories, it sets up incongruent relations between strata in cases where there is no grammatical metaphor.  For example, Martin (1992: 203) analyses the conjunctive relation in

Whereas usually we win, this time we lost 

as external comparison: contrast, even though, grammatically, the logical relation is extension: addition: adversative.

That is, on Martin's model, a logical relation of external comparison: contrast at the level of discourse semantics is realised as a logical relation of extension: addition: adversative at the level of lexicogrammar.  The relation between meaning and wording is thus incongruent.  Given that incongruent realisations are metaphorical, on Martin's model this would be an instance of grammatical metaphor.

[3] The first clause in text [6:22] is I think.

I	think	Governments	are	necessary	at different levels	for a number of reasons
a		‘b
Senser	Process	Carrier	Process	Attribute	Location	Cause: Reason

[4] The notion of 'repercussions for grammatical metaphor' is irrelevant.  In the second clause, reasons is metaphorically construed as a Thing of a nominal group serving as the Range of a minor Process of a prepositional phrase serving as a circumstance of Cause: reason.  That is, what is congruently realised as a minor Process — for, because of — is metaphorically realised as the Range: minor Process of that minor Process.  This provided, in this instance, the possibility of quantification by an indefinite Numerative.

for	a number of reasons
minor Process	Range

a number of	reasons
Numerative Deictic Thing	Thing

[5] 'Internal conjunctive relations' don't 'lend themselves to "independent" metaphorical realisations' for two reasons.  First, internal conjunctive relations obtain through the deployment of expansion types by the textual metafunction at the level of lexicogrammar, whereas the type of metaphorical relations here are between ideational semantics and lexicogrammar.  Second, the notion of "independent" metaphorical realisations rests on the false distinction of logical versus experiential metaphor.

Mistaking Ideational Metaphor For Metaphor

Martin (1992: 406):

All of the metaphorical examples presented in Table 6.15 involve nominalisation, the predominant semantic drift of grammatical metaphor in modern English.  Since nouns are fundamentally the output of experiential grammar this entails as well a skewing of all meaning towards the experiential.  Construing meaning as a thing in other words means construing text as material object — as a material part of the social reality it is simultaneously engaged in constructing (ideationally) and intruding upon (interpersonally).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is manifestly untrue.  The example in the table proposed as textual metaphor, this point, is clearly not a nominalisation.

[2] Nominalisation is a resource for ideational metaphor.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 656):

Nominalising is the single most powerful resource for creating grammatical metaphor. By this device, processes (congruently worded as verbs) and properties (congruently worded as adjectives) are reworded metaphorically as nouns; instead of functioning in the clause, as Process or Attribute, they function as Thing in the nominal group.

There are two motifs in the semantic drift of ideational metaphor.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 263-4):

It is possible to distinguish two predominant motifs in the phenomena characterised here: one major or primary and one minor or secondary one. (i) The primary motif is clearly the drift towards ‘thing’.  (ii) The secondary motif is what appears as a tendency in the opposite direction: the move from ‘thing’ into what might be interpreted as a manifestation of ‘quality’ (qualifying, possessive or classifying expansions of the 'thing').

[3] Nouns are not "fundamentally the output of experiential grammar".  Nouns are form not function.  Nouns realise elements of all metafunctions.

[4] Nominalisation does not entail "a skewing of all meaning toward the experiential".  Nominalisation is a resource for creating ideational metaphor.  The meanings that are incongruently realised in wording are (already) ideational meanings.  In ideational metaphor, the drift is from the logical to the experiential.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 293):

… the general tendency in the metaphorical move away from the congruent is away from the logical towards the experiential; and within the experiential towards the domain of participants in figures of being & having.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 642):

Within the ideational metafunction, the general effect of this realignment in the semantic system is a shift from the logical to the experiential — an experientialisation of experience. Thus logical sequences of figures are reconstrued as experiential configurations of elements.

[5] 'Construing meaning as thing' does not mean "construing text as material object"(!).  The reconstrual of experience through ideational metaphor objectifies our experience.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 548):

Grammatical metaphor objectifies our experience, transforming its being and happening into things; in so doing, it privileges order, since experience can now be categorised into classes and hierarchies of classes, which are significantly more determinate than the processes and properties favoured by the grammar in its congruent form.

[6] In SFL theory, the ideational metafunction is the dimension of language in its rôle of construing experience, not "constructing social reality".  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 7):

The ideational metafunction is concerned with construing experience — it is language as a theory of reality, as a resource for reflecting on the world.

The interpersonal metafunction is the dimension of language in its rôle of enacting interpersonal relations.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 7):

The interpersonal metafunction is concerned with enacting interpersonal relations through language, with the adoption and assignment of speech rôles, with the negotiation of attitudes, and so on — it is language in the praxis of intersubjectivity, as a resource for interacting with others.

∞

Further clarifications:

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 264):

… the drift towards ‘thinginess’ is the culminating and most clearly articulated form of a shift which can be characterised in more general terms as a shift towards the experiential — towards that mode of construing experience that is most readily organised into paradigmatic sets and contrasts. Things are more easily taxonomised than qualities, qualities than processes, and processes more easily than circumstances or relations. Since the ‘noun-ness’ is being used to construe phenomena that start out as something else than a noun, metaphors will inevitably be abstract.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 265, 267): 

… by construing any phenomenon of experience as a thing, we give it the maximum potential for semantic elaboration. … the more structure that is to be imposed on experience the more pressure there is to construe it in the form of things.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 267):

But things are merely the end-point of the metaphoric scale… . Processes, though more constrained than things, still have more semantic potential than relators: they accommodate categories of time and phase, among others, and are construed in open lexical sets, whereas relators for closed systems. So there is pressure there too, to metaphorise conjunctions into verbs: then, so, because, before, therefore becoming follow, result, cause, anticipate, prove. (Circumstances are something of a special case because most of them already contain participants in minor, subsidiary processes — prepositional phrases in the grammar.) But it remains true that things are the most susceptible of being classified and organised into taxonomies; hence the primary motif of grammatical metaphor is that of construing a world in the form of things.