Misconstruing Stratification: Semantics Realising Semantics

Martin (1992: 293):

For a given field, the message part realises (i) one of the features taxonomising people, places and things, or (ii) one of the actions configuring with people, places and things and entering into activity sequences, or (iii) one of the qualities associated with people, places, things and actions.

Blogger Comments:

The proposal here is to present a model of field-specific semantics.  The method of doing so is to interpret field as semantic descriptions of social activities and to have those semantic descriptions realised by a discourse semantic unit, the message part.  That is, the level of cultural context is misconstrued as a level of language, semantics, and this semantics is then realised by discourse semantics.

This violates the theoretical principle of stratification as distinct levels of symbolic abstraction, not only because it confuses context and language, but also because it distributes the same level of symbolic abstraction, semantics, over two distinct strata.

In SFL theory, the ideational meaning realising a specific field is known as a semantic domain — the semantic profile of a field (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 323).

Misconstruing Experiential As Constituent Of Logical

Martin (1992: 293):

On the basis of this characterisation of field, the discourse semantic unit underlying lexical item and entering into cohesive lexical relations can be set up.  Since it is an experientially defined unit, it will be referred to as a message part, to bring out its metafunctional relationship with CONJUNCTION.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The characterisation of field confuses context with language by construing field as a semantic description of social activity.  That is, it violates the principle of stratification.

[2] This confuses the syntagmatic axis (structural unit) and the paradigmatic axis (lexical item).

[3] This places the higher level of symbolic abstraction (discourse semantic) below the lower level (lexical).  That is, it inverts the stratification of content.

[4] This construes the experiential unit as something that is interrelated —cohesively, so: textually — rather than as something with internal structure; cf sequences, figures, elements in SFL theory.

[5] In SFL theory, a 'message' is a unit of the textual metafunction on the semantic stratum.

[6] This misconstrues the relation between the logical and experiential metafunctions as one of constituency.  On the one hand, logical units don't consist of experiential units; on the other hand, the relation between units in complexes is not constituency but interdependency.

Misconstruing First Order Field As Its Semantic Description [2]

Martin (1992: 292-3):

As a first approximation, these activity sequences can be broken down as follows:

i. taxonomies of actions, people, places, things and qualities

ii. configurations of actions with people, places, things and qualities and of people places and things with qualities.

iii. activity sequences of these configurations

This can be illustrated from the field of tennis as follows:

i. TAXONOMY — part/whole relations among game-set-match

ii. CONFIGURATION — Agent Process Medium structure player-serve-ball

iii. ACTIVITY SEQUENCE — player serve-opponent return-player volley

Blogger Comment:

This provides an ideational semantic model for analysing construals of social activities — while purporting to be a model of field.

In terms of SFL theory, the three components of this 'field' model correspond to the three orders of phenomena in ideational semantics: element, figure and sequence (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999).

Misconstruing First Order Field As Its Semantic Description [1]

Martin (1992: 292):

Halliday's notion of field will be developed here by defining fields as sets of activity sequences oriented to some global institutional purpose.  Examples include linguistics, tennis, cooking, wine making, gardening, dog breeding, film, architecture, sewing, car racing, philosophy, sailing, building, chess, war, politics, religion and so on. …

A given institution comprises a large number of different activity sequences, where these are realised linguistically through temporally ordered chains of Process and Medium with their attendant participant and circumstantial roles.  Tennis for example includes, among other activity sequences, playing coaching, commenting, analysing, viewing, training, club meetings, tournament presentations, interviews, grading, and so on.  The participants and processes in these are overlapping, not identical.  At the same time, each of these activities participates in an overall institutional focus — that of making it possible for people to enjoy in diverse ways a game played with strung raquets [sic] and a furry hollow ball.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This defines field only as first order field (what's going on), but exemplifies it largely in terms of second order field (what it's about).  That is, it is inconsistent in terms of orders of experience.

[2] This misconstrues (the linguistic realisation of first order) field as semantic descriptions of 'what's going on'. That is, if the field is 'someone predicting the weather', then the claim is that this is realised linguistically as participant^process^participant. In other words, the theoretical characterisation of the field is treated as text to be analysed semantically. On the SFL model, the field of weather prediction is realised in the language that realises the weather prediction.

[3] In SFL theory, 'chains of Process and Medium with their attendant participant and circumstantial roles' are modelled as sequences of figures, but they are not limited to temporal relations.  They involve the full range of expansion and projection types.  The depiction of 'activity sequences' as only 'temporally ordered' demonstrates that field is here misconstrued as semantic descriptions of temporally ordered social activities.

Confusing Context With Semantics

Martin (1992: 291-2):

Halliday (1985: 12) defines field of discourse as follows:

The FIELD OF DISCOURSE refers to what is happening, to the nature of the social action that is taking place; what is it [sic] that the participants are engaged in, in which the language figures as some essential component.

This is a useful starting point for interpreting the contextual semantics of experiential meaning in functional linguistics because the perspective is a social one, and because of the emphasis placed on language as action; field is not specifically tied to subject matter or topic, notions through which it can be discussed only in certain modes (it makes little sense for example when watching and listening to a rugby league training session to ask what the topic is; the appropriate question is "What is going on?").

Blogger Comments:

[1] The term 'contextual semantics' merges two distinct strata — two levels of symbolic abstraction — in the SFL model: context and semantics.  The former refers to the culture as a semiotic system, while the latter refers to a level within language.  It is a clear indication that the principle of stratification is not understood in the discourse semantic model.

[2] The concept of 'language as action' is distinct from 'field' referring to 'the nature of the social action taking place'. For the former, Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 354) acknowledge a cline from ‘language in reflection’ to ‘language in action’:

In situations of the ‘language in action’ kind, where the discourse is a relatively minor component of the total activity, the grammar and the semantics are obviously less constructive of the whole than in a ‘reflection’ context …

[3] In SFL theory, field refers to both 'what's going on' and the subject matter.  The former is the first order field; the latter is the second order field (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 320-1).

[4] If the first order field ('what's going on') is watching and listening to a rugby league training session, then the second order field ('what the topic is') is the subject matter of what is said while doing so.  To paraphrase Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 354): while watching and listening to a rugby league training session itself is not constituted of language, the activity of commenting on it is.  The subject matter is indispensable for modelling field.

Confusing Register (Language) With Context (Culture)

Martin (1992: 291):

As an alternative to approaching the problem simply from the perspective of grammar and lexis, one can turn to the level of context, and ask questions about appropriate units based on the structure of the register variable field.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The problem (of the syntagmatic extension of the lexical item) is a problem that only arises from misunderstanding the notion of 'lexical item'.  See previous post.

[2] In SFL theory, field is the ideational system, not structure, of context, not register.  Registers, on the other hand, are functional varieties of language use — text types — that differ in terms of the probabilities of systemic features being selected.

Misconstruing The Difference Between Lexical Item And Grammatical Word

Martin (1992: 290-1):

The distinction within a systemic model between lexical item and word means that in principle cohesion analysis is not tied to orthographic word boundaries.  Phrasal verbs for example can be taken as single lexical items. …

Just how far this notion of a lexical item could be pushed however, remains unclear. …

The problem is that if strong mutual expectancy is used to define lexical items, where does one stop?  If phrasal verbs are treated as single lexical items, then what about Process Range structures …

And if Process Range structures, such as these, what about Process and Medium …

Or Process and Circumstance (of location, with deixis-less destinations) …

The point is that the distinction between word and idiom is a gradient one, and that distinguishing word from lexical item does not determine where the line between the two is drawn.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misrepresents the distinction between lexical item and (grammatical) word as a question of how many words make up a lexical item.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 568):

The folk notion of the “word” is really a conflation of two different abstractions, one lexical [lexical item] and one grammatical [word rank].

[2] The view of lexical items presented here is from below (graphology) and the syntagmatic axis (word boundaries).  In SFL theory,  lexical items are specified paradigmatically, by combinations of the most delicate features of lexicogrammatical systems.

[3] In SFL theory, strong mutual expectancy is not used to define lexical items.  This misconstrues lexical items as a syntagmatic relation.  See [2].

[4] Here combined elements of grammatical structures are being used to raise doubts on the (misconstrued) notion of the lexical item.  The purpose of doing so is to justify an approach based on a misconstrued notion of 'field'.  See following posts.

[5] The distinction between word and idiom is irrelevant to the distinction between word and lexical item.  Again, idioms, in Martin's words 'frozen collocations', takes a syntagmatic perspective on the issue.

Inconsistencies Of Structure And Metafunction

Martin (1992: 290):

The problem of semantic units has been a recurrent one throughout Chapters 2, 3 and 4.  Stratifying the content pla[n]e makes it possible to distinguish move or message from clause, and participant from nominal group, although in a functional grammar, semantic units will obviously be founded on grammatical ones.  The issue arises once again here, with respect to the nature of the discourse semantic units lexical cohesion is analysed between.

Blogger Comments:

[1]  In SFL theory, units have internal structure: figures have elements of structure such as Senser, Process and Phenomenon.  In discourse semantics, on the other hand, the units participant and message don't have internal structure; instead, they are the elements that are related.  This inconsistency is necessary because, as previously explained, these discourse semantic structures are not actually structures.

[2] The discourse semantic unit move, on the other hand — inconsistent with the other discourse semantic units, message and participant — is presented as a unit with internal structure and one which realises elements of structure at a higher rank, exchange (op cit: 46-59).

[3] In SFL theory, a message is a unit of the textual metafunction at the level of semantics.  In discourse semantics, messages are the units that are said to be logically related to each other.

[4] In SFL theory, a participant is an experiential category.  In discourse semantics, participants are units of the textual metafunction — despite the fact that the textual metafunction is concerned with the organisation of the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions, not with the construal of experience (e.g. as participants).

Misconstruing Semantics As Context

Martin (1992: 289-90):

For the remainder of this chapter it will be assumed that lexical cohesion will be analysed with respect to field oppositions, and that lexical relations can [be] approached from four different perspectives within a systemic functional model.  These perspectives are:

i. from the point of view of mutual expectancy in lexicogrammar (collocation) 

ii. from the point of view of more delicate options in lexicogrammatical networks (the grammarian's dream)

iii. from the point of view of semantic relations between lexical items in text (lexical cohesion) 

iv. from the point of view of register specific oppositions (field taxonomies)

An overview of these perspectives is provided in Table 5.2. …

Table 5.2. Lexical relations across planes and strata

Context	Language
	DISCOURSE SEMANTICS	LEXICOGRAMMAR
field specific taxonomies	lexical relations (cohesion)	field neutral taxonomies (as delicate grammar)
		collocation patterns (lexical sets)

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, lexical cohesion is a grammatical resource of the textual metafunction and field is the ideational dimension of context.  Field oppositions and taxonomies are context oppositions and taxonomies, not language oppositions and taxonomies.

[2] In SFL theory, collocation is a type of lexical cohesion and both are located in the lexicogrammar.

[3] Not just in SFL theory, register is a functional variety of language.  Field, on the other hand, is the ideational dimension of context, which is not language, but the culture as a semiotic system that has language as its expression plane.  Field is more symbolically abstract than language.

Perhaps this confusion of register with context arose from the terms 'spoken registers' and 'written registers' in which registers are classified in terms of the context (mode features) they realise — as when Martin later writes: 'though these are less spoken in register' (op cit: 312).

[4]  In SFL theory, "field specific taxonomies" — in Martin's sense — are located at the level of semantics, not context, because they are a way of organising linguistic meaning, not the culture as semiotic.  Such a taxonomy constitutes a lexically oriented domain model, a way of modelling a semantic domain.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 323):

…the semantic correlate of a contextual field is a domain.  When we model the ideational semantics of a particular field, we create a domain model. … Domain models are variants of the general model.  A particular domain model specifies which of the semantic systems in the overall model are activated in a particular contextual field …

[5] As explained in the previous post, field "neutrality" is irrelevant for elaborating grammatical networks into the lexical zone.

[6] In SFL theory, 'lexical set' is opposed to 'collocation'.  That is, it describes the types of lexical cohesion in which the nature of the relation is paradigmatic (repetition, synonymy, hyponymy and meronymy).  Here the term is misapplied to the opposite type of lexical cohesion, collocation, in which the nature of the relation is syntagmatic.

Relocating Lexis Outside Language

Martin (1992: 289):

This raises the question as to what extent lexis can be treated as most delicate grammar while maintaining a lexicogrammar that is essentially neutral with respect to field. … One way of keeping the grammar neutral would be to locate specialised taxonomies in the register variable field, allowing the grammar to focus on field neutral oppositions.  This would mean for example that the similarity between morphology in linguistics and geology could be brought out in lexicogrammar and the differences between them in field taxonomies; similarly for cover in yachting and sleeping.  And analysts could make a principled decision as to whether they were analysing lexical cohesion with respect to lexicogrammatical taxonomies or field ones, depending on the purposes for which the analysis was designed.

Blogger Comments:

[1] 'Neutrality with respect to field' is irrelevant for elaborating lexis as most delicate grammar.  The lexicogrammar is the overall system of wording potential.  This misunderstanding seems to arise from giving priority to the view from below (e.g. the forms morphology, cover).

[2] This seriously misunderstands the meaning of the stratified model of SFL theory.  Field is not modelled as language; it is a higher level of symbolic abstraction than language: it is the ideational dimension of the culture construed as a semiotic system.  Locating lexical taxonomies outside language is a major category error.

[3] Construing field as a register variable confuses a higher level of symbolic abstraction than language, context, with a functional variety of language, a register.

Construing field variation as a register variable confuses instantial variation (e.g. situation type probabilities) with hyponymy (feature options in systems).

[4] The difference between morphology in the fields of linguistics and geology is characterised in the lexicogrammar — not field — by the different lexical features that specify them as distinct outputs.

[5] This confuses lexical cohesion with lexicogrammatical delicacy, and language with context.

In SFL theory, lexical cohesion is the use of repetition, synonymy, hyponymy, meronymy and collocation to establish non-structural textual relations.  A lexicogrammatical taxonomy, however, is a means of modelling the lexicogrammatical system.  A field taxonomy, on the other hand, is means of modelling the ideational dimension of context — not lexicogrammar (nor even language).

Confusing Textual Cohesion With Experiential Delicacy

Martin (1992: 288-9):

One critical consideration which has been set aside in the discussion of lexical relations to this point is that of field specificity.  In general cohesion analysts have tended not to be very specific about this point.  Categories tend to be illustrated with examples from core vocabulary, which are kept as field neutral as possible: verbs, adverbs and adjectives are favoured over nouns, and "commonsense" nouns are used rather than technical ones.  It is no accident that Hasan chooses action verbs in exploring the grammarian's dream; fields tend to differentiate themselves nominally, through technical lexis, rather than through verbs, adjectives and adverbs.  But even with verbs, the question of field slips in.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This discussion confuses two distinct domains of SFL theory:

• the grammatical system of lexical cohesion, a nonstructural resource of the textual metafunction that relates lexical items in terms of repetition, synonymy, hyponymy, meronymy and collocation; 


• the systemic specification of lexical items by extending the delicacy of grammatical networks (experiential metafunction).

[2] In SFL theory, lexical cohesion is a grammatical system concerned with textual relations between lexical items, whereas field is the ideational dimension of context.

[3] These remarks are about extending the delicacy of grammatical networks, while purporting to be about lexical cohesion.

[4] In SFL theory, field variation is modelled as a point on the cline of instantiation at the stratum of context.  For example, field variation is the ideational dimension of situation type variation, where the variation is of the probabilities of field features being selected.

Lexical Cohesion Update

Martin (1992: 288):

Finally, mention should be made of Halliday (1985: 310-2), who maintains repetition and collocation as distinct categories, and groups together synonymy, antonymy, meronymy and hyponymy under a general heading of synonymy.

Blogger Comment:

Using the dimensions of the SFL model, Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 572) systematically distinguish the lexical relations that play a rôle in lexical cohesion; most generally, according to axis:

• the nature of relation: syntagmatic (collocation) vs paradigmatic (the rest)

and the paradigmatic according to logical relations:

• the type of expansion: extending (meronymy) vs elaborating (the rest)

and the elaborating according to experiential relations:

• attribution (hyponymy) vs identity (synonymy, repetition).

Misconstruing The Agency Of Identifying Clauses

Martin (1992: 285):

Alternatively, be could have been specified as an optional lexicalisation of the feature [single agency], which if taken up would have to be as foreclosing choices in more delicate systems.  The network could then have been simplified as in Fig. 5.8, with the choice between [exemplifying] and [exhausting] dependent on [single agency] not being realised through be.

Blogger Comment:

The proposed network is undermined by the incorrect assumption that all unassigned identifying clauses have single agency, and all assigned clauses have double agency.  In fact:

• both unassigned encoding clauses and assigned decoding clauses have single agency,
• only operative* assigned encoding clauses have double agency, and
• unassigned decoding clause have no agency at all.

		assignment
		unassigned	assigned
direction of coding	decoding	0 Agent	1 Agent (Assigner)
	encoding	1 Agent (Token/Identifier)	*2 Agents (Token/Identifier, Assigner)

The verb be serves as identifying Process in unassigned clauses only, both encoding and decoding, which means it serves in clauses with both single agency and no agency at all.

Moreover, there are identifying clauses with single agency in which the verb be does not serve as Process: assigned decoding clauses.

Falsely Claiming To Have Uniquely Classified Two Lexical Items

Martin (1992: 283):

This brings us to the point where two lexical items have been uniquely classified (define and read) and a step or two in delicacy would isolate several others (e.g. call, name, mean, denote, connote, spell, write, transcribe).

Blogger Comment:

[1] In Fig. 5.5. (ibid.),  the unique classification of define is given as:

• realise: stratum specific: semantics/grammar : wording: encoding

As demonstrated in the previous post, when the verb define serves as an identifying process, the direction of coding, like all identifying processes, can be encoding or decoding, depending on whether the Token or Value is the Identifier.  The feature [encoding], therefore, does not classify the word define.

[2] Likewise, the unique classification of read is given as:

• realise: stratum specific: grammar/phon-graphology: encoding

As demonstrated in the previous post, the verb read did not serve as an identifying process in the clause provided.  Rather, it served as a verbal process in a projection nexus.  Accordingly, not one of the features specifying read — [realise: stratum specific: grammar/phon-graphology: encoding] — actually classifies the lexical item.

Misrepresenting The Directions Of Coding And Mistaking A Verbal Projection Nexus For An Identifying Clause

Martin (1992: 282):

The discussion will now be limited to the semiotic options subclassifying the feature [realise].  These can be divided into a general set which do not specify which strata or ranks are being related and a set which is specific to either the semantics/grammar interface or the grammar/phonology (including grammar/graphology) one…

Both interfaces make a distinction between encoding and decoding, depending on whether the Token is treated as closer or further away from the expression substance than the Value.

GRAMMAR/PHONOLOGY:ENCODING

[5:17]  N-G spells ng. 

GRAMMAR/PHONOLOGY:DECODING

[5:18]  But it actually reads the big dog must be able to see the dog at all times. 

SEMANTICS/GRAMMAR…ENCODING

[5:19]  Spell means 'to represent graphically as' 

SEMANTICS/GRAMMAR…DECODING

[5:20]  'To represent graphically as' defines spell.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This seriously misrepresents decoding and encoding.  The directions of coding are not semiotic options "subclassifying the feature [realise]", and have nothing whatsoever to do with "whether the Token is treated as closer or further away from the expression substance than the Value".

The direction of coding pertains to all identifying processes and simply depends on whether the Value is used to identify the Token (decoding) or the Token is used to identify the Value (encoding), as Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 230) make clear.

Of the three genuine identifying clauses provided, each can be construed as either decoding or encoding, as demonstrated below:

decoding: what word do the letters ‘N-G’ spell?

N-G	spells	ng
Token/Identified	Process: identifying	Value/Identifier
Given		New

encoding: what letters spell the word ‘ng’?

N-G	spells	ng
Token/Identifier	Process: identifying	Value/Identified
New		Given

decoding: what does the word ‘spell’ mean?

spell	means	to represent graphically as
Token/Identified	Process: identifying	Value/Identifier
Given		New

encoding: what word means ‘to represent graphically as’?

spell	means	to represent graphically as
Token/Identifier	Process: identifying	Value/Identified
New		Given

decoding: what meaning defines the word ‘spell’?

to represent graphically as	defines	spell
Value/Identifier	Process: identifying	Token/Identified
New		Given

encoding: what word is defined by the meaning ‘to represent graphically as’?

to represent graphically as	defines	spell
Value/Identified	Process: identifying	Token/Identifier
Given		New

This last  clause is extremely marked, not least because, in the vast majority of instances of identifying processes, it is the Token, not the Value that conflates with Subject in clauses of operative voice.

[2] This is not an identifying relational clause; it is a nexus of verbal clause projecting a quoted locution clause (despite the omitted quotation marks).

but	it	actually	reads (‘says’)	the big dog	must be able to see	the dog	at all times
1				“ 2
	Sayer		Process: verbal	Senser	Process: mental	Phenomenon	Location: time

This instance, therefore, does not construe the 'grammar/graphology interface'.  The logical relation it construes is projection, not elaboration, and the domains that are related are the material order of experience (a sayer saying) and the semiotic order of experience (a wording; i.e. lexicogrammar).