Subscribing To The Naturalistic Fallacy

Martin (1992: 586):

Beyond this studies are needed on the inter-relationships between affect and morality (between ATTITUDE and MODULATION to put this grammatically): I like/dislike clearly conditions you should/shouldn't in ways that have been barely broached (see Martin 1992a).

Blogger Comments:

[1] The claim here is that

• the relation between affect (a neutral or charged tenor relation between interlocutors) and morality (principles of right and wrong) 
• can be described as 
• the grammatical relation between attitude (positive or negative evaluation) and modulation (obligation and inclination).

[2] The claim here is that the giving of information conditions the demanding of goods-&-services:

• propositions that are realised by declaratives of the form I like/dislike
• condition
• proposals that are realised by declaratives of the form you should/shouldn't.

In philosophy, the claim that an "ought" (prescription) can be derived from an "is" (description) is known as the Naturalistic Fallacy (G.E. Moore); see also Hume's Law/Guillotine.

In SFL theory, the mental processes that relate to modulation are not those of emotion (I like), but those of desideration (I would like).  This is because desiderative processes project proposals and can serve as interpersonal metaphors of modulation, as in I would like you to finish this by tomorrow.

Confusing Tenor (Context) With Interpersonal Meaning (Semantics)

Martin  (1992: 586):

… it demonstrates that […] the coding orientations associated with class, gender, ethnicity and generation focus attitudes in systematic ways.  Affect is in other words ideologically addressed (see Martin 1986 on the orientation of attitude in ecological debates) and exploring this projection of interpersonal meaning is an important dimension of semiotic space.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This continues the misconstrual of Bernstein's coding orientation as ideology.

[2] This continues the confusion of affect, as a dimension of tenor (context stratum), with affect as interpersonal meaning (semantics stratum). Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 33) refer to the contextual system as 'sociometric rôles'.

[3] This stratal confusion is aided by the blurring of two distinct meanings of 'projection':

• tenor as the theoretical "projection" of the interpersonal metafunction onto the context stratum;
• interpersonal meaning as the verbal projection of speakers.

[4] Trivially, 'exploring' is not a dimension.

exploring this projection of interpersonal meaning	is	an important dimension of semiotic space
Identified / Token	Process	Identifier / Value

Misconstruing Semantics (Activity Sequence) As Context (Field)

Martin (1992: 564, 565, 566, 568):

These "stories" are alike in that they are built up around a set of narrative clauses (an activity sequence in terms of the field theory developed here); …

For Plum, as in Martin and Rothery's work, the recount is a relatively iconic rendering of an activity sequence (the Record stage); … Expectancies about how an activity sequence will unfold are countered, with ensuing events departing from the norm in some significant way. …

Texts 7.1-4 have been constructed below to illustrate these genres as interpersonal manipulations of the same activity sequence …

The ways in which interpersonal meaning inflects activity sequences to construct these four story genres is summarised in Table 7.20.

Table 7.20 Interpersonal meaning across story genres

	interpersonal: modalisation	modulation	attitude
recount	usuality		prosodic affect
anecdote	unusuality;		varied affect
exemplum	unusuality;	obligation	negative affect
narrative	unusuality;	inclination	negative to positive affect

Blogger Comment:

This continues the misconstrual of semantics (activity sequence) as context (field).  As can be seen from these excerpts, an activity sequence here refers to events in a narrative.  They are the linguistic construals of experience of an author.

Inconsistent Unsupported Claims About The Realisation Of Misconstrued Affect

Martin (1992: 535):

Table 7.14 Tenor — aspects the realisation of affect

Affect	system	process
[loud/soft]	iteration	amplification
[lexis foregrounded]
phonology		tone width
		voice quality
		rate
		pitch
		loudness
		phonæsthesia
		vowel length
		consonant aspiration
grammar	exclamative
	attitude
	comment
	minor expressive
	intensification
	repetition
	prosodic nominal groups
	diminuitives; [sic]
	mental affection
	manner degree
lexis	attitudinal
	taboo
	swearing
discourse semantics	no negotiation
	challenging
interaction patterns	1/2 person modal responsibility

Blogger Comments:

Some of the problems with this table of unsupported can be noted briefly here.

[1] Here the distinction between 'system' and 'process' is identified with the stratal distinction of content and expression.  See the post here on the previous misuse of these terms with regard to tenor.

[2] The general distinction of loud/soft is appropriate only for the phonological category loudness.

[3] The claim is that amplification is the 'basic realisation principle' of affect, and that 'amplification achieved largely through iteration' in the case of 'content form' (p533) — by which Martin means the content plane — and though various 'parameters' in the case of 'expression form' (p534).  Here the superordinate category 'amplification' is presented as one of its hyponyms.

[4] The claim here is that lexis is foregrounded; the examples given are restricted to those of attitude: the superordinate  (attitudinal) and one hyponym (taboo) and its hyponym (swearing).

[5] The claim here is that phonæsthesia is a means of realising affect — a charged relation between interlocutors — through amplification.  Phonæsthesia is any correspondence between sound and meaning, as in onomatopœia and phonæsthemes such as the [sl] in sleaze sled sledge sleek sleet sleigh slice slick slide slime sling slink slip slither sliver etc.

[6] The claim here is that 'exclamative' realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[7] The "prosodic nominal groups" are those that include multiple intrusions of attitude.  That is, the same feature has been included twice in the grammar examples.  See also the lexis examples.

[8] The claim here is that 'comment' realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[9] The claim here is that 'minor expressive' (undefined) realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[10] The claim here is that grammatical intensification realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[11] The claim here is that repetition is one way of realising a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[12] The claim here is that diminutives realise a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration. A diminutive is a word which has been modified to convey a slighter degree of its root meaning, to convey the smallness of the object or quality named, or to convey a sense of intimacy or endearment.

[13] The claim here is that 'mental affection' realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[14] The claim here is that Manner: degree ('how much?') realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.  See also [10] intensification.

[15] The claim here is that 'no negotiation' realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[16] The claim here is that 'challenging' realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[17] The claim here is that '1/2 person modal responsibility' realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.  In SFL theory, modal responsibility is the meaning of 'Subject'.  The claim then is that 1st/2nd person Subjects realise a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

Blurring The Distinction Between Context And Semantics

Martin (1992: 533-4):

As far as content form is concerned, amplification is achieved largely through iteration — affectual meanings are repeated until the appropriate volume is reached.  This interpersonal "taxis" is most striking in nominal groups (cf. you lousy rotten stinking bastard you vs. my lovely sweet little darling baby puppy dog), where positive and negative attitude is replayed prosodically across Deictic, Epithet and Thing; but attitudinal interpolation of this kind is pervasive across a range of grammatical structures, irrespective of experiential constituency boundaries (e.g. swearing — God damn it I fucking wish that shit of a un-bloody-grateful bastard would work his fucking problems out; or modality — I'm absolutely convinced that there certainly must be a solution right here, mustn't there?).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, 'content' refers to the two strata: semantics/meaning and lexicogrammar/wording; and 'form' on the content plane refers to the units of the rank scale: clauses, phrases, groups, words and morphemes.

[2] To be clear, such 'affectual meanings' are the meanings (semantics) that realise affect (context).  In terms of stratification, tenor and meaning are distinct levels of symbolic abstraction.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, 'taxis' is the logical relation of interdependency.

[4] To be clear, the constituency of form, the rank scale, is not metafunctional.  This is distinct from different metafunctions favouring different types of function structures: experiential/segmental, interpersonal/prosodic, textual/culminative and logical/iterative (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 85).

[5] In SFL Theory, modality is a system of the clause, and quite distinct from attitude.  Modality operates within the limits defined by polarity (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 183).

[6] Trivially, right is not an instance of modality. Modality covers modalisation (probability/usuality) and modulation (obligation/inclination).

Confusing Affect With Affection

Martin (1992: 533):

Poynton's (1984: 25) network for affect, subclassifies positive and negative features, but the more delicate features are not discussed.  Unfortunately at present there do not appear to be any obvious linguistic criteria for classifying types of affection.  Feelings about oneself do seem to pair off with attitudes to someone else, and so a [self/other] system will be introduced here (for an alternative classification see Roget).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses the theoretical notion of affect (a charged or neutral relation between interlocutors) with the general notion of affection ('a gentle feeling of fondness or liking').

[2] This continues the misconstrual of a relation between interlocutors (affect) as the mental processes and states of an individual.

Presenting Unsupported Claims As A Survey: Status & Grammar

Martin (1992: 529):

Table 7.10. Aspects of the realisation of unequal status
Unequal status non-reciprocity [grammar foregrounded]	dominate	defer
grammar	no ellipsis	Residue ellipsis
	polarity asserted	polarity matched
	modalisation: high	modalisation: low
	modulation: obligation	modulation: inclination
	attitude: manifested	attitude: concur
	comment: presented	comment: invited
	vocation: familiar	vocation: respectful
	person: 1st	person: 2nd
	tagging: inviting;	tagging: checking;
	agency: I/Agent	agency: I/Medium

Blogger Comments:

[1] The claim here is that:

• the absence of ellipsis construes the tenor feature 'dominate', whereas
• the ellipsis of the Residue construes the tenor feature 'defer'.

That is, the absence or presence of the textually cohesive resource of ellipsis construes different values of interpersonal context.  This claim can be falsified by concrete examples.  In answer to the question Is he at home?:

• Yes he is at home is claimed to construe the tenor feature 'dominate', whereas
• Yes he is is claimed to construe the tenor feature 'defer'.

[2] The claim here is that:

• 1st person construes the tenor feature 'dominate', whereas
• 2nd person construes the tenor feature 'defer'.

This claim can be falsified by concrete examples:

• I will clean up my mess is claimed to construe the tenor feature 'dominate', whereas
• You will clean up your mess is claimed to construe the tenor feature 'defer'.

[3] The claim here is that:

• the conflation of 'I' (speaker) with Agent construes the tenor feature 'dominate', whereas
• the conflation of 'I' (speaker) with Medium construes the tenor feature 'defer'.

That is:

• the construal of the self as Initiator, effective Actor, targeting Sayer, impinging Phenomenon, effective Token, Attributor or Assigner construes the tenor feature 'dominate', whereas 
• the construal of the self as middle Actor, effective Goal, Behaver, Senser, Sayer, Carrier, middle Token, effective Value or Existent construes the tenor feature 'defer'.

This claim can be falsified by concrete examples:

• I praised my boss (Agent/Sayer) is claimed to construe the tenor feature 'dominate', whereas
• I am your boss (Medium/Token) is claimed to construe the tenor feature 'defer'.