Inconsistent Unsupported Claims About The Realisation Of Misconstrued Affect

Martin (1992: 535):

Table 7.14 Tenor — aspects the realisation of affect

Affect	system	process
[loud/soft]	iteration	amplification
[lexis foregrounded]
phonology		tone width
		voice quality
		rate
		pitch
		loudness
		phonæsthesia
		vowel length
		consonant aspiration
grammar	exclamative
	attitude
	comment
	minor expressive
	intensification
	repetition
	prosodic nominal groups
	diminuitives; [sic]
	mental affection
	manner degree
lexis	attitudinal
	taboo
	swearing
discourse semantics	no negotiation
	challenging
interaction patterns	1/2 person modal responsibility

Blogger Comments:

Some of the problems with this table of unsupported can be noted briefly here.

[1] Here the distinction between 'system' and 'process' is identified with the stratal distinction of content and expression.  See the post here on the previous misuse of these terms with regard to tenor.

[2] The general distinction of loud/soft is appropriate only for the phonological category loudness.

[3] The claim is that amplification is the 'basic realisation principle' of affect, and that 'amplification achieved largely through iteration' in the case of 'content form' (p533) — by which Martin means the content plane — and though various 'parameters' in the case of 'expression form' (p534).  Here the superordinate category 'amplification' is presented as one of its hyponyms.

[4] The claim here is that lexis is foregrounded; the examples given are restricted to those of attitude: the superordinate  (attitudinal) and one hyponym (taboo) and its hyponym (swearing).

[5] The claim here is that phonæsthesia is a means of realising affect — a charged relation between interlocutors — through amplification.  Phonæsthesia is any correspondence between sound and meaning, as in onomatopœia and phonæsthemes such as the [sl] in sleaze sled sledge sleek sleet sleigh slice slick slide slime sling slink slip slither sliver etc.

[6] The claim here is that 'exclamative' realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[7] The "prosodic nominal groups" are those that include multiple intrusions of attitude.  That is, the same feature has been included twice in the grammar examples.  See also the lexis examples.

[8] The claim here is that 'comment' realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[9] The claim here is that 'minor expressive' (undefined) realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[10] The claim here is that grammatical intensification realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[11] The claim here is that repetition is one way of realising a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[12] The claim here is that diminutives realise a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration. A diminutive is a word which has been modified to convey a slighter degree of its root meaning, to convey the smallness of the object or quality named, or to convey a sense of intimacy or endearment.

[13] The claim here is that 'mental affection' realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[14] The claim here is that Manner: degree ('how much?') realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.  See also [10] intensification.

[15] The claim here is that 'no negotiation' realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[16] The claim here is that 'challenging' realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[17] The claim here is that '1/2 person modal responsibility' realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.  In SFL theory, modal responsibility is the meaning of 'Subject'.  The claim then is that 1st/2nd person Subjects realise a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

Using Allegory To Misrepresent The Rôle Of Mood And Residue In Modal Responsibility

Martin (1992: 490):

Text is a dialectic, a semiotic rally.  But the ball that comes back may be slightly different from the ball you've just played.  And the ball has two parts — a bit you thought might come back different and a bit you assumed would stay the same.  When the ball comes back unchanged, you throw it away and get a new one; and sometimes it doesn't come back at all — in which case you may choose another ball or stop playing altogether (or decide to find a new partner for the next round). 

Monologue is hitting up against the backboard; the tension is still there — choosing Subjects is important.  But you negotiate against yourself; you can't hit the same shot twice, and someone might be watching anyhow.  So the monologue is a dialogue.  Text is a rally you aren't trying to win; it's a game you're trying to share.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands the term 'dialectic', since a vanishingly small proportion of the total number of texts can be accurately categorised as such:

Dialectic or dialectics (Greek: διαλεκτική, dialektikḗ), also known as the dialectical method, is a discourse between two or more people holding different points of view about a subject but wishing to establish the truth through reasoned arguments. The term was popularised by Plato's Socratic dialogues but the act itself has been central to European and Indian philosophy since ancient history.

The term dialectic is not synonymous with the term debate. While in theory debaters are not necessarily emotionally invested in their point of view, in practice debaters frequently display an emotional commitment that may cloud rational judgment. Debates are won through a combination of persuading the opponent, proving one's argument correct, or proving the opponent's argument incorrect. Debates do not necessarily require promptly identifying a clear winner or loser; however clear winners are frequently determined by either a judge, jury, or by group consensus.

The term dialectics is also not synonymous with the term rhetoric, a method or art of discourse that seeks to persuade, inform, or motivate an audience. Concepts, like "logos" or rational appeal, "pathos" or emotional appeal, and "ethos" or ethical appeal, are intentionally used by rhetoricians to persuade an audience.

[2] This extended tennis metaphor is meant to illustrate Martin's characterisation of Mood and Residue in his misinterpretation of modal responsibility (ibid.):

In summary, Residue is what interlocutors are judged to have in common; Mood is what they may not share.

As explained previously, the Mood element carries the burden of the clause as an interactive event, so it remains constant, as the nub of the proposition, unless some positive step is taken to change it (Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 150), whereas the Residue comprises the remaining elements that realise the proposition (or proposal), but which do not 'bear the burden of the clause as an interactive event'.

[3] In monologue, as elsewhere, the choice of Subject is important in the sense that the validity of a proposition or proposal rests with it; there need be no "tension" (e.g. Mary had a little lamb).  In monologue, where there is negotiation, the speakers or writers don't "negotiate against" themselves, but with the addressees.

[4] This misunderstands the distinction between monologue and dialogue. A text (rally) with one speaker (player) is a monologue, no matter how many readers (observers) there are.

—∞—

Consider also the effectiveness of this tennis allegory: when the ball comes back unchanged, you throw it away and get a new one.

Rhapsodising On Modal Responsibility

Martin (1992: 489-90):

Finally modal responsibility accommodates the interlocutor, making ongoing assessments of meaning at risk.  Vulnerable meanings are woven through the Mood functions of a text's ranking clauses, constructing a constrained resource for openness — for interplay, as interlocutors negotiate the resolution of an exchange.  What is going on here is that meanings that can be shared without risk are not worth being made; there has to be some difference involved to make a text worth meaning.  At the same time, a text is not worth meaning if it cannot be shared.  And so the openness associated with point is delimited by the need to organise messages into interactive events in which certain meanings are taken for granted and others are the stakes.  Where interlocutors cannot agree, these stakes may be very high.  In summary, Residue is what interlocutors are judged to have in common; Mood is what they may not share.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is manifestly untrue.  In SFL theory, modal responsibility is the meaning of Subject, and refers to the rôle of Subject as the element on which the validity of a proposition or proposal rests.  The Subject does not "accommodate" the interlocutor.  Consider the "accommodation" of the interlocutor provided by the Subject the square of the hypotenuse in the following clause:

the square of the hypotenuse	equals		the sum of the squares of the other two sides
Subject	Finite	Predicator	Complement
Mood		Residue

[2] This is manifestly untrue.  Subjects do not "make ongoing assessments of meaning at risk".  Consider the "ongoing assessment of meaning at risk" made by the Subject the square of the hypotenuse in the previous example.

[3] This is manifestly untrue.  Consider the "vulnerability" of the meanings of the square of the hypotenuse and equals that are "woven through the Mood functions" in the example above.

[4] The function of the Mood block, Subject + Finite, is to make propositions and proposals arguable.

[5] Not all texts involve "interlocutors negotiating the resolution of an exchange", but all texts involve Subjects.  Consider the "interlocutors negotiating the resolution of an exchange" in the following text:

How pleasant to know Mr. Lear,
Who has written such volumes of stuff.
Some think him ill-tempered and queer,
But a few find him pleasant enough.

[6] This is manifestly untrue.  Consider the "sharing of meaning without risk" in:

the square of the hypotenuse equals the sum of the squares of the other two sides

This, the Pythagorean theorem, is a fundamental relation in Euclidean geometry and might thus be considered as "worth being made".  Two geometers don't need to disagree about it for it to be "worth meaning".

[7] Martin's point includes paragraph summaries (hyper-News) and a text summary (macro-New).  Summaries do not open up a text, they keep it within the bounds of what has already been written.  See the most recent previous critique here.

[8] This confuses metafunctions.  Modal responsibility is an interpersonal function, whereas the organisation of texts is the province of the textual metafunction.

[9] As well as being manifestly untrue, this misunderstands the nature of Mood and Residue. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 150):

… the Mood element has a clearly defined semantic function: it carries the burden of the clause as an interactive event. So it remains constant, as the nub of the proposition, unless some positive step is taken to change it …

The Residue, on the other hand, comprises the remaining elements that realise the proposition (or proposal), but which do not 'bear the burden of the clause as an interactive event'.

Using A Middle Clause To Illustrate Agency

Martin (1992: 488):

The way in which modal responsibility is mapped onto agency may well be a life and death matter, as text [6:53] shows.  Superintendent Harding is explaining why an innocent Aboriginal man has been shot to death during a commando style police raid (in connection with a search for a suspect who has wounded two policemen).  In contrast to the paper's headline, the Superintendent textures the gun as responsible for the killing.

‘Uptight’ police kill man in raid
[6: 53]	(Superintendent Harding)
	a	A struggle took place
	b	and the officer was reacting
	c	to keep the peace
	d	and stop himself or others being hurt.
	e	The gun then discharged.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The clause in question is middle, not effective; there is no agency:

the gun	then	discharged
Medium Actor		Process: material

[2] In terms of "experiential responsibility", the gun was not construed as an Agent by the speaker.  In terms of modal responsibility, as Subject, the gun is the element that the speaker makes responsible for the validity of what he is saying.

the gun	then	discharged
Subject	(conjunctive Adjunct)	Finite	Predicator

Note that according to Martin's misinterpretation of modal responsibility, it is the gun that is the "participant at risk".

[3] In SFL theory, 'texture', the property of being a text, is created by the textual metafunction.  Here it is misapplied to the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions — agency and modal responsibility, respectively.