Thursday, 28 January 2016

Misconstruing Congruent Obligation As Metaphorical Inclination

Martin (1992: 413):

Table 6.19. Congruent and metaphorical realisations of interpersonal meanings [2]

Modal verb

Verb complex
be allowed to
be obliged to

causative Process
allow (x) to do
oblige (x) to do



projecting Process
(I) recommend
(I) insist

in case

Blogger Comments:

[1] The congruent realisations of modulation are those of implicit manifestation: the subjective orientation being realised as a finite modal operator (e.g. will, should) and the objective orientation involving a hypotactic verbal group complex (e.g. willing to x, supposed to x); see Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 513, 517).  Halliday (1994: 82) also lists modal Adjuncts of readiness and obligation.

The metaphorical realisations of modulation are those of explicit manifestation.  For obligation, the subjective orientation is realised as a projecting desiderative mental clause (e.g. I want…) and the objective orientation as an attributive clause with a factual Carrier (e.g. it's expected…).  See Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 613ff).

[2] These are neither inclination nor metaphorical.  Verbal group complexes featuring allowed to x realise implicit objective obligation of low value; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 620-1).

[3] These are congruent, not metaphorical, realisations.  Verbal group complexes featuring obliged to x realise implicit objective obligation of high value.

[4] As Epithet, these serve as Attribute in metaphorical realisations of objective orientation (e.g. it's permissible…, it's necessary…).  In congruent realisations, they can function as Post-Deictic in a nominal group (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 317, 612).  However, permissible expresses low value obligation, not inclination (in contrast to the high value obligation of necessary.)

[5] Some nominalised forms can serve as an objective orientation of modulation, such as as a matter of necessity, but they are intermediate between explicit and implicit manifestation, and so intermediate between metaphorical and congruent.  See Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 615-6). However, permission expresses low value obligationnot inclination (in contrast to the high value obligation of necessity.)

[6] Neither of these functions as a metaphorical (explicit subjective) realisation of modulation.  On the one hand, there is no inclination counterpart for the probability metaphor I think (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 619).  On the other hand, the explicit subjective realisation of modulation is realised by a clause featuring a desiderative mental Process, whereas insist serves as a verbal Process (cf. demand).

[7] The conjunction groups in case and so — both of which can express causal-condition expansion relations — are not metaphorical realisations of inclination and obligation.