Not Acknowledging Barthes As Intellectual Source

Martin (1992: 537-8):

Barthes goes on to point out that sequences involve both expectancy and risk. Recognition of an activity sequence implies an expectation that one of its events will follow another, but the succession is not necessary.  It is always possible for expectations to be countered, which creates the context for concessive conjunctive relations. Counterexpectation is a critical feature of narrative genre (and one that does not come naturally to young writers who generally fail to put succession at risk):

However minimal its importance, a sequence, since it is made up of a small number of nuclei (that is to say, in fact of 'dispatchers'), always involves moments of risk and it is this that justifies analysing it.  It might seem futile to constitute into a sequence the logical succession of trifling acts which go to make up the offer of a cigarette (offering, accepting, smoking, lighting), but precisely at every one of these points, an alternative — and hence a freedom of meaning — is possible. … A sequence is thus, one can say, a threatened logical unit, this being its justification a minimo.  (1977: 102)

Blogger Comments:

[1] Martin (1992: 322-4) proposes 'expectancy' as an activity sequence relation (e.g. here).  He does not acknowledge Barthes as the source of the idea.  At the symposium to honour the late Ruqaiya Hasan, Martin falsely accused Hasan of not acknowledging Mitchell as one of her sources (evidence here).

[2] The highly fanciful notion of meaning 'at risk' is finally clarified here for the first time and sourced to Barthes.  In terms of SFL theory, it simply means the speaker is always free to instantiate a different option during logogenesis.  The risk is to the feature and it is the risk of not being selected.   All features are thus "put at risk" outside the moment of instantiation.  "Pretentious?! Moi?!"

[3] The perspective on language here is that of the addressee, not the speaker.

[4] This is relevant only for the semantics of specific text types, mainly fictional.  The discussion here is purported to be establishing a model of field (context), the ideational dimension of cultural potential in general — which Martin misconstrues as register.

[5] In SFL theory, concessive conjunctive relations are a specific type of causal-conditional relation, served by items such as yet, still, though, despite this, however, even so, all the same, nevertheless (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 614).  Martin misunderstands and misapplies the concessive enhancement relation, as demonstrated, for example, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here.

[6] It is worth pointing out that Barthes' construal of nuclei that make up a sequence as 'dispatchers' is imaginative fiction, not semiotic theory.  Barthes otherwise presents the relation as 'made up', but in sense of composition, not fiction.

[7] Barthes' claim is that it is the fact that the speaker is always free to instantiate a different option during logogenesis that justifies both the sequence and its analysis.  This is, of course, no less true, or false, of any instance of language.

[8] Note that, in this misquoting of Barthes, the carcinogenic cause of heart disease is not lit until after it is smoked.

A Short Summary Of Some Of The Misunderstandings Of Chapter 6

Martin (1992: 488):

The basic strategy adopted to explore this question [how do modules of the semiotic model interface?] was to look closely at the interaction of reference chains and lexical strings with specific lexicogrammatical and phonological variables — specifically TRANSITIVITY rôles, Theme, New and Subject.  The texture deriving from these four types of interaction was discussed under the headings of cohesive harmony, method of development, point and modal responsibility.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses the content plane (New information) with the expression plane (phonology).

[2] The term and concept of 'texture' come from Halliday & Hasan (1976).  Texture is the property of being a text, and is created by the textual metafunction.  Here it is misapplied to the experiential metafunction (TRANSITIVITY rôles) and the interpersonal metafunction (Subject).

[3] The term and concept of 'cohesive harmony' come from Hasan (1984, 1985).  Martin misunderstands and misrepresents Hasan's model and critiques these as if they were her model.  See the evidence in previous posts here, here, here, and here.

[4] The term and concept of 'method of development' come from Fries (1981).  Martin's 'method of development' is writing pedagogy masquerading as linguistic theory.  He rebrands 'topic sentence' as 'hyper-Theme' — a term taken from Daneš (1974) but redefined — and 'introductory paragraph' as 'macro-Theme'.

[5] The term and concept of 'point' come from Fries (1981).  Martin's 'point' is, again, writing pedagogy masquerading as linguistic theory.  He rebrands  'paragraph summary' as 'hyper-New', and 'text summary' as 'macro-New'.

[6] The term and concept of 'modal responsibility' come from Halliday (1985), where it is the meaning of 'Subject': that on which the validity of a proposition or proposal rests.  Martin first misunderstands 'modal responsibility', in proposals, as 'the constituent responsible for seeing that goods are exchanged or a service performed' (p461).  He then misinterprets the meaning of Subject from a discourse perspective, in terms of exchange resolution (p462), as 'what is at stake' (p464) and as 'participant at risk' (p477).

Using A Middle Clause To Illustrate Agency

Martin (1992: 488):

The way in which modal responsibility is mapped onto agency may well be a life and death matter, as text [6:53] shows.  Superintendent Harding is explaining why an innocent Aboriginal man has been shot to death during a commando style police raid (in connection with a search for a suspect who has wounded two policemen).  In contrast to the paper's headline, the Superintendent textures the gun as responsible for the killing.

‘Uptight’ police kill man in raid
[6: 53]	(Superintendent Harding)
	a	A struggle took place
	b	and the officer was reacting
	c	to keep the peace
	d	and stop himself or others being hurt.
	e	The gun then discharged.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The clause in question is middle, not effective; there is no agency:

the gun	then	discharged
Medium Actor		Process: material

[2] In terms of "experiential responsibility", the gun was not construed as an Agent by the speaker.  In terms of modal responsibility, as Subject, the gun is the element that the speaker makes responsible for the validity of what he is saying.

the gun	then	discharged
Subject	(conjunctive Adjunct)	Finite	Predicator

Note that according to Martin's misinterpretation of modal responsibility, it is the gun that is the "participant at risk".

[3] In SFL theory, 'texture', the property of being a text, is created by the textual metafunction.  Here it is misapplied to the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions — agency and modal responsibility, respectively.

Misconstruing Modal Responsibility As Speaker At Risk

Martin (1992: 486-7):

This interplay of embedding, taxis and MOOD was exploited in text [6:30] to focus modal responsibility on the sitting member, as analysed above. … So while the member is textured as modally responsible, he is never experientially responsible. Where he could be, in the congruent version of [6:30g] for example, he is realised as the possessor of a nominalised modulation:

My responsibility is to make sure that the life style we enjoy is maintained and improved.

(— Is it?)

… Mapping interpersonal responsibility onto experiential responsibility (i.e. agency) as in the congruent version of [6:30g] places the member rather more at risk:

I must make sure that the life style we enjoy is maintained and improved.

(— Must you?)

It is for this political consideration that the text is structured as an interpersonal massage, rather than an experiential message.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In the said analysis, the modal responsibility of the Subject (metalanguage) was confused with an instance of responsibility in the text (language) projected by the speaker.  Evidence here.

[2] In SFL theory, 'texture', the property of being a text, is created by the textual metafunction.  Here it is misapplied to the interpersonal metafunction — modal responsibility.

[3] Because modal responsibility is interpersonal meaning, the experiential agency of the Subject has no bearing on the interpersonal meaning.  The difference between the two versions of [6:30g] is that in the first, my responsibility carries the responsibility for the the validity of the proposition, whereas, in the second, I (the speaker) carries the responsibility for the the validity of the proposition.  In neither version is the member "at risk" — because that's not what modal responsibility means.

[4] To be clear, in SFL theory, 'message' refers to the semantic unit of the textual metafunction — not the experiential — that is realised in the lexicogrammar as the thematic structure of the clause. 

Problems With The Argument For Hyper-Theme

Martin (1992: 437):

Daneš (1974: 118-9) suggests a number of ways in which strings, chains, Themes and Rhemes may interact in text. In some texts Themes typically relate to immediately preceding Rhemes, in others to immediately preceding Themes. Of special interest is the pattern suggested by Daneš whereby successive Themes are related to a single preceding Theme (or hyper-Theme as he terms it). This is the pattern that [6:34] would have displayed had wisdom and chance been made thematic in clause [6:34d] (e.g. Wisdom and chance gave birth to the English Constitution). As [6:34] stands however, Themes are predicted by clause [6:34d]'s New, not its Theme.

The important point here however is that [6:34d] stands in a predictive relationship to the interaction between lexical strings and Theme selection.  It thus functions as the Topic Sentence in school rhetoric — as the Theme of the paragraph in other words, rather than as the Theme of a clause.  Daneš's term hyper-Theme will be extended here to refer to paragraph Themes of this kind.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Daneš (1974) identifies three main types of thematic progression:

1. a preceding Rheme becomes the next Theme;
2. a repetition of the same Theme, the first appearance termed a 'hypertheme';
3. a progression of derived Themes

[2] The relation here is one of identity. In SFL theory, this is lexical cohesion (elaborating: identity) working with Theme. That is, it is the non-structural and structural resources of the textual metafunction creating texture.

[3] The Greek prefix 'hyper-' means over; beyond; above.  The 'hypertheme' of Daneš (1974) is 'over' or 'above' its later repetitions.

[4] If the type 2 ('hypertheme') thematic progression had been used, it would have had a significant deleterious effect on the texture:

The English Constitution — that indescribable entity — is a living thing, growing with the growth of men, and assuming ever-varying forms in accordance with the subtle and complex laws of human character. Wisdom and chance gave birth to the English Constitution.

[5] On the model of Daneš (1974), the thematic progression from [6:34d] to [6:34e] is type 1 (above), at least to the extent that the preceding Rheme is the child of wisdom and chance can be said to be taken up in the following Theme the wise men of 1688.  But, strictly speaking, the Rheme does not become the following Theme; the relation between the two is the lexical cohesion between wisdom and wise.

[6] Any "prediction" in what will be taken up as subsequent Theme can only be made with hindsight — by taking a synoptic perspective on the text.  This is inconsistent with — contrary to — Martin's claim (1992: 401) that interaction patterns — here: mode of development — will be interpreted as a process rather than as a synoptic system:

Grammatical metaphor, like interaction patterns, will be interpreted as a process here, rather than as a synoptic system…

[7] To be clear:

In prescriptive grammar, the topic sentence is the sentence in an expository paragraph which summarises the main idea of that paragraph. It is usually the first sentence in a paragraph. 

Also known as a focus sentence, it encapsulates or organises an entire paragraph. Although topic sentences may appear anywhere in a paragraph, in academic essays they often appear at the beginning. The topic sentence acts as a kind of summary, and offers the reader an insightful view of the writer’s main ideas for the following paragraph. More than just being a mere summary, however, a topic sentence often provides a claim or an insight directly or indirectly related to the thesis. It adds cohesion to a paper and helps organise ideas both within the paragraph and the whole body of work at large. As the topic sentence encapsulates the idea of the paragraph, serving as a sub-thesis, it remains general enough to cover the support given in the body paragraph while being more direct than the thesis of the paper.

[8] The paragraph is a unit of graphology.  It is a unit of the expression plane form, but restricted to written mode.  The paragraph is not a unit of spoken language; no-one speaks in paragraphs.  Here it is misapplied to semantics, the stratum of meaning on the content plane.

[9] This extension of the term 'hypertheme' is not justified by Martin's exposition.  Here is a summary of the 'argument':

First, two of the three types of thematic progression in Daneš (1974) are introduced.

Second, an example in text [6:34] that actually demonstrates type 1 (Rheme > Theme) is used to make the case for type 2 (Theme repetition): hyper-Theme > Theme.

Third, the clause featuring the New/Rheme ([6:34d]) is claimed to have the same function as a Topic Sentence.

Fourth, the (clause featuring the New/Rheme that is misconstrued as functioning as a) Topic Sentence is deemed to be the Theme of a graphological unit, the sentence, and termed a hyper-Theme.


In short, this convoluted argument merely disguises the fact that Martin has just rebranded Topic Sentence as hyper-Theme.

Misconstruing 'A Realises B' As 'A Makes B Come To Be'

Martin (1992: 378):

Clearly this chapter has meant a number of things that have never been meant before; it has been involved in constructing the field of lexical relations (point (ii) above) as much as realising immanent meanings that have been previously construed.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As the critiques of this chapter demonstrate, there are valid reasons why these things 'have never been meant before'.  This chapter is purported to model experiential semantics, but instead:

• confuses two lexicogrammatical dimensions: lexical cohesion (textual metafunction) and lexis (delicacy),
• confuses semantics with context (field),
• models experiential structure as logical and interpersonal relations between units that are defined according to a misapplication of expansion relations.

[2] In 'point (ii) above', A realises B is interpreted as A constitutes B, which is, in turn, glossed as A makes B come to be.  In such an interpretation, the intensive identifying process of A realises B:

A	realises	B
Token	Process: relational: intensive: symbol	Value

is misconstrued as the caused existential process A makes B come to be:

A	makes	B	come to be
Creator	Process	Existent	existential

In SFL theory, this gloss is closer in meaning to the process of instantiation, where potential is actualised ('made actual'). However, instantiation is not an interstratal relation.

[3] The notion of 'realising immanent meanings that have been previously construed' relates to the distinction, in logogenesis, between recycling already codified meanings and constructing new ones.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 24):

The production of discourse by an individual speaker or writer can be seen as a dialectic between these two semiotic activities: between (i) recycling elements, figures and sequences that that individual has used many times before, and so for him or her are already fully codified, and (ii) constructing new ones that are being codified for the first time (and some of which may remain codified for future use — especially with a child who is learning the system).