Post Titles For Chapter 3 — Identification: Reference As Semantic Choice

The titles of the posts that evaluate chapter 3 provide a glimpse of some of its theoretical shortcomings.

1. Misunderstanding Grammatical Intricacy
2. On Context "Independency"
3. Misunderstanding The Use Of Reference In A Child's Text
4. Confusing Semogenesis With Levels Of Symbolic Abstraction
5. Confusing Tracking With Identifying And Misrepresenting English Grammar
6. Confusing Nominal Group Deixis With Cohesive Reference
7. Confusing Nominal Group Deixis With Reference And A Self-Contradiction
8. Confusing Identifiability With Newsworthiness, Deixis And Reader Knowledge
9. Confusing Nominal Groups With Reference Items
10. Confusing Frege's Reference (Bedeutung) With Halliday's Reference
11. Rebranding Co-Reference As Reminding Phoricity
12. Rebranding Comparative Reference As 'Relevance Phoricity'
13. Misconstruing Ellipsis–&–Substitution As Reference And Rebranding It As "Redundancy Phoricity"
14. Rebranding Co-Reference, Comparative Reference And Substitution As Reminding, Relevance And Redundancy Phoricity
15. Misconstruing A Textual Relation (Reference) As A Logical Relation (Dependency)
16. Confusing Semantic Relations (Reference) With Grammatical Relations (Ellipsis–&–Substitution)
17. Misidentifying Both The Reference Item And The Referent
18. Misconstruing Logico-Semantic Cause As Comparative Reference
19. Misconstruing Phonology As Grammatical Ellipsis–&–Substitution Misunderstood As Semantic Reference
20. Misconstruing The Absence Of Reference As "Presenting" Reference
21. Confusing The Referent With The Reference System And Reference With Lexical Cohesion (Hyponymy)
22. Misidentifying Instances Of Reference In A Text
23. Self-Contradiction And Circular Reasoning
24. On Knowledge Of Language As Context
25. Using Pronouns Generically Without Presuming Generic Participants
26. On Adjectives In "Generic Groups" And "Relevance Phoricity"
27. Confusing Nominal Group Deixis With Reference
28. Confusing Reference With Ellipsis And Deixis
29. A Manifestly False Claim
30. Confusing Reference With Misunderstood Deixis
31. Misrepresenting A Misunderstanding Of Deixis As Reference
32. Confusing Experiential Content With Textual Reference
33. Using A Report Of Unseen Data To Support An Unlikely Claim
34. An Invalid Conclusion From An Unlikely Claim
35. Confusing Non-Specific Deixis With Demonstrative Reference
36. Non-Phoric Reference
37. Deploying A Logical Fallacy To Deceive The Reader
38. Confusing Deixis, Reference, New And Theme
39. Misconstruing Non-Specific Deixis As Reference
40. Confusing Deixis With Reference
41. Confusing Identifiability With Identity
42. Mistaking Experiential Identity For Textual Reference
43. Confusing Textual Reference With 'Transcendent' Reference
44. Mistaking Proper Nouns For Common Nouns
45. Misunderstanding The Function Of Personal Reference Items
46. Mistaking The Experiential Construal Of Participants For Textual Reference
47. Misconstruing Experiential Naming And Interpersonal Deixis As Textual Reference
48. Confusing Construing Participants With Reference
49. Misunderstanding And Rebranding Demonstrative And Comparative Reference
50. Mistaking Deixis For Reference
51. Mistaking Numeratives And Epithets For Reference Items
52. Mistaking Experiential Construal For Textual Reference
53. The Oxymoron Of "Undirected" Reference
54. Mistaking The Deictic Function Of Determiners For Their Referential Function
55. Mistaking An Ordinal Numeral For A Superlative Adjective
56. A Misunderstanding Of A Nominal Group And A Misleading Inference
57. Confusing Nominal Group Structure With Non-Structural Reference
58. Deliberately Omitting Falsifying Evidence
59. Rebranding A Misunderstanding Of A Grammatical Opposition As Discourse Semantic
60. Mistaking Experiential For Textual, Grammar For Semantics, And Nominal Groups For Reference Items
61. Presenting Halliday & Hasan's Ideas As Martin's Ideas [1]
62. Presenting Halliday & Hasan's Ideas As Martin's Ideas [2]
63. Presenting Halliday & Hasan's Ideas As Martin's Ideas [3]
64. Misconstruing Nominal Group Modality As Comparative Reference
65. Misconstruing Comparative Reference
66. Some Of The Problems With Martin's Comparison Systems
67. Misconstruing Homophoric Reference As Not Phoric
68. Strategically Confusing Delicacy And Realisation
69. Fig. 3.9 The System Of Identification
70. Strategically Misrepresenting Halliday & Hasan (1976: 145)
71. Confusing Ideational Denotation With Textual Reference
72. Confusing Material Setting And Context Of Situation
73. Misunderstanding Homophoric Reference And Context Of Culture
74. Misconstruing Context As Language And Material Setting Instead Of Culture
75. Reasoning 'From Below' Instead Of 'From Above' And A Self-Contradiction
76. Misunderstanding Homophoric Reference As Its Opposite
77. The Inconsistencies Created By Rebranding Structural Cataphora As Esphora
78. Misunderstanding The Interpersonal Function Of Embedding
79. Confusing Immanent Textual Reference With Transcendent Ideational Denotation
80. Confusing Grammatical Reference And Lexical Cohesion
81. Mistaking Ideational Denotation For Textual Reference
82. Reference Without Referents
83. Confusing Ideational Denotation With Textual Reference
84. Confusing Instantiation With The Syntagmatic Axis
85. Text [3.1] — A Reference Analysis
86. Text [3:1] — Problems With Martin's 'Semantics Of Reference' Analysis [1]
87. Text [3:1] — Problems With Martin's 'Semantics Of Reference' Analysis [2]
88. Text [3:1] — Problems With Martin's 'Semantics Of Reference' Analysis [3]
89. Text [3:1] — Problems With Martin's 'Semantics Of Reference' Analysis [4]
90. Text [3:1] — Problems With Martin's 'Semantics Of Reference' Analysis [5]
91. Text [3:1] — Problems With Martin's 'Semantics Of Reference' Analysis [6]
92. Text [3:1] — Problems With Martin's 'Semantics Of Reference' Analysis [7]
93. Text [3:1] — Problems With Martin's 'Semantics Of Reference' Analysis [8]
94. Text [3:1] — Problems With Martin's 'Semantics Of Reference' Analysis [9]
95. Using Writing Pedagogy To Imply Theory Validation
96. Foreshadowing A Misconstrual Of Stratal Relations
97. Participant–Nominal Group "Incongruence"
98. On 'Structural It' Not Realising A Participant
99. On Nominal Groups In Idioms Not Realising A Participant
100. On Indefinite Nominal Groups Under The Scope Of Negation Not Realising A Participant
101. On Nominal Groups Realising Attributes But Not Realising Participants
102. On Nominal Groups Realising Range (Process) But Not Realising Participants
103. On Nominal Groups Realising Range (Entity) But Not Realising Participants
104. On Nominal Groups In Location Circumstances Not Realising Participants
105. On Nominal Groups In Extent Circumstances Not Realising Participants
106. On Nominal Groups In Role Circumstances Not Realising Participants
107. On "The Problem Of Realising More Than One Participant In A Nominal Group"
108. On Possessive "Pronouns" In Deictic Position
109. On "Whether Possessive Deictics Are The Deixis Of The Participant They Possess"
110. Misconstruing Embedded Things (And An Epithet) As Participants
111. Misconstruing Nominal Group Heads As Participants
112. Confusing Textual Reference With Interpersonal Deixis
113. Strategically Misapplying The Term 'Incongruence'
114. Misunderstanding Grammaticalisation
115. Misinterpreting Substitution-&-Ellipsis As Reference
116. Relating Phoricity Types To Nominal Group Structure
117. Giving Priority To Structure And Form Instead Of System And Function
118. Martin's Argument For Stratifying Identification And Nominal Group Options
119. Confusing Identity With Identifiability
120. Confusing Participant Identity With The Systemic Means Of Referring To Referents
121. Confusing Semogenesis With Stratification
122. A Reference Chain Of Non-Participant And Participant
123. Another Reference Chain Of Non-Participant And Participant
124. Oversimplifying Nominalisation
125. Two Bare Assertions Based On A Logical Confusion
126. "Villified"
127. Misunderstanding Nominalisation And Reference
128. Confusing Ideational Construal With Textual Reference
129. Confusing Metafunctions And Confusing Types Of Cohesion
130. The Notion Of "Grammatical Metaphor Functioning As A Kind Of Discourse Process"
131. Metafunctional Inconsistency
132. Two Theoretical Problems With Reference Chains
133. Mistaking Nominal Groups For Reference Items
134. A Fatal Theoretical Flaw And Misrepresenting Du Bois (1980)
135. Identifying 'The Cat' With 'Her Dinner'
136. Participant Chains Of Non-Participants
137. Reminding Phoricity, Relevance Phoricity And Bridging Clarified
138. Redundancy Phoricity: A System With No Structural Realisation
139. A Misleading Analysis Of "Instantial Reference"
140. Misrepresenting Halliday & Hasan On Reference
141. The Re-Initiation Of Generic Reference Chains
142. The Analysis Of Text [3:88]: An Attempt To Hide A Theoretical Inconsistency
143. Eight Problems With Martin's Six Notes To His Analysis Of Text [3:88]
144. Eight Problems With Martin's Nine Notes To His Analysis Of Text [3:89]
145. Confusing Circumstances Of Location With Reference Items
146. Mistaking Manner For Extent And Confusing Circumstances With Comparative Reference Items
147. Metafunctional Inconsistencies
148. Some Of The Theoretical Problems With Participant As The Entry Condition To The System Of Identification
149. Misconstruing 'Multivariate' & Metafunctional Inconsistencies
150. Martin's Insight That Interruptions Depend On There Being Something To Interrupt
151. The Commonality Of Reference Structures And Negotiation Structures
152. The Major Limitation On The Account Of Participant Identification

The Major Limitation On The Account Of Participant Identification

Martin (1992: 156-7):

Finally, the major limitation on the account of participant identification in this chapter needs to be acknowledged — that is, it's lack of attention to the process of identifying participants. This is reflected in the concentration on textual relations at the expense of their interaction with experiential ones and the lack of a procedural orientation to determining what would be appropriate to identifying a participant at a particular place in the unfolding of a text and how exactly interlocutors might go about retrieving presumed information. The account thus falls far short of the specificity required for computer implementation and text generation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the major limitation of this chapter is that it is not what it claims to be: reference as semantic choice.  This is because it is founded on several serious theoretical misunderstandings.  For example, Martin confuses:

• textual reference (identifiability) with ideational denotation (participant identification) — for the most part in the sense of Frege's reference to meanings transcendent of language (bedeutung);
• textual reference (cohesive) with interpersonal deixis of the nominal group (structural);
• reference items with nominal groups;
• reference with lexical cohesion;
• reference with ellipsis–&–substitution.

[2] Here Martin diverts the reader from personally identifying the actual problems with his theorising, and identifies the model's major limitation as issues of no importance — computer implementation and text generation — to his intended readership.

[3] This misunderstands SFL theory.  The process of identifying participants (or indeed the process of referring to referents) is the process of instantiation: the selection of features in networks and the activation of realisation statements.

[4] This is misleading.  Martin's model is a confusion of textual relations (reference) and experiential relations (lexical cohesion) and denotation (participant identification).

[5] The notion of "interaction" between textual and experiential relations betrays Martin's misunderstanding (1992: 390) of metafunctions as modules, instead of dimensions.

[6] On the one hand, the function of the grammatical metaphor and lexical density of this single nominal group — 11 lexical items — is to reduce its intelligibility to learners and outsiders (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 272).  On the other hand, it is untrue, since Martin has demonstrated his procedure for identifying participants in text, in his own terms, throughout the chapter.

[7] This misunderstands reference.  Reference presents items as identifiable; it does not inform the listener how to recover the identity.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 623):

The textual status at issue in the system of reference is that of identifiability: does the speaker judge that a given element can be recovered or identified by the listener at the relevant point in the discourse or not? If it is presented as identifiable, then the listener will have to recover the identity from somewhere else.

The Commonality Of Reference Structures And Negotiation Structures

Martin (1992: 156):

Reference structures make use of semantic dependency structures of this kind.  Phoric items depend on the co-text they presume, but are not themselves predicted by it.  Given a nominal group realising a participant in a text, there is no way of knowing whether or not it will be presumed, aside from the occasional selection of presenting reference marking certain participants as central to a discourse (signalled through this, these, a certain and certain).  The dependency relation between presuming and presumed is thus very like that between a tracking or challenging move and the move on which it depends.

Old Blogger Comments:

[1] The use of dependency (logical metafunction) for reference (textual metafunction) creates a theoretical inconsistency.  It misconstrues textual meaning as ideational meaning.

[2] The dependency relations do not form structures; they merely obtain between units.

[3] Martin's insight here is that a reference item depends on there being a referent to refer to.  To be clear, this is distinct from the SFL notion of dependency, and from the functional relation between the reference item and its referent.

[4] Martin's insight here is that there is no way of predicting which elements in a text will subsequently be referred to.

[5] As explained in previous posts, "presenting reference" does not involve reference. It is the first appearance of a potential referent. See Misconstruing The Absence Of Reference As "Presenting" Reference.

[6] For the confusions on which this false claim is based, see Confusing Experiential Content With Textual Reference.

[7] To be clear, Martin's argument is: A is very much like B, where

• A = a reference item depends on there being a referent to refer to, and
• B = an interruption (tracking or challenging move) depends on there being a move to interrupt.

Martin's Insight That Interruptions Depend On There Being Something To Interrupt

Martin (1992: 156):

In addition, dependency structures were introduced to account for tracking and challenging moves which are not strongly predicted by initiations; indeed, interlocutors may formulate interacts so as to avoid them.  So while the tracking move in [3:101] depends on the interact it tracks, it is not expected by it.

[3:101]

K1  Ben won.
cf   — Who?
rcf  — Ben Johnson
K1f — Wow! 

Old Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, the use of dependency (logical metafunction) for NEGOTIATION (interpersonal metafunction) creates a theoretical inconsistency. It misconstrues interpersonal meaning as ideational meaning.

[2] As previously explained, such dependency relations do not form structures; they merely obtain between units.

[3] To be clear, tracking and challenging moves are classified as interruptions to adjacency pairs (Martin 1992: 67).  Thus, Martin's claims here are simply that:

• initiating moves don't "strongly predict" or "expect" interruptions, and 
• interruptions "depend" on there being something to interrupt.

Misconstruing 'Multivariate' & Metafunctional Inconsistencies

Martin (1992: 156):

NEGOTIATION was approached from both a multivariate and covariate perspective in Chapter 2.  The notion of constituency between exchange and move was developed to account synoptically for sequences of up to five moves.  These moves are mutually predicting as set out in their constituency structures.  In [3:100] the initiation expects a response and the response presumes its initiation:

[3:100]

K2 Who won?
K1 — Ben did.

Blogger Comment:

[1] This confuses multivariate structures (of a rank) with constituency (rank hierarchy).  The constituency relation between exchange and move is the relation between levels in a rankscale.  A multivariate structure, on the other hand, is 'a configuration of elements each having a distinct function with respect to the whole' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 331).

Further, as Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 384) point out:

… the relationships among the elements in a multivariate structure can be characterised as segmental from an experiential point of view but as prosodic from an interpersonal point of view and as cumulative from a textual one.

That is, on the SFL model, the relation between elements in the multivariate structure realising interpersonal systems, like NEGOTIATION, are prosodic.  Since this is a proposition Martin elsewhere (1992: 549) supports, Martin is here inconsistent with his own model.

[2] To be clear, the notion of 'covariate structure' derives from Lemke (1985).  In Lemke (1988: 159) he acknowledged that 'covariate' is not a type of structure:

My own 'covariate structure' (Lemke 1985), which includes Halliday's univariate type, is for the case of homogeneous relations of co-classed units, and should perhaps be called a 'structuring principle' rather than a kind of structure.

[3] To be clear, these are merely statements about two alternative features in a closed system.

Misconstruing 'Multivariate' & Metafunctional Inconsistencies

Martin (1992: 156):

NEGOTIATION was approached from both a multivariate and covariate perspective in Chapter 2.  The notion of constituency between exchange and move was developed to account synoptically for sequences of up to five moves.  These moves are mutually predicting as set out in their constituency structures. … In addition, dependency structures were introduced to account for tracking and challenging moves which are not strongly predicted by initiations; indeed, interlocutors may formulate interacts so as to avoid them. … Reference structures make use of semantic dependency structures of this kind. 

Blogger Comment:

[1] This confuses multivariate structures (of a rank) with constituency (rank hierarchy).  The constituency relation between exchange and move is the relation between levels in a rankscale.  A multivariate structure, on the other hand, is 'a configuration of elements each having a distinct function with respect to the whole' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 331).  Further, as Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 384) point out:

… the relationships among the elements in a multivariate structure can be characterised as segmental from an experiential point of view but as prosodic from an interpersonal point of view and as cumulative from a textual one.

[2] The use of dependency (logical metafunction) for NEGOTIATION (interpersonal metafunction) creates a theoretical inconsistency.  It misconstrues interpersonal meaning as ideational meaning.

[3] The use of dependency (logical metafunction) for reference (textual metafunction) creates a theoretical inconsistency.  It misconstrues textual meaning as ideational meaning.

[4] The dependency relations do not form structures; they merely obtain between units.

Some Of The Theoretical Problems With Participant As The Entry Condition To The System Of Identification

Martin (1992: 155-6):

IDENTIFICATION has the semantic entity participant as its entry condition; its unmarked realisation is a nominal group and the people, places and things this encodes all have the potential to participate as Agent or Medium in clause structure at some point or other in a text.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Participant as the entry condition to the IDENTIFICATION system creates a host of serious theoretical inconsistencies.  For example, 

• metafunction: participant is an experiential function, whereas IDENTIFICATION is a textual system;
• delicacy: the features of the system do not elaborate the entry condition, participant, but  (purported) relations between participants; (cf. the entry condition 'clause' for the systems that elaborate the clause);
• function: participant is the entry condition for circumstantial features (manner/extent).

[2] To be clear, Martin's entire argument to justify IDENTIFICATION as discourse semantic, rather than lexicogrammatical, rests solely on "stratifying with respect to nominal group structure".

[3] To be clear, places are circumstantial meanings, not participants.

[4] To be clear, this does not define any semantic unit, let alone participant, since, through grammatical metaphor, all meaning has "the potential to be construed as an Agent or Medium in clause structure at some point or other in a text."

Metafunctional Inconsistencies

Martin (1992: 155):

NEGOTIATION is an interpersonal system; it focusses on the discourse semantics of MOOD.  IDENTIFICATION on the other hand is a textual system; it focusses on the discourse semantics of nominal DEIXIS.

Blogger Comment:

In terms of metafunction, nominal group DEIXIS, in the system network of DETERMINATION, is an interpersonal system.  Deixis is concerned with relations to the here–&–now of the speaker and listener.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 180):

… the structures of both types of group constitute a kind of path between the interpersonal reference point, reflected in the Deictic or Finite, and the experiential one, reflected in the Thing or Event.

REFERENCE, on the other hand, like all cohesive resources, is a system of the textual metafunction.  As a means of referring, it is concerned with the textual status of identifiability.

In contrast, the discourse semantic system of IDENTIFICATION is concerned with referents of the same identity in the unfolding of a text; 'reference chains' would be more accurately termed referent chains.  The relations between the referents in chains is construed in terms of dependency, a resource of the logical metafunction.

Mistaking Manner For Extent And Confusing Circumstances With Comparative Reference Items

Martin (1992: 154):

Comparative adverbs realise relevance phoricity; they function as Circumstances [sic] of Extent and Manner in clause structure and presume events.  Both relevant events and supersets of events are presumed.  The network of oppositions is outlined in Fig. 3.16; typical realisations are shown in the network and illustrated in [3:94] through [3:99].

Extent [quantity:difference]
[3:94]

Ben ran five miles;
Carl ran farther.

Manner [quality:semblance]
[3:95]

Ben ran very fast;
Carl didn't run as fast.

Extent [quantity:difference:superset]
[3:96]

The runners ran long distances;
Carl ran farthest.

Manner [quality:difference:superset]
[3:97]

The sprinters ran fast heats;
Ben didn't run fastest.

Extent [quantity:purposive]
[3:98]

You had to set a record to place;
Ben ran fast enough.

Manner [quality:purposive]
[3:99]

You had to run a record time to win;
Carl ran too slow.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'relevance phoricity' is Martin's rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) comparative reference, misunderstood and relocated from non-structural lexicogrammar (cohesion) to structural discourse semantics.

[2] This mistakes circumstances of Extent and Manner (clause rank experiential functions) for comparative reference items (a non-structural textual functions).  Moreover, it will be seen below that none of the examples provided are instances of Extent.

To be clear, the grammatical domains of comparative adverbs that function as reference items are the nominal group and the adverbial group.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 633):

[3] The notion of "presuming events" — Martin is not referring here to the verbal group function 'Event' — demonstrates that Martin has little understanding of the principles underlying comparative reference.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: ) explain:

Whereas personals and demonstratives, when used anaphorically, set up a relation of co-reference, whereby the same entity is referred to over again, comparatives set up a relation of contrast. In comparative reference, the reference item still signals ‘you know which’; not because the same entity is being referred to over again but rather because there is a frame of reference – something by reference to which what I am now talking about is the same or different, like or unlike, equal or unequal, more or less.

[4] In addition to being devised on the basis of the above-mentioned theoretical misunderstandings, a number of further problems with the network in Figure 3.16 Phoric circumstances of extent and manner can be identified.

• The system has no entry condition; the entry condition for IDENTIFICATION is 'participant', so including the entry condition would have exposed the theoretical inconsistency of having types of circumstance ('manner/extent') as a more delicate feature.
• None of the features in the network have been argued for in the text, let alone validated on the basis of evidence.  On the contrary, they have merely been attached to the six examples as labels.
• The more delicate features are distinctions in experiential meaning (quantity, quality, purposive), and the undefined term 'superset' derives from misconstruing ordinatives (last) and superlatives (fastest, farthest) as serving a comparative function.

[5] To be clear, these realisations are neither structural realisations (the dimension of axis) nor lexicogrammatical realisations (the dimension of stratification); they are merely examples of items that are said to serve the particular feature.

[6] To be clear, none of these is an instance of Extent.  The experiential function of farther, farthest and fast enough is Manner.

[7] To be clear, superlatives (farthest, fastest) do not function as comparative reference items.

[8] Here Martin misinterprets clause complexes as single clauses, and claims that the respective circumstances (fast enough, too slow) "presume" the respective purpose clauses (to place, to win).  However, in terms of cohesion, these are both instances of ellipsis, as restoring the elided items makes plain:

||| You had to set a record || to place. |||
|| Ben ran fast enough [[to place]]. || 

||| You had to run a record time || to win. |||
|| Carl ran too slow [[to win]]. ||

In terms of Martin's own model, these are instances of redundancy phoricity, not relevance phoricity — redundancy phoricity being Martin's rebranding of ellipsis-&-substitution, misunderstood as a type of reference, and relocated from non-structural lexicogrammar to structural discourse semantics.

Confusing Circumstances Of Location With Demonstrative Reference Items

Martin (1992: 153-4):

3.6 Location And Manner

Because the point of departure for this chapter has been participant identification, closely related IDENTIFICATION systems realised through demonstrative and comparative adverbs have not yet been considered.  The demonstrative adverbs function as Circumstances [sic] of Location in clause structure (e.g. Come here.) or as Qualifiers in nominal groups (e.g. that guy there); they are realised by here, there, now and then.  Each involves reminding phoricity, presuming location in space or time.  They function both exophorically and endophorically; and where endophoric here and there may presume text (see Halliday and Hasan 1976: 74-75).  The paradigm of oppositions is a simple one, exemplified in [3:90] through [3:93] below.

	PROXIMATE	DISTANT
TIME	here	there
SPACE	now	then

[3:90]

I'm at work;
bring it here.

[3:91]

He's a bit off.
— You're right there.

[3:92]

It's past noon;
do it now.

[3:93]

I got a computer in 88;
writing was harder before then.

Blogger Comments:

[1] On the one hand, Location and Manner are experiential functions, not textual functions.  On the other hand, Martin's network for this discussion, Fig. 3.16, is instead concerned with Extent and Manner, and does not account for Location.

[2] As previously demonstrated, throughout this chapter on 'reference as semantic choice', Martin misinterprets textual reference as ideational denotation — where the ideational denotation, also contrary to SFL theory, is of meanings transcendent of language.

[3] To be clear, Martin's unit of IDENTIFICATION, the entry condition to his system of IDENTIFICATION is 'participant'.  The switch to circumstances here thus creates a fundamental inconsistency in the model that is not addressed.  Martin's network for this discussion, Fig. 3.16, lacks an entry condition to disguise this anomaly.

[4] To be clear, given that the 'point of departure for this chapter has been participant identification', the reason for excluding nominal groups like that guy there from that discussion does not ring true. 

[5] Contrary to Martin's claim, the temporal demonstratives do not refer.  Halliday (1985: 294):

The temporal demonstratives now and then also function as cohesive items, but conjunctively rather than referentially.

[6] To be clear, 'reminding phoricity' is Martin's rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) co-reference, demonstrative and personal.

[7] This confuses experiential location with textual location.  As reference items, here and there only refer endophorically, anaphorically or cataphorically.  Examples provided by Halliday (1985: 294) include:

So here's a question for you.  How old did you say you were?

… she said: "but it wouldn't be all the better his being punished".  "You're wrong there, at any rate," said the Queen.

[8] Martin's paradigm is actually just part of the larger set of systematic distinctions devised by Halliday (1985: 295), reproduced in Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 629) as:

 

[9] Trivially, these terms are in reverse order.

[10] To be clear, this is not a referential use of here.  See [7] above.

[11] As mentioned above in [5], temporal demonstratives do not refer, but can function in another cohesive system, conjunction.  In Martin's second example, [3:93], this is the function of the conjunctive Adjunct before then.  In Martin's first example, [3:92], however, now simply serves as a circumstantial Adjunct.

Eight Problems With Martin's Nine Notes To His Analysis Of Text [3:89]

Martin (1992: 151):

Information presumed through text reference and extended reference is not shown in the diagram, but is taken up in the following notes; information indirectly presumed by another time, last time and lighter (in [3:89:xxii]) is similarly treated. …

1.  Both of the potential participants (the sacks and the sugar) in this Pre-Numerative structure are presumed in [3:89].
2.  that presumes the projection that the sacks were much lighter than they were before as a fact (text reference).
3.  that again presumes the same projection as a fact (text reference).
4.  Another time is another setting in time marker, presuming the previous episode via bridging.
5.  Last time — again, setting in time, bridging from the previous episode.
6.  lighter — than they were in xviii; involving bridging as the relevant information about the sacks' weight was implicit there.
7.  it presumes he went in the stream as an act (extended reference).
8.  that presumes the projection that the sacks got ver heavy as a fact (text reference).
9.  that presumes an indefinite amount of information here as a fact — minimally clauses xxxii through xxv, but probably the whole story, especially if xxxii and xxxviii are taken as Coda as far as narrative structure is concerned (see Chapter 7 below).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This might be taken to suggest that this diagrammatic technique is an inadequate means of representing reference chains.

[2] To be clear, these "potential participants" are the Head (sacks) and Thing (sugar) of the nominal group realising the actual participant (Goal) some sacks of sugar.

[3] To be clear, only sacks serves in the (extended) Numerative structure; sugar serves as Thing.

[4] To be clear, Martin's distinction between participant reference and text reference clearly demonstrates that participant reference means Frege's reference: the ideational denotation of meanings outside the text.

[5] To be clear, the reference here is comparative, and made by the reference item another.  Martin's rebranding of comparative reference is 'relevance phoricity', which is overlooked here.

[6] As previously explained, Martin's "bridging" is a confusion of grammatical reference and lexical cohesion.

[7] To be clear, the nominal group last time, which serves as a circumstance, not participant, contains no reference items.

[8] To be clear, here lighter is an instance of lexical cohesion, repeating an item in [xiv] that makes structural cataphoric comparative reference: lighter than they were before.