Miscategorising Text Types

Martin (1992: 518):

Similarly reconstruction may be either an account of what someone was told to do or what they did, and generalising texts may be either macro-proposals (e.g. assembly manuals) or macro-propositions (e.g accounts of how a product works).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This purports to cross-classify texts according to (Martin's) mode and mood: imperative vs indicative.  However, an account of what someone was told to do — just like an account of what someone did — is "indicative" in these terms, not "imperative"; the "imperative" lies in the 'telling what to do', not in the accounting of it.

[2] This is inconsistent with the meaning of the word 'generalise': to make a general or broad statement by inferring from specific cases.  That is, generalisations are propositions, not proposals, and, moreover, neither 'assembly manuals' nor 'accounts of how a product works' constitute text types that can be accurately termed "generalising".

The practice of insisting that a word means whatever one wishes is termed Humpty Dumptyism.

∞

The fundamental confusion here is that the discussion is presented as theorising mode, the systems of the textual metafunction at the level of context.  Here, instead, the discussion is concerned with the interpersonal dimension of linguistic content — semantics (speech function) and lexicogrammar (mood) — of registers.  The confusion is thus simultaneously along three theoretical dimensions: stratification, metafunction and instantiation.

Miscategorising Texts By Mode

Martin (1992: 518):

It is important not to confuse the semiotic space under construction here with either of two independent dimensions; the interpersonal distinction between proposals and propositions, and the experiential distinction between activities and things.  Pursuing the MOOD opposition first, monitoring texts for example can be 'imperative', telling someone what to do (e.g. ærobics class), or indicative, telling someone (e.g. a small child) what is going on (or is about to).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, "the interpersonal distinction between proposals and propositions" is one of speech function (semantics), not mood (lexicogrammar).  The difference between the systems is stratal.

[2] A text that tells someone what to do is not a monitoring text.  Synonyms of 'monitor' include: 

observe, watch, keep an eye on, keep track of, track, keep under observation, keep watch on, keep under surveillance, surveil, check, keep a check on, scan, examine, study, record, note, oversee, supervise, superintend

[3] In an ærobics class, the language that 'tells people what to do' is instructing, not monitoring.  Further, the rôle of language (Hasan 1985/9) in such a situation type is ancillary, not monitoring.  (Martin distinguishes monitoring from ancillary.)

[4] Telling someone what is about to happen is predicting, not monitoring.

The practice of insisting that a word means whatever one wishes is termed Humpty Dumptyism.

∞

The fundamental confusion here is that the discussion is presented as theorising mode, the systems of the textual metafunction at the level of context.  Here, instead, the discussion is concerned with the interpersonal dimension of linguistic content — semantics (speech function) and lexicogrammar (mood) — of registers.  The confusion is thus simultaneously along three theoretical dimensions: stratification, metafunction and instantiation.

A Summary Of Discourse Systems Inconsistencies

Martin (1992: 372-3):

This chapter concludes the presentation of the four major discourse systems developed in this book.  Lexical relations represent the discourse semantics of experiential meaning.  The association of discourse systems with metafunctions and their unmarked realisations in lexicogrammar can now be summarised as in Table 5.26.

Table 5.26. Unmarked realisations for discourse semantics systems in lexicogrammar
(discourse system)	metafunction	lexicogrammaticalisation
ideation	experiential	transitivity; group rank experiential grammar; lexis as delicate grammar; collocation
conjunction	logical	clause complex: logico-semantics & interdependency
identification	textual	nominal group: deixis
negotiation	interpersonal	clause: mood

Blogger Comments:

[1] The discourse semantics model of experiential meaning is a "development" of the lexicogrammatical system of lexical cohesion, a system of the textual metafunction, mixed up with the notion of lexis as most delicate grammar.  It involves units, message parts, that are related logically and/or interpersonally.

[2] This continues the confusion between markedness and congruence.  The realisation of semantics in lexicogrammar is either congruent or incongruent (metaphorical).  A pattern is either unmarked (typical), as when Theme conflates with Subject in a declarative clause, or marked, as when Theme conflates with a functional element other than Subject in a declarative clause.

[3] If the discourse system of ideation were an experiential system at the level of semantics, it would be realised by an experiential system at the level of lexicogrammar — and a theoretical requirement would be the inclusion of realisation statements that specify the relations between the two stratal systems.  Here, the lexicogrammatical realisations are said to include lexis as most delicate grammar and (only) one type of lexical cohesion, collocation, a non-structural system of the textual metafunction.  The model is claimed to be a development of lexical cohesion, but this is omitted from the list of lexicogrammatical realisations.

[4] The discourse system of conjunction is claimed to be a logical system at the level of semantics, and to be realised in the lexicogrammar by the logico-semantic and interdependency relations of the clause complex.  However, it makes no distinction between logical deployments of expansion (creating complexes) and textual deployments of expansion (cohesively marking transitions between messages).  Moreover, the logical relation of projection is omitted altogether from the semantic model — because, in fact, the model takes the textual deployment of expansion (cohesive conjunction) as its point of departure for logical semantics.  The discourse semantics system also omits the logical relation of elaboration in cases where the interdependency relation is hypotaxis.  For the rich panoply of miscategorisations of logical relations, see most of the critiques of Chapter 4.

[5] The discourse system of identification is claimed to be a textual system at the level of semantics.  If this were so, its realisations would involve the textual systems at the level of lexicogrammar, such as those of theme, information and cohesion.  Even if the textual metafunction is reduced for discourse semantics to merely 'reference as semantic choice', the realisation of the system of identification in lexicogrammar would be the cohesive system of reference.  As demonstrated in previous posts, by treating cohesive relations as structures, the discourse system of identification confuses the system of referring with the items thus referred to.

[6] In SFL theory, the semantic system realised by the lexicogrammatical system of mood is termed speech function.

Misconstruing Extension As Elaboration

Martin (1992: 333):

Note that elaborations are included as single message parts (as with the centre of = the ring).

Blogger Comment:

The relation here is extension, not elaboration, because the centre is part of the ring and composition is one major category of extension that resonates across the entire linguistic system.  The reason why this type of error matters is that, on the discourse semantic model, instances involving extension are regarded as two message parts, not one, and such miscategorisations can have significant consequences on the outcome of text analysis.

Reducing All Verbal Group Complex Relations To Extension

Martin (1992: 315-6):

With verbal groups, extension combines events.  Halliday (1985: 255-69) categorises a wide variety of verbal group complexes with respect to both expansion and projection.  He reserves the category of extension for conation… 

For purposes of lexical cohesion analysis however, all verbal group complexes will be treated as involving extension here, in order to bring out proportionalities of the following kind:

 ELABORATION : EXTENSION : ENHANCEMENT ::

(phrasal verb : verbal group complex : event x quality ::)

look into : keep looking : look carefully ::

run into : attempt to run : run quickly ::

see through : happen to see : see clearly ::

go over : promise to go : go reluctantly

etc.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Extension — in common with projection, elaboration and enhancement — relates verbal groups logically in a verbal group complex.

[2] The logical grammatical structure of verbal group complexes is not a factor in analysing cohesive (textual nonstructural) relations between lexical items.

[3] To treat all verbal group complexes as involving extension — for whatever reason — is to miscategorise the instances that do not involve extension, and to misrepresent the category 'extension'.  Three of the four examples do not involve extension, and one does not even involve expansion:

• keep looking is elaboration: phase: time: durative
• happen to see is enhancement: modulation: cause: reason
• promise to go is projection: proposal: locution

[4] Any proportionalities that depend on a falsehood are themselves false.  Moreover, no argument is provided for the value of cross-categorising types of expansion with phrasal verbs, verbal group complexes, and clause fragments.

[5] As related by enhancement, these examples are each Process and Manner circumstance within a clause realising a figure.


General Observations:

• The concern here is purported to be discourse semantics, but the focus is merely on (rebranding) the grammar.

• The concern here is purported to be the experiential metafunction, but the focus is on (rebranding) logical relations.

Misconstruing The Absence Of Reference As "Presenting" Reference

Martin (1992: 102):

As far as participant identification is concerned the central oppositions have to do with reminding and relevance phoricity. With nominal groups, redundancy phoricity has to do with recovering experiential meaning, not participant identity, and so can be set aside here. The core reference paradigm is thus:

	[presenting]	[presuming]
[comparison]	a smaller frog	the smaller frog
[–]	a frog	the frog

Formulated systemically as in Fig. 3.2 this gives the simultaneous systems [presenting/presuming] and [comparison/–]. Presenting reference signals that the identity of the participant in question cannot be recovered from the context; presuming reference signals that it can. Presenting reference is thus strongly associated with first mention and presuming reference categorically associated with second mention. The [comparison/–] system makes reference to the identity of related participants optional.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, "reminding and relevance phoricity" are Martin's rebrandings of Halliday's co-reference and comparative reference, respectively.

[2] To be clear, "redundancy phoricity" is Martin's rebranding of Halliday's ellipsis–&–substitution, misunderstood as a subtype of reference.

[3] To be clear, (the recovery of) the identity of participants is (the recovery of) experiential meaning.  Given this confusion, and his dependence on Du Bois (1980), Martin may be locating 'the identity of participants' outside language; that is, treating meaning as transcendent of semiotic systems, contra the epistemological foundation on which SFL is based.

[4] Having mistaken ellipsis–&–substitution for a type of reference, Martin now excludes it from his model of 'reference as semantic choice' — on mistaken criteria.

[5] This again confuses the referent — in this case, a potential reference point — with the reference item.  Halliday (1994: 309):

A participant or circumstantial element introduced at place in the text can be taken as a reference point for something that follows.

To be clear, in SFL theory, "presenting reference" is not reference, by definition, if it there is no marking of an identity as recoverable elsewhere.

[6] To be clear, "presuming reference", whether [comparison] (comparative reference) or [–] (personal or demonstrative co-reference) can also be cataphoric, and so, contrary to Martin's bare assertion, also "associated with first mention".

[7] To be clear, given that "presenting reference" is not reference, the [comparison/–] system is another rebranding of Halliday's distinction between comparative reference and co-reference (personal and demonstrative).

[8] To be clear, of the four examples, only the frog appears in the text ([3:88]) on which 'most of the examples are based' (p99).  If a smaller frog and the smaller frog are interpreted as including cohesive reference items, then, in terms of SFL theory, the former makes comparative anaphoric reference (smaller), and the latter makes both demonstrative anaphoric co-reference (the) and comparative anaphoric reference (smaller).

Importantly, because Martin mistakes the nominal group in which a reference item appears for the reference item itself, he only attributes one (cross-classified) referential function to each nominal group.  As a consequence, the two reference markers in the smaller frog — the and smaller — are conflated into one function, and the one (genuine) reference marker in a smaller frog — smaller — is miscategorised, in terms of Martin's own definition, as "presenting" ('not recoverable from context') rather than "presuming".