A Summary Of Discourse Systems Inconsistencies

Martin (1992: 372-3):

This chapter concludes the presentation of the four major discourse systems developed in this book.  Lexical relations represent the discourse semantics of experiential meaning.  The association of discourse systems with metafunctions and their unmarked realisations in lexicogrammar can now be summarised as in Table 5.26.

Table 5.26. Unmarked realisations for discourse semantics systems in lexicogrammar
(discourse system)	metafunction	lexicogrammaticalisation
ideation	experiential	transitivity; group rank experiential grammar; lexis as delicate grammar; collocation
conjunction	logical	clause complex: logico-semantics & interdependency
identification	textual	nominal group: deixis
negotiation	interpersonal	clause: mood

Blogger Comments:

[1] The discourse semantics model of experiential meaning is a "development" of the lexicogrammatical system of lexical cohesion, a system of the textual metafunction, mixed up with the notion of lexis as most delicate grammar.  It involves units, message parts, that are related logically and/or interpersonally.

[2] This continues the confusion between markedness and congruence.  The realisation of semantics in lexicogrammar is either congruent or incongruent (metaphorical).  A pattern is either unmarked (typical), as when Theme conflates with Subject in a declarative clause, or marked, as when Theme conflates with a functional element other than Subject in a declarative clause.

[3] If the discourse system of ideation were an experiential system at the level of semantics, it would be realised by an experiential system at the level of lexicogrammar — and a theoretical requirement would be the inclusion of realisation statements that specify the relations between the two stratal systems.  Here, the lexicogrammatical realisations are said to include lexis as most delicate grammar and (only) one type of lexical cohesion, collocation, a non-structural system of the textual metafunction.  The model is claimed to be a development of lexical cohesion, but this is omitted from the list of lexicogrammatical realisations.

[4] The discourse system of conjunction is claimed to be a logical system at the level of semantics, and to be realised in the lexicogrammar by the logico-semantic and interdependency relations of the clause complex.  However, it makes no distinction between logical deployments of expansion (creating complexes) and textual deployments of expansion (cohesively marking transitions between messages).  Moreover, the logical relation of projection is omitted altogether from the semantic model — because, in fact, the model takes the textual deployment of expansion (cohesive conjunction) as its point of departure for logical semantics.  The discourse semantics system also omits the logical relation of elaboration in cases where the interdependency relation is hypotaxis.  For the rich panoply of miscategorisations of logical relations, see most of the critiques of Chapter 4.

[5] The discourse system of identification is claimed to be a textual system at the level of semantics.  If this were so, its realisations would involve the textual systems at the level of lexicogrammar, such as those of theme, information and cohesion.  Even if the textual metafunction is reduced for discourse semantics to merely 'reference as semantic choice', the realisation of the system of identification in lexicogrammar would be the cohesive system of reference.  As demonstrated in previous posts, by treating cohesive relations as structures, the discourse system of identification confuses the system of referring with the items thus referred to.

[6] In SFL theory, the semantic system realised by the lexicogrammatical system of mood is termed speech function.

Self-Contradiction And Misunderstanding Stratification

Martin (1992: 324):

The description of ideational meaning has now been pursued on three levels: lexicogrammar, discourse semantics and field.  At its most basic level a field consists of activity sequences, which are in turn composed of activities, which are themselves made up of actions configuring with people, places and things, all four of which components may be configured with qualities.  Activity sequences stand in an unmarked relation relation to temporally sequenced clause complexes in lexicogrammar;

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, ideational meaning is located on one stratum of the stratification hierarchy, semantics, not three.  Meaning can be viewed from the other levels, from above (context) or from below (lexicogrammar), as well as from its own level — the trinocular perspective — but that is not what has been pursued here.  In the discourse semantics model, instead, because the SFL notion of strata as different levels of symbolic abstraction is not understood:

• relations at one level (lexicogrammar) are misconstrued as obtaining between units two levels higher in symbolic abstraction (context) — a level, which in SFL theory, is not even within language;

• context (field) is misconstrued as a level of language; and

• ideational semantics is misconstrued as field.

[2] Trivially, field is not a level; it is the ideational dimension of a level (context).

[3] These "field" units correspond to the orders of phenomena in the ideational semantics of SFL theory: sequences ('activity sequences'), figures ('activities') and elements, which include processes ('actions'), participants ('people', 'things' and 'qualities') and circumstances ('places').

[4] This continues the terminological confusion of using 'unmarked' for 'congruent' relations across strata.  Moreover, since activity sequences are misconstrued as being at the level of context, the intervening level, discourse semantics, is omitted from this stratal relation.

[5] This is even inconsistent with Martin's own observations:

• 'the most common conjunction relating activities in an activity sequence is and, alongside the much more occasional realisation of temporal succession' (1992: 322);

• 'in the following text for example, one activity follows another by law; in scientific discourse this relation is made explicit through conditional consequential conjunctions (typically if/then)' (1992: 323).

Reclassifying Function According To Form

Martin (1992: 316-7):

It is sometimes argued that Manner adverbs should be treated as circumstances in light of the fact that they all have alternative prepositional phrase realisations.  Note however that in order to be expressed as a prepositional phrase, these qualities of events must be nominalised, making the circumstantial realisation the marked one:

MANNER ADVERBS : INCONGRUENT PREPOSITIONAL PHRASES ::

Ben ran quickly : Ben ran with considerable speed ::

Ben won easily : Ben won with ease ::

Ben slept fitfully : Ben slept in fits and starts :

Ben winced painfully : Ben winced in great pain

The prepositional realisations will be taken here as enhancing Processes, and the adverbial realisations as enhancing Events.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, priority is given to the view 'from above', the meaning realised by the wording, not to the view 'from below', how the wording is realised at lower ranks.  Here function is being classified according to form, rather than form classified according to function.  That is, the account is formal rather than functional.

[2] The argument here is that a "marked" realisation of a circumstance of Manner: quality (a prepositional phrase) is reason to treat the "unmarked" realisation (an adverbial group) as something different — as an element of the verbal group.  By the same logic, a "marked" realisation of Theme is reason to treat an "unmarked" realisation of Theme as something other than Theme.

See yesterday's post for a theoretical explanation for the different realisations of Manner: as adverbial group or prepositional phrase.

[3] This continues the earlier confusion of markedness and congruence.  See previous clarification  (30/4/15) here.

Misrepresenting The Discourse Systems Of Conjunction & Identification

Martin (1992: 265-6):

In this chapter, an account of a third major discourse system, CONJUNCTION, has been presented; in addition the relatively minor system of CONTINUITY was briefly reviewed.  CONJUNCTION represents the discourse semantics of clause complex relations, much as IDENTIFICATION underlies nominal group DEIXIS and NEGOTIATION underlies MOOD.  The association of these discourse systems with metafunctions and their unmarked realisation in lexicogrammar is summarised in Table 4.16.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The discourse system of continuity is presented as system of the logical metafunction.  It was demonstrated in earlier posts that most markers of continuity were not conjunctions marking logical relations, but adverbs serving as adjuncts that realise interpersonal functions.  (It was also shown that elements serving experiential and textual functions were also misconstrued as continuity items.)

In SFL theory, continuity refers to a cohesive system, a non-structural resource of the textual metafunction, that marks relations by means of continuatives.  (In the discourse semantic model of conjunction, this SFL textual system was subsumed under the logical relation of addition.)

[2] Contrary to this claim, the proposed system of conjunction does not represent the discourse semantics of clause complex relations.  It was demonstrated in previous posts that the model does not discriminate between structural logical relations between clauses in a clause complex and nonstructural textual relations of conjunctive cohesion between (groups of) messages.  In the former case, it was shown that the model represents a logically invalid reorganisation of clause complex relations; in the latter case, since it is not clause complexes that are being modelled, it is not a model of clause complex relations.

[3] Contrary to this claim, as demonstrated in previous posts, the system of identification is not a discourse model of the use of deixis in the service of cohesive system of reference.  Whereas grammatical reference is a system for marking the identifiability of elements in a text, discourse semantic identification is instead concerned with tracking the persistence of specific instantial participants through a text.

[4] Contrary to the theoretical architecture of SFL theory and the principle of symbolic abstraction, this use of the term 'underlies' places the higher level of symbolic abstraction (the discourse semantic systems of identification and negotiation) below the lower level of symbolic abstraction (the grammatical systems of deixis and mood).

[5] In SFL theory, cohesive conjunction is a system of the textual metafunction, not the logical metafunction.

[6] This again confuses markedness — as in: Subject is the unmarked Theme in declarative clauses — with congruence: non-metaphorical realisations of the semantics in the lexicogrammar.

Strategically Misapplying The Term 'Incongruence'

Martin (1992: 134):

The incongruence between participants, nominal groups and the explicit realisation of deixis is summarised in the following table.

	# NOMINAL GROUPS	# PARTICIPANTS	PHORICITY MARKED
structural it	1	-	-
idioms	1	-	-
indefinite negation	1	-	-
Attribute	1	-	-
Range	1	0/1	-/once
Extent	1	-	-
Role	1	-	-
possessive Deictics	1/2	2	once
Pre-D/N/E/C	2	1/2	once/twice

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL theory, 'incongruence' refers to the relation between semantics and lexicogrammar in cases of grammatical metaphor.  So the unintended claim here is that all these cases are examples of grammatical metaphor.  To demonstrate that these are genuine cases of grammatical metaphor, it would be necessary to provide the congruent (non-metaphorical) counterpart of each.

Martin's use of the term here is strategic, and misleading, because grammatical metaphor is a genuine motivation for stratifying the content plane of language into semantics and lexicogrammar, and Martin is trying to justify his system, IDENTIFICATION, as the semantic counterpart of grammatical reference.

[2] For some of the misunderstandings that invalidate the claims of this table, see the previous fifteen posts.

Participant–Nominal Group "Incongruence"

Martin (1992: 129):

The entry condition for the IDENTIFICATION network developed in section 3.3 was participant, where this can be defined as a person, place or thing, abstract or concrete, capable of functioning as Agent or Medium in TRANSITIVITY.  Defined in this way, it can be argued that all participants are realised through nominal groups; but not all nominal groups realise participants and some nominal groups realise more than one.  This incongruence will now be explored in more detail …

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the entry condition for this system of the textual metafunction, at the level of discourse semantics, is a category of the experiential metafunction, at the level of lexicogrammar.  The theoretical inconsistencies are therefore twofold: metafunctional and stratal.

The mistaken focus on the experiential participant arises from misconstruing textual reference as ideational denotation, and the mistaken focus on the nominal group arises from confusing a structurally-realised system of nominal group, deixis, with the non-structural system of reference.

Importantly, the nominal group is not the only grammatical domain in which reference items appear.  Martin's 'reference as semantic choice' makes no provision for demonstrative and comparative reference made from within the adverbial group; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 625, 629, 633).

[2] On the one hand, this confuses the Thing of a nominal group ('person', 'thing') with participants of a clause ('Agent or Medium') — omitting Range and Beneficiary — and on the other hand, it mistakes a circumstance ('place') for a participant.  Moreover, as defined, these are all grammatical categories, not discourse semantic categories.

[3] To be clear, 'defined in this way', participants are realised by the Thing of a nominal group, not a nominal group; see [2].  This confusion recurs throughout the discussion that follows.

[4] To be clear, in SFL theory, it is simply not true that all participants are realised by nominal groups.  Agents and Mediums are also realised by prepositional phrases, as in:

• the chihuahua was snatched by a pelican (Agent),
• the incident was witnessed by the dog's owner (Medium)

[5] To be clear, nominal groups also realise circumstances, as in:

• the pelican flew 20 metres (Extent)
• it happened the day before yesterday (Location)

[6] This is a misunderstanding that arises from confusing Thing with participant (see [2]), as will be demonstrated in the relevant critique.

[7] This is misleading.  In SFL theory, the term 'incongruence' is used to refer to the relation between semantics and lexicogrammar in the case of grammatical metaphor — grammatical metaphor being the chief reason for modelling content as two levels, semantics and lexicogrammar.

Here Martin uses the term 'incongruence' — in the absence of metaphor — to imply, falsely, that the examples to be discussed provide a theoretical motivation for stratifying his IDENTIFICATION system "with respect to nominal group structure".