Misconstruing First & Second Orders Of Field

Martin (1992: 572):

The distinction between first and second order field is presented as follows:

In a discussion about a game of football, the social action is the discussion and the verbal interaction among the participants is the whole of this interaction.  Here the game constitutes a second order of 'field', one that is brought into being by that of the first order, the discussion … (1978: 144)

English Text would model a context of this kind by treating it as a discussion at the level of genre, and as simultaneously involving two fields at the level of register — one field realised through language in action mode (the discussion), and the other realised reflectively (the subject matter).  Keeping in mind that as far as text structure is concerned genre and field give convergent accounts as texts approach ancillary mode, English Text's approach to this context would amount in practice to treating the genre as discussion and the field as the game discussed.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The inconsistencies here are too complex to analyse without the glossary below:

Martin’s Usage	What Martin Thinks It Means	What Halliday Means By It
context	register and genre	the semiotic system that has language as its expression plane
genre	context, not language; more abstract than register	language, not context; text type, i.e. register viewed from the instance pole of the cline of instantiation
register	context, not language; less abstract than genre	language, not context; text type viewed from the system pole of the cline of instantiation
field	ideational dimension of register	ideational dimension of context, not register

So Martin's approach is to model this situation type

• as a discussion at his higher level of context (genre), and 
• as two fields at his lower level of context (register),
• with first order field realised through ancillary mode, and
• second order field realised through constitutive mode.

That is, new inconsistencies are introduced at this point:

• a situation type has two modes simultaneously (two points on the same cline);
• systems at the same level of abstraction (field and mode) are related by realisation — the relation between different levels of abstraction;
• ideational features (field) are realised by textual features (mode);
• different orders of experience (first and second order field) are both realised by the same order (mode, which is second order).

[2] Note that mode of this situation type is constitutive, not ancillary.  Halliday explicitly specifies that 'the verbal interaction among the participants is the whole of this interaction'.

[3] Martin's approach is thus to treat the lower (first) order field as the higher level of semiotic abstraction — genre stratum — and higher (second) order field as the lower level of semiotic abstraction — register stratum — based on an incorrect interpretation of mode (see [2]).  The inconsistencies therefore are in terms of ordering (lower vs higher), relation (realisation vs projection) and mode (ancillary vs constitutive).

Consequently, on this third tendered piece of evidence, Martin's claim that his model of register and genre avoids additional complications in Halliday's model is the exact opposite of what is true.

Misconstruing A Higher Order Of Experience As A Lower Level Of Symbolic Abstraction

Martin (1992: 571):

First and second order tenor would be dealt with as the difference between register (tenor) and discourse semantics (NEGOTIATION) here;

Blogger Comment:

For Halliday, tenor is the interpersonal dimension of context.  The relation between first and second order tenor is projection.

Martin's proposal is to reconstrue:

• first order tenor as a dimension of register (misconstrued as context), and
• second order tenor as a dimension of discourse semantics.

That is, the proposal is to treat a higher order of experience within context, as a lower level of symbolic abstraction — within language.

That is, Martin misconstrues

• orders of experience (related by projection) as levels of symbolic abstraction (related by realisation), and 
• the lower order as the higher level.

Consequently, on this first tendered piece of evidence, Martin's claim that his model of register and genre avoids additional complications in Halliday's model is the exact opposite of what is true.

Misrepresenting Halliday On Context, Register And Genre

Martin (1992: 571):

For Halliday, the complication has to do with introducing the concept of first and second order contexts, with first order field and tenor oriented to situation and second order field, tenor and mode defined by reference to language.  Table 7.21 sums up his (1978: 143-5) position:

Table 7.21. First and second oder [sic] register in Halliday (1978)

	first order	second order
field	social action	subject matter
tenor	social roles	speech function roles
mode	–	medium, rhetorical genre

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, both first and second order field and tenor are systems of context, and both are related to language by realisation — the relation between levels of symbolic abstraction.  The relation between different orders of experience is projection.

[2] Here Martin misrepresents Halliday (1978: 142-5) by substituting his own model for Halliday's.  For Halliday's 'context', Martin substitutes 'register', and for Halliday's '(rhetorical) mode', Martin substitutes his 'genre'.

Misrepresenting Longacre

Martin (1992: 561-2):

It is important to compare Longacre's features [for cross-classifying text types] with those used by Hasan when classifying text structures with respect to contextual configurations. … Longacre's chronological dimension can be related to Hasan's field features, his prescription to her tenor and his dialogue/monologue opposition to her mode.  In effect Longacre has selected features from different aspects of Hasan's contextual construct (i.e. field, mode and tenor variables) and integrated them into a single matrix in order to classify genres.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Longacre's (1976) ± chronological framework classifies text types according ideational semantics whereas Hasan (1977, 1985/9) specifies the ideational dimensions of the culture (field) that identify a text type.  The difference between them is thus stratal. (semantics vs context).

[2] Longacre's ± prescription is concerned with the rôle played by language.  In SFL theory, this is mode, not tenor.  The difference between them is thus metafunctional (textual vs interpersonal).

[3] As Martin reports it, Longacre's monologic vs dialogic opposition distinguishes narrative from drama, respectively.  That is, it distinguishes text types according to whether the projection of the author contain a single voice (a narrator), or many voices (dramatis personæ).  On the other hand, Hasan's monologic vs dialogic opposition is concerned with the number of authors (speakers) of the text.  The difference between them is thus in terms of orders of experience (second-order vs first-order).

[4] As the three previous points clearly demonstrate, this is not true.  Longacre (1976) did not select features of Hasan's (1977, 1985/9) context and integrate them into a single matrix to classify genres.

Confusing First And Second Orders Of Experience

Martin (1992: 546-7):

In this connection it is useful to compare three of Barthes's examples of sequences with three of Hasan's examples of text structure (only her obligatory elements will be considered here):

sequences (Barthes 1966/1977):

‘telephone call’:

telephone ringing ^ picking up the receiver ^ speaking ^ putting down the receiver (1966/1977: 101)

“having a drink”:

order a drink ^ obtain it ^ drink it ^ pay for it (1966/1977: 101)

“offering a cigarette”:

offering ^ accepting ^ smoking ^ lighting (1966/1977: 102)

text structures (Hasan 1977, 1984, 1985/9):

“medical appointment making”:

Identification ^ Application ^ Offer ^ Confirmation (1977: 233)

“service encounter”:

Sale request ^ Sale compliance ^ Sale ^ Purchase ^ Purchase closure (1985/1989: 60)

“nursery tale”:

Initiating event ^ Sequent event ^ Final event (1984: 80)

At a glance it might appear that Barthes is analysing action whereas Hasan is analysing text (cf. Barthes's telephone call and Hasan's appointment making).  But the opposition is by no means as simple as this.  Most of Barthes's nuclei involve interlocutors speaking, and those which do not are easy to render linguistically in narration (as they have been in Barthes's own account).  So a simple opposition between verbal and non-verbal action will not do.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Both Barthes and Hasan are analysing texts, instances of language, at the level of semantics.  The difference between them, in terms of SFL theory (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014), is that Barthes approach is more "bottom-up", staying close to the sequences of figures that are realised grammatically as clauses, whereas Hasan's approach is more "top-down", viewing from context.

[2] The interlocutors in Barthes' data are characters in narrative texts.  That is, they are verbal projections of the writer.  The confusion here is in terms of orders of experience: first-order (writers, speakers, readers, listeners etc.) vs second-order (characters in stories etc.).

Confusing Orders Of Experience

Martin (1992: 545):

The distinctive [field] taxonomies of recreation and trades tend to be utilitarian in focus, organising in large part the special equipment and tools required and the Mediums they operate on.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Equipment and tools are parts of the material setting, not the semiotic context.  This confuses orders of experience.

[2] This construes tools and equipment, rather than people, as the Agents of such Processes.

Misconstruing Behaviour As A Register Of Language

Martin (1992: 543):

Domestic sequences tend to be implicit — they are not usually written down, or taken notice of in any way by mature speakers, and are learned by doing, under the guidance of caregivers by children.

Blogger Comment:

Here 'sequences' refers to (material order) behaviour, not (semiotic order) language, nor the context realised by language.  The model being developed here is purported to be field, the ideational dimension of the culture as semiotic, realised in language, so the confusion is one of orders of experience.

The inconsistency is compounded by Martin's misconstrual of this behaviour as register, a subpotential of language.

Misrepresenting Barthes And Confusing Material & Semiotic Orders Of Experience

Martin(1992: 538-9):

Focussing on narrative theory, Barthes does not take the step of theorising paradigmatic relations among activity sequences, for which the notion of field is developed here.  A field such as linguistics for example involves a large number of sequences: lecturing, evaluation, supervising, writing, editing, meetings, committees, seminars, conferences, research activities, referee's reports, community work, administration and so on.  More than one of these may well succeed another as a series of micro-sequences, but there is more to their interrelationships than this constituency analysis suggests.  All are related to participation in the field of linguistics, sharing a large number of taxonomies of both the superordinate and compositional variety.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misrepresents Barthes' sequences, which are language structures, as Martin's activity sequences, which are misconstrued by Martin as context, which in turn is misconstrued by Martin as register.  The confusion is thus simultaneously along the two theoretical dimensions of stratification and instantiation.

[2] This confuses what people do (lecturing etc.) with what people say (sequences). The confusion is thus between material and semiotic orders of experience.

Misconstruing Dialogue As Unprojected

Martin (1992: 523):

With film and theatre projection is naturalised as real; this does not however take away from the fact that the language spoken has been scripted and is very different from the unprojected dialogue of everyday life.  These projection systems are developed in Fig. 7.12 where they crossclassify [sic] the basic action/reflection mode options.

Blogger Comments:

[1] More accurately, and theoretically, scriptwriters/dramatists (first-order experience) verbally project written texts, scripts/dramas, in which characters (second-order experience) verbally project spoken texts (third-order experience).  In the acting of films and plays, the orders of experience are reduced to as if two, with the characters as if of first-order experience, and their projections as if of second-order experience.

[2] Whether the language of films and plays is "very different" from the language of everyday life depends very much on the script/drama and the scriptwriter/dramatist.  Compare the films of Ken Loach with the films of Peter Greenaway, for example.

[3] This provides further evidence that the SFL theoretical notion of projection is not understood.  All dialogue is projected — all texts are projected — by sayers engaged in verbal processes, at whatever order of experience.

[4] In addition to the misconceived notions of projected vs unprojected mode, and experientialised vs unexperientialised verbalisation, the system network in Fig. 7.12 (p524) introduces two new inconsistencies — an inconsistency with the accompanying text, and an internal (logical) inconsistency.

With regard to the first inconsistency, the network distinguishes 'projected' from 'unprojected' and includes speaking and writing within 'projected', despite referring to the language of everyday life (above) as "unprojected".

With regard to the second inconsistency, the network distinguishes 'projected' from 'unprojected' and, within 'unprojected': '–'.  The logical problem here is that –unprojected equals projected.

Misconstruing The Notion Of Projection

Martin (1992: 521):

The final ideational consideration which has to be taken into account here has to do with projection.  All of the text types considered to this point can be spoken or written directly; alternatively their verbalisation may itself be experientialised.  Linguistically this is accomplished through behavioural, mental and verbal processes which explicitly construct meaning as doing (as in the examples from [4:2] above).  Alternative resources for projection include drawing (comics and cartoons), film and stage.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This discussion is purported to be concerned with systems of the textual metafunction at the level of context — mode — which Martin misconstrues as register.  Ideational considerations thus add a further confusion of metafunction.

[2] To be clear, in SFL theory, projection is the logical relation between two orders of experience, as between a mental clause and an idea clause, or between a verbal clause and a locution clause.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 443):

projection relates phenomena of one order of experience (the processes of saying and thinking) to phenomena of a higher order (semiotic phenomena – what people say and think).

[3] The claim here is that, as an alternative to speaking or writing, "verbalising" may be "made experiential".  This is nonsensical both in terms of the everyday meaning of experiential as involving or based on experience and observation, and in terms of the technical usage in SFL theory as a metafunction of meaning.

[4] The claim here is that behavioural, mental and verbal clauses that project material clauses are the means by which "verbalising may be made experiential".  This again is nonsensical, both, for the reason given above in [3], and for the further reasons that:

• behavioural processes do not project meaning (Martin has misconstrued a verbal process as behavioural; see [5] below),
• mental processes project ideas, not (verbal) locutions,
• verbal processes projecting locutions are not an alternative to "verbalisation", but a construal of it.

[5] The "examples in [4:2] above" (p517) are two projecting verbal processes, and a projecting desiderative mental process:

• After that he usually tells you to wait over there.
• Then he will say "line up your dog or get the best out of your dog."
• so you're hoping all the time that your dog will stand nice and steady…

[6] The claim here is that drawing (comics and cartoons), film and stage are alternatives to "direct" verbal projection through speaking or writing.  This confusion can be untangled by examining it from two orders of experience.

In terms of first order experience, the authors of comics, cartoons, film scripts or dramas verbally project the wordings of their respective texts.  This is not an alternative to "direct" projection through writing.

In terms of second order experience, the characters in comics, cartoons, film scripts or dramas verbally project the wordings of their respective texts.  This is not an alternative to "direct" projection through speaking.

Given the above — and the absence of projection from Martin's logical system of discourse semantics, conjunction — it is fair to say that Martin does not understand the SFL theoretical notions of projection and orders of experience.

Misconstruing Lower And Higher Orders Of Experience As Higher & Lower Levels Of Symbolic Abstraction

Martin (1992: 521):

Participation may allow room for the construction of an additional field if the activity sequence in which the speakers/listeners are involved is not too engaging (e.g. chatting while washing up).  The notion of first (washing up) and second (what the chat is about) order field has been used for texts of this kind (Halliday 1978: 144).*

* Endnote #19 (p589):

It has also been used for distinguishing the field of a review (first order) from the field of the text being reviewed (second order), which is a different distinction involving what can be conceived of metaphorically as projection.  English Text's distinction between genre and field makes it unnecessary to use the concepts of first and second order field to distinguish a discussion (genre) about a football game from the game itself (field: activity sequence).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands orders of experience.  Both instances involve the distinction between first and second order experience, and the theoretical relation between orders of experience is projection — it is not metaphorical.

[2] This is inconsistent with the notion of first and second order field.  In Martin's model, genre and field are related stratally, so the relation between them is realisation — elaboration + identity — whereas the relation between orders of experience is projection.  Moreover, Martin misconstrues the lower order of experience (first order field) as his higher level of semiotic abstraction (genre).

These inconsistencies are further multiplied by the inconsistencies entailed by Martin misconstruing field as register, instead of context, and register and genre as context, instead of language.

[3] The absurdity here is made patently obvious by tabulating the confusions as follows:

SFL Theory		Martin (1992)
field (ideational semiotic context)	higher order	lower stratum	field (register)	a game of football
	projected by	realises
	lower order	higher stratum	genre	a discussion of that game of football

On Martin's model, a game of football — people running around kicking a ball — is 'register', and the game realises a discussion of itself.

[4] This confuses the material order (what people do) with the semiotic order (what people say).

Confusing Different Strata, Metafunctions & Orders Of Experience

Martin (1992: 521):

Reconstructions may be based on shared or unshared experience, which affects how much of the social process has to be explicitly replayed.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The claim here is that the ± shared experience of the speaker and listener is a distinction of mode.  This is inconsistent with the notion of mode as the part played by language in cultural contexts.

[2] This confuses mode — the textual metafunction at the level of context — with the construal of experience as meaning — the ideational metafunction at the level of semantics.  The confusion is thus along two theoretical dimensions simultaneously: stratification (context vs semantics) and metafunction (textual vs ideational).

[3] This misrepresents the verbal reconstrual of a past experience as the replaying of a social process.  That is, it confuses the (verbally projected) semiotic order of experience (metaphenomena) with the material order of experience (phenomena).