Confusing Tenor (Context) With Interpersonal Meaning (Semantics)

Martin  (1992: 586):

… it demonstrates that […] the coding orientations associated with class, gender, ethnicity and generation focus attitudes in systematic ways.  Affect is in other words ideologically addressed (see Martin 1986 on the orientation of attitude in ecological debates) and exploring this projection of interpersonal meaning is an important dimension of semiotic space.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This continues the misconstrual of Bernstein's coding orientation as ideology.

[2] This continues the confusion of affect, as a dimension of tenor (context stratum), with affect as interpersonal meaning (semantics stratum). Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 33) refer to the contextual system as 'sociometric rôles'.

[3] This stratal confusion is aided by the blurring of two distinct meanings of 'projection':

• tenor as the theoretical "projection" of the interpersonal metafunction onto the context stratum;
• interpersonal meaning as the verbal projection of speakers.

[4] Trivially, 'exploring' is not a dimension.

exploring this projection of interpersonal meaning	is	an important dimension of semiotic space
Identified / Token	Process	Identifier / Value

Misinterpreting Hasan And Proposing Theoretical Inconsistencies

Martin (1992: 551):

For Hasan, text structures are derived from generic structure potentials conditioned by choices in field, tenor and mode — with most of the optionality apparently determined by tenor and mode.  This suggests that systemic relationships among different text structures are equivalent to relationships among field, mode and tenor options; and the question of systemic relationships among generic structure potentials does not arise.  Challenging the first of these suggestions, and redressing the second, Martin (1985) suggests reformulating generic structure potentials as system networks and realisation rules as with Ventola's (1987: 15) reformulation of Mitchell above, proposing a speculative network and realisation rules for service encounters by way of illustrating how this might be done (Martin 1985: 253-4; Fig. 7.21 below).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, for Hasan (1985/9: 64), a generic structure potential is the structural potential of a text — as the largest unit of the semantic stratum — of a given genre (text type/register).  For Hasan, genres that share the same contextual configuration of field, tenor and mode features share the same structural potential at the level of semantics.  In SFL theory, the relation between context and semantics is realisation: context is a higher level of symbolic abstraction than semantics.

[2] This false inference derives from Martin's earlier false claim (see here) that Hasan associates obligatory elements of text structure with field (p546). For Hasan (1985/9: 62), the obligatory elements of text structure are the elements that define the genre (text type).

[3] This is a false inference in that it blurs important distinctions between the theoretical dimensions of axis, stratification and instantiation:

• The relation between structure (syntagmatic axis) and system (paradigmatic axis) is realisation; semantic structure realises semantic system.
• The relation between semantic stratum systems and context stratum systems is realisation, not equivalence.
• Different text structures are a matter of registerial (text type/genre) variation at the level of semantics.

[4] Martin (1985) is thus challenging his own misinterpretation of Hasan.

[5] The proposal here is to model registerial (text type/generic) variation in semantic structure as a system network at the level of context.  The confusion here is thus along two dimensions simultaneously:

• the cline of instantiation: system (potential) vs register (subpotential);
• stratification: context vs semantics.

[6] Ventola's network models registerial variation (service encounters) as a system network with semantic structure specified by realisation rules activated by the selection of features.  That is, it models subpotentials (registers) as potential (system) and specifies semantic structure as its realisation.

The network is thus inconsistent with the architecture of SFL theory in that it posits a midway point on the cline of instantiation (subpotential) as the systemic potential that specifies semantic structure.  According to the architecture of SFL theory, the systems that specify semantic structure are the systems of the semantic stratum (axially) and context (stratally).

Blurring The Distinction Between Realisation, Logogenesis And Instantiation

Martin (1992: 536-7):

Field is the contextual projection of experiential meaning and so alongside IDEATION puts at risk the clause rank systems TRANSITIVITY, CIRCUMSTANTIATION and AGENCY, as well as systems generating Numerative, Epithet, Classifier, Thing and Qualifier in nominal group structure and various other group/phrase systems, all of which need to be interpreted as embracing lexis as most delicate grammar; in addition, research into collocation patterns provides an important perspective on field's realisation (see Benson & Greaves 1981, 1992, forthcoming).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading.  Field is not the contextual projection of experiential meaning.  Field is the ideational dimension of context.  That is, it is application of the theoretical notion of the ideational metafunction to the culture as a semiotic system.

[2] As previously demonstrated, Martin's system of ideation, purported to be a model of experiential meaning on the discourse semantic stratum, is actually a confusion of lexical cohesion (textual metafunction at the level of grammar), lexis as most delicate grammar (lexicogrammatical delicacy), and logical relations between figure elements.

Martin here omits systems of the logical metfunction.  This would have required the inclusion of the discourse semantic system of conjunction, which, as previously demonstrated, is a confusion of clause complex relations (logical metafunction) and cohesive conjunction (textual metafunction), both of which are grammatical systems.

[3] Unhappily, the risk that semiotic systems face is never identified.

[4] To be clear, the clause rank system of transitivity includes the systems of agency and circumstantiation.  Circumstantiation refers to 'circumstantial transitivity' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 758).

[5] 'Systems generating structure' blurs the distinction between axial realisation, logogenesis and instantiation.  The relation between paradigmatic system and syntagmatic structure is realisation.  Structure realises system.  That is, they are in a relation of symbolic identity, with system as Value and structure as Token.

On the other hand, 'generating', in this sense, is modelled in SFL theory as logogenesis, the unfolding of text at the instance pole of cline of instantiation, as features are selected and realisation statements activated (the process of instantiation).

[6] This demonstrates a lack of understanding of the notion of lexis as most delicate grammar — as also demonstrated by its inclusion in Martin's model of experiential discourse semantics.  Lexis as most delicate grammar means that if grammatical networks were to be elaborated to sufficient delicacy, bundles of the most delicate features would specify individual lexical items — just as bundles of articulatory features specify individual phonemes.

[7] To be clear, collocation is a resource of lexical cohesion, and so represents a resource of the textual, not ideational metafunction.

Blurring The Distinction Between Context And Semantics

Martin (1992: 533-4):

As far as content form is concerned, amplification is achieved largely through iteration — affectual meanings are repeated until the appropriate volume is reached.  This interpersonal "taxis" is most striking in nominal groups (cf. you lousy rotten stinking bastard you vs. my lovely sweet little darling baby puppy dog), where positive and negative attitude is replayed prosodically across Deictic, Epithet and Thing; but attitudinal interpolation of this kind is pervasive across a range of grammatical structures, irrespective of experiential constituency boundaries (e.g. swearing — God damn it I fucking wish that shit of a un-bloody-grateful bastard would work his fucking problems out; or modality — I'm absolutely convinced that there certainly must be a solution right here, mustn't there?).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, 'content' refers to the two strata: semantics/meaning and lexicogrammar/wording; and 'form' on the content plane refers to the units of the rank scale: clauses, phrases, groups, words and morphemes.

[2] To be clear, such 'affectual meanings' are the meanings (semantics) that realise affect (context).  In terms of stratification, tenor and meaning are distinct levels of symbolic abstraction.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, 'taxis' is the logical relation of interdependency.

[4] To be clear, the constituency of form, the rank scale, is not metafunctional.  This is distinct from different metafunctions favouring different types of function structures: experiential/segmental, interpersonal/prosodic, textual/culminative and logical/iterative (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 85).

[5] In SFL Theory, modality is a system of the clause, and quite distinct from attitude.  Modality operates within the limits defined by polarity (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 183).

[6] Trivially, right is not an instance of modality. Modality covers modalisation (probability/usuality) and modulation (obligation/inclination).

Blurring The Distinction Between Tenor (Context) And Interpersonal Meaning (Semantics)

Martin (1992: 523):

The model of tenor to be presented here is that developed by Poynton (1984, 1985, 1990).  As with interpersonal meaning in general, tenor is concerned with the semiotics of relationships.  It mediates these relationships along three dimensions, which will be referred to here as status (Poynton's power), contact and affect.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This blurs the important stratificational distinction between the context of culture (tenor) and the semantics of language (interpersonal meaning).  As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 320) tenor is concerned with: 

the relationship between the interactants, between speaker and listener, in terms of social rôles in general and those created through language in particular (‘who are taking part?).

Interpersonal meaning, on the other hand, is concerned with the linguistic resources that interactants use to enact social and intersubjective relationships.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 11):

The interaction base provides the resources for speaker and listener to enact a social and intersubjective relationship, through the assignment of discursive rôles, the expression of evaluations and attitudes.

[2] This is misleading.  Tenor does not mediate the "semiotics of relationships".  The system of tenor models the interpersonal dimension of cultural potential that is realised in language.

Confusing Strata And Metafunctions

Martin (1992: 519-20):

The potential source of confusion here has to do with the fact that genre-structured texts tend to be heavily nominalised, and through grammatical metaphor construct fields as thing-like, whether referring to activities or not.  Abstract modes in other words interpret social reality through semiotic resources that in less abstract modes would be applied to things — texts are organised around semiotic space instead of experiential time or place.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses ideational context (field) with ideational content (grammatical metaphor) of registers. The confusion is thus simultaneously along two theoretical dimensions: stratification and instantiation.

[2] The term 'abstract mode' confuses context (textual metafunction) with content (ideational metafunction).  The confusion is thus simultaneously along two theoretical dimensions: stratification and metafunction.

[3] This confuses context (textual metafunction) with content (ideational metafunction — construing experience).

[4] The term 'social reality' blurs the distinction between ideational metafunction (construing experience as meaning) and the interpersonal metafunction (enacting intersubjective relations as meaning).

Multiple Violations Of Theoretical Dimensions

Martin (1992: 517):

Labelling these text types field-structured and genre-structured is potentially misleading;*

* Endnote #16 (p589):

The distinction does not divide texts into those realising field and those realising genre; all text [sic] realise both field and genre in the model of context developed here.  The argument is rather that with field-structured texts, field (activity sequence) and genre (schematic structure) overdetermine text organisation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, to say that text types are either field-structured or genre-structured is to say that semantic structure varies registerially according to whether it is organised by field (ideational context) or genre (text type/register).  In SFL theory, semantic structure realises semantic system (axial relation), and semantics realises context (stratal relation).  See also [4] below.

[2] This blurs the distinction between stratification and instantiation.  It is language (semantics-lexicogrammar-phonology) that realises field (context).  Text is an instance of language, which realises an instance of context (situation).

[3] In SFL theory, the relation between text and genre, in the sense of text type, is instantiation, not realisation.

[4] The 'model of context developed here' confuses the context of language with functional varieties of language, with the latter modelled twice, as register and genre — two levels of symbolic abstraction — with register realising genre.  In SFL theory, register and genre (text type) are the same phenomenon, viewed from opposite ends of the cline of instantiation.

[5] As previously noted, this confuses strata: semantics (activity sequences) with context (field).

[6] In terms of SFL theory, this confuses text type (genre) with the structural dimension of the semantic stratum (schematic structure).

Confusing Context Potential (Mode) With Language Sub-Potentials (Registers)

Martin (1992: 517):

One way to scale texts along this action/reflection dimension of mode is to take the activity sequences aspect of field as a base line and see to what extent texts are structured with respect to these sequences.  Texts can then be divided into those organised primarily with respect to activity sequences (iconic texts) and those organised along different lines (non-iconic texts).

Blogger Comments:

[1] There is a general blurring here of the distinction between different features of mode (context stratum) and the different registers (text types) that realise situation types.  That is, the blurring is of two dimensions simultaneously: stratification (context is confused with language) and instantiation (general potential is confused with registerial variation).  This, in fact, summarises the problems with Martin's misconstrual of context as register.

[2] As previously demonstrated, this notion of 'activity sequences' confuses ideational semantics, meanings of language, with field (the ideational context of language).  This misunderstanding arose through confusing the meanings of a conversational text that recounted the procedure of 'parading a dog for judging' (language) with the cultural practice (context: field) of 'parading a dog for judging', in which language plays an ancillary rôle (context: mode).

Blurring Distinctions

Martin (1992: 510-1):

Two-way visual context [contact?] means that any attendant semiosis that is realised visually can be brought into play (kinesics, proxemics, the social action in which the speaker/listener dyad is engaged and so on).  This increases the potential for a text to depend on its material context, as part of the accompaniment to what is going on.

Blogger Comment:

This confuses two distinct notions in SFL theory:

1. the rôle of language as constitutive or ancillary (mode), and
2. the relevance of the material setting in manifesting the (semiotic) context of situation.

Halliday (2007 [1991]: 278):

The setting, on the other hand, is the immediate material environment. This may be a direct manifestation of the context of situation, and so be integrated into it: if the situation is one of, say, medical care, involving a doctor and one or more patients, then the setting of hospital or clinic is a relevant part of the picture. But even there the setting does not constitute the context of situation …

Misrepresenting Mode

Martin (1992: 509):

As with textual meaning in general, mode is concerned with symbolic reality — with texture. Since symbolic reality (i.e. text/process) has the function of constructing social reality, mode is oriented to both interpersonal and experiential meaning. It thus mediates the rôle played by language along two dimensions.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is the textual metafunction that is concerned with symbolic reality (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 7-8, 398, 512, 532).

[2] Symbolic reality is neither texture nor text/process.  Texture is the quality of being a text; text/process is the unfolding of the text at the instance pole of the cline of instantiation during logogenesis.

[3] Symbolic reality does not have the function of constructing social reality.  Moreover, the term 'social reality' blurs the distinction between the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions. The ideational metafunction construes a natural reality; the interpersonal metafunction enacts an intersubjective reality.  Symbolic reality is a second-order reality with regard to natural and intersubjective reality (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 398).

[4] Mode is not oriented to interpersonal and experiential meaning.  The textual metafunction is both enabling and second-order with regard to the interpersonal and ideational metafunctions.

[5] Mode does not mediate the rôle played by language along two dimensions (interpersonal and experiential).  The textual metafunction is both enabling and second-order with regard to the interpersonal and ideational metafunctions.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398):

The textual metafunction is second–order in the sense that it is concerned with semiotic reality: that is, reality in the form of meaning.  This dimension of reality is itself constructed by [the] other two metafunctions: the ideational, which construes a natural reality, and the interpersonal, which enacts an intersubjective reality. … The function of the textual metafunction is thus an enabling one with respect to the rest; it takes over the semiotic resources brought into being by the other two metafunctions and as it were operationalises them …

This second–order enabling nature of the textual metafunction is seen both at the level of context, where mode (the functions assigned to language in the situation) is second–order in relation to field and tenor (the ongoing social processes and interactant rôles), and the level of content — the semantics and the lexicogrammar, where the systems of THEME and INFORMATION, and the various types of cohesion, are second–order in relation to ideational and interpersonal systems of TRANSITIVITY, MOOD, and the rest.

Blurring Metafunctions

Martin (1992: 474, 476):

Although it is harder to unpick the meaning of Subject in written monologue [than in spoken mode] from the meaning of Theme and Given, texts such as [6:36] above which realise their method of development through marked Themes demonstrate the significance of modal responsibility in this mode. …

Unlike Theme, Subject selection in [6:36] does not reflect the text's contrastive method of development.

Blogger Comment:

The meanings of these grammatical functions are metafunctionally distinct.  The meaning of Subject is interpersonal (modal responsibility) whereas the meanings of Theme (point of departure of the message) and Given (recoverable information) are textual.  Because 'method of development' is a concern of the textual metafunction, Subject selection is irrelevant to a text's method of development.

The Confused Notion Of "Interpersonally Oriented Textual Metaphor"

Martin (1992: 417):

Textual metaphors are not however tied to logical meaning.  They are commonly interpersonally oriented as well, deployed particularly for expressing an interlocutor's attitude to meanings being made:

meta-message relation	That point is just silly!
text reference	That’s ridiculous!
negotiating text	What a stupid point you just made!
internal conjunction	Indeed, she just made a complete mess of it.

Blogger Comments:

[1] By definition, a textual metaphor would involve textual meaning (semantics) being incongruently realised as textual wording (lexicogrammar).  Metaphorical grammatical realisations of logical meaning — e.g. as circumstantial processes — constitute ideational metaphor.

[2]  This blurs the distinction between what is claimed to be textual metaphor and various (congruent) grammatical realisations of negative attitude:

just	mood Adjunct of intensity (counterexpectancy: limiting)
silly	Attribute
ridiculous	Attribute
stupid	Epithet
mess	Thing

[3] The notion of 'negotiating text(ure)' as textual metaphor derives from mistaking monologic texts that acknowledge the addressee for dialogic texts, as explained in a previous post here.

Problems With The Argument For "Textual" Metaphor

Martin (1992: 416):

The possibility of textual grammatical metaphor is not introduced in Halliday (1985).  However, as has been introduced in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5, discourse systems can be used to construe text as "material" social reality.  From the point of view of lexical relations Winter's (1977) Vocabulary 3 items and Francis's (1985) A-nouns (e.g. reason, example, point, factor) organise text, not field.  Similarly, text reference identifies facts, not participants, and internal conjunction orchestrates textual not activity sequences.  NEGOTIATION can also be exploited to construe monologic text as dialogue.  Good examples of meta-proposals/propositions were considered from a different perspective in Chapter 4 (see also 6.3.4 below): the imperative realisation of internal elaboration in [4:187j] — Let's be clear, and the interrogative realisation of internal concession as [4:188a] — What if you're having to clean floppy heads too often?  These proportionalities are summarised below:

organising social reality :	organising text as social reality ::
message part relation :	meta-message relation ::
participant reference :	text reference ::
external conjunction :	internal conjunction ::
negotiating dialogue :	negotiating texture

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, there is only ideational and interpersonal metaphor, though these are themselves manifestations of the second–order nature of the textual metafunction (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 398-9).  Setting aside the incongruity of the notion of 'textual metaphor', in order to demonstrate textual metaphor, Martin would need to provide congruent versus metaphorical grammatical realisations (wordings) of his textual discourse semantic system of identification (meanings).  Since this system reduces all textual semantics to merely the semantics of cohesive reference, textual metaphor would involve congruent versus metaphorical grammatical realisations of identification, which he does not provide; see further below.

[2] This specific misunderstanding was only explicitly introduced in the present chapter (6); see [3]. 

[3] This notion of construing text as "material" social reality is presented as the basis of Martin's notion of textual metaphor.  The argument (Martin 1992: 406) was that this follows from nominalisation (a source of ideational metaphor):

Construing meaning as a thing in other words means construing text as material object — as a material part of the social reality it is simultaneously engaged in constructing (ideationally) and intruding upon (interpersonally). 

See the critique in the post Mistaking Ideational Metaphor For Metaphor here.

[4] This distinction — organising field versus organising text — from the logical discourse semantic system of conjunction (Martin 1992: 183) is presented as the basis for determining congruent versus metaphorical grammatical realisations of textual meaning.  As previously demonstrated, this distinction arises from a misunderstanding of the distinction between external and internal expansion relations together with a misunderstanding of stratification, inter alia.  See, for example, the critique in the post Misconstruing Internal And External Relations here.

[5] This combines the notion of 'construing text as material social reality' ([3] above) with the notion of 'organising text' ([4] above) to present 'organising text as social reality' as the identifier of textual metaphor, i.e. of metaphorical grammatical realisations of textual meaning.

The notion of 'organising field' then becomes relabelled as 'organising social reality' and presented as the identifier of congruent grammatical realisations of textual meaning.

Cf.  Martin (1992: 378):

organising field :	organising text ::
message part relation :	meta-message relation ::
participant reference :	text reference ::
external conjunction :	internal conjunction

[6] This distinction — identifying participants versus identifying facts — from the textual discourse semantic system of identification is presented as the basis for determining congruent versus metaphorical grammatical realisations of textual meaning.  

However, this distinction is not one of metaphor, but Martin's (1992: 139) blurring of Halliday & Hasan's distinctions within the grammatical system of cohesive reference: in personal reference, the distinction of extended versus text reference (Halliday & Hasan 1976: 52), and in demonstrative reference, the type of extended reference termed 'reference to fact' (op. cit.: 66).

[7] This confuses dialogic text (two or more speakers) with monologic text (one speaker) in which the addressee is acknowledged.

[8] The text [4:187j] does not appear in Chapter 4.  Text [4:187] on page 237 is:

[4:187] a. Ben was unlucky.
b. He had to take steroids for his injured hamstring
c. and then they introduced more sophisticated tests.

The clause let's be clear occurs in text [4:199j] on page 244.  See the critique in the post Confusing Textual Conjunction With Logical Relations here.

The text [4:188a] on page 238 is:

[4:188] a. Ben was thirsty.

The clause simplex What if you're having to clean floppy heads too often? occurs as text [4:200a] on page 247.  The claim there was that it was related to the following clause simplex Ask for SYNCOM diskettes, with burnished Ectype coating and dust-absorbing jacket liners by the logical relation of internal condition.