Misrepresenting Field And Misconstruing Interstratal Realisation

Martin (1992: 378):

Throughout this chapter, much more attention has had to be paid to register variables than in Chapter 2, 3 and 4.  The discussion of IDEATION was undertaken with a view to textually mediating the realisation of field in lexicogrammar.  During any such consideration of the realisation of one level of meaning in another, it needs to be kept in mind that as a theoretical construct realisation is not directional.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misrepresents field — tenor and mode were not discussed — as a register variable instead of contextual variable.  No argument has been made for reinterpreting context as register; the claim has merely been repeated over and over.*  The many reasons why modelling context as register is inconsistent with the meaning of both concepts will be outlined in the critique of Chapter 7: Context.

[2] Texts don't "mediate" realisation.  Texts are instances of a systemic potential that is stratally organised in terms of realisation.

[3] 'The realisation of field in lexicogrammar' misrepresents stratification.  Field is realised in semantics, not lexicogrammar; it is semantics that is realised in lexicogrammar.  However, since Martin's 'field' is actually semantic, there is an unintentional truth here.

[4] This continues the misunderstanding of stratification arising from confusing it with semogenesis, as previously explained.  In SFL theory, the strata construe different levels of symbolic abstraction, only one of which, semantics, is the level of meaning.  This is distinct from 'meaning-making' or semogenesis.

[5] Realisation is a relation of identity between two levels of symbolic abstraction — one higher (the Value), one lower (the Token).  The lower Token (e.g. lexicogrammatical stratum) realises the higher Value (e.g. semantic stratum); the higher Value is realised by the lower Token.

—

*As Aldous Huxley (1991 [1932]: 38) described 'hypnopædia' in Brave New World:

Sixty-two thousand four hundred repetitions make one truth.

Multiplying A Misunderstanding Of The External Vs Internal Distinction

Martin (1992: 377-8):

The proportionalities among these "external" and "internal" aspects of IDEATION, IDENTIFICATION  and CONJUNCTION are as follows:

organising field :	organising text ::
message part relation :	meta-message relation ::
participant reference :	text reference ::
external conjunction :	internal conjunction

Blogger Comment:

[1] This continues the misunderstanding of the distinction between internal and external expansion relations, and exports the misunderstanding to other proposed discourse semantic systems.

Internal relations are those that are internal to the exchange, obtaining between propositions (interpersonal) rather than figures (experiential).  A memorable example of an internal relation, deployed logically in a clause complex, is the line from Monty Python's Life Of Brian:

If it's not a personal question, are you a virgin?

Martin confuses internal relations with those that are, in SFL terms, textually cohesive — though not consistently — as these pages demonstrate.

[2] The systems of ideation, identification and conjunction are said to be developed as the discourse semantic counterparts of lexical cohesion, reference and conjunction in the lexicogrammar.  In SFL, all three lexicogrammatical systems are types of cohesion, the non-structural resource of the textual metafunction, and so are all 'meta' in the sense of being concerned with the organisation of the ideational and the interpersonal meanings in the creation of text.

[3] Although participant reference is presented as a resource of the textual metafunction at the level of discourse semantics, it is here presented as 'organising' (i.e. in SFL: construing) the ideational dimension of context.  As previously demonstrated, this relates to mistaking cohesive relations for covariate structures, which in turn leads to confusing the system of referring with the elements ("participants") referred to.

Claiming That Conjunctive Relations Are Realised By Nouns

Martin (1992: 377):

This use of messages and message parts in a kind of meta-discursive relation to preceding and subsequent meanings in text is not unlike the function of text reference or that of internal conjunction.  Indeed, meta-message relations often work in conjunction with demonstratives and closely resemble text reference; and internal conjunctive relations are often realised through what Francis calls A-nouns.

TEXT REFERENCE
[5:54]  Ben lost in straight sets; it really upset him. 

A-NOUN
[5:55]  Ben lost in straight sets; that result really upset him. 

INTERNAL CONJUNCTION
[5:56]  Ben lost in straight sets; in that respect I hardly recognised him.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The 'meta' aspect here relates to the second-order status of the textual metafunction in relation to the ideational and interpersonal metafunction.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398):

The textual metafunction second–order in the sense that it is concerned with semiotic reality: that is, reality in the form of meaning. This dimension of reality is itself constructed by [the] other two metafunctions: the ideational, which construes a natural reality, and the interpersonal, which enacts an intersubjective reality. … The function of the textual metafunction is thus an enabling one with respect to the rest; it takes over the semiotic resources brought into being by the other two metafunctions and as it were operationalises them …

This second–order enabling nature of the textual metafunction is seen both at the level of context, where mode (the functions assigned to language in the situation) is second–order in relation to field and tenor (the ongoing social processes and interactant rôles), and the level of content — the semantics and the lexicogrammar, where the systems of theme and information, and the various types of cohesion, are second–order in relation to ideational and interpersonal systems of transitivity, mood, and the rest. 

[2] In each of the three examples, cohesive relations are effected through reference items: it (personal), that (demonstrative).

[3] This continues the confusion of cohesive conjunction with "internal" conjunction.  Here the cohesive conjunctive relation marking the textual transition is enhancement: matter: positive (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 543).

[4] By definition, conjunctive relations — the textual deployment of types of expansion — are not realised by nouns.  There is no conjunctive relation in the example given ([5:55]), internal or otherwise.

[5] This misconstrues the noun result as an A-noun (Francis 1985).  All the A-nouns listed were names of projections, and so second-order construals (construals of construals of experience).  The noun result is not the name of a projection; it is simply a first-order construal of experience.

Confusing Three Distinct Notions Of "Predicting" Discourse

Martin (1992: 377):

Predicting and referring to discourse is not simply a function of lexical items.  Nuclear configurations are also used in this way; for example:

Before I begin, let me say…

I'll stop here for questions…

I'll conclude by summarising…

Before going on to Chapter 6…

etc.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The use of the term 'predicting' in this chapter confuses three distinct meanings.  Here it is used in sense of a speaker referring to what is to come in the discourse.  Previously it was used in the sense of instantial probabilities (selecting one lexical item 'predicts' certain others will likely follow).  In the first instance, it was used in the sense of a hearer expecting an oncoming proposition — as in the example Becker's double faulting was unexpected in the field (p323).

[2] None of the nuclear configurations exemplifying the claim are identified.

Three Minor Clarifications

Martin (1992: 376-7):

Carter also reports on Francis's (1985) study of what she terms anaphoric nouns (A-nouns).  These are used in conjunction with anaphoric reference items to refer to preceding discourse. … Carter (1987: 80) lists the following examples of Francis's A-nouns.  All, it can be noted, are grammatical metaphors, reflecting the fact that congruent English reconstructs discourse as a rhetorical process, not as a product or thing.

retrospective
Examples from Francis (A-nouns)
accusation	consideration	interpretation	report
admission	criticism	judgement	repudiation
allegation	declaration	observation	retort
answer	definition	point	revelation
argument	denial	prediction	statement
assumption	description	proposal	stipulation
belief	diagnosis	proposition	suggestion
challenge	estimate	reading	threat
complaint	evidence	reasoning	theory
conclusion	examination	reference	viewpoint
confession	hypothesis	refusal

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, these 'anaphoric nouns' are nominalisations that name types of verbal and mental projections.  Any anaphoric function is realised by the reference item that marks its identity as recoverable in the preceding discourse. 

[2] The congruent construes experience; the metaphorical reconstrues experience.

[3] In SFL theory, 'discourse as process' is theorised as logogenesis: the unfolding of text through the instantiation of potential.

Misconstruing Instantiation Probability As The Opposite Of Anaphoric Reference

Martin (1992: 375):

One type of lexical relation which has not received sufficient attention here is that whereby message parts either predict subsequent discourse patterns or refer backwards to what has already been written or said.  Winter (1977) proposes a set of 108 Vocabulary 3 items which predict ensuing discourse patterns, especially conjunctive relations.  Winter's point is that using an item like convergence in a sentence predicts that some kind of comparison will follow.

Bloggers Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, this type of 'prediction' during logogenesis is modelled as instantiation probabilities of register.

[2] In SFL theory, discourse patterns are modelled in terms of logogenesis: as logogenetic patterns.

[3] In SFL theory, referring 'backwards to what has already been written or said' is modelled as anaphoric reference.  It is a distinct system from cohesive lexical relations.  Referring backwards is not the opposite of predicting forwards.

[4] In SFL theory, 'using an item' is modelled as the process of instantiation: selecting features and activating realisation statements — during logogenesis, the unfolding of text.

A Convoluted Non-Sequitur

Martin (1992: 375):

The discourse system of lexical relations then is like NEGOTIATION in that message parts, like moves, are not in themselves phoric; both systems are however associated with redundancy as opposed to relevance or reminding phoricity because of the way in which both message parts and moves may be realised through SUBSTITUTION and ELLIPSIS in lexicogrammar.

Blogger Comments:

The claim here is that the experiential and interpersonal discourse semantic systems are both associated with a type of phoricity because units of both systems may be realised by the non-structural textual system of substitution–&–ellipsis at the level of lexicogrammar — in contradistinction to the fact that, in SFL theory, phoricity is an aspect of reference rather than substitution–&–ellipsis.

Construing A Scale From Hyponym To Ellipsis (Via Word Classes)

Martin (1992: 373-4):

While message parts are not in themselves phoric, they may be realised phorically, through the systems of SUBSTITUTION and ELLIPSIS at group rank in lexicogrammar.  These systems have been presented in detail in Halliday and Hasan (1976) and their discussion has been assumed throughout English Text.  It is important to review here however the continuity between nominal and verbal ellipses and substitutes and the taxonomic cline from general superordinate to more specific hyponymic items.  This grading is outlined in Table 5.27 and illustrated for nominal and verbal realisations of message parts below (see especially Halliday and Hasan 1976: 106 & 129).  Hasan (1985: 74) generalises these relationships under the heading co-classification.

Table 5.27. General to specific grading of substitution, ellipsis and taxonomic relations
	nominal	verbal
ellipsis	–	–
substitution	one, ones	do, do so
pro-noun/verb	one, thing	do, happen
general noun/verb	thing, person, stuff etc.	do, take, make etc.
superordinate	ship (air/space/sailing)	attack
é ê	boat	race
	sail-boat	sail
	yacht	manœuvre
hyponym	12-metre	tack

Blogger Comments:

[1] The claim here is that units of the experiential metafunction on the discourse semantics stratum, message parts, can be realised on the lexicogrammatical stratum, at group rank, as phoric, by the system of substitution–&–ellipsis, one of the types of cohesion, a resource of the textual metafunction.  That is, experiential semantics is realised "phorically" by textual lexicogrammar, by a system does not involve phoricity.  Phoricity is an aspect of another system of textual cohesion: reference.

[2] This confuses two distinct resources of textual cohesion: substitution–&–ellipsis and lexical cohesion.  The former is the textual deployment of interpersonal relations, the latter is the textual deployment of experiential relations.

[3] This is not a grading from general to specific.  An omitted element is not more general that a substituted element, etc.  Moreover, the grades are not ranks on a one-dimensional scale, but are a mixture of categories of different types, with classes of grammatical form, noun and verb, wedged in between two different types of cohesive relations: substitution–&–ellipsis and a type of lexical cohesion (hyponymy), with the latter relation forming part of the scale.

[4] Halliday and Hasan (1976: 106) is Table 5: The forms of one, and related items in a section on nominal substitution; and Halliday and Hasan (1976: 129) is Table 6: The forms of do in a section on verbal substitution.  Neither supports Martin's claim for a grading from ellipsis to hyponym.

[5] In discussing cohesive devices (textual metafunction), Hasan (1985: 74) distinguishes co-classification from co-referentiality (identity of reference) as follows:

In this type of meaning relation, the things, processes, or circumstances to which A and B refer belong to an identical class, but each end of the cohesive tie refers to a distinct member of this class. 

Misconstruing Instantial Probabilities As Structural Relations

Martin (1992: 372-3):

Like reference chains and conjunctive structures, lexical strings were treated as covariate structures; message parts are typically both depending and depended on.  However, it was pointed out that the lexicalised message parts are not phoric and that the retrospective dependency that characterised phoric reference items and conjunctions was not relevant.  Rather message parts enter into relationships of mutual expectancy in text, fulfilling predictions deriving from preceding text at the same time as they create expectancies about what will follow.  In this respect lexical relations are more field-like than particulate in nature, and it was suggested in 5.4.1.6 above that they might be better modelled as a kind of lattice rather than as a string…

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously argued, covariate structures are not structures. They are related units (X related to Y) not structured units (X structured as A^B).

[2] In SFL theory, interdependency is a logical system.  In discourse semantics, a message part is an experiential unit.

[3] 'Lexicalised message parts' are the lexical realisations of discourse semantic message parts.  Here they are construed as if they are both at the same level of symbolic abstraction (stratum).

[4] In SFL theory, the different kinds of pointing, phora, are features of cohesive reference, a non-structural resource of the textual metafunction.  Conjunction is construed here as a structural resource of the logical metafunction.

[5] In SFL theory, this type of 'prediction' during logogenesis is modelled as instantiation probabilities of register.

[6] The argument here is:

• message parts are related by mutual expectancy,
• therefore the relations are more like fields than particles,
• therefore, the relations would be better modelled as a lattice than as a string.

A Summary Of Discourse Systems Inconsistencies

Martin (1992: 372-3):

This chapter concludes the presentation of the four major discourse systems developed in this book.  Lexical relations represent the discourse semantics of experiential meaning.  The association of discourse systems with metafunctions and their unmarked realisations in lexicogrammar can now be summarised as in Table 5.26.

Table 5.26. Unmarked realisations for discourse semantics systems in lexicogrammar
(discourse system)	metafunction	lexicogrammaticalisation
ideation	experiential	transitivity; group rank experiential grammar; lexis as delicate grammar; collocation
conjunction	logical	clause complex: logico-semantics & interdependency
identification	textual	nominal group: deixis
negotiation	interpersonal	clause: mood

Blogger Comments:

[1] The discourse semantics model of experiential meaning is a "development" of the lexicogrammatical system of lexical cohesion, a system of the textual metafunction, mixed up with the notion of lexis as most delicate grammar.  It involves units, message parts, that are related logically and/or interpersonally.

[2] This continues the confusion between markedness and congruence.  The realisation of semantics in lexicogrammar is either congruent or incongruent (metaphorical).  A pattern is either unmarked (typical), as when Theme conflates with Subject in a declarative clause, or marked, as when Theme conflates with a functional element other than Subject in a declarative clause.

[3] If the discourse system of ideation were an experiential system at the level of semantics, it would be realised by an experiential system at the level of lexicogrammar — and a theoretical requirement would be the inclusion of realisation statements that specify the relations between the two stratal systems.  Here, the lexicogrammatical realisations are said to include lexis as most delicate grammar and (only) one type of lexical cohesion, collocation, a non-structural system of the textual metafunction.  The model is claimed to be a development of lexical cohesion, but this is omitted from the list of lexicogrammatical realisations.

[4] The discourse system of conjunction is claimed to be a logical system at the level of semantics, and to be realised in the lexicogrammar by the logico-semantic and interdependency relations of the clause complex.  However, it makes no distinction between logical deployments of expansion (creating complexes) and textual deployments of expansion (cohesively marking transitions between messages).  Moreover, the logical relation of projection is omitted altogether from the semantic model — because, in fact, the model takes the textual deployment of expansion (cohesive conjunction) as its point of departure for logical semantics.  The discourse semantics system also omits the logical relation of elaboration in cases where the interdependency relation is hypotaxis.  For the rich panoply of miscategorisations of logical relations, see most of the critiques of Chapter 4.

[5] The discourse system of identification is claimed to be a textual system at the level of semantics.  If this were so, its realisations would involve the textual systems at the level of lexicogrammar, such as those of theme, information and cohesion.  Even if the textual metafunction is reduced for discourse semantics to merely 'reference as semantic choice', the realisation of the system of identification in lexicogrammar would be the cohesive system of reference.  As demonstrated in previous posts, by treating cohesive relations as structures, the discourse system of identification confuses the system of referring with the items thus referred to.

[6] In SFL theory, the semantic system realised by the lexicogrammatical system of mood is termed speech function.