Friday, 12 August 2016

The Reason For Separating Field & Genre

Martin (1992: 547):
The reason for separating field and genre as far as obligatory elements of text structure are concerned is to maintain inter-relationships among activity sequences and inter-relationships among text structures as distinct patterns of agnation regardless of mode


Blogger Comment:

Translating into SFL theory, this becomes:

The reason for separating the ideational dimension of context (field) and text type (genre), 
as far as Hasan's obligatory elements of text structure are concerned, 
is to maintain 
inter-relationships among semantic structures viewed from below (Barthes) 
and interrelationships between semantic structures viewed from above (Hasan)
as distinct patterns of agnation, 
regardless of whether the rôle of language is ancillary or constitutive of the cultural context.

See the most recent posts for relevant critiques.

This all derives from Martin interpreting field as activity sequences and genres as social processes.  A legitimate theoretical reason for separating field and genre is that field is context, not language, whereas genre is language, a type of text, not context.

Thursday, 11 August 2016

Inferring Invalidly From Misconstruals Of Semantic Structure As Field And Genre

Martin (1992: 547):
More to the point is the fact that Hasan's elements of structure at times collapse several nuclei in Barthes's sequence: Identification for example in Hasan's appointment making covers Barthes's telephone ringing, picking up the receiver and speaking.  At the same time, Hasan's elements may expand one of Barthes's nuclei, as Identification ^ Application ^ Offer ^ Confirmation do for Barthes's speaking in potentially the same genre (although Barthes could of course have recognised a micro-sequence here).  The point of these differences is that Hasan is placing boundaries at just those points where they are linguistically manifested, implying that the same sequences might be involved in very different genres (cf. Barthes's opposition of histoire and discours).  A telephone call in a modern nursery tale for example might just be one of a number of acts comprising the Initiating Event (which for Hasan continues until the expectation set up by its main act is frustrated); in appointment making on the other hand the call itself needs to be broken down into the genre's structural formula.
This suggests that where language is constitutive of what is going on (mode) the relationship between activity sequence (field) and text structure may be quite divergent (genre); where language is ancillary on the other hand, there may be little difference between the two.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously pointed out, both Barthes and Hasan are modelling the semantic structure of texts, with Barthes taking the view 'from below' and Hasan taking the view 'from above'.

[2] All structural boundaries in texts are "linguistically manifested".

[3] This is a non-sequitur, since the placement of structural boundaries says nothing about the incidence of specific structures in other text types.  However, on the other hand, it is trivially true that the same sequence, in the sense of both Barthes and SFL, can occur across many text types.

[4] Martin previously misrepresented this distinction, which Barthes took from the Russian Formalists (see here).  Histoire (fabula) refers to the raw material of a story, whereas discours (syuzhet) refers to the way the story is organised.  The inclusion of this distinction here is thus irrelevant.

[5] The preceding discussion suggests nothing at all about the relationship between activity sequence and text structure varying according to mode, because the two are different perspectives on semantic structure (see [1]).  Moreover, it says less than nothing about field and genre, since activity sequence isn't field, and text structure isn't genre.

Wednesday, 10 August 2016

Confusing First And Second Orders Of Experience

Martin (1992: 546-7):
In this connection it is useful to compare three of Barthes's examples of sequences with three of Hasan's examples of text structure (only her obligatory elements will be considered here):

sequences (Barthes 1966/1977):
‘telephone call’:
telephone ringing ^ picking up the receiver ^ speaking ^ putting down the receiver (1966/1977: 101)

“having a drink”:
order a drink ^ obtain it ^ drink it ^ pay for it (1966/1977: 101)

“offering a cigarette”:
offering ^ accepting ^ smoking ^ lighting (1966/1977: 102)

text structures (Hasan 1977, 1984, 1985/9):
“medical appointment making”:
Identification ^ Application ^ Offer ^ Confirmation (1977: 233)

“service encounter”:
Sale request ^ Sale compliance ^ Sale ^ Purchase ^ Purchase closure (1985/1989: 60)

“nursery tale”:
Initiating event ^ Sequent event ^ Final event (1984: 80)
At a glance it might appear that Barthes is analysing action whereas Hasan is analysing text (cf. Barthes's telephone call and Hasan's appointment making).  But the opposition is by no means as simple as this.  Most of Barthes's nuclei involve interlocutors speaking, and those which do not are easy to render linguistically in narration (as they have been in Barthes's own account).  So a simple opposition between verbal and non-verbal action will not do.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Both Barthes and Hasan are analysing texts, instances of language, at the level of semantics.  The difference between them, in terms of SFL theory (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014), is that Barthes approach is more "bottom-up", staying close to the sequences of figures that are realised grammatically as clauses, whereas Hasan's approach is more "top-down", viewing from context.

[2] The interlocutors in Barthes' data are characters in narrative texts.  That is, they are verbal projections of the writer.  The confusion here is in terms of orders of experience: first-order (writers, speakers, readers, listeners etc.) vs second-order (characters in stories etc.).

Tuesday, 9 August 2016

Misconstruing Activity Sequence (Semantics) As Field And Schematic Structure (Semantics) As Genre

Martin (1992: 546):
Hasan's association of obligatory elements of text structure with field makes it critical to consider the relationship between activity sequence (field) and schematic structure (genre) here.

Blogger Comment:

[1] For Hasan (1985/9: 62), the obligatory elements of text structure are the elements that define the genre (text type):
So, by implication, the obligatory elements define the genre to which a text belongs;
[2] This is a non-sequitur; see [1] and [3].

[3] One problem here is that activity sequence is not field and schematic structure is not genre.

An activity sequence is a semantic construal of experience, whether a mental construal of visual experience or a verbal construal in a spoken or written text.  Field, on the other hand, is 'what is going on' and the subject matter when interlocutors are speaking to each other.  The confusion is along the stratal dimension: semantics (activity sequence) vs context (field).

Schematic structure is the structure of a text as a semantic unit.  Genre, on the other hand, is text type — that is, register viewed from the instance pole of the cline of instantiation.  The confusion is along the dimension of instantiation: potential (semantic) vs subpotential (genre).

In short, in purporting to consider the relationship between field and genre, Martin is actually considering the relation between two ways of construing semantic units.  This will be borne out in the following blog posts.

This, like so many other confusions identified here, demonstrates the serious pitfalls of misunderstanding 'all strata make meaning' (semogenesis) as all strata are levels of linguistic meaning.

Sunday, 7 August 2016

Internal Inconsistency

Martin (1992: 546):
There is also the danger that the more domestic fields be misinterpreted as natural theories of experience with the more technical ones treated as semiotic construals of reality.  This is not the case — all fields are semiotically constructed.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Cf Martin (1992: 545):
domestic taxonomies deal with the 'natural' order of things — the common sense construction of experience.
[2] Cf Martin (1992: 545), where "linguistically constructed" fields are contrasted with fields that are not so constructed:
The linguistically constructed taxonomies of humanities, social science, and science are the ones that are most appropriately referred to as technical since they function as distillations of common sense or less technical experience into uncommon sense classifications of the world.

It would appear that Martin is here incorporating feedback he received on earlier drafts, but failing to connect the feedback with the implications of what he had written.

Saturday, 6 August 2016

Metafunctional Inconsistency

Martin (1992: 545-6):
Any such scaling of fields with respect to degree of specialisation and technicality, alongside the scaling of oral and written (especially metaphorical) modes this implies, runs the risk of being misinterpreted as valuing different fields in different ways.  This kind of ranking should not be read into the networks at the level of field.  However it is obvious that fields are valued in different ways and so ranked by all cultures: in Australia, for example, being young, non-anglo, working class or female vastly restricts the meaning potential human cultures otherwise afford.  Discourses of generation, gender, ethnicity and class channel subjects in very different ways according to the coding orientations they enjoy.  It is the responsibility of the plane of ideology to make the nature of this channeling clear, deconstructing the momentum and inherent contradictions which allow it to evolve.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Alongside the mode system distinction of oral vs written (textual metafunction), Martin includes the distinction of oral vs written transmission in his discussion and system of field (ideational metafunction).

[2] This is misleading.  It is not any mode that is metaphorical.  Instead, the language of some modes may deploy more grammatical metaphor than the language of other modes.  For example, ceteris paribus, there is typically more use of ideational metaphor in the language of written mode than in the language of spoken mode.

[3] This simplistic analysis is falsified, for example, by the considerable number of young, non-"Anglo", female and formerly working class academics in Australian universities.  Compare also the 'coding orientation' of the present blogger, whose ancestral lines include Irish, German, Jewish and Australian indigenous, and who comes from a family where the father laboured as an employee on factory floors and building sites.

[4] The model of the plane of ideology (pp573-88) will be assessed in terms of how well it meets this responsibility.

Friday, 5 August 2016

Confusing Experience With Construals Of Experience

Martin (1992: 545):
The linguistically constructed [field] taxonomies of humanities, social science, and science are the ones that are most appropriately referred to as technical since they function as distillations of common sense or less technical experience into uncommon sense classifications of the world.

Blogger Comments:

[1] All field taxonomies are "linguistically constructed", and in two senses.  On the one hand, field is construed by language; that is, during logogenesis, the language that realises a given contextual field intellectually constructs that field.  On the other hand, field taxonomies are linguistic construals of experience.

[2] This confuses field (context) with the language that realises field.  The confusion is thus along the dimension of stratification (symbolic identity).

[3] The nominal group 'commonsense or less technical experience' confuses experience with commonsense construals of experience.

Thursday, 4 August 2016

Misconstruing Field Taxonomies As Classifications Of Personnel & Semiotic Objects

Martin (1992: 545):
The distinctive [field] taxonomies of public administration are also pragmatic, but tend to organise people (or better, subjects) rather than things (e.g. classification of personnel), and writing (e.g. files, legislation, minutes, manuals, etc.) rather than experience.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The claim here is that taxonomic classifications of such fields tend to "organise" subjects — as exemplified by a classification of personnel — rather than things.  On the other hand, in SFL theory, field refers to 'what's going on' in terms of the culture when language is used.

[2] The claim here is that taxonomic classifications of such fields tend to "organise" writing — or more accurately: semiotic objects, as exemplified by files, legislation, minutes, manuals, etc. — rather than experience.  On the other hand, in SFL theory, field refers to 'what's going on' in terms of the culture when language is used.

(It might be noted that the contrast between semiotic objects and experience is the contrast between construals of experience and experience.)

Wednesday, 3 August 2016

Confusing Orders Of Experience

Martin (1992: 545):
The distinctive [field] taxonomies of recreation and trades tend to be utilitarian in focus, organising in large part the special equipment and tools required and the Mediums they operate on.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Equipment and tools are parts of the material setting, not the semiotic context.  This confuses orders of experience.

[2] This construes tools and equipment, rather than people, as the Agents of such Processes.

Tuesday, 2 August 2016

Confusing Field And Language

Martin (1992: 545):
As far as [field] taxonomies are concerned, domestic taxonomies deal with the 'natural' order of things — the common sense construction of experience.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL theory, a field taxonomy is a classification of the types of fields in a culture that are realised by language and its attendant semiotic systems.

[2] To be clear, no field taxonomy deals with the 'natural' order of things.  On the one hand, a field taxonomy models the ideational dimension of culture as a semiotic system.  On the other, it is the ideational dimension of the language that construes experience. This confusion is thus stratificational.

[3] It is very misleading to equate the commonsense construal experience — i.e. those that don't employ ideational metaphor — with the 'natural' order of things (scare quotes notwithstanding).  On the other hand, the language that realises the field of quantum physics depends heavily on ideational metaphor, is very uncommonsense, and yet construes the physical order of Nature.

Monday, 1 August 2016

A False Dichotomy

Martin (1992: 544-5):
The activity sequences generated by the discourses of humanities, social science and especially science tend to be logical rather than sequential — if/then or so then rather than and then.  It is for this reasons [sic] that scientific sequences (e.g. how it rains) are referred to as implication sequences in Wignell et al. (1987/1990), Shea (1988) and Martin (1990).

Blogger Comments:

[1] In this modelling of field, in this instance, 'activity sequences' now refers to the language realising fields, rather than to non-linguistic behaviours (see previous post) or to the contextual fields that are realised in language.  The confusion is thus stratificational.

[2] 'Logical vs sequential' is a false dichotomy.  Leaving aside the fact that, in SFL theory, 'sequence' refers to two or more figures related logically through expansion or projection, the relations here are all logical:
  • if…then construes a hypotactic logical relation of expansion: enhancement: condition;
  • so then construes a logical relation of expansion: enhancement;
  • and then construes a paratactic logical relation of expansion: enhancement: temporal.

Sunday, 31 July 2016

Misconstruing Behaviour As A Register Of Language

Martin (1992: 543):
Domestic sequences tend to be implicit — they are not usually written down, or taken notice of in any way by mature speakers, and are learned by doing, under the guidance of caregivers by children.

Blogger Comment:

Here 'sequences' refers to (material order) behaviour, not (semiotic order) language, nor the context realised by language.  The model being developed here is purported to be field, the ideational dimension of the culture as semiotic, realised in language, so the confusion is one of orders of experience.

The inconsistency is compounded by Martin's misconstrual of this behaviour as register, a subpotential of language.

Saturday, 30 July 2016

Misconstruing Mode As Field

Martin (1992: 542):
Taking the nature of socialisation and lexical specialisation into account, a provisional classification of fields can be provided.  The first cut is between fields depending on oral transmission and those depending on writing; this opposes home, recreation and trades to public administration, humanities, social science and science (or in more general terms, oral cultures to literate ones).

Blogger Comments:

[1] The 'oral' vs 'writing' distinction is a distinction of mode (textual), not field (ideational).  The confusion is thus in terms of metafunction.

[2] Many trades, of course, require some form of (literate) tertiary education.

Friday, 29 July 2016

Why Chomskyan Linguistics Has Power

Martin (1992: 541-2):
Note that this taxonomy [Fig. 7.18 Superordination taxonomy for theories of language] is uninflected for power, which rests for obvious reasons with theories that naturalise discourses of ethnicity, gender, generation and class by positing an arbitrary relation between form and meaning, thereby rendering language a transparent conduit through which these discourses are poured.

Blogger Comments:

The claim here is that:
  1. Chomskyan Linguistics has power over other theories;
  2. Chomskyan Linguistics naturalises discourses of ethnicity, gender, generation and class;
  3. the means of this naturalisation is the construal of the relation between syntax and semantics as arbitrary;
  4. the result of this naturalisation by such means is that language is construed as a transparent conduit through which these naturalised discourses are poured;
  5. the reason why this should confer power on Chomskyan Linguistics is obvious.

a
= b
Note  
[[that this taxonomy is uninflected for power]]
which
(power)
rests
for obvious reasons
with
theories [[[that naturalise discourses of ethnicity, gender, generation and class || by positing an arbitrary relation between form and meaning, || thereby rendering language a transparent conduit [[through which these discourses are poured]] ]]]]
Process: mental
Phenomenon: fact
Attribute: possession
Pro-
Cause
-cess
Carrier: possessor


a
x b manner
x c result
that
(theories)
naturalise
discourses of ethnicity, gender, generation and class
by
positing
an arbitrary relation
between form and meaning
thereby
rendering
language
a transparent conduit [[through which these discourses are poured]]
Attributor
Process
Attribute
Carrier

Process
Goal
Location

Process
Token
Value

Thursday, 28 July 2016

Confusing Composition And Superordination

Martin (1992: 540-1):
As noted in Chapter 5, alongside activity sequences, the participants involved in sequences are organised into taxonomies of two basic kinds: composition and superordination.  The compositional taxonomy in Fig. 7.17 for members of an Australian linguistics department for example organises participants who play some part in all of the sequences reviewed above.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As noted previously here, Martin confuses composition with superordination taxonomies.

[2] This "compositional" taxonomy (meronymic) is largely one of superordination (hyponymy).  This can be demonstrated by presenting the claims made by Fig. 7.17:
  • an Australian linguistics department consists of two parts: salaried staff and students;
  • salaried staff consist of two parts: academic and non-academic;
  • academic consists of two parts: Head and scaled;
  • scaled consists of two parts: lecturing and tutoring;
  • lecturing consists of five parts: Professor, Associate Professor, Reader, Senior Lecturer and Lecturer;
  • tutoring consists of two parts: full-time and part-time;
  • full-time consists of two parts: Senior Tutor and Tutor;
  • non-academic consists of two parts: clerical and technological;
  • clerical consists of three parts: secretarial, administrative and keyboard operator;
  • technological consists of two parts: programmer and technician;
  • post-graduate consists of two parts: research and coursework;
  • research consists of two parts: PhD and MA;
  • MA consists of two parts: MA Hons and MA Pass;
  • undergraduate consists of four parts: I, II, III and IV Hons;
  • both II and III consist of two parts: pass and honours.

Cf. a spoon consists of two parts: the handle and the bowl.

[3] This is an error of Aristotelian logic.  Not all participants play some part in all of the sequences.  All participants play some part in some sequences.

[4] The confusion here is between playing a part in a sequence and being a part of a whole.

Wednesday, 27 July 2016

Misrepresenting Barthes And Confusing Material & Semiotic Orders Of Experience

Martin(1992: 538-9):
Focussing on narrative theory, Barthes does not take the step of theorising paradigmatic relations among activity sequences, for which the notion of field is developed here.  A field such as linguistics for example involves a large number of sequences: lecturing, evaluation, supervising, writing, editing, meetings, committees, seminars, conferences, research activities, referee's reports, community work, administration and so on.  More than one of these may well succeed another as a series of micro-sequences, but there is more to their interrelationships than this constituency analysis suggests.  All are related to participation in the field of linguistics, sharing a large number of taxonomies of both the superordinate and compositional variety.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misrepresents Barthes' sequences, which are language structures, as Martin's activity sequences, which are misconstrued by Martin as context, which in turn is misconstrued by Martin as register.  The confusion is thus simultaneously along the two theoretical dimensions of stratification and instantiation.

[2] This confuses what people do (lecturing etc.) with what people say (sequences). The confusion is thus between material and semiotic orders of experience.

Tuesday, 26 July 2016

Misrepresenting Barthes

Martin (1992: 538):
Barthes continues by pointing out that activity sequences have names, and may be encapsulated by the name to form part of another sequence.  This suggests in effect that the notion of constituency can be applied to the compositional relations among activity sequences (and Barthes in fact provides an appropriate tree diagram for the first episode of Goldfinger):
It (a sequence) is also founded a maximo: enclosed on its function, subsumed under a name, the sequence itself constitutes a new unit, ready to function as a single term in another, more extensive sequence.  Here, for example, is a micro-sequence: hand held out, hand shaken, hand released.  This Greeting then becomes a simple function: on the one hand, it assumes the rôle of an indice (flabbiness of Du Pont, Bond's distaste); on the other, it forms globally a term in a larger sequence, with the name Meeting, whose other terms (approach, halt, interpellation, sitting down) can themselves be micro-sequences. (1977: 102-3)
The meeting sequence in other words has as one of its nuclei another sequence — greeting:

meeting (greeting):
approach ^ halt ^ interpellation ^ (hand held out ^ hand shaken ^ hand released) ^ sitting down

Blogger Comments:

[1] For Barthes, it is a sequence of language that has a name.  Martin's activity sequence is misconstrued as context (field) which, in turn, is misconstrued as register.

[2] The (tautological) claim here is that part-whole relations (constituency) can be applied to part-whole (compositional) relations.

[3] To be clear, Barthes claim is that (micro-)sequences can be embedded in other sequences.