Misconstruing Incongruent Realisations And Expansion Types

Martin (1992: 326):

As has just been reviewed, lexical cohesion is being developed here as an analysis of relations between message parts.  A message part is realised congruently as a lexical item and incongruently through one of the elaborating structures defined above.  These are reviewed in Table 5.19.

Table 5.19. Congruent and incongruent realisations of message parts
	multiple lexical items (incongruent)	single lexical item (congruent)
clause	Process = Range:process act = a role Process = ritual Location go = to work	Process act go
verbal group	Event = Particle think = over Event = Leisure event go = skating	Event consider skate
nominal group	Classifier = Thing skating = rink Pre-Deictic = Thing the edge of = the rink Pre-Numerative = Thing a pair = of skates Pre-Epithet = Thing the largest of = the rinks Pre-Classifier = Thing that kind of = rink Deictic (possessive) = Thing her = foot	Thing rink the rink the skates the rink the rink the foot

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, lexical cohesion is a non-structural resource of the textual metafunction on the lexicogrammatical stratum.  Here it is being "developed" as a relation between experiential units on the discourse semantic stratum.

[2] In SFL theory, the incongruent realisation of semantics in lexicogrammar is termed grammatical metaphor.  On this basis, all the realisations in the 'multiple lexical items' column are metaphorical, whereas all those in the 'single lexical item' column are not.  That is, the incongruent act a rôle etc. are all metaphorical, whereas the congruent act etc. are not.

[3] The expansion relation between the Nucleus and Location (ritual or otherwise) is enhancement, not elaboration, since to work does not specify or describe (they) go.  Unsurprisingly, to work qualifies (they) go in terms of Location: direction.  Consequently, this example fails the criterion for being a message part.

[4] The expansion relation between such verbal groups in a verbal group complex is not elaboration, since skating does not specify or describe (they) go.  Instead, skating is the cause (purpose or result) of (they) go and, on that basis, the relation is enhancement. Consequently, this example fails the criterion for being a message part.

[5] If skating is the purpose of rink, then the expansion relation here is enhancement: cause, not elaboration;  cf a rink for skating.  Consequently, this example fails the criterion for being a message part.

[6] In the facet expression the edge of the rink, the expansion relation is extension: composition, not elaboration, since the edge is part of the rink.  Consequently, this example fails the criterion for being a message part.

[7] Unsurprisingly, the expansion relation between her and foot is extension: possession, not elaboration.  Consequently, this example fails the criterion for being a message part.

Using Ideational Labels For Textual Units And Vice Versa

Martin (1992: 325):

These ideational units at the level of discourse semantics are brought into relation with the interpersonal and textual units proposed in Table 5.18.

Table 5.18. Discourse semantics: units proposed in English Text
interpersonal	textual	ideational: logical	experiential
exchange
move		message
	participant		message part

Blogger Comments:

[1] Given that participants are construals of experience (experiential metafunction), and that the textual metafunction is second-order — concerned with organising the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions — the use of the term 'participant' for a unit of the textual metafunction betrays a misunderstanding of what the metafunctions mean.  As explained in posts critiquing Chapter 3, this specific misunderstanding arises from confusing the textual system that makes cohesive reference with the elements thus cohesively related.

[2] In SFL theory, 'message' is a unit of the textual metafunction at the level of semantics.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2004) discuss the realisation of textual meaning in the clause under the title 'Clause as Message', and in textual cohesion, the (lexicogrammatical) system of conjunction realises transitions between (semantic) messages.

[3] Here again, the relation between units of the logical and experiential metafunctions is misconstrued as composition (part–whole).

The Avoidance Of Experiential Meaning In Discourse Semantics

Martin (1992: 325):

The level of discourse semantics is the least differentiated as far as ideational meaning is concerned.  This is mainly due to the fact that the description developed here has focussed on relationships between experiential meanings, rather than the experiential meanings themselves.  So while it was found important to distinguish between message parts and lexical items, no formal distinctions were drawn among message parts.  As work on discourse semantics continues, particularly with respect to grammatical metaphor, it will prove necessary to differentiate technically among the different meanings at this level.  As far as English Text is concerned, the distinctions made at the levels of field and lexicogrammar are rich enough to carry the burden of the text analyses presented below.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is a very serious shortcoming indeed, given the rôle of ideational meaning in the history of the human species.  Humans construe experience as ideational meaning.

[2] In SFL theory, ideational meaning includes both experiential meaning and logical meaning.  In the discourse semantics model, logical meaning was the subject of Chapter 4, whereas experiential meaning is the subject of this chapter, Chapter 5: Ideation.

[3] The question here is 'Why?'.  Why does a chapter on experiential meaning focus on the relationships between experiential meanings, rather than on the experiential meanings themselves, and why are the relationships those of other metafunctions, logical and interpersonal?  How is this a model of experiential semantics?  Why, also, are experiential meanings exported to context, which is outside language?  Is it because it provides a better model of semantics?

[4] Given that message parts are proposed as units of the discourse semantic stratum, whereas lexical items are the outputs of systems of the lexicogrammatical stratum, the difference between them is clearly defined by the architecture of SFL theory.

[5] Given that, in SFL theory, grammatical metaphor depends on the distinction between congruent and incongruent realisations of semantics in lexicogrammar, the discourse semantic model provides no means of distinguishing experiential metaphors.  On the weaker claim that grammatical metaphor is a matter of stratal tension, it will be seen from previous and future posts that there is little other than stratal tension between discourse semantics and lexicogrammar.

[6] This is because the distinctions made at the level of field are actually distinctions made at the level of semantics, as explained in many previous posts.  The misunderstanding of what stratification means is one of many major factors undermining the theoretical value of the entire discourse semantic model, as the reasoning throughout this blog demonstrates.

No Identifiable Discourse Semantic Unit Realised By Clause Complexes

Martin (1992: 324-5):

the grammatical functions (based on Halliday 1985) which correspond most closely to the field categories just reviewed are outlined in Table 5.17.

Table 5.17. Ideational labelling across levels
field	discourse-semantics	experiential grammar
activity sequence	(unnamed)	clause complex (temporal)
activity	message	Process (& transitivity roles)
activity	message part	Event
people & things	message part	Thing
place	message part	Circumstance
quality	message part	Epithet; Manner adverb

Blogger Comments:

[1] Obviously, clause complexes and adverbs are not functions.  They are forms.

[2] The labels listed under 'field' are semantic categories (that realise context), not context.

[3] Activity sequences in 'field' have no identified realisation in discourse semantics, and all sequences other than those related temporally are ignored in the model.

[4] Activity in 'field' is realised by 

• a logical unit in discourse semantics, the message, which, in turn is realised in lexicogrammar by the experiential functions of the clause, and also
• an experiential unit in discourse semantics, the message part, which in turn is realised in lexicogrammar by just one of the experiential functions of the verbal group.

Activity in 'field' is thus realised in discourse semantics by both a whole and a part of that whole. The relation between the logical and experiential metafunctions is thus misconstrued as one of composition.

Self-Contradiction And Misunderstanding Stratification

Martin (1992: 324):

The description of ideational meaning has now been pursued on three levels: lexicogrammar, discourse semantics and field.  At its most basic level a field consists of activity sequences, which are in turn composed of activities, which are themselves made up of actions configuring with people, places and things, all four of which components may be configured with qualities.  Activity sequences stand in an unmarked relation relation to temporally sequenced clause complexes in lexicogrammar;

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, ideational meaning is located on one stratum of the stratification hierarchy, semantics, not three.  Meaning can be viewed from the other levels, from above (context) or from below (lexicogrammar), as well as from its own level — the trinocular perspective — but that is not what has been pursued here.  In the discourse semantics model, instead, because the SFL notion of strata as different levels of symbolic abstraction is not understood:

• relations at one level (lexicogrammar) are misconstrued as obtaining between units two levels higher in symbolic abstraction (context) — a level, which in SFL theory, is not even within language;

• context (field) is misconstrued as a level of language; and

• ideational semantics is misconstrued as field.

[2] Trivially, field is not a level; it is the ideational dimension of a level (context).

[3] These "field" units correspond to the orders of phenomena in the ideational semantics of SFL theory: sequences ('activity sequences'), figures ('activities') and elements, which include processes ('actions'), participants ('people', 'things' and 'qualities') and circumstances ('places').

[4] This continues the terminological confusion of using 'unmarked' for 'congruent' relations across strata.  Moreover, since activity sequences are misconstrued as being at the level of context, the intervening level, discourse semantics, is omitted from this stratal relation.

[5] This is even inconsistent with Martin's own observations:

• 'the most common conjunction relating activities in an activity sequence is and, alongside the much more occasional realisation of temporal succession' (1992: 322);

• 'in the following text for example, one activity follows another by law; in scientific discourse this relation is made explicit through conditional consequential conjunctions (typically if/then)' (1992: 323).

Confusing Strata And Confusing Metafunctions

Martin (1992: 324):

Accordingly, as far as lexical relations between activities are concerned, a distinction will be drawn between expectancy and implicational relations according to whether one activity is probably followed by another (modalisation; activity a probably followed by activity b) or is absolutely determined by the other (modulation; activity a necessarily followed by activity b) as in the scientific explanation discussed above.

Blogger Comments:

[1] There are two inconsistencies here.  The first is the notion that lexical relations (lexicogrammatical stratum) can obtain between activities (construed as context).  The second is the notion that relations between activities — in SFL theory: between figures in sequences — can be lexical rather than semantic (realised grammatically).

[2] There is a metafunctional inconsistency here.  In this chapter on experiential semantics, interpersonal relations (modality) are proposed for (lexical) relations between activities (misconstrued as context).

[3] This is a category error.  Implication is not necessity; necessity is a hyponym of implication.  In logic, necessity contrasts with sufficiency as types of implicational relations between statements.

[4] The geography text does not construe deterministic or necessary relations between 'activities'.  See the previous post and/or any discussion of determinism (e.g. here) and/or necessity and sufficiency (e.g. here).

Misconstruing Ideational Semantics As Field

Martin (1992: 323-4):

In the following text for example, one activity follows another by law; in scientific discourse this relation is made explicit through conditional consequential relations (typically if/then). 

[5:31]  We saw that leaching was a very prominent process in all hot, wet, forest lands; in deserts because the rainfall is so low, it hardly occurs at all.  Instead a reverse process may develop called calcification.  Water may soak into the ground after rains and dissolve mineral salts in the usual way, but as the surface dries out, this water is drawn upwards like moisture rising through blotting paper.  The salts then accumulate in the surface soil as this moisture evaporates; thus desert soils are often rich in mineral salts, particularly calcium, sodium and potassium.  Provided the salts are not too concentrated (and their concentration is reduced under irrigation), they contain a plentiful supply of plant foods and can therefore be considered as fertile soils.

 The logical structure of the activity sequence calcification outlined here is as follows:

i.  If water soaks into the ground

ii.  then it will dissolve mineral salts.

iii. If it does, then if the surface dries out

iv.  then the water is drawn upwards.

v.  If it is, then if the water evaporates

vi.  then salts accumulate in the surface soil.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In the discourse semantics model, as these 'activity sequences' demonstrate, language (ideational semantics) is confused with context (field).  These 'activity sequences' are ideational meanings, not the ideational dimension of culture.  In SFL terms, the (second-order) field here is geography.  The meanings of geography are semantics, or more precisely: a semantic domain.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 323):

… the semantic correlate of a contextual field is a domain. When we model the ideational semantics of a particular field, we create a domain model.

[2] No laws are presented in the geography text, and there is only one instance of a conditional relation.

[3] This is purported to be the 'logical structure' of the field of the first text.  However, it is actually just another text that reconstrues the expansion relations of first text as exclusively enhancing: causal-conditional. The expansion relations could also have been reconstrued as, say, exclusively enhancing: temporal or as extending: addition.