Misconstruing 'A Realises B' As 'A Makes B Come To Be'

Martin (1992: 378):

Clearly this chapter has meant a number of things that have never been meant before; it has been involved in constructing the field of lexical relations (point (ii) above) as much as realising immanent meanings that have been previously construed.

Blogger Comments:

[1] As the critiques of this chapter demonstrate, there are valid reasons why these things 'have never been meant before'.  This chapter is purported to model experiential semantics, but instead:

• confuses two lexicogrammatical dimensions: lexical cohesion (textual metafunction) and lexis (delicacy),
• confuses semantics with context (field),
• models experiential structure as logical and interpersonal relations between units that are defined according to a misapplication of expansion relations.

[2] In 'point (ii) above', A realises B is interpreted as A constitutes B, which is, in turn, glossed as A makes B come to be.  In such an interpretation, the intensive identifying process of A realises B:

A	realises	B
Token	Process: relational: intensive: symbol	Value

is misconstrued as the caused existential process A makes B come to be:

A	makes	B	come to be
Creator	Process	Existent	existential

In SFL theory, this gloss is closer in meaning to the process of instantiation, where potential is actualised ('made actual'). However, instantiation is not an interstratal relation.

[3] The notion of 'realising immanent meanings that have been previously construed' relates to the distinction, in logogenesis, between recycling already codified meanings and constructing new ones.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 24):

The production of discourse by an individual speaker or writer can be seen as a dialectic between these two semiotic activities: between (i) recycling elements, figures and sequences that that individual has used many times before, and so for him or her are already fully codified, and (ii) constructing new ones that are being codified for the first time (and some of which may remain codified for future use — especially with a child who is learning the system).

Misconstruing 'A Realises B' As 'A Makes B Material'

Martin (1992: 378):

As noted in Chapter 1, to say that A realises B is to say: (i) A manifests B (i.e. makes B material); (ii) A constitutes B (i.e. makes B come to be); (iii) A reconstitutes B (i.e. continually renovates B, however gradually); and (iv) A symbolises B (i.e. is a metaphor for B).  Unfortunately the grammar of English can focus on only one aspect of this realisation spectrum at a time, and the part which has usually been grammaticalised in this chapter is realisation i. A (lexicogrammar) manifests B (field). 

It should go without saying however with respect to the system/process model developed here that points (ii), (iii) and (iv) are always relevant. … Realisation then is a technical concept embracing all these meanings.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This was not noted in Chapter 1.

[2] To say A realises B is to say that A and B are in a relation of symbolic identity, such that A is less abstract than B.  Moreover, the identity encodes B by reference to A, and decodes A by reference to B.

encoding

A	realises	B
Identifier	Process: relational: identifying: intensive: symbol	Identified
Token		Value

decoding

A	realises	B
Identified	Process: relational: identifying: intensive: symbol	Identifier
Token		Value

For example, in wording realises meaning, the identity encodes meaning by reference to wording, and decodes wording by reference to meaning.

[3] Obviously, what the grammar can or cannot 'focus on' has no bearing on the theoretical definition of realisation.

[4] This is a misuse of the word 'grammaticalised'.  The theoretical notion of realisation has not been 'made grammatical' or 'integrated into a system of grammar' in this chapter.

[5] In SFL theory, lexicogrammar does not "manifest field" or "make field material".  (Lexicogrammar, like field, is semiotic, not material.)  Lexicogrammar realises semantics, and semantics realises context, the ideational dimension of which is field.  Or to take metaredundancy into account: lexicogrammar realises the realisation of context in semantics; or: the realisation of semantics in lexicogrammar realises context.  See Halliday (1992) How Do You Mean?.

[6] Preferably, this should not be said at all, for the simple reason that it isn't true, as this and subsequent posts demonstrate.

Misrepresenting Field And Misconstruing Interstratal Realisation

Martin (1992: 378):

Throughout this chapter, much more attention has had to be paid to register variables than in Chapter 2, 3 and 4.  The discussion of IDEATION was undertaken with a view to textually mediating the realisation of field in lexicogrammar.  During any such consideration of the realisation of one level of meaning in another, it needs to be kept in mind that as a theoretical construct realisation is not directional.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misrepresents field — tenor and mode were not discussed — as a register variable instead of contextual variable.  No argument has been made for reinterpreting context as register; the claim has merely been repeated over and over.*  The many reasons why modelling context as register is inconsistent with the meaning of both concepts will be outlined in the critique of Chapter 7: Context.

[2] Texts don't "mediate" realisation.  Texts are instances of a systemic potential that is stratally organised in terms of realisation.

[3] 'The realisation of field in lexicogrammar' misrepresents stratification.  Field is realised in semantics, not lexicogrammar; it is semantics that is realised in lexicogrammar.  However, since Martin's 'field' is actually semantic, there is an unintentional truth here.

[4] This continues the misunderstanding of stratification arising from confusing it with semogenesis, as previously explained.  In SFL theory, the strata construe different levels of symbolic abstraction, only one of which, semantics, is the level of meaning.  This is distinct from 'meaning-making' or semogenesis.

[5] Realisation is a relation of identity between two levels of symbolic abstraction — one higher (the Value), one lower (the Token).  The lower Token (e.g. lexicogrammatical stratum) realises the higher Value (e.g. semantic stratum); the higher Value is realised by the lower Token.

—

*As Aldous Huxley (1991 [1932]: 38) described 'hypnopædia' in Brave New World:

Sixty-two thousand four hundred repetitions make one truth.

Multiplying A Misunderstanding Of The External Vs Internal Distinction

Martin (1992: 377-8):

The proportionalities among these "external" and "internal" aspects of IDEATION, IDENTIFICATION  and CONJUNCTION are as follows:

organising field :	organising text ::
message part relation :	meta-message relation ::
participant reference :	text reference ::
external conjunction :	internal conjunction

Blogger Comment:

[1] This continues the misunderstanding of the distinction between internal and external expansion relations, and exports the misunderstanding to other proposed discourse semantic systems.

Internal relations are those that are internal to the exchange, obtaining between propositions (interpersonal) rather than figures (experiential).  A memorable example of an internal relation, deployed logically in a clause complex, is the line from Monty Python's Life Of Brian:

If it's not a personal question, are you a virgin?

Martin confuses internal relations with those that are, in SFL terms, textually cohesive — though not consistently — as these pages demonstrate.

[2] The systems of ideation, identification and conjunction are said to be developed as the discourse semantic counterparts of lexical cohesion, reference and conjunction in the lexicogrammar.  In SFL, all three lexicogrammatical systems are types of cohesion, the non-structural resource of the textual metafunction, and so are all 'meta' in the sense of being concerned with the organisation of the ideational and the interpersonal meanings in the creation of text.

[3] Although participant reference is presented as a resource of the textual metafunction at the level of discourse semantics, it is here presented as 'organising' (i.e. in SFL: construing) the ideational dimension of context.  As previously demonstrated, this relates to mistaking cohesive relations for covariate structures, which in turn leads to confusing the system of referring with the elements ("participants") referred to.

Claiming That Conjunctive Relations Are Realised By Nouns

Martin (1992: 377):

This use of messages and message parts in a kind of meta-discursive relation to preceding and subsequent meanings in text is not unlike the function of text reference or that of internal conjunction.  Indeed, meta-message relations often work in conjunction with demonstratives and closely resemble text reference; and internal conjunctive relations are often realised through what Francis calls A-nouns.

TEXT REFERENCE
[5:54]  Ben lost in straight sets; it really upset him. 

A-NOUN
[5:55]  Ben lost in straight sets; that result really upset him. 

INTERNAL CONJUNCTION
[5:56]  Ben lost in straight sets; in that respect I hardly recognised him.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The 'meta' aspect here relates to the second-order status of the textual metafunction in relation to the ideational and interpersonal metafunction.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398):

The textual metafunction second–order in the sense that it is concerned with semiotic reality: that is, reality in the form of meaning. This dimension of reality is itself constructed by [the] other two metafunctions: the ideational, which construes a natural reality, and the interpersonal, which enacts an intersubjective reality. … The function of the textual metafunction is thus an enabling one with respect to the rest; it takes over the semiotic resources brought into being by the other two metafunctions and as it were operationalises them …

This second–order enabling nature of the textual metafunction is seen both at the level of context, where mode (the functions assigned to language in the situation) is second–order in relation to field and tenor (the ongoing social processes and interactant rôles), and the level of content — the semantics and the lexicogrammar, where the systems of theme and information, and the various types of cohesion, are second–order in relation to ideational and interpersonal systems of transitivity, mood, and the rest. 

[2] In each of the three examples, cohesive relations are effected through reference items: it (personal), that (demonstrative).

[3] This continues the confusion of cohesive conjunction with "internal" conjunction.  Here the cohesive conjunctive relation marking the textual transition is enhancement: matter: positive (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 543).

[4] By definition, conjunctive relations — the textual deployment of types of expansion — are not realised by nouns.  There is no conjunctive relation in the example given ([5:55]), internal or otherwise.

[5] This misconstrues the noun result as an A-noun (Francis 1985).  All the A-nouns listed were names of projections, and so second-order construals (construals of construals of experience).  The noun result is not the name of a projection; it is simply a first-order construal of experience.

Confusing Three Distinct Notions Of "Predicting" Discourse

Martin (1992: 377):

Predicting and referring to discourse is not simply a function of lexical items.  Nuclear configurations are also used in this way; for example:

Before I begin, let me say…

I'll stop here for questions…

I'll conclude by summarising…

Before going on to Chapter 6…

etc.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The use of the term 'predicting' in this chapter confuses three distinct meanings.  Here it is used in sense of a speaker referring to what is to come in the discourse.  Previously it was used in the sense of instantial probabilities (selecting one lexical item 'predicts' certain others will likely follow).  In the first instance, it was used in the sense of a hearer expecting an oncoming proposition — as in the example Becker's double faulting was unexpected in the field (p323).

[2] None of the nuclear configurations exemplifying the claim are identified.

Three Minor Clarifications

Martin (1992: 376-7):

Carter also reports on Francis's (1985) study of what she terms anaphoric nouns (A-nouns).  These are used in conjunction with anaphoric reference items to refer to preceding discourse. … Carter (1987: 80) lists the following examples of Francis's A-nouns.  All, it can be noted, are grammatical metaphors, reflecting the fact that congruent English reconstructs discourse as a rhetorical process, not as a product or thing.

retrospective
Examples from Francis (A-nouns)
accusation	consideration	interpretation	report
admission	criticism	judgement	repudiation
allegation	declaration	observation	retort
answer	definition	point	revelation
argument	denial	prediction	statement
assumption	description	proposal	stipulation
belief	diagnosis	proposition	suggestion
challenge	estimate	reading	threat
complaint	evidence	reasoning	theory
conclusion	examination	reference	viewpoint
confession	hypothesis	refusal

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, these 'anaphoric nouns' are nominalisations that name types of verbal and mental projections.  Any anaphoric function is realised by the reference item that marks its identity as recoverable in the preceding discourse. 

[2] The congruent construes experience; the metaphorical reconstrues experience.

[3] In SFL theory, 'discourse as process' is theorised as logogenesis: the unfolding of text through the instantiation of potential.

Misconstruing Instantiation Probability As The Opposite Of Anaphoric Reference

Martin (1992: 375):

One type of lexical relation which has not received sufficient attention here is that whereby message parts either predict subsequent discourse patterns or refer backwards to what has already been written or said.  Winter (1977) proposes a set of 108 Vocabulary 3 items which predict ensuing discourse patterns, especially conjunctive relations.  Winter's point is that using an item like convergence in a sentence predicts that some kind of comparison will follow.

Bloggers Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, this type of 'prediction' during logogenesis is modelled as instantiation probabilities of register.

[2] In SFL theory, discourse patterns are modelled in terms of logogenesis: as logogenetic patterns.

[3] In SFL theory, referring 'backwards to what has already been written or said' is modelled as anaphoric reference.  It is a distinct system from cohesive lexical relations.  Referring backwards is not the opposite of predicting forwards.

[4] In SFL theory, 'using an item' is modelled as the process of instantiation: selecting features and activating realisation statements — during logogenesis, the unfolding of text.