Misconstruing 'Cohesion Within The Sentence'

Martin (1992: 19):

Halliday and Hasan do recognise that "cohesion within the sentence need not be regarded essentially as distinct phenomena" (1976: 9), but argue that in the description of a text "it is the intersentence cohesion that is significant, because that represents the variable aspect of cohesion, distinguishing one text from another" (1976: 9).  In a sense, the line they draw between cohesion and grammar is justified descriptively rather than theoretically.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here Martin misinterprets the line between 'cohesion within the sentence' and 'intersentence cohesion' as the line between cohesion and grammar.  Both uses of cohesion are cohesion, the non-structural component of the textual metafunction, and cohesion is located on the lexicogrammatical stratum.

[2] The distinction between 'cohesion within the sentence' and 'intersentence cohesion' is thus not a descriptive justification of a distinction between grammar and cohesion.  The reason Halliday and Hasan focus on 'intersentence cohesion' for the description of a text is that this is most relevant for comparing texts in terms of (as instances of) register.  The quote from Halliday and Hasan (1976: 23) that Martin provides (op cit: 28) makes this clear:

The concept of COHESION can therefore be usefully supplemented by that of REGISTER, since the two together effectively define a TEXT.

Misrepresenting The Domain Of Cohesion

Martin (1992: 19):

In Cohesion In English terms, structure is concerned with relationships within the sentence, cohesion with relationships between them.

Blogger Comment:

This is not true.  In Systemic Functional grammar, multivariate structures pertain to rank units, such as the clause, and univariate structures to unit complexes, such as the clause complex.

Cohesive relations can obtain both within and between clauses and clause complexes.  Examples include substitution or ellipsis in the secondary clause of a clause nexus, or anaphoric reference or lexical cohesion within a clause nexus.

Misrepresenting Cohesion [Augmented]

Martin (1992: 17, 19):

Third there is the problem of text. This is really a question of limits. As far as experiential structure is concerned the most embracing grammatical unit is the clause; and the grammar extends its scope by combining clauses in logical interdependency structures referred to in Halliday (1985a) as clause complexes. But even extended in this way, the grammar provides only a partial account of textual patterns. At issue are proportionalities of the following kinds:

Each of these oppositions [taxis vs cohesion] represents the line drawn by Halliday and Hasan (1976; Halliday 1973; 1985: 288) between grammar (in this case the clause complex) and cohesion, with grammar focussing on structural resources for realising text and cohesion on non-structural ones.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading, because taxis and cohesion are both components of the grammar, and together they account for the data that Martin presents. 

[2] This misrepresents the place of cohesion in Halliday's model.  Cohesion is part of the grammar — the non-structural resources of the textual metafunction — not separate from it.

Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 538):

… the systems of cohesion operate within either the grammatical zone or the lexical zone of the lexicogrammatical continuum. Conjunction, reference and ellipsis are all grammatical systems, and are thus all manifestations of what we might call grammatical cohesion. The point of origin of each of these systems falls within one or more particular grammatical unit; and terms within these systems are realised either by grammatical items that have some particular place within the structure of that unit or (in the case of ellipsis) by the absence of elements of grammatical structure. For example, the systemic environment of conjunction is that of the clause; and conjunctions serve as conjunctive Adjuncts in the structure of the clause. In contrast, lexical cohesion operates within the lexical zone; and it follows the general principle that lexical items are not defined in terms of particular grammatical environments.

Separating cohesion from the grammar will provide Martin with a pretext for relocating it on his stratum of 'discourse semantics'.

Self-Contradiction On Modelling Grammatical Metaphor [New]

Martin (1992: 17):

Note that it is not being suggested here that a semantics be set up to generate meanings which are then expressed congruently or metaphorically in grammatical forms (see Martin 1991a for further discussion). Rather, taking semantics as point of departure, choosing an metaphorical realisation means encoding additional layers of meaning; it is not just a question of choosing an untypical means of expression. The grammar makes meaning, irrespective of whether it constitutes, or participates as one level, in the content plane.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, even though this suggestion would indeed be inconsistent with Martin's proposal — see previous post — this is precisely what Martin does do, despite the claim above, as demonstrated by his discussion of his only experiential semantic unit, the message part. Martin (1992: 326):

A message part is realised congruently as a lexical item and incongruently through one of the elaborating structures defined above. These are reviewed in Table 5.19.

(Note also the absence of metaphor in the "incongruent" grammatical realisations, and the confusion of lexical item with grammatical function.)

[2] To be clear, for Martin, grammatical 'form' means the grammar, not just the rank scale. He uses 'content form' (p401) to refer to the content plane as a whole.

[3] To be clear, this is true, but not in a sense understood by Martin, or accounted for in his model of discourse semantics. As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 288) explain, grammatical metaphor involves an internal "stratification" within the semantic stratum, with the congruent meaning (Value) realised by the metaphorical meaning (Token):

The metaphorical relation is thus similar to inter-stratal realisation in that it construes a token-value type of relation. Here, however, the relation is intra-stratal: the identity holds between different meanings, not between meanings and wordings. The metaphor consists in relating different semantic domains of experience…

[4] To be clear, here Martin confuses semogenesis (the grammar making meaning) with stratification (the grammar realising meaning), a confusion that runs through this entire publication.

Misrepresenting Grammatical Metaphor [Revised]

Martin (1992: 17):

Stratifying the content plane provides one mechanism for handling semantic layering of this kind.  The level of grammar can be used to provide an interpretation of the "literal" meaning of metaphorical structures and the meaning of congruent ones; the level of semantics can then be deployed to construct additional interpretations for metaphorical expressions (their "figurative" or "transferred" meaning).

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, Martin proposes that, in his stratification of the content plane, congruent construals of experience are located at the level of lexicogrammar, and metaphorical construals of experience are located at the level of semantics. There are two fundamental problems that undermine this proposal:

1. On this model, there are no semantic systems unless there are instances of grammatical metaphor in a text.
2. On this model, the levels of symbolic abstraction are upside down. Martin locates the lower level construal, the metaphorical, at the higher level, and the higher level construal, the congruent, at the lower level. A metaphorical construal stands for (realises) the congruent construal — not the reverse.

As this demonstrates, and will be seen later, Martin understands neither stratification nor grammatical metaphor. 

Grammatical Metaphor As Martin's Second Motivation For Stratifying Content [New]

 Martin (1992: 16-7):

Second, there is the process of grammatical metaphor, whereby the content plane derives structures requiring more than one level of interpretation. The following proportionalities illustrate phenomena of this kind:

It is the second member of each set that concerns us here. Each is "literally" a circumstantial relational clause with a causal verb (i.e. led to, resulted in and engendered) relating two nominalisations. At the same time each clause codes a "figurative" or "transferred" meaning closely related to the meaning literally coded in the first member of each set. Halliday (1985b) relates multiply coded structures such as these to the evolution of writing in English, describing them as grammatical metaphors. They contrast with the congruent structures typifying spoken English, for which a single layer of coding provides an adequate interpretation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, grammatical metaphor is Martin's second motivation for stratifying the content plane, despite the facts that the content plane is already stratified and grammatical metaphor was Halliday's principal motivation for doing so. As Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 237) later explained:

If the congruent pattern had been the only form of construal, we would probably not have needed to think of semantics and grammar as two separate strata: they would be merely two facets of the content plane, interpreted on the one hand as function and on the other as form.

[2] To be clear, as the terms 'metaphorical' and 'congruent' make plain, both  types of construal require more than one level of interpretation, since, if a construal is metaphorical or congruent, it is metaphorical or congruent with respect to some other interpretation. In the case of congruent construals, wording is congruent with respect to meaning, or, in the unstratified alternative, form is congruent with respect to function.

The Problems With Semantic Motifs As A Motivation For Stratification [Revised]

 Martin (1992: 16):

First, there is the question of semantic motifs running through the grammar which cannot be generalised at that level because of their diverse structural realisations.  The following proportionalities can be used to illustrate this point: 

Following Halliday (1985), the first clause in each set is behavioural, the second mental and the third relational — fundamentally different process types.  At the same time, all three clauses construct a relatively uniform, and not unfamiliar disposition for Ford.  One way to generalise across these various realisations of the same disposition is to stratify the content plane, setting up an attitude network realised across process types (with realisations extending into other areas of the grammar as well; for example, adverbial and nominal groups).

Blogger Comments:

To be clear, these 'semantic motifs' are the first of Martin's three reasons for his innovation of stratifying the content plane, despite the fact that the content plane is already stratified into semantics (meaning) and lexicogrammar (wording) in SFL Theory. Cf Halliday (1985: xvii-iii):

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, generalisation is a matter of systemic delicacy, not stratification. The relation between strata is one symbolic abstraction.

[2] To be clear, it is not true that different structural realisations necessarily warrant systems on a higher stratum. This is because the system of a stratum is already of a higher level of symbolic abstraction than the structures it specifies.

[3]  To be clear, the proportionality here is somewhat reduced, not least because, unknown to Martin, the first instance in each set is a clause complex, not a clause.

[4] To be clear, the "relatively uniform, and not unfamiliar disposition for Ford" in each set is variously construed as:

• a behavioural Process manifesting a conscious state,
• a mental Process impinged upon by a Phenomenon, and
• an Attribute realised by a qualified Epithet.

The rhetorical device deployed here is unnecessary complication — in order to overload the reader. Martin could easily have just contrasted:

• Ford is smiling [behavioural]
• Ford is rejoicing [mental]
• Ford is happy [relational]

[5] To be clear, having presented this as a reason for stratifying the content plane, Martin does not set up the proposed attitude network, and the issues are not raised again in the entire book.

Falsely Claiming That The Content Plane Was Not Stratified Before Martin (1992) [New]

Martin (1992: 15-6):

As we know, human languages elaborate these two strata in various ways: removing their experiential bias by adding foot and tone group ranks to the phonology, enabling the periodic and prosodic patterning characterising textual and interpersonal meaning; incorporating metafunctional layering in the grammar, of the different types discussed above; systematising combinations of words (groups) and reduced clauses (phrases) giving rise to an intermediate rank of group/phrase in the grammar (see Halliday 1985a:159); introducing morphology (eg. Hudson 1973), adding a rank below the word; providing for clause linkage (see Chapter 4) and so on. This raises the question of the point at which the grammar and phonology become saturated? When is stratification necessary within the content plane, especially given the extravagant approach to grammar pursued by systemic linguists as outlined above? Extravagant as systemic functional grammars are, they do run out of steam.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1]  This confuses language with metalanguage. To be clear, it wasn't human languages that elaborated these two strata in these specific ways but Halliday in his Systemic Functional theory of language.

[2]  This also confuses language with metalanguage. To be clear, any "experiential bias" is in theories of language that don't distinguish the different metafunctional modes of meaning.

[3] To be clear, the notion of a stratum becoming "saturated" or "running out of steam" is nonsensical, and derives from Martin's misunderstanding of the dimensions of SFL Theory as modules (pp 55, 77-8, 90, 268-9, 390, 488). The strata represent different views on language in terms of different levels of symbolic abstraction: 

• the semantic stratum is language viewed as meaning,
• the lexicogrammatical stratum is language viewed as wording
• the phonological stratum is language viewed as sounding.

Accordingly, all wording is located on the lexicogrammatical stratum, no matter how "saturated" it gets, and, since it alone is concerned with all of wording, no other stratum can be of assistance if it "runs out of steam".

[4] This is very misleading indeed, because here Martin falsely claims that the content plane is not already stratified into semantics and lexicogrammar, and that he will be the one to do so. Importantly, Martin knows that the content plane is already stratified, because it is explicitly stated in the principal source of his ideas: Halliday & Hasan (1976: 5):

Moreover, the earlier notion of grammatical metaphor depends on the content plane being stratified into semantics and lexicogrammar, and Martin uses Halliday's semantic system of SPEECH FUNCTION, rebranding it as his NEGOTIATION.

If John Bateman's review of Martin's English Text is any guide, then Martin has been successful in this deception. See

• On The Theoretical Value Of Martin's Stratification Of The Content Plane
• On "Martin's" Solidary Relationship Between Grammar And Semantics

Confusing Levels Of Symbolic Abstraction [New]

Martin (1992: 15):

The solution, referred to by Hjelmslev (1961) as the essential genius of human language, involves combining sounds in sequence to distinguish meanings. This immediately provides a stratified model with two ranks in the phonology, phoneme (distinct sounds) and syllable (distinct combinations of sounds) and one in grammar, the word (distinct meanings). At this point a second language can be proposed, lexese, in which there is a one to one relation between meanings and words.

As far as we know, evolved systems on the model of lexese do not occur. Once again, their limitations are obvious. They would require humans to remember an inordinately large number of words; and they have the further important limitation that no-one could mean something they hadn't already heard. The logical way out of systems of this kind is once more a combinatorial one — adding on a grammar than organises sequences of words. This brings us to something more closely resembling human language, at least as it is modelled in Hjelmslevian terms — a two strata system, with a minimum of two ranks on each stratum and an non-biunique (and therefore in principle arbitrary) relation between sound and meaning. This kind of two strata system is outlined in Fig. 1.11.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, Hjelmslev (1961) is concerned with expression and content; see [6] below.

[2] To be clear, the word, as grammatical form, is not meaning. The word realises meaning.

[3] This is a false conclusion to draw. To be clear, the one-to-one relation in this scenario is between wording and sounding, not between meaning and wording.

[4] To be clear, a language like lexese could not occur, because it requires grammatical form to emerge prior to the meaning it realises.

[5] To be clear, this does not resemble human language, because it is model in which words have no meanings.

[6] This is misleading, because it is not true. Hjelmslev's two levels are content and expression, whereas as Martin's are grammar and phonology. Where Hjelmslev's model includes meaning (in content), Martin's model does not.

On the one hand, this reflects Martin's misunderstanding of stratification, mistaking every stratum as a stratum of meaning; see later posts. On the other hand, it serves a rhetorical purpose, since Martin will later claim that he is filling a gap in SFL Theory by proposing a stratum of discourse semantics above the stratum of grammar, ignoring the fact that SFL Theory has always had a stratum of semantics above the stratum of grammar; see e.g. the primary source of Martin's model: Halliday & Hasan (1976: 5).

Misunderstanding Levels Of Symbolic Abstraction [New]

 Martin (1992: 14, 28n):

The strategy adopted here will be to review the arguments for distinguishing content and expression form, before pursuing the problem of stratifying the content plane.

To begin, consider a language called phonese, in which there is a one to one relation between sounds and meanings, such as that "spoken" by animals and young humans in the proto-language phase⁵ (Halliday 1975, Painter 1984). In such a language we have a very simple system of signs. Formulated systemically, it consists of a system with a list of features. The labelling of features in a system of this kind is a moot point; since content and expression are fused, either "semantic" or "phonetic" labels can be used.⁶ In Fig. 1.10 fused labels interfacing with both content and expression substance are employed; the language modelled there consists of six signs, with a bi-unique relation between meaning and sound.

 

⁵ Halliday, but not Painter, actually models the proto-language phase as a two strata system; Painter's mono-stratal characterisation is preferred here.

⁶ In traffic-light-ese this is the problem of labelling terms as [stop/speed up/go] or [red/yellow/green].

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, on the model of Saussure, and its development by Hjelmslev (1961: 58), a sign necessarily entails two levels of symbolic abstraction: signifier/expression and signified/content. In SFL terms, the signifier/expression (Token) realises the signified/content (Value).

[2] This is misleading. Such a system involves a system of content features, together with realisation statements that specify the expression of each content choice.

[3] This is a very serious misunderstanding. Content and expression are not semiotically "fused", since they are different levels of abstraction. If only content features are used, then their means of expression are not specified; if only expression features are used, then the meanings they expressed are not specified.

[4] In Figure 1.10, content and expression features are mistakenly juxtaposed, as if they were of the same level of symbolic abstraction. The problem is easily rectified, and made consistent with SFL Theory, by placing the phonetic symbols in realisation statements; e.g. ➘ [ba] etc. But the problem here is not the absence of a symbol in a representation; it is Martin's failure to understand the most fundamental notion of semiotic systems: different levels of symbolic abstraction, and as will be seen, this pervades Martin's work.

Misrepresenting Agency As A Recursive System [New]

Martin (1992: 13, 12):

In addition to the experiential, interpersonal and textual metafunctions just considered, Halliday has in addition proposed a fourth metafunction, the logical. Systemically the logical metafunction comprises recursive systems (such as TENSE, PROJECTION and AGENCY in English; see Halliday 1985a), which tend to be associated across languages with experiential meaning. Structurally logical meaning is realised as another kind of particulate structure — but this time as part/part rather than part/whole. … These complementary perspectives are outlined in Fig. 1.9. 

 

The relationship between the metafunctions, realisation principles and types of structural [sic] is summarised in Table 1.3.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, recursive systems are realised by the iterative structures of the logical metafunction. Of the systems cited by Martin, the system of TENSE is realised by an iterative logical structure, and the system of PROJECTION is one system within the recursive systems of the clause complex and verbal group complex; see Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 410, 438, 589). The system of AGENCY, on the other hand, is not a recursive system, and is not realised by an iterative structure; Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 355):

The 'open-endedness' of ergative structure, whereby agency can be added in analytical causative constructions (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 352) is effected by the recursive system that is realised by the iterative structure of the verbal group complex. Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 579-80):

[2] To be clear, this confuses formal constituency (nominal group consisting of words) with function structure (the relations between functional elements). In both experiential and logical structures of the nominal group, the structure is the relation between the functions of the constituents (parts). Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 85) characterise the experiential as segmental, and the logical as iterative:

Misrepresenting Information Distribution [New]

 Martin (1992: 11-2):

Thirdly, constituency representation is also poorly adapted to textual meaning, which tends to structure clauses and groups in such a way as to highlight first and last position. The English clause for example uses first position to highlight the speaker's angle on the experience being constructed while last position is hearer oriented, highlighting information that is in some respect new. The systems of THEME and INFORMATION can thus be seen as assigning peaks of prominence to the beginning and end of the English clause; this textual patterning assigns a periodic texture to English discourse as it unfolds. Halliday's analysis of THEME and INFORMATION structure is presented in Fig. 1.7, followed by a more iconic form of representation highlighting clause texture as a rhythmic pulse.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] As Halliday (1985: 169) explains:

The textual meaning of the clause is expressed by what is put first (the Theme); by what is phonologically prominent (and tends to be put last – the New, signalled by information focus); and by conjunctions and relatives which if present must occur in initial position. Thus it forms a wave-like pattern of periodicity that is set up by peaks of prominence and boundary markers.

Importantly, INFORMATION is not a system of the clause, and an information unit only coincides with the clause in the unmarked case. Moreover, in these unmarked cases, the New only occurs last in the unmarked case. The New can occur anywhere in the clause, or not at all (as is the case of the first clause in He said he didn't know).

As will be seen, Martin falsely assumes that New information always occurs in the Rheme of a clause, which is one of the factors that undermines his model.

[2] To be clear, the term 'texture' has a specific meaning in SFL Theory: the property of being a text, which is derived 'from the fact that it functions as a unity with respect to its environment' (Halliday & Hasan 1976: 2).

Preparing To Argue 'From Below' And Misunderstanding 'Cumulative' [New]

Martin (1992: 10, 28n):

Structural arguments for metafunctional diversity are of particular relevance here in light of the proposals for discourse structures to be developed in Section 1.5 below. Halliday's (1979a) suggestion is that experiential meanings predispose particulate forms of realisation, interpersonal meanings prosodic ones and textual meanings periodic² ones.

² Halliday (1979) actually refers to periodic structures as culminative ones; the term periodic is preferred here because of the misleading association between culmination and final position.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, arguing for metafunctional diversity on the basis of structure is arguing 'from below', which is the direct opposite of the perspective taken in SFL Theory, where priority is given to the view 'from above'. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 49):

Giving priority to the view ‘from above’ means that the organising principle adopted is that of system: the grammar is seen as a network of interrelated meaningful choices. In other words, the dominant axis is the paradigmatic one: the fundamental components of the grammar are sets of mutually defining contrastive features. Explaining something consists not in stating how it is structured but in showing how it is related to other things: its pattern of systemic relationships, or agnateness …

[2] To be clear, in the field of linguistics, the term 'culminative' is not associated with final position, but with prominence, which in SFL Theory, is a resource of the textual metafunction. The notion of 'culminative function' is from the phonology of Trubetskoy (1960):

the function carried out by those characteristics (features) of sounds in speech that permit the listener to apprehend the number of words, or syntagmas, in a sentence. The unit containing the element of sound that performs the culminative function is called the culmination, for example, the culmination of a syntagma. The culminative function in German, for example, is performed by the primary stress. Stress, pitch, and other prosodic elements usually carry out the culminative function.

Blurring The Distinction Between Function (Structure) And Form (Rank Scale) [New]

Martin (1992: 5-6):

Fig. 1.2 represents the clause as a bundle of features, realised by the structural sequence Finite^Subject^Predicator.

Note that structures of this kind contain both function (e.g. Finite; initial upper case) and class labels (e.g. clause; lower case, enclosed in square brackets). These structures, like the systems which underlie them, are further organised along a scale of rank, which reduces the number of levels between clause and morpheme required in analysis (see Hudson 1967/1981). Making use of a different set of functions (from Halliday 1985a), implying a different set of options, this labelling and bracketing is further illustrated in Fig. 1.3. Three ranks are included (i.e. clause, group and word), but word structure is not shown.

 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is potentially misleading. In SFL Theory structures are relations between functions. The string of formal units of various classes is known as a syntagm.

[2] This is also potentially misleading. The rank scale is a way of modelling formal constituency, such that a clause consists of groups and phrases, which consist of words, which consist of morphemes. Functions are assigned to constituents of a unit, such as groups and phrases of a clause, and it is the relations between these functions that constitute the structure of the (higher ranked) unit.

[3] See Halliday (1985: 22-30) on ranked constituent analysis (minimal bracketing, function labelling) vs immediate constituent analysis (maximal bracketing, class labelling).

Misconstruing Realisation And Instantiation [Augmented]

Martin (1992: 5):

As noted above, system is related to process through the concept of realisation — realisation formalises the instantiation of the system in process. … These realisation statements relate system to structure; the statements in Fig. 1.1 are summarised and then glossed to clarify their reading in Table 1.1.

Blogger Comments:

[1] System is related to structure through the concept of realisation — not to the process of instantiation.

[2] Realisation doesn't "formalise" the instantiation of the system in process.  Realisation is an intensive identifying relation (token-value) between levels of symbolic abstraction, as between strata and between axes; instantiation is an intensive attributive relation (token-type) between actual instances of the system and the overall system of potential (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 14-5, 145).  See also here.

Confusing Realisation And Instantiation

Martin (1992: 4):

Following Hjelmslev (1961), paradigmatic relations are mapped onto potential and syntagmatic relations are mapped onto actual; thus system is described in terms of paradigmatic oppositions, process in terms of syntagmatic structure.  System and process are related through the important concept of realisation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses realisation and instantiation.  The relation between the axes, paradigmatic and syntagmatic, is one of realisation.  The relation between potential and actual is one of instantiation.

[2] This also confuses realisation and instantiation, but in a different way.  Here the instantiation process is confused with the realisation of paradigmatic options as syntagmatic structure.

[3] This confuses syntagmatic structure and the process of instantiation.  It isn't system and process that are related through realisation, but system and structure.

Misunderstanding Halliday On Linguistics As Ideologically Committed Social Action [New]

Martin (1992: 2):

There are any number of uses to which the analyses presented here can be put. In Australia they have evolved in two main contexts: (i) as a means of exploring the relation between text and context — between text and register, genre and ideology (see Chapter 7 below); and (ii) as one foundation for the development of an educational linguistics, which has been used in particular to focus on literacy development (e.g. Painter and Martin 1986, Hasan and Martin 1989). From the start, this work has been pursued within the framework of critical linguistics (inspired by Fowler et al. 1979, Kress and Hodge 1979, Chilton 1985, Kress 1985/1989, Fowler 1987, Fairclough 1989) — a linguistics which "deconstructs" texts in such a way as to draw attention to the semiotic systems they instantiate, with a view to critically evaluating the ideologies they construe. Observational, descriptive and explanatory adequacy aside, this means that English Text has been written as a contribution to the linguistics envisioned by Halliday (1985e:5) as "an ideologically committed form of social action." For this reason it needs in part to be read in the context of projects oriented to de-naturalising hegemonic discourses and, concomitantly, facilitating intervention in political processes (e.g. Poynton 1985/1989, Martin 1985b/1989, Threadgold et al. 1986, Christie 1991, Giblett and O'Carrol 1990, and the new journal Social Semiotics).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, the relation between text and context is the realisation relation between an instance of language (text) and an instance of context (situation).  Martin, however, misunderstands varieties of language, register and genre, as not language, but the context of language. This is analogous to claiming that varieties of dog, such as Rottweiler and Retriever, are not dogs, but the context of dogs.

In SFL Theory, register is the midway point on the cline of instantiation — for the content plane of language — viewed from the system pole, and genre (in sense of text type) is the same point viewed from the instance pole. That is, register and text type are complementary perspectives on the same phenomenon: functional varieties of language.

Ideology, on the other hand, is a different matter. Ideology is realised in language, and as such, is located at the level of context, where 'context' means the culture as semiotic system. Ideationally, then, ideology is modelled in terms of field, with different ideologies characterised by different combinations of FIELD system features. And interpersonally, the fact that ideologies tend to be realised more by proposals than propositions suggests that modelling them also involves TENOR system features.

Martin, however, here models ideology as a stratum above genre and register, though he has since withdrawn ideology from this hierarchy.

[2] From the perspective of SFL Theory, this confuses both levels of symbolic abstraction and poles of the cline of instantiation. To be clear, the semiotic systems that texts instantiate are those of language, whereas the ideologies that texts construe, are characterised by the selection of contextual features that specify the instance of context: the situation.

[3] This is a very widespread misunderstanding of Halliday (1985e: 5). What Halliday actually wrote was:

… linguistics cannot be other than an ideologically committed form of social action.

That is to say, any linguistics is 'an ideologically committed form of social action', whether linguists realise it or not. The question then is 'Which ideology?'. For example, SFL Theory foregrounds the notion of choice, whereas Formal linguistic theories foreground rules, government and binding.

[4] To be clear, it will be seen that Martin (1992) provides nothing in this regard that SFL Theory, properly understood, does not already provide.

Misunderstanding The Natural Relation Of Grammar And Semantics [New]

Martin (1992: 1-2):

Halliday's Introduction to Functional Grammar (1985a) outlines the grammar of English which realises the discourse semantics developed in English Text (for a very useful elaboration of this grammar, see Matthiessen 1992). As Matthiessen and Halliday (in press) point out, in functional linguistics semantics is naturally (not arbitrarily) related to grammar. It follows from this point that functional approaches to discourse systems and structures will be enriched to the extent that they are able to draw on comprehensive, semantically oriented grammars which interface in a responsible way with textual considerations. English Text evolved in tandem with the richest extant English grammar of this kind, as developed by Halliday, and later Matthiessen, in the Department of Linguistics at the University of Sydney. 

For many linguists, the richness of Halliday and Matthiessen's grammar has appeared excessive (see for example Huddleston's (1988) dismissal of Halliday (1985a)). It is important to stress here however that what might appear extravagant from the point of view of "syntax" is more often than not fundamental to the point of parsimony from the perspective of discourse analysis (see Matthiessen (1989) for an alternative perspective on Halliday (1985a) and Matthiessen and Martin (1991) for a reply to Huddleston (1988)). English Text has been designed to complement in a solidary way a non-parsimonious grammar of this kind. It has been designed in other words to be grammatically responsible, interfacing with a grammar that is equally responsible to textual considerations.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading. Martin's discourse semantics is largely a rebranding of textual lexicogrammar (Halliday & Hasan's systems of COHESION), together with a rebranding of interpersonal semantics (Halliday's system of SPEECH FUNCTION). Moreover, even ignoring this, Martin provides no realisation statements specifying how features in his systems are realised in lexicogrammatical systems.

[2] To be clear, this point had already been made in Halliday (1985: xvii):

[3] To be clear, what Halliday means by this is that the relation between experiential meanings and grammatical forms is not arbitrary: process and verbal group, participant and nominal group, circumstance and adverbial group/prepositional phrase.

Martin, however, mistakes this to mean the relation between his discourse semantics and lexicogrammar interpreted 'by reference to what it means' (rather than grammatical forms).

Confusing Strata [Revised]

Martin (1992: 1):

Like Cohesion In English [Halliday & Hasan], English Text uses systemic functional grammar to ask questions about text structure, and complements the grammar by developing additional analyses which focus on text rather than clause.  Cohesion In English organises this division of labour as the opposition between grammar and cohesion (between structural and non-structural resources for meaning).  English Text organises this division of labour in a different way — stratally, as an opposition between grammar and semantics (between clause oriented and text oriented resources for meaning).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands the most basic premise of Cohesion In English. Halliday & Hasan (1975: 6,7):

[2] In SFL, cohesion is not in opposition to grammar — it is within the grammar, and within the textual metafunction, as its non-structural component (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 524-85).  As such, cohesion is a lexicogrammatical means of realising textual meaning.  That is, cohesion is construed as a lower level of symbolic abstraction than semantics.

Symbolic abstraction is the principle on which linguistic strata are organised.  The relation between strata is one of realisation: lower stratum realises higher stratum.  A transitivity analysis of this shows that the relation between strata is identifying and intensive (elaborating):

lexicogrammar (wording)	realises	semantics (meaning)
Token	Process: identifying: intensive	Value

[3] Clearly, construing the opposition between the non-structural textual grammar and the remainder of the grammar — textual, interpersonal, experiential, and logical — as a stratal opposition is inconsistent with the meaning of strata: as different levels of symbolic abstraction.

Since Martin distinguishes the content plane strata as an opposition "between clause oriented and text oriented resources for meaning", it is reasonable to conclude that he formulated his semantics on the basis of the size of units, rather than on the basis of symbolic abstraction.  This is a serious inconsistency with the original model.


Conclusion: The founding rationâle for establishing a stratum of 'discourse semantics' is inconsistent with the theory in which it is intended to be situated.

The Aim Of Martin (1992) [New]

Martin (1992: 1):

English Text is an introduction to discourse analysis within the framework of systemic functional linguistics. Its aim is to provide a comprehensive set of discourse analyses which can be used to relate any English text to the context in which it is used. Readers familiar with Halliday and Hasan's seminal Cohesion in English will find in English Text an elaboration of their work, in ways that have been influenced by Gleason's stratificational approach to discourse structure (Gutwinski 1976:36-63) and by almost 20 years of research by systemic linguists since Cohesion in English was first circulated in manuscript form.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, within the framework of Systemic Functional linguistics, it is the grammar that provides the means of analysing discourse. Halliday (1985: xvi-xvii, 345):

The current preoccupation is with discourse analysis, or 'text linguistics'; and it has sometimes been assumed that this can be carried on without grammar — or even that it is somehow an alternative to grammar.  But this is an illusion.  A discourse analysis that is not based on grammar is not an analysis at all, but simply a running commentary on a text … the exercise remains a private one in which one explanation is as good or as bad as another.

A text is a semantic unit, not a grammatical one.  But meanings are realised through wordings; and without a theory of wordings — that is, a grammar — there is no way of making explicit one's interpretation of the meaning of a text. …

A text is meaningful because it is an actualisation of the potential that constitutes the linguistic system; it is for this reason that the study of discourse (‘text linguistics’) cannot properly be separated from the study of the grammar that lies behind it.

[2] To be clear, readers familiar with Halliday and Hasan's Cohesion in English will find in English Text Martin's misunderstandings of Halliday and Hasan's seminal work, rebranded as Martin's systems, and incongruously relocated from textual lexicogrammar to textual, logical and experiential semantics, as the analyses on this blog demonstrate.