Misconstruing Negative Vs Positive Condition

Martin (1992: 195-6):

Contingent relations make a distinction between conjunctions incorporating negative polarity (unless and lest) and those which don't.  The relevant proportionalities and relevant paradigm are as follows:

UNLESS : IF…NOT ::

LEST : SO THAT…WILL + NOT 

unless Ben plays you'll lose :

if Ben doesn't play you'll lose :: 

Ben'll play lest you lose :

Ben will play so that you won't lose

But the opposition between "positive" and "negative" values has a different meaning in the context of conditional relations from that in purposives.  With conditionals, the opposition is between exclusion and inclusion (or non-exclusive) to be precise).  Unless means 'if and only if not';  if on the hand does not preclude the possibility of additional modalised Causes:

EXCLUSIVE

[4:60]  Unless you go that way ['as long as you don't]

            you'll be there by six.

            (It's the only way you can go wrong.) 

INCLUSIVE

[4:61]  If you go that way

            you'll be there by six.

            (But you could also go the back way.)

Blogger Comment:

In SFL theory, as in formal logic, the logical meaning of positive condition is if P then Q and the logical meaning of negative condition is simply if not P then Q — not "if and only if not":

• If Ben doesn't play, you'll lose. 
• If you don't go that way, you'll be there by six.

The opposition of 'exclusive vs non-exclusive' is irrelevant to the logical opposition of positive and negative condition.

See also if and only if.

Misrepresenting Reason As Purpose

Martin (1992: 194):

The distinction between condition and purpose has to do with modulation again. Purposives contain an additional modulation of inclination, associated with the Effect (the Effect is desired). This can be brought out by comparing hypotactic and paratactic realisations of the purposive relation; these proportionalities also reveal another peculiarity of purposive relations, namely that desire for Effect commences before the Cause — wanting to win, get there on time and give the opposition a chance are the motivation for, not the results of, training hard, driving fast and skating slowly in the examples below (with all other consequential relations the Cause is temporally anterior):

we trained hard so that we'd win :

we wanted to win, and so we trained hard :: 

we drove fast in order to get there on time :

we were keen to get there on time and so we drove fast :: 

we skated slowly to give them a chance :

we were willing to give them a chance and so we skated slowly

Blogger Comments:

This is the second of two critiques of this extract.

[1] Contrary to the claim, none of the paratactic clause complexes involves the logical relation of cause: purpose.  In all three, the relation is cause: reason (see Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 411).  This can be demonstrated by substituting and therefore for and so:

we wanted to win, and therefore we trained hard
we were keen to get there on time and therefore we drove fast
we were willing to give them a chance and therefore we skated slowly

The proportionality is thus hypotactic purpose : paratactic reason.

The paratactic clauses, therefore, unlike the hypotactic clauses, do construe a cause^effect relation.

[2] In each of the three paratactic clause complexes (of cause: reason), 'desire' is a feature of the clause construing the cause.  That is, the "desire for Effect" does not "commence before" the Cause.

Misconstruing The Distinction Between Condition And Purpose

Martin (1992: 194):

The distinction between condition and purpose has to do with modulation again.  Purposives contain an additional modulation of inclination, associated with the Effect (the Effect is desired).  This can be brought out by comparing hypotactic and paratactic realisations of the purposive relation; these proportionalities also reveal another peculiarity of purposive relations, namely that desire for Effect commences before the Cause — wanting to win, get there on time and give the opposition a chance are the motivation for, not the results of, training hard, driving fast and skating slowly in the examples below (with all other consequential relations the Cause is temporally anterior):

we trained hard so that we'd win :

we wanted to win, and so we trained hard :: 

we drove fast in order to get there on time :

we were keen to get there on time and so we drove fast :: 

we skated slowly to give them a chance :

we were willing to give them a chance and so we skated slowly

Blogger Comments:

This is the first of two critiques of this extract.

[1] This confuses the ideational and interpersonal metafunctions.  The distinction between the logical categories of condition and purpose is logical, not interpersonal (modulation).  In SFL theory, as elsewhere, the logical meaning of condition is if P then Q whereas the logical meaning of purpose is because intention Q so action P.

[2] Logically, neither condition nor purpose involve a cause-effect relation.  In SFL theory, the cause-effect relation — because P so result Q — is construed logically by cause: reason and cause: result.

[3] This misconstrues the purpose relation — because intention Q so action P — as desire.  The semantic distinction between intention and desire is demonstrated by the contrast between he intends to get his tooth extracted today and he wants to get his tooth extracted today.

Misconstruing Condition And Purpose As Cause–Effect

Martin (1992: 193-4):

Alongside being modulated through obligation, causal relations may be modalised.  With both condition and purpose the relation between Cause and Effect is a contingent one; and in both cases the Effect is irrealis — there is a possibility, a probability or a certainty that it will be determined by the Cause, but as the meanings are made it has not yet ensued.  This is the opposition between [4:57] and [4:58-9].

CONSEQUENCE (Effect realis)

[4:57] Cause     Because we trained hard,

           Effect     we won. 

CONDITION (Effect irrealis)

[4:58] Cause     If we'd trained hard,

           Effect     we'd have won. 

PURPOSE (Effect irrealis)

[4:59] Cause     We trained hard,

           Effect     so that we'd win.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses enhancement (ideational metafunction) with modality (interpersonal metafunction).  Cause is language in the rôle of construing experience, whereas modalisation is language in the rôle of acting on each other.  The probability of a construed causal relation is expressed using the interpersonal system of modalisation, as in genes possibly/probably/certainly determine behaviour. The (interpersonal) modalisation values are not features of (ideational) causal relations.

[2] Neither condition nor purpose can be logically construed as cause and effect.  The logical meaning of condition is 'if P then Q' and the logical meaning of purpose is 'because intention Q so action P'.  Cause and effect, on the other hand, is the logical meaning of reason and result: 'because P so result Q'.  For why conditional statements are not statements of causality, see also here.

[3] The logical relation here is reason, not consequence.  This is shown by the expression of the logical relation in the dependent clause ('because'), just as condition is shown by the expression of the logical relation in the dependent clause ('if') and purpose is shown the expression of the logical relation in the dependent clause ('so that').

The use of the term 'consequence' here is inconsistent with its use in both SFL theory and formal logic, where it is a term used for conditional — not causal — relations.

Misconstruing Manner As Cause

Martin (1992: 193):

With [manner] relations, the relationship between events is modulated through "potentiality"; we won by training hard means that the Cause (preparing well) enabled the Effect (winning). With other consequential relations the connection between events is modulated through "obligation": we won because we trained hard means that the Cause determined the Effect. This is the "natural logic" of the distinction between sufficient and necessary conditions:

we won by training hard (among other things) :

we trained hard enough to win (but we lost) ::

we won because we trained hard :

we trained hard enough to make sure we won 

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses the ideational metafunction (expansion) with the interpersonal metafunction (modality).

[2] This is a fundamental category error.  Manner is not cause and effect.  In the clause complex, training hard is construed as the manner: means by which we won, but not as the cause.  Manner and cause are semantically distinct.  For example, the manner of the wind blowing is semantically distinct from the cause of the wind blowing.

[3] It is a category error to construe the distinction between manner and cause as the distinction between sufficient and necessary conditions.  See yesterday's post or the discussion on necessity and sufficiency in formal logic here.

Using 'Condition' To Unite 'Cause' And 'Manner' As 'Consequential'

Martin (1992: 193):

Within consequential relations the basic opposition is between how and why.

MANNER (sufficient conditions)

[4:55] How did you win?

— By training hard.

CAUSE (necessary conditions)

[4:56] Why did you win?

— Because we trained hard.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is a fundamental category error.  Cause ('why') and manner ('how') are logically distinct categories.  The error is compounded by subsuming both under 'consequential', a feature of a third logical type: condition.

[2] It is a category error to construe the distinction between manner and cause as the distinction between sufficient and necessary conditions.  

A sufficient condition for some state of affairs S is a condition that, if satisfied, guarantees that S obtains.  A necessary condition for some state of affairs S is a condition that must be satisfied in order for S to obtain.

The manner training hard is not a condition that guarantees we did win.
The cause we trained hard is not a condition that must be satisfied for we did win.

See also necessary and sufficient causes here.

Confusing Ideational Cause And Interpersonal Modulation

Martin (1992: 193):

Like temporal relations, external consequential relations are oriented to the activity sequences constituting fields; but the connections between events are "modulated" in such a way that one event is seen as enabling or determining the other rather than simply preceding it.  All consequential relations have the experiential structure Cause · Effect.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses the ideational system of enhancement with the interpersonal system of modality.  The ideational metafunction is concerned with the construal of experience as meaning, whereas the interpersonal metafunction is concerned with the enactment of the self as meaning. These are distinct complementary functions in the SFL model.

[2] Here again an experiential structure is proposed for a logical structure at the level of discourse semantics.

Seeing Metafunctions As Alternatives Rather Than Complementary

Martin (1992: 189-90):

There are a number of variations on as soon as, which shade into diversified realisations involving Circumstances and IDENTIFICATION.  These include the moment that, the minute that, the second that and so on.  This borderline area of realisation between the systems of IDENTIFICATION and CONJUNCTION will not be pursued here.  Halliday & Hasan (1976: 230-1)and Halliday (1985: 308) suggest incorporating the "circumstantial" realisations into the account of CONJUNCTION to bring out proportionalities such as the following:

instead : instead of that ::

as a result : as a result of that ::

in consequence : inconsequence of that

etc.

But pursuing this is really a matter of perspective.  From the point of view of IDENTIFICATION these expressions are phoric and combine with experiential clause systems to link clauses in a text; from the point of view of CONJUNCTION they are only minimally distinct from realisations involving conjunctions alone.  It may be that Halliday and Hasan and Halliday are suggesting many of the realisations involving IDENTIFICATION are now congruent (that is, no longer processed as grammatical metaphors); this would be one reason for including them as part of the system of CONJUNCTION in the discourse semantics.

Blogger Comments:

This is intended as an argument for determining which metafunction wordings such as the moment that, the minute that, the second that belong to — either to the textual discourse system of IDENTIFICATION or to the logical discourse system of CONJUNCTION.  This is the same error as asking which metafunctional system a prepositional phrase belongs to, rather than asking what function it is performing with regard to each metafunction.

Rebranding Grammar As Discourse Semantics

Martin (1992: 185):

External temporal relations are strongly oriented to the activity sequences constituting fields.  Most of these relations (excepting co-extensive simultaneous ones) have the experiential structure Anterior · Posterior, where Anterior names the event which begins before the Posterior.

At primary delicacy the opposition is between [successive] relations, where the Anterior does not continue beyond the beginning of the Posterior, and [simultaneous] relations, where the two events overlap to some extent.  This is the opposition between after and while in [4:24] and [4:25]:

SUCCESSIVE
[4:24] After we walk the ring with our dog,
          we just wait. 

SIMULTANEOUS
[4:25] While the judge is handling the dog,
          we hope that it will stand nice and steady.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Here an experiential structure is proposed for a logical structure — a clause nexus.

[2] The temporal relations exemplified are between clauses in clause complexes.  The grammatical categories are:

• same time                     A meanwhile B
• different time: later        A subsequently B
• different time: earlier     A previously B

¶ In modelling logical relations between clauses, this is simply rebranding Halliday's grammar as Martin's discourse semantics.

Confusing The Logical And Experiential Metafunctions

Martin (1992: 184):

As in Martin (1983) the point of departure for the analysis presented here will be the hypotactic clause complex.  It is in this area that English makes the most delicate experiential distinctions as far as logico-semantic relations between clauses are concerned.

Blogger Comments:

In SFL theory, the logico-semantic relations between clauses in clause complexes fall within the logical, not experiential, component of the ideational metafunction.

Misconstruing Internal And External Relations

Martin (1992: 183):

The distinction between internal and external relations, though clear in principle, is in some cases hard to draw, either because it doesn't matter as in [4:15] above, or because certain relations, such as the concessive, are themselves interpersonal enough in orientation that they fudge the distinction being drawn between organising text and constructing field.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, the distinction between internal and external relations is not the distinction between organising text and constructing field.

In the case of logical relations between clauses, the distinction between internal and external relations is the distinction between the beta clause relating to the enactment of the proposition (interpersonal meaning) of the alpha clause and the beta clause relating to the figure (experiential meaning) that the alpha clause represents (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 419).  For a semantic perspective on interpersonally oriented sequences (realised by clause complexes), see Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 123-4).

In the case of temporal conjunction in textual cohesion, the distinction between internal and external relations is the distinction between the temporal unfolding of the discourse (interpersonal time) and the temporal sequence of the processes referred to (experiential time), respectively (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 545).

Field, on the other hand, is the ideational dimension of context, the culture viewed as a semiotic system that is realised in language.  Field is thus realised by the ideational features of language, including those construals of experience that are logically expanded or cohesively conjuncted by internal and external relations.

The "construction" of field during logogenesis is thus the construal of the ideational dimension of context through the instantiation of the ideational meanings that realise the field.

[2] Concessive conditional relations between clauses in complexes are logical in metafunction; concessive conditional relations between messages in cohesive conjunction are textual in metafunction.  The meanings they realise are distinct from any interpersonal meanings also being realised.

Confusing The Logical And Textual Metafunctions And Misconstruing Elaboration As Enhancement

Martin (1992: 182):

The centrality of the internal/external distinction to an adequate account of the discourse semantics of logical relations is the main factor distinguishing Halliday's (1985) classification of expansion from that being developed here.  The internal/external opposition does not play a part in Halliday's (1985) discussion because his focus is on the clause complex in relation to the rest of the grammar, rather than in relation to cohesion and text structure.  In particular, a good deal of his elaboration category is reinterpreted here as simply the internal face of comparative similarity rather than as a major logico-semantic category in its own right.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The main factor distinguishing Halliday's (1985) model and Martin's (1992), apart from the fact that Halliday's model is original and Martin's model is a reworking of Halliday's, is that Martin's model ignores the metafunctional distinction between logico-semantic relations between clauses (logical) and conjunctive cohesion (textual).  Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 538-9):

… logico-semantic relations are confined to the internal organisation of each clause complex: the clause complex is the most extensive domain of relational organisation. The cohesive system of conjunction has evolved as a complementary resource for creating and interpreting text. It provides the resources for marking logico-semantic relationships that obtain between text spans of varying extent, ranging from clauses within clause complexes to long spans of a paragraph or more.

[2] In SFL theory, internal relations may obtain in logical relations between clauses in complexes, and in conjunctive cohesion, the non-structural resource of the textual metafunction for marking textual transitions.  On internal logical relations between clauses, Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 419) write:

… the enhancing relation may be internal rather than external; that is, the beta-clause may relate to the enactment of the proposition or proposal realised by the alpha-clause rather than to the figure that it represents. For example, if it is not too personal an inquiry, what limits do you set… means ‘if it is not…, I ask you…’; that is, the condition is on the act of questioning, not on the content of the question.

 On internal relations in conjunctive cohesion, Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 545) write:

Many temporal conjunctives have an ‘internal’ as well as an ‘external’ interpretation; that is, the time they refer to is the temporal unfolding of the discourse itself, not the temporal sequence of the processes referred to. In terms of the functional components of semantics, it is interpersonal not experiential time.

[3] This is a serious category error — enhancement and elaboration are distinct logico-semantic types.  As a transphenomenal fractal type manifest at different scales across various domains, comparison is a subtype of the enhancement category manner.

[4] As a transphenomenal fractal type manifest at different scales across various domains, elaboration is a major logico-semantic category, contrasting with extension and enhancement within expansion.  For example, the distinction between 'intensive', 'possessive' and 'circumstantial' relational processes, identifying and attributive, is the distinction between elaboration, extension and enhancement, respectively.

Confusing Textual Relations With Construals Of Experience

Martin (1992: 181):

In other modes, where language is constitutive of what is going on, the distinction between external and internal relations is vital.  The temporal organisation of such texts will be quite different from that of the institutional events to which they refer and internal relations will prove critical in signalling this textual organisation.

Blogger Comments:

This again confuses the ideational metafunction with the textual metafunction.  External temporal conjunctive relations do not refer to 'institutional events'.  External temporal relations, like internal conjunctive relations, are concerned with textual organisation: they are cohesive resources for marking textual transitions between messages or groups of messages.  These relations between messages are distinct from the construals of experience thus conjuncted.

Confusing Conjunctive Relations With Conjuncted Messages

Martin (1992: 180-1):

The distinction between external and internal is probably clearest with temporal relations.  External relations are used to display the activity sequences in which people engage as members of various institutions.  Internal relations on the other hand attend to text-time — time in relation to what is being said, not what is being done.  In certain registers, especially those where language accompanies what is going on institutionally, text time and field time are so much in tune that the internal/external distinction is not that important.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This confuses the ideational metafunction with the textual metafunction.  External temporal conjunctive relations do not 'display the activity sequences in which people engage as members of various institutions'.  External temporal relations, like all conjunctive relations, are cohesive resources for marking textual transitions between messages or groups of messages.  These relations are distinct from the messages thus related.

[2] In SFL theory, 'text time' is the temporal dimension of logogenesis; 'field' is the ideational dimension of context, the semiotic system that has language as its expression plane.  As a text unfolds during logogenesis, so too does the instance of context (field, tenor and mode) that the text realises.

Misinterpreting Internal And External Conjunctive Relations

Martin (1992: 180):

Internal relations in other words structure semiosis; external ones code the structure of the world.  A less materialistic interpretation, drawing on the semiotic approach to context to be developed in Chapter 7, could be framed along the following lines.  This would treat external relations as by and large oriented to field — they encode the institutional organisation of our culture.  Internal relations on the other hand are oriented to genre (including the conversational structure realising genre in dialogic modes) — they encode the organisation of text as it is formulated to construct our culture.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is an incorrect reading of the distinction between external and internal conjunctive relations in SFL theory.  As cohesive relations, both are text-forming resources of the lexicogrammar that are concerned with marking textual transitions between whole messages or groups of whole messages (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 583).  External conjunctive relations involve textual relations between 'external phenomena' — that is: between experiences construed as meanings — whereas internal conjunctive relations involve textual relations that are internal to the communication situation itself.

[2] A materialistic interpretation of internal and external conjunctive relations is thus a misinterpretation, not least because the textual metafunction is concerned with semiotic reality.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398):

The textual metafunction second–order in the sense that it is concerned with semiotic reality: that is, reality in the form of meaning. This dimension of reality is itself constructed by [the] other two metafunctions: the ideational, which construes a natural reality, and the interpersonal, which enacts an intersubjective reality. … The function of the textual metafunction is thus an enabling one with respect to the rest; it takes over the semiotic resources brought into being by the other two metafunctions and as it were operationalises them …

[3] In SFL theory, context is construed in semiotic terms: as a connotative semiotic system with language as its expression plane. On the other hand, Martin (1992: 33, 39-40, 121, 122) instead uses the term 'context' to refer to the (semiotic) co-text and the material setting.

[4] External conjunctive relations are a resource of the textual metafunction.  The textual metafunction at the level of context is the system of MODE, whereas FIELD is the ideational dimension of context.

[5] In SFL theory, institutions are situation types.  That is, theoretically they are located halfway down the cline of instantiation at the level of context.  Thus they differ by probabilities in the context systems of FIELD, TENOR and MODE — not just field.

[6] Genre, in the sense of the different rôles that language plays, is a system of MODE at the level of context — not a stratum of context.

Genre, in the sense of text type, is a point on the cline of instantiation.  It is register viewed from the instance pole of the cline.

In SFL theory, therefore, genres are registers that vary according to different feature probabilities in the system of MODE — that is, in terms of the textual metafunction.

Misidentifying A Metafunction

Martin (1992: 178):

As noted in 4.1 with respect to text [4:3] some kinds of relations between clause complexes are more "rhetorical" than experiential. … The rhetorical nature of these conjunctions can be brought out by comparing them with three experientially oriented conjunctive relations in the same text … 

Blogger Comment:

In SFL theory, non-structural conjunctive relations — textual transitions between messages or groups of messages — are textual, while structural relations between clauses in complexes are logical.  See Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 583-5).

This use of 'experiential' is meant to be a characterisation of Halliday & Hasan's (1976: 239-41) external conjunction, 'relations between external phenomena', in contradistinction to internal conjunction, relations 'internal to the communication situation'.  See tomorrow's posting.

Presenting Subtypes Of Expansion As The Principal Types

Martin (1992: 178):

In this chapter, following Martin (1983), four main types of logico-semantic relation will be recognised: additive, comparative, temporal and consequential.  And CONJUNCTION will be developed as a system of oppositions at the level of discourse semantics.

Blogger Comment:

[1] The proposed four main types of logico-semantic relation correspond to four subtypes of expansion: comparative, temporal and consequential are subtypes of enhancement and additive is a subtype of extension.  The third type of expansion, elaboration, is omitted altogether.

In contrast, the system of cohesive conjunction (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 541) features two subtypes of elaboration: appositive and clarifying, three subtypes of extension: additive, adversative and varying, and four subtypes of enhancement: matter, manner, spatio-temporal and causal-conditional.

In not recognising the three most general forms of expansion, the overall parsimony (or "elegance") of the theory is compromised.  See Occam's razor.

[2] An argument justifying the reconstrual of the grammatical system of textual metafunction (cohesive conjunction) as a semantic system of the logical metafunction (CONJUNCTION) has not been presented.

Misconstruing the Theoretical Status Of Expansion

Martin (1992: 177):

These problems are not isolated.  Halliday (1985) for example subclassifies enhancing relations on the basis of of his categories for types of Circumstance in the system of TRANSITIVITY.  Thus likewise comes out as enhancing: manner and in that respect as enhancing: matter.  This contrasts with the Cohesion In English analysis which groups likewise among the additives (extension: addition for Halliday 1985) and in that respect among causals (enhancing: causal-conditional for Halliday 1985).  Since the prepositions realising circumstantial relations organise the world differently from conjunctions, this divergence is not surprising.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, it is the other way around: it is circumstances that are classified according to the transphenomenal fractal types, expansion and projection, that they manifest —  Extent, Location, Manner, Cause and Contingency as enhancing, Accompaniment as extending, Rôle as elaborating, Matter and Angle as projection.

[2] These are wordings that can be used to serve such conjunctive functions.  Here they are misinterpreted as belonging to functional categories.  This is the same type of error as allocating a verb (e.g. mean) to a PROCESS TYPE instead of considering its function in a clause.

Misconstruing Extension As Enhancement

Martin (1992: 176-7):

A second factor underlying the differences in categorisation has to do with the essential indeterminacy of some of the relations themselves.  The problem of alternation (or) and contrast (whereas) is a case in point.  Both relations imply a system of terms (a taxonomy of some kind) — for example, tea or coffee as hot after-dinner drinks.

The terms themselves can be viewed in two ways.  One way is to view them as available alternatives, which combine in text like additives:

A OR B : A AND B ::

We have tea or coffee : we have tea and coffee ::

Get tea. — Or coffee? : Get tea — And coffee? ::

They drink either tea or coffee : They drink both tea and coffee ::

Have tea, or coffee instead : Have tea, and coffee as well

Another way of looking at the terms is to consider how they are similar (as a result of subclassifying after-dinner drinks) and how they differ (since they are oppositions in the same system).  Looked at in this way not A but B contrasts with A similarly B:

A WHEREAS B : A LIKE B ::

Tea doesn't taste bitter to me whereas coffee does :

Tea tastes just as bitter to me as coffee does :: 

I take tea with milk but coffee without :

I take tea with milk as I do with coffee ::  

So you have tea in the morning while she takes coffee :

So you have tea in the morning just as she does

Since the relationship between such terms can be looked at in different ways, classifying the relevant hypotactic conjunctions becomes problematic (e.g. while, whereas, apart from, without, except that, instead of, rather than, other than).  Halliday (1985) groups them with additives under the heading extension, emphasising the relationship with alternation ('or') and addition ('and'); Martin (1983) on the other hand focusses on on the idea of opposition ('whereas'), grouping them with similarity ('like') under the general heading of comparison.  Because of the indeterminacy of the relations themselves, neither categorisation is completely satisfactory.

Blogger Comments:

This is quoted at length because it is presented as an argument that is intended to identify problems in the categorisation of logico-semantic relations, as part of the justification for the 'discourse semantic' approach that is about to be undertaken.

[1] This is not the same relationship "looked at in different ways".  The first set of examples display the extension categories of addition: additive: positive (logically: A and B) and alternation (logically: A or B).

However, the second set of examples, instead of focusing on additive addition and alternation, displays the extension category of addition: adversative (logically: A and conversely B) and the enhancing category of means: comparison (logically: A is like B).

In addition to not being an alternative view of the same logical relations, it is manifestly a simple category error to group A and conversely B (adversative) with A is like B (comparison).

[2] Because of the category error and invalid reasoning involved, the argument fails to make the case for the claimed "indeterminacy of some of the relations themselves".

Misrepresenting Different Manifestations Of Expansion As Indeterminacy

Martin (1992: 176):

The general point is that oppositions among cohesive conjunctions are different from those among hypotactic ones, and that in any attempt to generalise a framework for logico-semantic relations relations across these and other realisations some indeterminacy is bound to arise.

Blogger Comment:

See the earlier post on expansion and projection as transphenomenal fractal types that are manifested in various guises across different scales of the system (here).

Misconstruing Different Systems As Divergent Classifications

Martin (1992: 170-1):

The problem of just how to classify the logico-semantic relations that can be realised through the diversified realisations outlined above is a difficult one.  A large number of classifications have been proposed… .  Another source of divergence among the classifications has to do with the type of realisation is taken as point of departure for the analysis.  Halliday & Hasan for example focus on cohesive relations between clause complexes, Martin (1983) bases his classification on hypotactic conjunctions and Halliday (1985) develops a categorisation for paratactic and hypotactic relations within the clause complex.  Given the different oppositions as one moves from one of these types of realisation to another, not to mention the problem of universalist vs particularist schemes, it is hardly surprising that the classifications that have been proposed are divergent in many respects.

Blogger Comment:

The "divergence" here reflects two distinct lexicogrammatical systems.  Halliday & Hasan are concerned with cohesive conjunction, a non-structural resource of the textual metafunction, whereas Halliday (1985) is concerned with the logical structure of clause complexes.

See also the earlier post on expansion and projection as transphenomenal fractal types here.

Conflating Systems Of The Logical And Textual Metafunctions

Martin (1992: 168):

… in spontaneous spoken monologue the semantic system of CONJUNCTION tends to be realised through paratactic and hypotactic relationships within the clause complex, and through 'cohesive' conjunctions relating clause complexes to each other.  Texts produced in this way foreground realisations of CONJUNCTION as logico-semantic relationships between processes.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This creates a metafunctional inconsistency at the level of semantics by merging systems of the logical metafunction: logico-semantic relations and taxis, with systems of the textual metafunction: cohesive conjunction.

[2] Relations between clauses in complexes involve two distinct simultaneous systems: the LOGICO-SEMANTIC TYPE: projection or expansion, and the degree of INTERDEPENDENCY or TAXIS: hypotaxis or parataxis (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 373).  Logico-semantic relations are not "realised through" tactic relations.

Underplaying The Scope Of Logical Relations

Martin (1992: 162-3):

The following clauses in particular do not make use of clause complex resources to encode causal or temporal relations:

That's because it's a low dog.

That is so the judge can get the hind movement of your dog.

After that he usually tells you…

He proceeds to do that with every dog.

… The point is that while examples such as these make use of resources other than the clause complex to mark logical relations between part of a text, there is a sense in which the alternative realisations are all variations on the same theme — namely that of relating one part of a text to another in terms of the natural logic of time, cause, comparison and addition.  So not only does the clause complex need to be supplemented as far as a consideration of logical relations is concerned, but it needs to be abstracted from as well so that a more general treatment can be pursued, taking the clause complex into account as just one of its manifestations.  It is for this reason of course that logical relations will be interpreted from the perspective of discourse semantics, rather than that of lexicogrammar here.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This vastly underplays the place of logical relations in SFL theory.  The logico-semantic relations that obtain between clauses in clause complexes are those of expansion and projection.

Firstly, these are called transphenomenal categories because they 'operate across the various categories of phenomena' (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 223).  For example,  as well as obtaining between rank units in complexes, they are also manifested in relational clause types (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 210-48) and circumstance types (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 262-3).

Secondly, they are called fractal types because they recur at various levels in the system.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 223):

… they are principles of construing our experience of the world that generate identical patterns of semantic organisation which are of variable magnitude and which occur in variable semantic environments. Such patterns therefore constitute fractal types.

Thirdly, they are thus "meta" to the organisation of ideational meaning, and provide an additional level of agnation in the system. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 223-4): 

… the fractal types constitute an additional order of agnation that is projected onto the ideational system as a whole. We can refer to this as fractal agnation. Because of this, a qualifying sequence and a figure of circumstantial being, such as cause, are agnate; they are both manifestations of the fractal type of enhancement.

Fourthly, as fractal types, they provide the major means of creating new meaning in the system.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 224): 

The fractal types of projection and expansion are also a primary resource by which the semantic system creates new meanings. […] The ideation base thus itself embodies, auto-genetically, the principles on which it is organised and enabled to develop further, such that the primary systems of ideational meaning then serve as a grid within which more delicate categories are construed.

Fifthly, it is these fractal types that make grammatical metaphor possible. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 225):

Thus our concept of “construing experience through meaning” refers to the construal in human consciousness of an ideational system in which such [transphenomenal] motifs play a crucial part. Expansion and projection are, as we put it earlier, fractal principles; they generate organisation within many environments in the ideation base, at different strata and at different ranks within one stratum. These environments are thus related to one another through the local manifestations of these different motifs; and this opens up the system’s potential for alternative construals of experience … . What this means is, that whatever is construed can also be reconstrued, giving yet another dimension to the topology of semantic space.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 294-5): 

The whole metaphorical elaboration [of the semantic system] is made possible by a fractal pattern that runs through the whole system. We have suggested that the metaphorical elaboration is a token–value relation; but in order for it to be a token–value relation within the semantic system, it has to be natural in the sense that the token and the value domains have to be similar enough to allow for the token to stand for the value. … The principle behind this similarity is the fractal pattern of projection/expansion …

That is, while grammatical metaphor constitutes a move from one “phenomenal domain” to another … this move is made possible because fractal types engender continuity across these domains: the metaphorical move from one phenomenal domain to another takes place within the one and the same transphenomenal domain.

Sixthly, it is these fractal types, especially elaboration, that makes the "importation" of experience into the system possible.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 224):

Here we have foregrounded especially the motif of elaborating, with particular reference to its manifestation in the identifying and ascriptive figures of being. We have tried to show how elaboration makes it possible to “import” extra-linguistic experience into the meaning base by actively construing it (as in ‘that [thing there] is a circle’); and also to “transport” meanings internally from one region of the ideation base in order to construe new meanings in another (as in ‘balance means you hold it in your fingers and it does not go’). The extension of meaning in delicacy — not merely generalising across different types but construing such types into dimensional and open-ended taxonomies — is a function of the elaborating potential, exploiting the basic dimensions of the system itself.

[2]  A consideration of logico-semantic relations as transphenomenal fractal types that provide an additional organisation of ideational meaning undermines the stated justification for a 'discourse semantics of logical relations'.

Why The Argument For A Discourse Semantics Of Logical Relations Is Invalid

Martin (1992: 162-3):

The following clauses in particular do not make use of clause complex resources to encode causal or temporal relations:

That's because it's a low dog.

That is so the judge can get the hind movement of your dog.

After that he usually tells you…

He proceeds to do that with every dog.

Each of these uses a combination of IDENTIFICATION and TRANSITIVITY to make the necessary logical connections between parts of the text.  The first two are causal and involve text reference; anaphoric that functions as Carrier in an attributive relational clause with cause and purpose clauses embedded in the Attribute. …

The temporal examples also make use of that, but in the context of extended rather than text reference.  In After that, that functions as part of a Circumstance of Location in time, with the temporal connection coded as a preposition.  In the last example, that functions as a Range for the general process do and temporal succession is coded through the process proceed.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The reason why the clauses 'do not make use of clause complex resources to encode causal or temporal relations' is that they are not clause complexes.  Of the four clauses, only one actually realises any causal or temporal relation — non-structurally through conjunctive cohesion — as will be demonstrated below.

[2] In SFL theory, the first two clauses are related cohesively to their respective previous text through anaphoric demonstrative reference marked by that.  Neither clause realises a causal relation to the preceding text.  Instead, in the first, an attributive reason is ascribed, via the reference item, to a referent:

that	’s	[[because it’s a low dog]]
Carrier reference: demonstrative: anaphoric	Process: relational	Attribute: reason because it ’s a low dog Carrier Process: relational Attribute

and in the second, a mental purpose is ascribed, via the reference item, to a referent:

that	is	[[so the judge can get the hind movement of your dog]]
Carrier reference: demonstrative: anaphoric	Process: relational	Attribute: purpose so the judge can get the hind movement of your dog Senser Process: mental Phenomenon

[3] Contrary to the claim, the second "temporal" example does indeed make use of "text" reference (anaphoric demonstrative), and on Martin's analysis of the first example, it does as well (but see point [4] below).

[4] In SFL theory, after that functions as a conjunctive Adjunct, rather than a circumstantial Adjunct, and functions cohesively to mark a temporal conjunctive relation with a previous message.

after that	he	usually	tells		you
conjunctive Adjunct	Subject	mood Adjunct: modality	Finite	Predicator	Complement

[5] This confuses temporal relations between messages with the time-phase elaboration of a Process.  See Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 499-501).

he	proceeds to do	that	with every dog
Actor	Process: material proceeds to do a =b	Goal reference: demonstrative: anaphoric	Accompaniment

[6] The Process is realised by the elaborating verbal group complex proceeds to do.

Postscript: 

These clause simplex examples are presented as the motivation for theorising a discourse semantics of logical relations (p163), and it is later (p262) claimed that these examples 

cause problems for the clause complex analysis, in spite of the fact that Halliday's system was specifically designed to handle the dynamics of clause combining.