Using Embedding To Argue About Hypotaxis

Martin (1992: 486):

Subjects in embedded clauses are not however modally responsible, as can be seen from the fact that embedded clauses cannot be  tagged or queried.  Both the tag and the response in [6:51] for example refer unambiguously to the test, not the drug.

[6:51]	(embedding)
	The test proved [[the drug killed her]], didn’t it?
	— Yes it did.

With hypotaxis, the situation is more equivocal; the tag and response in [6:52] may refer either to the test or the drug, although the tag is much more likely to refer to the alpha clause than the beta:

[6:52]	(hypotaxis)
	The test suggested that the drug may have killed her, didn’t it?
	— It did.

So while hypotactically dependent clauses are still negotiable, the Mood element is less likely to be replayed than that of the alpha clause, and their Subject can accordingly be considered less at risk than those of ranking a [alpha?] clauses.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Text [6:52], like text [6:51], involves embedding, not hypotaxis.  It is the Subject of this clause simplex that is picked up by the pronoun in the Mood Tag.

the test	suggested		[[that the drug may have killed her]]	didn’t	it
Token/Identified	Process: identifying		Value/Identifier
Subject	Finite	Predicator	Complement	Finite	Subject
Mood		Residue		Mood Tag

Cf. the receptive agnate: That the drug may have killed her was suggested by the test, wasn't it?

[[that the drug may have killed her]]	was	suggested	by the test	wasn’t	it
Value/Identifier	Process: identifying		Token/Identified
Subject	Finite	Predicator	Adjunct	Finite	Subject
Mood		Residue		Mood Tag

See, for example, Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 269, 277, 285).

[2] Here the meaning of Subject, modal responsibility, is misconstrued as meaning "at risk".  In SFL theory, the Subject 'is the element the speaker makes responsible for the validity of what he is saying' (Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 83).

The Argument That "Verbal Processes Are Fundamentally Metaphorical In Nature"

Martin (1992: 483):

This text ([6:50]) is also organised by means of meta-proposals and meta-propositions which refer explicitly to the ongoing negotiation (functioning like the look proposals in [6:48] above). … These meta-proposals and meta-propositions could be interpreted as a type of textual metaphor (the dynamic equivalent of Francis's 1985 A-nouns).  This would however be to argue that verbal processes are fundamentally metaphorical in nature, rather than an ongoing classification of verbal behaviour as part of the experiential world.  When used to orchestrate rather than report on dialogue, this interpretation does not seem too far-fetched.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Meta-proposals and meta-propositions, as proposals and propositions, are language in its interpersonal guise, not its textual guise.  As such, they enact the interpersonal exchange.  They do not organise the text; instead, the textual metafunction organises them.

[2] There are two principal reasons why meta-proposals and meta-propositions can not be treated as a type of textual metaphor:

1. Meta-proposals and meta-propositions are interpersonal meanings, not textual meanings;
2. There is no such thing as textual metaphor (see previous arguments here and here).

[3] To interpret meta-proposals and meta-propositions as textual metaphor is not to argue that verbal processes are fundamentally metaphorical in nature.  This is because to interpret some interpersonal meanings as textual metaphor is not to argue that some experiential meanings are metaphorical.

[4] This seriously misunderstands grammatical metaphor.  Grammatical metaphor is the incongruent realisation of meaning (semantics) in wording (lexicogrammar).  Verbal processes — like anything else — can only be metaphorical by contrast with a congruent realisation.

[5] The alternatives presented here are that verbal processes are either:

• metaphorical, or
• construals of experience.

Grammatical metaphors involving verbal processes are ideational metaphors. Ideational metaphors are reconstruals of experience. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 241):

They constitute a resource for reconstruing experience along certain lines, redeploying the same categories that have evolved in the congruent mode of construing experience.

[6] Even if verbal processes were used to orchestrate text, to interpret them as "fundamentally metaphorical" — especially as opposed to construals of experience — would demonstrate a serious misunderstanding of SFL theory.

Confusing Metafunctions, Misunderstanding Modal Responsibility And Misinterpreting Data

Martin (1992: 477-8):

Text [6:50] is taken from Halliday's (1982) analysis of de-automatisation and interpersonal metaphor in Priestley's An Inspector Calls.  … The participants at risk in [6:50] include the Inspector and members of the Birling family (Mrs Birling, Birling, Sheila) except Gerald, but not the woman they have wronged.  Taking the congruent unpacking of interpersonal metaphor outlined in Table 6.27 as a baseline, the woman wronged is made modally responsible on four occasions ([6:50r, s, nn, qq] — and [6:50nn, qq] are dependent clauses); she is realised four times as often in the Residue. The family (except Gerald) and the Inspector on the other hand are modally responsible as often as not.

Table 6.27. Congruent realisations of interpersonal metaphors in [6:30]
	as subject [modally responsible]	as residue [not modally responsible]
Inspector	d,e,f,g,h,i,y,aa,bb,cc,dd,hh,ii,jj,yy	t,u,x,z,bb,cc
Gerald	rr,ss	c,d,e,f,g,rr,tt
Mrs Birling	j,k,l,m,n,o,p,q,t,u,v,w,x,uu,ww,xx	k,l,v,uu,vv,ww
Birling	z,ee,mm	ff,hh,ii,jj
Sheila	oo,pp,vv	kk
[we ‘Birlings’]	a,b,c,ll,ll
[you ‘parents’]	zz	zz
woman	r,s,nn,qq,d,e,f,g,h,i,o,p,q,	mm,nn,rr,ss,uu,ww

Blogger Comments:

[1] The interpersonal meaning of Subject, modal responsibility, is here misconstrued as experiential meaning: "participants at risk".

[2] This confuses the interlocutors in the play with the pronoun Subjects of the clauses they project.  The words Mrs Birling, (Mr) Birling and Sheila do not serve as the Subject of any of the clauses in the play.  In this discussion of interpersonal meaning, the pronouns are being interpreted experientially, instead of interpersonally.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 525):

If the ideational metafunction is language in its "third person" guise, the interpersonal is language in its “first and second person” guise; the interaction of a ‘me’ and a ‘you’. The ‘me’ and the ‘you’ are of course constructed in language; they have no existence outside the social semiotic. Once constructed, me and you become a part of experience and can be referred to alongside the him, the her and the it; but note that (unlike the interpersonal meaning, which does not change) their ideational meaning changes every time there is a change of speaker (this is what makes me and you so difficult for children to learn).

[3] This contradicts the analysis in Table 6.27, which claims that 'Gerald' serves as Subject twice. Actually, in Martin's terms, 'Gerald' serves as Subject three times: in [b] as I, in [rr] as Gerald, and in [ss] as the ellipsed Subject.

[4] This contradicts the analysis in Table 6.27, which claims that 'the woman they have wronged' serves as Subject thirteen times, and the sentence that follows which claims that she serves as Subject four times.

[5] This contradicts the analysis in Table 6.27, which claims that 'the woman they have wronged' serves as Subject thirteen times.  Actually, in Martin's terms, 'the woman they have wronged' serves as Subject only twice: in [r, qq] as she.

[6] This contradicts the analysis in Table 6.27, which claims that 'the woman they have wronged' serves as Subject thirteen times, and in the Residue six times.  4 x 13 ≠ 6.

[7] This contradicts the analysis in Table 6.27, which claims that

• 'Inspector' serves as Subject fifteen times, but in the Residue only six times (15–6);
• 'Mrs Birling' serves as Subject sixteen times, but in the Residue only six times (16–6);
• 'Sheila' serves as Subject three times, but in the Residue only once (3–1).

Misconstruing Semiotic Validity As Social Success

Martin (1992: 476):

Instead the Subject codes the modally responsible participants (including the metaphorical interpersonal "participant" a vital responsibility and two further nominalisations the earlier conflict–the latter); these are at risk not because they contrast with each other but because they are alternatives to potential Subjects in the Residue. The argument can be changed completely by promoting these to Subject position, as outlined below.  The main result of this transformation is that the success of the propositions no longer depends on the American armed forces; these are demoted from modal responsibility and no longer seen to be at risk.

Blogger Comments:

[1] A participant is a construal of experience.  This demonstrates that Martin is here misconstruing interpersonal meaning as experiential meaning.

[2] Here the meaning of Subject, modal responsibility, is misconstrued as "meaning at risk".  It is the proposition that is arguable, and the validity of the proposition rests on the Subject.

[3] Here the validity of propositions is misconstrued as "the success of the propositions", presumably in the sense of 'closing negotiation' (p462).  This follows from misconstruing modal responsibility as a type of social responsibility incumbent on the interlocutors, as explained in previous posts.

Blurring Metafunctions

Martin (1992: 474, 476):

Although it is harder to unpick the meaning of Subject in written monologue [than in spoken mode] from the meaning of Theme and Given, texts such as [6:36] above which realise their method of development through marked Themes demonstrate the significance of modal responsibility in this mode. …

Unlike Theme, Subject selection in [6:36] does not reflect the text's contrastive method of development.

Blogger Comment:

The meanings of these grammatical functions are metafunctionally distinct.  The meaning of Subject is interpersonal (modal responsibility) whereas the meanings of Theme (point of departure of the message) and Given (recoverable information) are textual.  Because 'method of development' is a concern of the textual metafunction, Subject selection is irrelevant to a text's method of development.

Misunderstanding The Metafunctions

Martin (1992: 465):

Interpersonal resources for negotiation are foregrounded in the following sketch from Monty Python's first movie.  Interlocutor A has paid for an argument, which he defines in ideational terms: An argument is a connected series of statements intended to establish a proposition; what he receives instead is simply interpersonal — contradiction: the automatic gainsaying of any statement the other person makes.  This underlines the fact that negotiation is more than interaction; it is about interlocutors accommodating ideational meaning.

Blogger Comments:

[1] (True to form) Monty Python's 'argument sketch' did not appear in the first "movie" And Now For Something Completely Different — a re-filming of some sketches from the 1st and 2nd series of the BBC television programme, Monty Python's Flying Circus, for U.S. cinema release in 1971. The argument sketch didn't appear until the 3rd episode of the 3rd series, broadcast in November 1972. 

[2] The distinction between these two definitions of 'argument' in the text is not a metafunctional one. Experientially, they are both figures of being–&–having realised by identifying relational clauses, and interpersonally, they are both propositions: statements realised by declarative clauses. As propositions, they demonstrate the meaning of Subject as modal responsibility.

well	an argument	isn’t	just	contradiction
	Subject	Finite	mood Adjunct: intensity: counterexpectancy: limiting	Complement
	Mood			Residue

an argument	is	a connected series of statements intended to establish a proposition
Subject	Finite	Complement
Mood		Residue

argument	is	an intellectual process
Subject	Finite	Complement
Mood		Residue

contradiction	is	just	the automatic gainsaying of any statement the other person makes
Subject	Finite	mood Adjunct: intensity: counterexpectancy: limiting	Complement
Mood			Residue

For each clause, the responsibility for the validity of what is predicated is carried by the Subject. The responsibility for the validity of an argument is a connected series of statements intended to establish a proposition is carried by its Subject an argument; the responsibility for the validity of contradiction is just the automatic gainsaying of any statement the other person makes is carried by its Subject contradiction.

[3] Negotiation isn't about "interlocutors accommodating ideational meaning". This misunderstands the metafunctions. Meaning is simultaneously ideational, interpersonal and textual. Negotiation is concerned with meaning in its interpersonal guise. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 525):

Choosing a particular speech function is, obviously, only one step in a dialogue; what the grammar creates, through the system of “mood”, is the potential for arguing, for an ongoing exchange of speech rôles among the interactants in a conversation. The mood system, together with other systems associated with it, constructs a great range of speech functional variation; and since in principle any ideational meaning can be mapped on to any interpersonal meaning, this makes it possible to construe any aspect of experience in dialogic form. 

Confusing Subject With Validity

Martin (1992: 464):

Seen in these terms negotiation involves resolving an exchange by replaying its Mood function (possibly fine tuning through tone), adjusting its POLARITY, MODALITY or TENSE, or substituting its Subject or part of its Residue; alternatively the initiating proposal or proposition has to be replaced and negotiation started all over again.  The interlocutor initiating the exchange tries to facilitate this by centring meanings at risk in the Mood; it is this facilitation process that explains the pattern of Subject choice in dialogue — the Subject, in other words, is what is at stake.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, it is the Mood block, the Subject and Finite, that makes a proposition arguable. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 212):

The ‘nub of the argument’ is realised by the Subject of clause and the Finite fixes it … in relation to the now of speaking.

[2] In considering the clause in its interpersonal semantic guise, as a move in an exchange, what's "at stake" or "at risk" — that is, what is arguable — is not the Subject, but the validity of the proposition or proposal.  The Subject is the element on which this modal responsibility rests; the validity of a proposition is stated or questioned with respect to the Subject.

Misconstruing Modal Responsibility In Terms Of Exchange Resolution

Martin (1992: 462):

The challenge here is to interpret the meaning of Subject from a discourse perspective, by looking at the way in which discourse structures interact with Subject selection.  The best context for examining this interaction is dialogue, since negotiation provides the appropriate interpersonal context.  As noted in Chapter 2, in the unmarked case, negotiation is aimed at closure; interlocutors work around an obligatory K1 or A1 move which will resolve the exchange.  It follows from this that the interlocutor initiating the exchange will arrange propositions and proposals in such a way that they can be "naturally" resolved.

Blogger Comment:

This misconstrual of modal responsibility — the meaning of Subject — follows directly from Martin's (p461) misinterpretation of the Subject of proposals:

The meaning of Subject is glossed in terms of modal responsibility. This meaning is most transparent in proposals, where regardless of voice, the Subject is the constituent responsible for seeing that goods are exchanged or a service performed.

Applied to propositions, this becomes:

• the Subject is the constituent responsible for seeing that information is exchanged.

In the excerpt above, this social responsibility for interlocutors seeing that information is exchanged becomes a responsibility for interlocutors seeing that exchanges are resolved.

Again, this confuses the material order of experience (interlocutors) with the semiotic order of experience (the linguistic content that they project).