Theoretical Inconsistencies In Modelling Genre And Register As Context Strata

Martin (1992: 495):

The tension between these two perspectives will be resolved in this chapter by including in the interpretation of context two communication planes, genre (context of culture) and register (context of situation), with register functioning as the expression form of genre, at the same time as language functions as the expression form of register.  Register can then itself be organised with respect to field, tenor and mode, reflecting metafunctional diversity in its expression form, leaving genre to concentrate on the integration of meanings engendered by field, tenor and mode as systemically related social processes.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands the theoretical concepts of 

1. stratification,
2. context, 
3. genre and 
4. register.

In SFL theory, strata are levels of symbolic abstraction, such that each lower stratum is a Token that realises an upper stratum, as Value.  Context is culture modelled as a semiotic system that is more symbolically abstract than language; language is a Token that realises context as Value.  Genre and register, on the other hand, are types of language; they are not more abstract than language, they do not realise language, they are language.  Because they are not more abstract than language, it is nonsensical to model them as strata above language.

[2] This misunderstands the theoretical concepts of

1. stratification, and
2. instantiation.

The relation between context of culture and context of situation is one of instantiation (ascription); a situation is an instance of a culture.  On the other hand, the relation between strata is realisation (identity); on this model, genre is realised by register.  Accordingly, it is theoretically inconsistent to equate the ascriptive relation between culture and situation as an identity relation between two strata, however conceived.

With regard to interpreting context of culture as genre and context of situation as register, note the inconsistencies with Martin's definitions of context of culture and context of situation here.

[3] This misunderstands the theoretical concepts of

1. genre, and
2. register.

In SFL theory, genre, in the sense of text type, is register viewed from the instance pole of the cline of instantiation; and contrariwise, register is genre (text type) viewed from the system pole of the cline of instantiation.  That is, genre and register are the same phenomenon viewed from different angles, instance and system.  Genre and register are not, therefore, different levels of symbolic abstraction, and, as such, it is theoretically inconsistent to model them as two strata related by realisation.

[4] This misunderstands the theoretical concepts of

1. stratification, and
2. register.

On the stratificational model, construing language as the 'expression form of register', is construing language as less symbolically abstract than register.  However, since register is language, register and language are of the same level of symbolic abstraction.  Register and language are not, therefore, different levels of symbolic abstraction, and, as such, it is theoretically inconsistent to model them as two strata related by realisation.

[5] In SFL theory, registers of language differ by the different contextual features — field, tenor and mode — that they realise.  Registers of language and contextual features are construed as different levels of symbolic abstraction.

[6] This confuses context with language.  In SFL theory, 'the integration of meanings engendered by field, tenor and mode' is the domain of the textual metafunction at the level of semantics.  So Martin's proposal is to model textual semantics as a higher stratum of context: genre.  It might be remembered that Martin models ideational semantics, activity sequences, as field, within his lower level of context: register.

Why The Argument For Register And Genre As Context Strata Is Invalid

Martin (1992: 494-5):

Halliday's intrinsic theory of language function is thus projected onto context as an extrinsic theory of language use.  The realisation relationship between context and language is treated as a symbolic one, with language a metaphor for social reality at the same time as social reality is a metaphor for language. … 

Seen from the perspective of culture on the other hand, context can be alternatively interpreted as a system of social processes.  This for example is the perspective that underlies much of Bakhtin's writing on genre.  While acknowledging metafunctional diversity in terms strikingly similar to those developed by Halliday, Bakhtin places emphasis as well on the integration of these meanings as speech genres which evolve and differentiate themselves in different spheres of human activity.  This more "wholistic" perspective on text-type Bakhtin (1986 [1953]: 60) constructs as follows …

All the diverse areas of human activity involve the use of language.  Quite understandably, the nature of forms of this use are just as diverse as are the areas of human activity…Language is realised in the form of individual concrete utterances (oral and written) by participants in various areas of human activity.  The utterances reflect the specific conditions and goals of each such area not only through their content (thematic) and linguistic style, that is the selection of the lexical, phraseological, and grammatical resources of the language, but above all through their compositional structure.  All three of these aspects — thematic content, style, and compositional structure — are inseparably linked to the whole of the utterance and are equally determined by the specific nature of the particular sphere of communication.  Each separate utterance is individual, of course, but each sphere in which language is used develops its own relatively stable types of these utterances.  These may well be called speech genres.

The tension between these two perspectives will be resolved in this chapter by including in the interpretation of context two communication planes, genre (context of culture) and register (context of situation), with register functioning as the expression form of genre, at the same time as language functions as the expression form of register.  Register can then itself be organised with respect to field, tenor and mode, reflecting metafunctional diversity in its expression form, leaving genre to concentrate on the integration of meanings engendered by field, tenor and mode as systemically related social processes.

Blogger Comments:

[1] See previous post for a critique of this misunderstanding.

[2] This is misleading. Bakhtin's 'conditions and goals of areas of human activity' corresponds to Halliday's contextual dimensions of field and rhetorical mode.

[3] Like Bakhtin, Halliday also "places emphasis as well on the integration of these meanings as speech genres which evolve and differentiate themselves in different spheres of human activity".  The difference is one of terminology: Halliday calls speech genres text types (instance pole perspective), or registers (system pole perspective).

[4] Given the above, this claim is as valid as the use of the word "wholistic" for 'holistic'.

[5] Given the above, no tension between "these two perspectives" has been demonstrated.

[6] No explanation is provided as to how these proposals will resolve the undemonstrated tensions between "these two perspectives".

Conclusion

This constitutes Martin's argument for modelling register and genre as contextual strata. The argument is as follows:

1. There is a tension between Halliday's and Bakhtin's perspectives on context;
2. The tension will be resolved by modelling genre and register as two contextual strata.

The problems with argument are are as follows:

1. There is no tension demonstrated between Halliday's and Bakhtin's perspectives on context;
2. There is no argument as to how the proposed model will resolve the undemonstrated tension, it is merely asserted that it will;
3. The proposed model is inconsistent with the meanings of stratification, context, genre and register.

The following post will deal with the theoretical inconsistencies created by the proposed model.

Confusing Orders Of Experience

Martin (1992: 494):

Halliday (1978: 122) outlines the semiotic structure of context as follows:

The semiotic structure of the situation is formed out of the three sociosemiotic variables of field, tenor and mode.  These represent in systematic form the type of activity in which the text has significant function (field), the status and rôle relationships involved (tenor) and the symbolic mode and rhetorical channels that are adopted.

Halliday's intrinsic theory of language function is thus projected onto context as an extrinsic theory of language use.  The realisation relationship between context and language is treated as a symbolic one, with language a metaphor for social reality at the same time as social reality is a metaphor for language. … Seen from the perspective of culture on the other hand, context can be alternatively interpreted as a system of social processes.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This continues the misunderstanding of realisation and, within this, the misinterpretation of symbolic as metaphorical, and, within this, the misunderstanding of metaphor.  In SFL theory, context and language are modelled as levels of symbolic abstraction, such that language realises context.  If the notion of metaphor is applied to the relation between context and language, then the claim would be that context may be realised congruently or metaphorically in language.  To claim that the higher level of abstraction, context, is a metaphor for the lower, language, misunderstands metaphor in precisely the same way as saying semantics is a metaphor for lexicogrammar.  On the contrary, semantics may be realised in lexicogrammar either congruently or metaphorically.

[2] This confuses different orders of experience: semiotic and material.  In SFL theory, context is construed as a semiotic system; the Halliday quote above makes this clear in its opening words: 'the semiotic structure of the situation'. Social processes, on the other hand, are of the material order of experience.  Despite interpreting context materially as social reality, it will be seen that Martin's model of context is concerned with the semiotic order: genre and register.

Misunderstanding Metafunctions

Martin (1992: 494):

Seen from the perspective of language, context can be interpreted as reflecting metafunctional diversity.  Projecting experiential meaning onto context giving field,* interpersonal meaning giving tenor and textual meaning giving mode, Halliday (1978: 122) outlines the semiotic structure of context…

*Endnote #2 (p588):

Halliday is inconsistent as far as the question of whether ideational (i.e. experiential and logical) meaning projects field (1978: 116, 125) or whether the projection is from experiential meaning alone (1978: 143, 189, 1985: 9: 26).  This uncertainty has probably arisen because while the logico-semantics of logical meaning (expansion and projection; see also the discussion of nuclear relations in 5.3.3 above) is field oriented, taxis itself (grammatical intricacy) is very sensitive to mode.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading.  What is "projected" onto context — in the act of modelling it — are the metafunctional dimensions — not linguistic meanings — that also organise language.  Halliday (1978: 123):

The semiotic components of the situation (field, tenor and mode) are systematically related to the functional components of the semantics (ideational, interpersonal and textual): field to the ideational component, representing the 'content' function of language, the speaker as observer; tenor to the interpersonal component, representing the 'participation' function of language, the speaker as intruder; and mode to the textual component, representing the 'relevance' function of language, without which the other two do not become actualised.

[2] Halliday is not inconsistent on this matter; the uncertainty is Martin's only, and it arises from a misunderstanding.  Because the ideational metafunction includes both the experiential and logical metafunctions, the systematic relation to field can be stated in terms of all three metafunctional terms.

[3] This confuses taxis with grammatical intricacy and misrepresents the latter.

Taxis refers specifically to the 'degree of interdependency' — parataxis vs hypotaxis — between rank units in a complex (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 438).

Grammatical intricacy is the type of lexicogrammatical complexity found in spoken mode — in contrast to the lexical density of written mode.  Grammatical intricacy involves both interdependency and logical semantic relations.  Halliday (1985/9: 86):

It is often thought that sequences of conversational discourse like this are simply strings of 'ands'.  These extracts make it clear that they are not.  Rather, they are intricate constructions of clauses, varying not only in the kind of interdependency (parataxis or hypotaxis) but also in the logical semantic relationships involved.  These include not only the three basic types of expansion — adding a new point, restating or exemplifying the previous one, or adding a qualification — but also in the relationship of projection, whereby the speaker brings in what somebody else says or thinks and incorporates it grammatically into his own discourse.

Under-Acknowledging A Significant Intellectual Source

Martin (1992: 491):

NOTES

1. …
2. The conjunction so that has been selected here since it codes the meaning of inclination; see Chapter 4.
3. …
4. The topical Theme clear in r is metaphorical (experiential) realisation of an interpersonal Theme (congruently clearly).
5. …
6. The modalised conjunctions whether, whether and if have been treated as interpersonal Themes in this analysis.
7. Fries (1981/1983: 135) complements his notion of development with that of point, which he sees as realised through Rheme; his point is interpreted as "pattern of news" here. …

Blogger Comments:

[1] The conjunction group so that realises logical meaning, a relation of expansion: enhancement: cause: purpose or result, between two clauses in a nexus.  It does not realise inclination, which is interpersonal meaning: modality: modulation; see Chapter 4 critiques.

[2] The topical Theme in clause [r] (It is clear that future generations…) is it, not clear.  Both it and clear function both experientially (Carrier and Attribute) and interpersonally (Subject and Complement).  In interpersonal terms, clearly functions as a comment Adjunct, whereas it is clear enacts a comment (modal assessment) on a proposition as an objectively oriented proposition in its own right.  If the comment Adjunct clearly had been used, then the topical Theme would have been future generations, but this is not acknowledged as a Theme in the analysis of the text.

[3] The conjunctions whether and if function as structural Themes, because they realise a logico-semantic relation between clauses in a clause nexus.  They do not function as interpersonal Themes because they do not realise values of modality.

[4] This endnote — 42 pages after the discussion — is the only acknowledgement that Martin's 'point' derives from Fries (1981).  Since Martin interprets New as the last element of clause structure, his point, like Fries', is also "realised through Rheme".

Using Metaphor To Misrepresent Grammatical Metaphor

Martin (1992: 490-1):

Grammatical metaphor then is the meta-process behind a text.  It co-ordinates the synoptic systems and dynamic processes that give rise to text.  It is the technology that let's [sic] the modules harmonise.  It is their medium, their catalyst, the groove of their symbiosis, their facilitator, their mediator.  It is the re/source of texture.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is all disproved by the existence of just one text that doesn't deploy grammatical metaphor.

[2] This continues the misconstrual of the architecture of SFL theory in terms of "interacting modules".  See the earlier critique here.

Misrepresenting Grammatical Metaphor

Martin (1992: 490):

Because of this, grammatical metaphor is linguistics' most important tool for understanding discourse semantics as research is developed beyond the systems and patterns of interaction proposed here — and for understanding the relation between texture and context.  It is thus the key to understanding text in context — to contextualising the ineffable.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The discourse semantics model does not provide a means of modelling grammatical metaphor, and the notion of grammatical metaphor in the model is largely misunderstood, as repeatedly demonstrated  in the critiques here.

A major shortcoming of discourse semantics, with regard to grammatical metaphor, is that it doesn't provide the semantics (meanings) that are to be realised either congruently or metaphorically in lexicogrammar (wordings).  For example, with regard to ideational metaphor, it doesn't provide the equivalent of a figure (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999), that is realised either congruently as a clause, or metaphorically as something else, such as a nominal group serving as a participant element of clause structure.  Martin (1992: 325):

The level of discourse semantics is the least developed as far as ideational meaning is concerned.  This is mainly due to the fact that the description developed here has focussed on relationships between experiential meanings, rather than the experiential meanings themselves.

A second major shortcoming is the fact that much of logical discourse semantics is merely a mislabelling of expansion relations — projection is omitted from the model — with no regard for whether they are deployed logically (structurally) or textually (cohesively).  This sets up incongruent realisations where there is no metaphor.  For example, in discourse semantics, the logical relation in

• Ben can train hard without improving his time

is said to be concessive purpose (p199), whereas, in lexicogrammar, the relation is adversative addition.  That is, concessive purpose is incongruently realised as adversative addition. This is incongruence, but not metaphor.

[2] There are texts that don't involve the deployment of grammatical metaphor.  For these, the relation between texture and context can, nevertheless, be understood.  Thus grammatical metaphor is not key to understanding text in context.

[3] In the words of Conan Doyle's Dr. John H. Watson: "What ineffable twaddle!"

Rhapsodising On Grammatical Metaphor

Martin (1992: 490):

The main resource for facilitating all this interaction is grammatical metaphor.  It is the scrambler — it processes meaning in natural and unnatural ways, depending on what the texture demands.  It orchestrates the many to many relationships among discourse and lexicogrammatical meanings, thereby indefinitely expanding the scope of the content plane as a meaning making resource.  It provides the technology needed to predict and accumulate meanings.  It makes the text like a clause; it makes the clause like a text.  It thingises and naturalises, it dissembles and reveals.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is manifestly untrue, since all texts have texture, the property of being a text, even those that don't make use of grammatical metaphor.

[2] The word 'scramble' means, inter alia, to make (something) jumbled or muddled.  This is not what grammatical metaphor does.

[3] Grammatical metaphor, ideational and interpersonal, involves incongruent wordings of meanings.

[4] This continues the misunderstanding of the stratification of the content plane as two modules of meaning, instead of two levels of symbolic abstraction, namely: meaning (semantics) and wording (lexicogrammar).

[5] Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 626):

Systemically, metaphor leads to an expansion of the meaning potential: by creating new patterns of structural realisation, it opens up new systemic domains of meaning.  And it is the pressure to expand the meaning potential that in fact lies behind the development of metaphorical modes of meaning.

[6] This is manifestly untrue.  If it were grammatical metaphor that provided the "technology needed to predict and accumulate meanings", then writers and readers of texts without grammatical metaphor would not be able to "predict and accumulate meanings".

[7] See the previous critique of this misunderstanding here.

[8] This refers to ideational metaphor only, specifically nominalisation.

[9] Neither ideational nor interpersonal metaphor "naturalises".  Quite the reverse.  Ideational metaphor construes a model that is further removed from everyday experience than the congruent.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 646):

… grammatical metaphor of the ideational kind is primarily a strategy enabling us to transform our experience of the world: the model of experience construed in the congruent mode is reconstrued in the metaphorical mode, creating a model that is further removed from our everyday experience — but which has made modern science possible.

Interpersonal metaphors enacts a greater social distance between speaker and addressee than the congruent. Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 631):

The potential for negotiation in dialogue created by metaphors of mood is directly related to the contextual variables of tenor. These are usually discussed in terms of status, formality and politeness. What they have in common is a very general sense of the social distance between the speaker and the addressee. Here interpersonal metaphor is part of a principle of interpersonal iconicity: metaphorical variants create a greater semiotic distance between meaning and wording, and this enacts a greater social distance between speaker and addressee.

Using Allegory To Misrepresent The Rôle Of Mood And Residue In Modal Responsibility

Martin (1992: 490):

Text is a dialectic, a semiotic rally.  But the ball that comes back may be slightly different from the ball you've just played.  And the ball has two parts — a bit you thought might come back different and a bit you assumed would stay the same.  When the ball comes back unchanged, you throw it away and get a new one; and sometimes it doesn't come back at all — in which case you may choose another ball or stop playing altogether (or decide to find a new partner for the next round). 

Monologue is hitting up against the backboard; the tension is still there — choosing Subjects is important.  But you negotiate against yourself; you can't hit the same shot twice, and someone might be watching anyhow.  So the monologue is a dialogue.  Text is a rally you aren't trying to win; it's a game you're trying to share.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This misunderstands the term 'dialectic', since a vanishingly small proportion of the total number of texts can be accurately categorised as such:

Dialectic or dialectics (Greek: διαλεκτική, dialektikḗ), also known as the dialectical method, is a discourse between two or more people holding different points of view about a subject but wishing to establish the truth through reasoned arguments. The term was popularised by Plato's Socratic dialogues but the act itself has been central to European and Indian philosophy since ancient history.

The term dialectic is not synonymous with the term debate. While in theory debaters are not necessarily emotionally invested in their point of view, in practice debaters frequently display an emotional commitment that may cloud rational judgment. Debates are won through a combination of persuading the opponent, proving one's argument correct, or proving the opponent's argument incorrect. Debates do not necessarily require promptly identifying a clear winner or loser; however clear winners are frequently determined by either a judge, jury, or by group consensus.

The term dialectics is also not synonymous with the term rhetoric, a method or art of discourse that seeks to persuade, inform, or motivate an audience. Concepts, like "logos" or rational appeal, "pathos" or emotional appeal, and "ethos" or ethical appeal, are intentionally used by rhetoricians to persuade an audience.

[2] This extended tennis metaphor is meant to illustrate Martin's characterisation of Mood and Residue in his misinterpretation of modal responsibility (ibid.):

In summary, Residue is what interlocutors are judged to have in common; Mood is what they may not share.

As explained previously, the Mood element carries the burden of the clause as an interactive event, so it remains constant, as the nub of the proposition, unless some positive step is taken to change it (Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 150), whereas the Residue comprises the remaining elements that realise the proposition (or proposal), but which do not 'bear the burden of the clause as an interactive event'.

[3] In monologue, as elsewhere, the choice of Subject is important in the sense that the validity of a proposition or proposal rests with it; there need be no "tension" (e.g. Mary had a little lamb).  In monologue, where there is negotiation, the speakers or writers don't "negotiate against" themselves, but with the addressees.

[4] This misunderstands the distinction between monologue and dialogue. A text (rally) with one speaker (player) is a monologue, no matter how many readers (observers) there are.

—∞—

Consider also the effectiveness of this tennis allegory: when the ball comes back unchanged, you throw it away and get a new one.

Rhapsodising On Modal Responsibility

Martin (1992: 489-90):

Finally modal responsibility accommodates the interlocutor, making ongoing assessments of meaning at risk.  Vulnerable meanings are woven through the Mood functions of a text's ranking clauses, constructing a constrained resource for openness — for interplay, as interlocutors negotiate the resolution of an exchange.  What is going on here is that meanings that can be shared without risk are not worth being made; there has to be some difference involved to make a text worth meaning.  At the same time, a text is not worth meaning if it cannot be shared.  And so the openness associated with point is delimited by the need to organise messages into interactive events in which certain meanings are taken for granted and others are the stakes.  Where interlocutors cannot agree, these stakes may be very high.  In summary, Residue is what interlocutors are judged to have in common; Mood is what they may not share.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is manifestly untrue.  In SFL theory, modal responsibility is the meaning of Subject, and refers to the rôle of Subject as the element on which the validity of a proposition or proposal rests.  The Subject does not "accommodate" the interlocutor.  Consider the "accommodation" of the interlocutor provided by the Subject the square of the hypotenuse in the following clause:

the square of the hypotenuse	equals		the sum of the squares of the other two sides
Subject	Finite	Predicator	Complement
Mood		Residue

[2] This is manifestly untrue.  Subjects do not "make ongoing assessments of meaning at risk".  Consider the "ongoing assessment of meaning at risk" made by the Subject the square of the hypotenuse in the previous example.

[3] This is manifestly untrue.  Consider the "vulnerability" of the meanings of the square of the hypotenuse and equals that are "woven through the Mood functions" in the example above.

[4] The function of the Mood block, Subject + Finite, is to make propositions and proposals arguable.

[5] Not all texts involve "interlocutors negotiating the resolution of an exchange", but all texts involve Subjects.  Consider the "interlocutors negotiating the resolution of an exchange" in the following text:

How pleasant to know Mr. Lear,
Who has written such volumes of stuff.
Some think him ill-tempered and queer,
But a few find him pleasant enough.

[6] This is manifestly untrue.  Consider the "sharing of meaning without risk" in:

the square of the hypotenuse equals the sum of the squares of the other two sides

This, the Pythagorean theorem, is a fundamental relation in Euclidean geometry and might thus be considered as "worth being made".  Two geometers don't need to disagree about it for it to be "worth meaning".

[7] Martin's point includes paragraph summaries (hyper-News) and a text summary (macro-New).  Summaries do not open up a text, they keep it within the bounds of what has already been written.  See the most recent previous critique here.

[8] This confuses metafunctions.  Modal responsibility is an interpersonal function, whereas the organisation of texts is the province of the textual metafunction.

[9] As well as being manifestly untrue, this misunderstands the nature of Mood and Residue. Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 150):

… the Mood element has a clearly defined semantic function: it carries the burden of the clause as an interactive event. So it remains constant, as the nub of the proposition, unless some positive step is taken to change it …

The Residue, on the other hand, comprises the remaining elements that realise the proposition (or proposal), but which do not 'bear the burden of the clause as an interactive event'.