Misrepresenting The Distinction Between Fabula And Syuzhet

Martin (1992: 537):

Barthes's notion of sequence was developed in the context of studying the relations between story (alternatively fabula or histoire) and discourse (alternatively sjuzhet or discours) in narrative theory (see Toolan 1988: 9-11), a context very similar to that in which the field/genre distinction proposed here evolved in Australian educational linguistics.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading.  The distinction between fabula and syuzhet is not the distinction between story and discourse: 

Fabula and syuzhet are terms originating in Russian formalism and employed in narratology that describe narrative construction. Syuzhet is an employment of narrative and fabula is the chronological order of the events contained in the story. They were first used in this sense by Vladimir Propp and Viktor Shklovsky. The fabula is "the raw material of a story, and syuzhet, the way a story is organized.

[2] In SFL Theory, field is the ideational dimension of the culture as a semiotic system that has language as its expression plane, and genre is text type, which is register viewed from the instance pole of the cline of instantiation.

Martin's model of field, however, confuses field (context) with activity sequences (semantics) and miscontrues this confusion as register.

On the other hand, Martin's model of genre confuses text type (register) with text structure (semantics) and misconstrues this confusion as a level of context that is realised by his confused model of register.

Confusing Context With Extra-Linguistic Knowledge, Register And Semantics

Martin (1992: 537):

The notion of activity sequence has obvious affinities with various concepts developed in artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology (e.g. the frames, scripts, scenarios and schemata reviewed in Brown & Yule 1983: 236-70).  The most relevant articulation here however is that of Barthes (1966/1977: 101-4), of whose earlier work Brown and Yule make no mention.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The frames, scripts, scenarios and schemata reviewed in Brown & Yule are ways of 'representing background knowledge', 'knowledge of the world' (1983: 236-7), with an emphasis on the way knowledge of the world is stored in memory (ibid.).  That is, what, for SFL Theory is meaning potential, established ontogenetically, is construed, in such models, as extra-linguistic cognition.

As Martin conceives them, however, activity sequences are an entirely different matter.  For Martin, activity sequences are an aspect of field, the ideational dimension of context.  However, Martin's model is further complicated by the facts that

• context (culture) is misconstrued as register (subpotentials of language), and
• activity sequences are meanings (semantics) misconstrued as field (context).

[2] It is understandable that Brown & Yule (1983) did not review Barthes (1966/77) in this regard, since the former are concerned with models of extra-linguistic cognition, whereas the latter is concerned with a unit of language (the sequence).

Misrepresenting Data & Confusing Strata

Martin (1992: 537):

Benson & Greaves (forthcoming) for example show that the lexical item hand in an introductory bridge manual has left collocates oriented to the organisation of participants in field: balanced hand, weak hand, first hand; to the right however hand collocates with lexical items oriented to activity: Take your tricks from the short hand first, Revalue your hand using dummy points, with a maximum hand, opener knows how high.  This organisation of fields as things and activities will be briefly reviewed below;

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, this is not cohesive collocation, merely the juxtaposition of lexical items.  The probability of left and right juxtapositions correlates with the probability of clause and group structures.

The left vs right difference relates to the unmarked realisation of a semantic Thing as Head of a nominal group serving as a participant.  Within nominal group structure, to the left, Thing is likely to be preceded by modifying Deictics, Numeratives, Epithets and Classifiers, and to the right, Thing is likely to be followed by the Process or minor Process of a Qualifier.  At clause rank, hand is likely to be Complement, and so followed, if at all, by an Adjunct.  In a clause nexus, hand is likely to be followed by the Theme of the following finite clause (e.g. opener), or Predicator of a non-finite clause (e.g. using).

[2] This confuses context with the language that realises context.  The confusion is thus along the dimension of stratification.  Specifically, it confuses field — what's going on (a reader learning how to play bridge) — with lexical items construing participants and processes in the text (lexicogrammar).

[3] This misrepresents the data.  Only 1/3 of the "activities" is a Process (using); the other 2/3 are a conjunctive Adjunct/relator (first) and a Senser participant (opener).

Blurring The Distinction Between Realisation, Logogenesis And Instantiation

Martin (1992: 536-7):

Field is the contextual projection of experiential meaning and so alongside IDEATION puts at risk the clause rank systems TRANSITIVITY, CIRCUMSTANTIATION and AGENCY, as well as systems generating Numerative, Epithet, Classifier, Thing and Qualifier in nominal group structure and various other group/phrase systems, all of which need to be interpreted as embracing lexis as most delicate grammar; in addition, research into collocation patterns provides an important perspective on field's realisation (see Benson & Greaves 1981, 1992, forthcoming).

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is misleading.  Field is not the contextual projection of experiential meaning.  Field is the ideational dimension of context.  That is, it is application of the theoretical notion of the ideational metafunction to the culture as a semiotic system.

[2] As previously demonstrated, Martin's system of ideation, purported to be a model of experiential meaning on the discourse semantic stratum, is actually a confusion of lexical cohesion (textual metafunction at the level of grammar), lexis as most delicate grammar (lexicogrammatical delicacy), and logical relations between figure elements.

Martin here omits systems of the logical metfunction.  This would have required the inclusion of the discourse semantic system of conjunction, which, as previously demonstrated, is a confusion of clause complex relations (logical metafunction) and cohesive conjunction (textual metafunction), both of which are grammatical systems.

[3] Unhappily, the risk that semiotic systems face is never identified.

[4] To be clear, the clause rank system of transitivity includes the systems of agency and circumstantiation.  Circumstantiation refers to 'circumstantial transitivity' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 758).

[5] 'Systems generating structure' blurs the distinction between axial realisation, logogenesis and instantiation.  The relation between paradigmatic system and syntagmatic structure is realisation.  Structure realises system.  That is, they are in a relation of symbolic identity, with system as Value and structure as Token.

On the other hand, 'generating', in this sense, is modelled in SFL theory as logogenesis, the unfolding of text at the instance pole of cline of instantiation, as features are selected and realisation statements activated (the process of instantiation).

[6] This demonstrates a lack of understanding of the notion of lexis as most delicate grammar — as also demonstrated by its inclusion in Martin's model of experiential discourse semantics.  Lexis as most delicate grammar means that if grammatical networks were to be elaborated to sufficient delicacy, bundles of the most delicate features would specify individual lexical items — just as bundles of articulatory features specify individual phonemes.

[7] To be clear, collocation is a resource of lexical cohesion, and so represents a resource of the textual, not ideational metafunction.

Confusing Field With The Language That Realises It

Martin (1992: 536):

The semiotic system of field was introduced in Chapter 5 by way of contextualising the discussion of IDEATION.  Field was introduced there in terms of sets of activity sequences oriented to some global institutional purpose (or more informally, field provides the semiotic interpretation of what counts as an answer to the question //1 What do you do// as put to strangers).

Blogger Comments:

[1] As demonstrated in several previous posts, the discussion (p292, pp321-5) of activity sequences in Chapter 5 confuses the contextual category of field with the language that realises it.

[2] This is misleading.  The answer to the question What do you do? is language, not field (context).  As a dimension of context, field is not language.  Language realises field; language and field are different levels of symbolic abstraction, with language as Token and field as Value.  This stratal identity relation encodes field by reference to language; and decodes language by reference to field.

The confusion arises, most generally, from Martin mistaking semogenesis (all strata make meaning) for stratification (context/meaning/wording/sounding), and because of this, treating all strata as levels of (linguistic) meaning.  This misunderstanding then leads, in the present chapter, to misconstruing context as types of language (register and genre).  Martin's model of register and genre, as contextual strata, is thus based on sequenced theoretical misunderstandings, and is inconsistent with both stratification and the notion of text type (register/genre).

Invoking Clinical And Social Psychology

Martin (1992: 535):

The system network for affect developed in this section is presented in Figure 7.15.  As with system networks in general, the account is a purely synoptic one, glossing over completely the elaborate interplay that charges relationships between speakers.  For this a dynamic accounts needs to be constructed, drawing on a long tradition of theory and practice in clinical and social psychology.  Regrettably, no attempt has been made to develop an interpersonal dynamics here (this concern will be raised again in 7.3.2.2 below).

Blogger Comments:

[1] The 'system' of 'system network' is shorthand for system–&–process.  The system is located on the cline of instantiation, from potential to instance.  The process is instantiation, the selection of features and the activation of realisation statements during logogenesis, the unfolding of text.

[2] The belief that the 'long tradition of theory and practice in clinical and social psychology' has much to offer the tenor classification of the relation between interlocutors, as either charged or neutral, during the dynamic unfolding of text, arises from Martin's misunderstanding of that relation as the behavioural surges and predisposed reactions of individuals.

[3] Regrettably, this concern is not raised again in 7.3.2.2 (Narrative Genres).

Inconsistent Unsupported Claims About The Realisation Of Misconstrued Affect

Martin (1992: 535):

Table 7.14 Tenor — aspects the realisation of affect

Affect	system	process
[loud/soft]	iteration	amplification
[lexis foregrounded]
phonology		tone width
		voice quality
		rate
		pitch
		loudness
		phonæsthesia
		vowel length
		consonant aspiration
grammar	exclamative
	attitude
	comment
	minor expressive
	intensification
	repetition
	prosodic nominal groups
	diminuitives; [sic]
	mental affection
	manner degree
lexis	attitudinal
	taboo
	swearing
discourse semantics	no negotiation
	challenging
interaction patterns	1/2 person modal responsibility

Blogger Comments:

Some of the problems with this table of unsupported can be noted briefly here.

[1] Here the distinction between 'system' and 'process' is identified with the stratal distinction of content and expression.  See the post here on the previous misuse of these terms with regard to tenor.

[2] The general distinction of loud/soft is appropriate only for the phonological category loudness.

[3] The claim is that amplification is the 'basic realisation principle' of affect, and that 'amplification achieved largely through iteration' in the case of 'content form' (p533) — by which Martin means the content plane — and though various 'parameters' in the case of 'expression form' (p534).  Here the superordinate category 'amplification' is presented as one of its hyponyms.

[4] The claim here is that lexis is foregrounded; the examples given are restricted to those of attitude: the superordinate  (attitudinal) and one hyponym (taboo) and its hyponym (swearing).

[5] The claim here is that phonæsthesia is a means of realising affect — a charged relation between interlocutors — through amplification.  Phonæsthesia is any correspondence between sound and meaning, as in onomatopœia and phonæsthemes such as the [sl] in sleaze sled sledge sleek sleet sleigh slice slick slide slime sling slink slip slither sliver etc.

[6] The claim here is that 'exclamative' realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[7] The "prosodic nominal groups" are those that include multiple intrusions of attitude.  That is, the same feature has been included twice in the grammar examples.  See also the lexis examples.

[8] The claim here is that 'comment' realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[9] The claim here is that 'minor expressive' (undefined) realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[10] The claim here is that grammatical intensification realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[11] The claim here is that repetition is one way of realising a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[12] The claim here is that diminutives realise a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration. A diminutive is a word which has been modified to convey a slighter degree of its root meaning, to convey the smallness of the object or quality named, or to convey a sense of intimacy or endearment.

[13] The claim here is that 'mental affection' realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[14] The claim here is that Manner: degree ('how much?') realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.  See also [10] intensification.

[15] The claim here is that 'no negotiation' realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[16] The claim here is that 'challenging' realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

[17] The claim here is that '1/2 person modal responsibility' realises a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.  In SFL theory, modal responsibility is the meaning of 'Subject'.  The claim then is that 1st/2nd person Subjects realise a charged relation between interlocutors through iteration.

Blurring The Distinction Between Context And Semantics

Martin (1992: 533-4):

As far as content form is concerned, amplification is achieved largely through iteration — affectual meanings are repeated until the appropriate volume is reached.  This interpersonal "taxis" is most striking in nominal groups (cf. you lousy rotten stinking bastard you vs. my lovely sweet little darling baby puppy dog), where positive and negative attitude is replayed prosodically across Deictic, Epithet and Thing; but attitudinal interpolation of this kind is pervasive across a range of grammatical structures, irrespective of experiential constituency boundaries (e.g. swearing — God damn it I fucking wish that shit of a un-bloody-grateful bastard would work his fucking problems out; or modality — I'm absolutely convinced that there certainly must be a solution right here, mustn't there?).

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, in SFL Theory, 'content' refers to the two strata: semantics/meaning and lexicogrammar/wording; and 'form' on the content plane refers to the units of the rank scale: clauses, phrases, groups, words and morphemes.

[2] To be clear, such 'affectual meanings' are the meanings (semantics) that realise affect (context).  In terms of stratification, tenor and meaning are distinct levels of symbolic abstraction.

[3] To be clear, in SFL Theory, 'taxis' is the logical relation of interdependency.

[4] To be clear, the constituency of form, the rank scale, is not metafunctional.  This is distinct from different metafunctions favouring different types of function structures: experiential/segmental, interpersonal/prosodic, textual/culminative and logical/iterative (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 85).

[5] In SFL Theory, modality is a system of the clause, and quite distinct from attitude.  Modality operates within the limits defined by polarity (Halliday & Matthiessen 2014: 183).

[6] Trivially, right is not an instance of modality. Modality covers modalisation (probability/usuality) and modulation (obligation/inclination).

Misconstruing A Tenor Relation As The Behaviours And Predispositions Of Individuals

Martin (1992: 533):

The basic realisation principle associated with affect is amplification (see Table 7.14).  Like a stereo system, affect is something that can be turned on or off and balanced between speakers (both off, one on, both on) and whose volume can be adjusted to normal listening levels (predisposition) or turned on really loud when the occasion desires (surge).

Blogger Comment:

This continues the misconstrual of affect — a charged or neutral relation between interlocutors — as the behavioural surges or predisposed reactions of individuals. A given text realises a situation with either charged or neutral affect, as one dimension of the tenor relation between interlocutors.

Misconstruing Affect With Unsupported Claims

Martin (1992: 534):

Table 7.13 Tenor — a provisional classification of affect

		surge	predisposition
		(behaviour)	(reaction)
negative:
	discord:
	self	cry	sad	[misery]
	other	tell off	dislike	[antipathy]
	insecurity:
	self	loss of nerve	nervous	[disquiet]
	other	terror	fearful	[apprehension]
	frustration:
	self	exasperation	tedium	[boredom]
	other	demand	want	[desire]
positive
	satisfaction:
	self	laugh	cheerful	[happiness]
	other	embrace	affection	[care]
	security:
	self	intrepid	confident	[confidence]
	other	entrust	depend	[trust]
	fulfillment: [sic]
	self	excitement	interest	[engagement]
	other	homage	respect	[admiration]

Blogger Comments:

[1] This continues the misconstrual of a contextual relation between interlocutors (affect) as the behavioural surges and predisposed reactions of individuals.  See previous posts.

[2] The claim here is that 'discord' is the negative counterpart of 'satisfaction', and that

• self-oriented discord is misery, which is exemplified by the behavioural surge 'cry', and the predisposed reaction 'sad', whereas
• other-oriented discord is antipathy, which is exemplified by the behavioural surge 'tell off', and the predisposed reaction 'dislike'.

[3] The claim here is that:

• self-oriented insecurity is disquiet, which is exemplified by the behavioural surge 'loss of nerve', and the predisposed reaction 'nervous', whereas
• other-oriented insecurity is apprehension, which is exemplified by the behavioural surge 'terror', and the predisposed reaction 'fearful'.

[4] The claim here is that 'frustration' is the negative counterpart of 'fulfilment', and that

• self-oriented frustration is boredom, which is exemplified by the behavioural surge 'exasperation', and the predisposed reaction 'tedium', whereas
• other-oriented frustration is desire, which is exemplified by the behavioural surge 'demand', and the predisposed reaction 'want'.

[5] The claim here is that 'satisfaction' is the positive counterpart of 'discord', and that

• self-oriented satisfaction is happiness, which is exemplified by the behavioural surge 'laugh', and the predisposed reaction 'cheerful', whereas
• other-oriented satisfaction is care, which is exemplified by the behavioural surge 'embrace', and the predisposed reaction 'affection'.

[6] The claim here is that:

• self-oriented security is confidence, which is exemplified by the behavioural surge 'intrepid', and the predisposed reaction 'confident', whereas
• other-oriented security is trust, which is exemplified by the behavioural surge 'entrust', and the predisposed reaction 'depend'.

[7] The claim here is that 'fulfilment' is the positive counterpart of 'frustration', and that

• self-oriented fulfilment is engagement, which is exemplified by the behavioural surge 'excitement', and the predisposed reaction 'interest', whereas
• other-oriented fulfilment is admiration, which is exemplified by the behavioural surge 'homage', and the predisposed reaction 'respect'.

Because these unsupported claims are irrelevant to the theoretical notion of affect, I will leave it to the reader to consider their internal consistency.

Mental vs Relational vs Material Affection

Martin (1992: 533):

Table 7.13 provides a provisional account of how affections might be classified along three dimensions: surge/predisposition, negative/positive and self/other.  In addition the following proportionalities are suggestive:

positive : negative ::
discord : satisfaction ::	‘feel’
insecurity : security ::	‘be’
frustration : fulfillment [sic]	‘do’

Blogger Comments:

[1] This continues the confusion of the theoretical notion of affect (a charged or neutral relation between interlocutors) with the general notion of affection ('a gentle feeling of fondness or liking').

[2] These are clearly the reverse of what is intended.

[3] The claim here is that 'discord' is the negative counterpart of 'satisfaction', and 'satisfaction' the positive counterpart of 'discord'.

To be clear, discord is 'disagreement between people' whereas satisfaction is 'fulfilment of one's wishes, expectations, or needs, or the pleasure derived from this'.

[4] The claim here is that "affection" (mental process) oppositions can be further differentiated according to process type:

• the "affection" opposition of discord vs satisfaction is mental ('feel'), whereas
• the "affection" opposition of insecurity vs security is relational ('be'), and
• the "affection" opposition of frustration vs fulfilment is material ('do').

No attempt is made to clarify, let alone justify, the claim.