Martin (1992: 36):
To this point a model has been outlined in which SPEECH FUNCTION (discourse semantics) has been stratified with respect to MOOD (lexicogrammar) on the content plane. This immediately raises two questions: (i) the determination of speech function in the absence of a one to one correlation between general SPEECH FUNCTION categories and those of MOOD; and (ii) the nature of the units to which speech function is assigned.
Blogger Comments:
[1] This is very misleading indeed. On the one hand, it gives the false impression that Halliday's system of SPEECH FUNCTION was not already a semantic system, and not already "stratified with respect to MOOD (lexicogrammar) on the content plane" before Martin came along to try and take the credit.
On the other hand, it gives the false impression that Martin has provided argument that SPEECH FUNCTION is specifically a discourse semantic system, whereas, in fact, no such argument has been made. Moreover, as previously demonstrated, the "argument" that has been made confuses the non-structural textual system of ELLIPSIS-&-SUBSTITUTION with the structural interpersonal system of MOOD.
[2] To be clear, the absence (or presence) of a "one to one correlation between general SPEECH FUNCTION categories and those of MOOD" has no bearing on the determination of speech function. Each of the four categories realises the feature bundle that specifies it:
- 'statement' realises [give, information];
- question' realises [demand, information];
- 'offer' realises [give, goods-&-services];
- 'command' realises [demand, goods-&-services].
In other words, if the meaning is 'give information' etc., then the speech function is 'statement' etc.
[3] To be clear, Halliday (1981) identifies the semantic unit "to which speech function is assigned" as a move in an exchange. Halliday (2002 [1981]: 240):
Each clause is in this sense a kind of gift, one move in an exchange, symbolised by the change of perspective from me to you.
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