Misinterpreting Internal And External Conjunctive Relations

Martin (1992: 180):

Internal relations in other words structure semiosis; external ones code the structure of the world.  A less materialistic interpretation, drawing on the semiotic approach to context to be developed in Chapter 7, could be framed along the following lines.  This would treat external relations as by and large oriented to field — they encode the institutional organisation of our culture.  Internal relations on the other hand are oriented to genre (including the conversational structure realising genre in dialogic modes) — they encode the organisation of text as it is formulated to construct our culture.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This is an incorrect reading of the distinction between external and internal conjunctive relations in SFL theory.  As cohesive relations, both are text-forming resources of the lexicogrammar that are concerned with marking textual transitions between whole messages or groups of whole messages (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 583).  External conjunctive relations involve textual relations between 'external phenomena' — that is: between experiences construed as meanings — whereas internal conjunctive relations involve textual relations that are internal to the communication situation itself.

[2] A materialistic interpretation of internal and external conjunctive relations is thus a misinterpretation, not least because the textual metafunction is concerned with semiotic reality.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 398):

The textual metafunction second–order in the sense that it is concerned with semiotic reality: that is, reality in the form of meaning. This dimension of reality is itself constructed by [the] other two metafunctions: the ideational, which construes a natural reality, and the interpersonal, which enacts an intersubjective reality. … The function of the textual metafunction is thus an enabling one with respect to the rest; it takes over the semiotic resources brought into being by the other two metafunctions and as it were operationalises them …

[3] In SFL theory, context is construed in semiotic terms: as a connotative semiotic system with language as its expression plane. On the other hand, Martin (1992: 33, 39-40, 121, 122) instead uses the term 'context' to refer to the (semiotic) co-text and the material setting.

[4] External conjunctive relations are a resource of the textual metafunction.  The textual metafunction at the level of context is the system of MODE, whereas FIELD is the ideational dimension of context.

[5] In SFL theory, institutions are situation types.  That is, theoretically they are located halfway down the cline of instantiation at the level of context.  Thus they differ by probabilities in the context systems of FIELD, TENOR and MODE — not just field.

[6] Genre, in the sense of the different rôles that language plays, is a system of MODE at the level of context — not a stratum of context.

Genre, in the sense of text type, is a point on the cline of instantiation.  It is register viewed from the instance pole of the cline.

In SFL theory, therefore, genres are registers that vary according to different feature probabilities in the system of MODE — that is, in terms of the textual metafunction.

Misidentifying A Metafunction

Martin (1992: 178):

As noted in 4.1 with respect to text [4:3] some kinds of relations between clause complexes are more "rhetorical" than experiential. … The rhetorical nature of these conjunctions can be brought out by comparing them with three experientially oriented conjunctive relations in the same text … 

Blogger Comment:

In SFL theory, non-structural conjunctive relations — textual transitions between messages or groups of messages — are textual, while structural relations between clauses in complexes are logical.  See Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 583-5).

This use of 'experiential' is meant to be a characterisation of Halliday & Hasan's (1976: 239-41) external conjunction, 'relations between external phenomena', in contradistinction to internal conjunction, relations 'internal to the communication situation'.  See tomorrow's posting.

Presenting Subtypes Of Expansion As The Principal Types

Martin (1992: 178):

In this chapter, following Martin (1983), four main types of logico-semantic relation will be recognised: additive, comparative, temporal and consequential.  And CONJUNCTION will be developed as a system of oppositions at the level of discourse semantics.

Blogger Comment:

[1] The proposed four main types of logico-semantic relation correspond to four subtypes of expansion: comparative, temporal and consequential are subtypes of enhancement and additive is a subtype of extension.  The third type of expansion, elaboration, is omitted altogether.

In contrast, the system of cohesive conjunction (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 541) features two subtypes of elaboration: appositive and clarifying, three subtypes of extension: additive, adversative and varying, and four subtypes of enhancement: matter, manner, spatio-temporal and causal-conditional.

In not recognising the three most general forms of expansion, the overall parsimony (or "elegance") of the theory is compromised.  See Occam's razor.

[2] An argument justifying the reconstrual of the grammatical system of textual metafunction (cohesive conjunction) as a semantic system of the logical metafunction (CONJUNCTION) has not been presented.

Misconstruing the Theoretical Status Of Expansion

Martin (1992: 177):

These problems are not isolated.  Halliday (1985) for example subclassifies enhancing relations on the basis of of his categories for types of Circumstance in the system of TRANSITIVITY.  Thus likewise comes out as enhancing: manner and in that respect as enhancing: matter.  This contrasts with the Cohesion In English analysis which groups likewise among the additives (extension: addition for Halliday 1985) and in that respect among causals (enhancing: causal-conditional for Halliday 1985).  Since the prepositions realising circumstantial relations organise the world differently from conjunctions, this divergence is not surprising.

Blogger Comments:

[1] In SFL theory, it is the other way around: it is circumstances that are classified according to the transphenomenal fractal types, expansion and projection, that they manifest —  Extent, Location, Manner, Cause and Contingency as enhancing, Accompaniment as extending, Rôle as elaborating, Matter and Angle as projection.

[2] These are wordings that can be used to serve such conjunctive functions.  Here they are misinterpreted as belonging to functional categories.  This is the same type of error as allocating a verb (e.g. mean) to a PROCESS TYPE instead of considering its function in a clause.

Misconstruing Extension As Enhancement

Martin (1992: 176-7):

A second factor underlying the differences in categorisation has to do with the essential indeterminacy of some of the relations themselves.  The problem of alternation (or) and contrast (whereas) is a case in point.  Both relations imply a system of terms (a taxonomy of some kind) — for example, tea or coffee as hot after-dinner drinks.

The terms themselves can be viewed in two ways.  One way is to view them as available alternatives, which combine in text like additives:

A OR B : A AND B ::

We have tea or coffee : we have tea and coffee ::

Get tea. — Or coffee? : Get tea — And coffee? ::

They drink either tea or coffee : They drink both tea and coffee ::

Have tea, or coffee instead : Have tea, and coffee as well

Another way of looking at the terms is to consider how they are similar (as a result of subclassifying after-dinner drinks) and how they differ (since they are oppositions in the same system).  Looked at in this way not A but B contrasts with A similarly B:

A WHEREAS B : A LIKE B ::

Tea doesn't taste bitter to me whereas coffee does :

Tea tastes just as bitter to me as coffee does :: 

I take tea with milk but coffee without :

I take tea with milk as I do with coffee ::  

So you have tea in the morning while she takes coffee :

So you have tea in the morning just as she does

Since the relationship between such terms can be looked at in different ways, classifying the relevant hypotactic conjunctions becomes problematic (e.g. while, whereas, apart from, without, except that, instead of, rather than, other than).  Halliday (1985) groups them with additives under the heading extension, emphasising the relationship with alternation ('or') and addition ('and'); Martin (1983) on the other hand focusses on on the idea of opposition ('whereas'), grouping them with similarity ('like') under the general heading of comparison.  Because of the indeterminacy of the relations themselves, neither categorisation is completely satisfactory.

Blogger Comments:

This is quoted at length because it is presented as an argument that is intended to identify problems in the categorisation of logico-semantic relations, as part of the justification for the 'discourse semantic' approach that is about to be undertaken.

[1] This is not the same relationship "looked at in different ways".  The first set of examples display the extension categories of addition: additive: positive (logically: A and B) and alternation (logically: A or B).

However, the second set of examples, instead of focusing on additive addition and alternation, displays the extension category of addition: adversative (logically: A and conversely B) and the enhancing category of means: comparison (logically: A is like B).

In addition to not being an alternative view of the same logical relations, it is manifestly a simple category error to group A and conversely B (adversative) with A is like B (comparison).

[2] Because of the category error and invalid reasoning involved, the argument fails to make the case for the claimed "indeterminacy of some of the relations themselves".

Misrepresenting Different Manifestations Of Expansion As Indeterminacy

Martin (1992: 176):

The general point is that oppositions among cohesive conjunctions are different from those among hypotactic ones, and that in any attempt to generalise a framework for logico-semantic relations relations across these and other realisations some indeterminacy is bound to arise.

Blogger Comment:

See the earlier post on expansion and projection as transphenomenal fractal types that are manifested in various guises across different scales of the system (here).

Misconstruing Different Systems As Divergent Classifications

Martin (1992: 170-1):

The problem of just how to classify the logico-semantic relations that can be realised through the diversified realisations outlined above is a difficult one.  A large number of classifications have been proposed… .  Another source of divergence among the classifications has to do with the type of realisation is taken as point of departure for the analysis.  Halliday & Hasan for example focus on cohesive relations between clause complexes, Martin (1983) bases his classification on hypotactic conjunctions and Halliday (1985) develops a categorisation for paratactic and hypotactic relations within the clause complex.  Given the different oppositions as one moves from one of these types of realisation to another, not to mention the problem of universalist vs particularist schemes, it is hardly surprising that the classifications that have been proposed are divergent in many respects.

Blogger Comment:

The "divergence" here reflects two distinct lexicogrammatical systems.  Halliday & Hasan are concerned with cohesive conjunction, a non-structural resource of the textual metafunction, whereas Halliday (1985) is concerned with the logical structure of clause complexes.

See also the earlier post on expansion and projection as transphenomenal fractal types here.

Conflating Systems Of The Logical And Textual Metafunctions

Martin (1992: 168):

… in spontaneous spoken monologue the semantic system of CONJUNCTION tends to be realised through paratactic and hypotactic relationships within the clause complex, and through 'cohesive' conjunctions relating clause complexes to each other.  Texts produced in this way foreground realisations of CONJUNCTION as logico-semantic relationships between processes.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This creates a metafunctional inconsistency at the level of semantics by merging systems of the logical metafunction: logico-semantic relations and taxis, with systems of the textual metafunction: cohesive conjunction.

[2] Relations between clauses in complexes involve two distinct simultaneous systems: the LOGICO-SEMANTIC TYPE: projection or expansion, and the degree of INTERDEPENDENCY or TAXIS: hypotaxis or parataxis (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 373).  Logico-semantic relations are not "realised through" tactic relations.

Underplaying The Scope Of Logical Relations

Martin (1992: 162-3):

The following clauses in particular do not make use of clause complex resources to encode causal or temporal relations:

That's because it's a low dog.

That is so the judge can get the hind movement of your dog.

After that he usually tells you…

He proceeds to do that with every dog.

… The point is that while examples such as these make use of resources other than the clause complex to mark logical relations between part of a text, there is a sense in which the alternative realisations are all variations on the same theme — namely that of relating one part of a text to another in terms of the natural logic of time, cause, comparison and addition.  So not only does the clause complex need to be supplemented as far as a consideration of logical relations is concerned, but it needs to be abstracted from as well so that a more general treatment can be pursued, taking the clause complex into account as just one of its manifestations.  It is for this reason of course that logical relations will be interpreted from the perspective of discourse semantics, rather than that of lexicogrammar here.

Blogger Comments:

[1] This vastly underplays the place of logical relations in SFL theory.  The logico-semantic relations that obtain between clauses in clause complexes are those of expansion and projection.

Firstly, these are called transphenomenal categories because they 'operate across the various categories of phenomena' (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 223).  For example,  as well as obtaining between rank units in complexes, they are also manifested in relational clause types (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 210-48) and circumstance types (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 262-3).

Secondly, they are called fractal types because they recur at various levels in the system.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 223):

… they are principles of construing our experience of the world that generate identical patterns of semantic organisation which are of variable magnitude and which occur in variable semantic environments. Such patterns therefore constitute fractal types.

Thirdly, they are thus "meta" to the organisation of ideational meaning, and provide an additional level of agnation in the system. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 223-4): 

… the fractal types constitute an additional order of agnation that is projected onto the ideational system as a whole. We can refer to this as fractal agnation. Because of this, a qualifying sequence and a figure of circumstantial being, such as cause, are agnate; they are both manifestations of the fractal type of enhancement.

Fourthly, as fractal types, they provide the major means of creating new meaning in the system.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 224): 

The fractal types of projection and expansion are also a primary resource by which the semantic system creates new meanings. […] The ideation base thus itself embodies, auto-genetically, the principles on which it is organised and enabled to develop further, such that the primary systems of ideational meaning then serve as a grid within which more delicate categories are construed.

Fifthly, it is these fractal types that make grammatical metaphor possible. Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 225):

Thus our concept of “construing experience through meaning” refers to the construal in human consciousness of an ideational system in which such [transphenomenal] motifs play a crucial part. Expansion and projection are, as we put it earlier, fractal principles; they generate organisation within many environments in the ideation base, at different strata and at different ranks within one stratum. These environments are thus related to one another through the local manifestations of these different motifs; and this opens up the system’s potential for alternative construals of experience … . What this means is, that whatever is construed can also be reconstrued, giving yet another dimension to the topology of semantic space.

Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 294-5): 

The whole metaphorical elaboration [of the semantic system] is made possible by a fractal pattern that runs through the whole system. We have suggested that the metaphorical elaboration is a token–value relation; but in order for it to be a token–value relation within the semantic system, it has to be natural in the sense that the token and the value domains have to be similar enough to allow for the token to stand for the value. … The principle behind this similarity is the fractal pattern of projection/expansion …

That is, while grammatical metaphor constitutes a move from one “phenomenal domain” to another … this move is made possible because fractal types engender continuity across these domains: the metaphorical move from one phenomenal domain to another takes place within the one and the same transphenomenal domain.

Sixthly, it is these fractal types, especially elaboration, that makes the "importation" of experience into the system possible.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 224):

Here we have foregrounded especially the motif of elaborating, with particular reference to its manifestation in the identifying and ascriptive figures of being. We have tried to show how elaboration makes it possible to “import” extra-linguistic experience into the meaning base by actively construing it (as in ‘that [thing there] is a circle’); and also to “transport” meanings internally from one region of the ideation base in order to construe new meanings in another (as in ‘balance means you hold it in your fingers and it does not go’). The extension of meaning in delicacy — not merely generalising across different types but construing such types into dimensional and open-ended taxonomies — is a function of the elaborating potential, exploiting the basic dimensions of the system itself.

[2]  A consideration of logico-semantic relations as transphenomenal fractal types that provide an additional organisation of ideational meaning undermines the stated justification for a 'discourse semantics of logical relations'.

Why The Argument For A Discourse Semantics Of Logical Relations Is Invalid

Martin (1992: 162-3):

The following clauses in particular do not make use of clause complex resources to encode causal or temporal relations:

That's because it's a low dog.

That is so the judge can get the hind movement of your dog.

After that he usually tells you…

He proceeds to do that with every dog.

Each of these uses a combination of IDENTIFICATION and TRANSITIVITY to make the necessary logical connections between parts of the text.  The first two are causal and involve text reference; anaphoric that functions as Carrier in an attributive relational clause with cause and purpose clauses embedded in the Attribute. …

The temporal examples also make use of that, but in the context of extended rather than text reference.  In After that, that functions as part of a Circumstance of Location in time, with the temporal connection coded as a preposition.  In the last example, that functions as a Range for the general process do and temporal succession is coded through the process proceed.

Blogger Comments:

[1] The reason why the clauses 'do not make use of clause complex resources to encode causal or temporal relations' is that they are not clause complexes.  Of the four clauses, only one actually realises any causal or temporal relation — non-structurally through conjunctive cohesion — as will be demonstrated below.

[2] In SFL theory, the first two clauses are related cohesively to their respective previous text through anaphoric demonstrative reference marked by that.  Neither clause realises a causal relation to the preceding text.  Instead, in the first, an attributive reason is ascribed, via the reference item, to a referent:

that	’s	[[because it’s a low dog]]
Carrier reference: demonstrative: anaphoric	Process: relational	Attribute: reason because it ’s a low dog Carrier Process: relational Attribute

and in the second, a mental purpose is ascribed, via the reference item, to a referent:

that	is	[[so the judge can get the hind movement of your dog]]
Carrier reference: demonstrative: anaphoric	Process: relational	Attribute: purpose so the judge can get the hind movement of your dog Senser Process: mental Phenomenon

[3] Contrary to the claim, the second "temporal" example does indeed make use of "text" reference (anaphoric demonstrative), and on Martin's analysis of the first example, it does as well (but see point [4] below).

[4] In SFL theory, after that functions as a conjunctive Adjunct, rather than a circumstantial Adjunct, and functions cohesively to mark a temporal conjunctive relation with a previous message.

after that	he	usually	tells		you
conjunctive Adjunct	Subject	mood Adjunct: modality	Finite	Predicator	Complement

[5] This confuses temporal relations between messages with the time-phase elaboration of a Process.  See Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 499-501).

he	proceeds to do	that	with every dog
Actor	Process: material proceeds to do a =b	Goal reference: demonstrative: anaphoric	Accompaniment

[6] The Process is realised by the elaborating verbal group complex proceeds to do.

Postscript: 

These clause simplex examples are presented as the motivation for theorising a discourse semantics of logical relations (p163), and it is later (p262) claimed that these examples 

cause problems for the clause complex analysis, in spite of the fact that Halliday's system was specifically designed to handle the dynamics of clause combining.

The Major Limitation On The Account Of Participant Identification

Martin (1992: 156-7):

Finally, the major limitation on the account of participant identification in this chapter needs to be acknowledged — that is, it's lack of attention to the process of identifying participants. This is reflected in the concentration on textual relations at the expense of their interaction with experiential ones and the lack of a procedural orientation to determining what would be appropriate to identifying a participant at a particular place in the unfolding of a text and how exactly interlocutors might go about retrieving presumed information. The account thus falls far short of the specificity required for computer implementation and text generation.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, the major limitation of this chapter is that it is not what it claims to be: reference as semantic choice.  This is because it is founded on several serious theoretical misunderstandings.  For example, Martin confuses:

• textual reference (identifiability) with ideational denotation (participant identification) — for the most part in the sense of Frege's reference to meanings transcendent of language (bedeutung);
• textual reference (cohesive) with interpersonal deixis of the nominal group (structural);
• reference items with nominal groups;
• reference with lexical cohesion;
• reference with ellipsis–&–substitution.

[2] Here Martin diverts the reader from personally identifying the actual problems with his theorising, and identifies the model's major limitation as issues of no importance — computer implementation and text generation — to his intended readership.

[3] This misunderstands SFL theory.  The process of identifying participants (or indeed the process of referring to referents) is the process of instantiation: the selection of features in networks and the activation of realisation statements.

[4] This is misleading.  Martin's model is a confusion of textual relations (reference) and experiential relations (lexical cohesion) and denotation (participant identification).

[5] The notion of "interaction" between textual and experiential relations betrays Martin's misunderstanding (1992: 390) of metafunctions as modules, instead of dimensions.

[6] On the one hand, the function of the grammatical metaphor and lexical density of this single nominal group — 11 lexical items — is to reduce its intelligibility to learners and outsiders (Halliday & Matthiessen 1999: 272).  On the other hand, it is untrue, since Martin has demonstrated his procedure for identifying participants in text, in his own terms, throughout the chapter.

[7] This misunderstands reference.  Reference presents items as identifiable; it does not inform the listener how to recover the identity.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 623):

The textual status at issue in the system of reference is that of identifiability: does the speaker judge that a given element can be recovered or identified by the listener at the relevant point in the discourse or not? If it is presented as identifiable, then the listener will have to recover the identity from somewhere else.

The Commonality Of Reference Structures And Negotiation Structures

Martin (1992: 156):

Reference structures make use of semantic dependency structures of this kind.  Phoric items depend on the co-text they presume, but are not themselves predicted by it.  Given a nominal group realising a participant in a text, there is no way of knowing whether or not it will be presumed, aside from the occasional selection of presenting reference marking certain participants as central to a discourse (signalled through this, these, a certain and certain).  The dependency relation between presuming and presumed is thus very like that between a tracking or challenging move and the move on which it depends.

Old Blogger Comments:

[1] The use of dependency (logical metafunction) for reference (textual metafunction) creates a theoretical inconsistency.  It misconstrues textual meaning as ideational meaning.

[2] The dependency relations do not form structures; they merely obtain between units.

[3] Martin's insight here is that a reference item depends on there being a referent to refer to.  To be clear, this is distinct from the SFL notion of dependency, and from the functional relation between the reference item and its referent.

[4] Martin's insight here is that there is no way of predicting which elements in a text will subsequently be referred to.

[5] As explained in previous posts, "presenting reference" does not involve reference. It is the first appearance of a potential referent. See Misconstruing The Absence Of Reference As "Presenting" Reference.

[6] For the confusions on which this false claim is based, see Confusing Experiential Content With Textual Reference.

[7] To be clear, Martin's argument is: A is very much like B, where

• A = a reference item depends on there being a referent to refer to, and
• B = an interruption (tracking or challenging move) depends on there being a move to interrupt.

Martin's Insight That Interruptions Depend On There Being Something To Interrupt

Martin (1992: 156):

In addition, dependency structures were introduced to account for tracking and challenging moves which are not strongly predicted by initiations; indeed, interlocutors may formulate interacts so as to avoid them.  So while the tracking move in [3:101] depends on the interact it tracks, it is not expected by it.

[3:101]

K1  Ben won.
cf   — Who?
rcf  — Ben Johnson
K1f — Wow! 

Old Blogger Comments:

[1] As previously explained, the use of dependency (logical metafunction) for NEGOTIATION (interpersonal metafunction) creates a theoretical inconsistency. It misconstrues interpersonal meaning as ideational meaning.

[2] As previously explained, such dependency relations do not form structures; they merely obtain between units.

[3] To be clear, tracking and challenging moves are classified as interruptions to adjacency pairs (Martin 1992: 67).  Thus, Martin's claims here are simply that:

• initiating moves don't "strongly predict" or "expect" interruptions, and 
• interruptions "depend" on there being something to interrupt.

Misconstruing 'Multivariate' & Metafunctional Inconsistencies

Martin (1992: 156):

NEGOTIATION was approached from both a multivariate and covariate perspective in Chapter 2.  The notion of constituency between exchange and move was developed to account synoptically for sequences of up to five moves.  These moves are mutually predicting as set out in their constituency structures.  In [3:100] the initiation expects a response and the response presumes its initiation:

[3:100]

K2 Who won?
K1 — Ben did.

Blogger Comment:

[1] This confuses multivariate structures (of a rank) with constituency (rank hierarchy).  The constituency relation between exchange and move is the relation between levels in a rankscale.  A multivariate structure, on the other hand, is 'a configuration of elements each having a distinct function with respect to the whole' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 331).

Further, as Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 384) point out:

… the relationships among the elements in a multivariate structure can be characterised as segmental from an experiential point of view but as prosodic from an interpersonal point of view and as cumulative from a textual one.

That is, on the SFL model, the relation between elements in the multivariate structure realising interpersonal systems, like NEGOTIATION, are prosodic.  Since this is a proposition Martin elsewhere (1992: 549) supports, Martin is here inconsistent with his own model.

[2] To be clear, the notion of 'covariate structure' derives from Lemke (1985).  In Lemke (1988: 159) he acknowledged that 'covariate' is not a type of structure:

My own 'covariate structure' (Lemke 1985), which includes Halliday's univariate type, is for the case of homogeneous relations of co-classed units, and should perhaps be called a 'structuring principle' rather than a kind of structure.

[3] To be clear, these are merely statements about two alternative features in a closed system.

Misconstruing 'Multivariate' & Metafunctional Inconsistencies

Martin (1992: 156):

NEGOTIATION was approached from both a multivariate and covariate perspective in Chapter 2.  The notion of constituency between exchange and move was developed to account synoptically for sequences of up to five moves.  These moves are mutually predicting as set out in their constituency structures. … In addition, dependency structures were introduced to account for tracking and challenging moves which are not strongly predicted by initiations; indeed, interlocutors may formulate interacts so as to avoid them. … Reference structures make use of semantic dependency structures of this kind. 

Blogger Comment:

[1] This confuses multivariate structures (of a rank) with constituency (rank hierarchy).  The constituency relation between exchange and move is the relation between levels in a rankscale.  A multivariate structure, on the other hand, is 'a configuration of elements each having a distinct function with respect to the whole' (Halliday & Matthiessen 2004: 331).  Further, as Halliday & Matthiessen (2004: 384) point out:

… the relationships among the elements in a multivariate structure can be characterised as segmental from an experiential point of view but as prosodic from an interpersonal point of view and as cumulative from a textual one.

[2] The use of dependency (logical metafunction) for NEGOTIATION (interpersonal metafunction) creates a theoretical inconsistency.  It misconstrues interpersonal meaning as ideational meaning.

[3] The use of dependency (logical metafunction) for reference (textual metafunction) creates a theoretical inconsistency.  It misconstrues textual meaning as ideational meaning.

[4] The dependency relations do not form structures; they merely obtain between units.

Some Of The Theoretical Problems With Participant As The Entry Condition To The System Of Identification

Martin (1992: 155-6):

IDENTIFICATION has the semantic entity participant as its entry condition; its unmarked realisation is a nominal group and the people, places and things this encodes all have the potential to participate as Agent or Medium in clause structure at some point or other in a text.

Blogger Comments:

[1] Participant as the entry condition to the IDENTIFICATION system creates a host of serious theoretical inconsistencies.  For example, 

• metafunction: participant is an experiential function, whereas IDENTIFICATION is a textual system;
• delicacy: the features of the system do not elaborate the entry condition, participant, but  (purported) relations between participants; (cf. the entry condition 'clause' for the systems that elaborate the clause);
• function: participant is the entry condition for circumstantial features (manner/extent).

[2] To be clear, Martin's entire argument to justify IDENTIFICATION as discourse semantic, rather than lexicogrammatical, rests solely on "stratifying with respect to nominal group structure".

[3] To be clear, places are circumstantial meanings, not participants.

[4] To be clear, this does not define any semantic unit, let alone participant, since, through grammatical metaphor, all meaning has "the potential to be construed as an Agent or Medium in clause structure at some point or other in a text."

Metafunctional Inconsistencies

Martin (1992: 155):

NEGOTIATION is an interpersonal system; it focusses on the discourse semantics of MOOD.  IDENTIFICATION on the other hand is a textual system; it focusses on the discourse semantics of nominal DEIXIS.

Blogger Comment:

In terms of metafunction, nominal group DEIXIS, in the system network of DETERMINATION, is an interpersonal system.  Deixis is concerned with relations to the here–&–now of the speaker and listener.  Halliday & Matthiessen (1999: 180):

… the structures of both types of group constitute a kind of path between the interpersonal reference point, reflected in the Deictic or Finite, and the experiential one, reflected in the Thing or Event.

REFERENCE, on the other hand, like all cohesive resources, is a system of the textual metafunction.  As a means of referring, it is concerned with the textual status of identifiability.

In contrast, the discourse semantic system of IDENTIFICATION is concerned with referents of the same identity in the unfolding of a text; 'reference chains' would be more accurately termed referent chains.  The relations between the referents in chains is construed in terms of dependency, a resource of the logical metafunction.

Mistaking Manner For Extent And Confusing Circumstances With Comparative Reference Items

Martin (1992: 154):

Comparative adverbs realise relevance phoricity; they function as Circumstances [sic] of Extent and Manner in clause structure and presume events.  Both relevant events and supersets of events are presumed.  The network of oppositions is outlined in Fig. 3.16; typical realisations are shown in the network and illustrated in [3:94] through [3:99].

Extent [quantity:difference]
[3:94]

Ben ran five miles;
Carl ran farther.

Manner [quality:semblance]
[3:95]

Ben ran very fast;
Carl didn't run as fast.

Extent [quantity:difference:superset]
[3:96]

The runners ran long distances;
Carl ran farthest.

Manner [quality:difference:superset]
[3:97]

The sprinters ran fast heats;
Ben didn't run fastest.

Extent [quantity:purposive]
[3:98]

You had to set a record to place;
Ben ran fast enough.

Manner [quality:purposive]
[3:99]

You had to run a record time to win;
Carl ran too slow.

Blogger Comments:

[1] To be clear, 'relevance phoricity' is Martin's rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) comparative reference, misunderstood and relocated from non-structural lexicogrammar (cohesion) to structural discourse semantics.

[2] This mistakes circumstances of Extent and Manner (clause rank experiential functions) for comparative reference items (a non-structural textual functions).  Moreover, it will be seen below that none of the examples provided are instances of Extent.

To be clear, the grammatical domains of comparative adverbs that function as reference items are the nominal group and the adverbial group.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 633):

[3] The notion of "presuming events" — Martin is not referring here to the verbal group function 'Event' — demonstrates that Martin has little understanding of the principles underlying comparative reference.  Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: ) explain:

Whereas personals and demonstratives, when used anaphorically, set up a relation of co-reference, whereby the same entity is referred to over again, comparatives set up a relation of contrast. In comparative reference, the reference item still signals ‘you know which’; not because the same entity is being referred to over again but rather because there is a frame of reference – something by reference to which what I am now talking about is the same or different, like or unlike, equal or unequal, more or less.

[4] In addition to being devised on the basis of the above-mentioned theoretical misunderstandings, a number of further problems with the network in Figure 3.16 Phoric circumstances of extent and manner can be identified.

• The system has no entry condition; the entry condition for IDENTIFICATION is 'participant', so including the entry condition would have exposed the theoretical inconsistency of having types of circumstance ('manner/extent') as a more delicate feature.
• None of the features in the network have been argued for in the text, let alone validated on the basis of evidence.  On the contrary, they have merely been attached to the six examples as labels.
• The more delicate features are distinctions in experiential meaning (quantity, quality, purposive), and the undefined term 'superset' derives from misconstruing ordinatives (last) and superlatives (fastest, farthest) as serving a comparative function.

[5] To be clear, these realisations are neither structural realisations (the dimension of axis) nor lexicogrammatical realisations (the dimension of stratification); they are merely examples of items that are said to serve the particular feature.

[6] To be clear, none of these is an instance of Extent.  The experiential function of farther, farthest and fast enough is Manner.

[7] To be clear, superlatives (farthest, fastest) do not function as comparative reference items.

[8] Here Martin misinterprets clause complexes as single clauses, and claims that the respective circumstances (fast enough, too slow) "presume" the respective purpose clauses (to place, to win).  However, in terms of cohesion, these are both instances of ellipsis, as restoring the elided items makes plain:

||| You had to set a record || to place. |||
|| Ben ran fast enough [[to place]]. || 

||| You had to run a record time || to win. |||
|| Carl ran too slow [[to win]]. ||

In terms of Martin's own model, these are instances of redundancy phoricity, not relevance phoricity — redundancy phoricity being Martin's rebranding of ellipsis-&-substitution, misunderstood as a type of reference, and relocated from non-structural lexicogrammar to structural discourse semantics.

Confusing Circumstances Of Location With Demonstrative Reference Items

Martin (1992: 153-4):

3.6 Location And Manner

Because the point of departure for this chapter has been participant identification, closely related IDENTIFICATION systems realised through demonstrative and comparative adverbs have not yet been considered.  The demonstrative adverbs function as Circumstances [sic] of Location in clause structure (e.g. Come here.) or as Qualifiers in nominal groups (e.g. that guy there); they are realised by here, there, now and then.  Each involves reminding phoricity, presuming location in space or time.  They function both exophorically and endophorically; and where endophoric here and there may presume text (see Halliday and Hasan 1976: 74-75).  The paradigm of oppositions is a simple one, exemplified in [3:90] through [3:93] below.

	PROXIMATE	DISTANT
TIME	here	there
SPACE	now	then

[3:90]

I'm at work;
bring it here.

[3:91]

He's a bit off.
— You're right there.

[3:92]

It's past noon;
do it now.

[3:93]

I got a computer in 88;
writing was harder before then.

Blogger Comments:

[1] On the one hand, Location and Manner are experiential functions, not textual functions.  On the other hand, Martin's network for this discussion, Fig. 3.16, is instead concerned with Extent and Manner, and does not account for Location.

[2] As previously demonstrated, throughout this chapter on 'reference as semantic choice', Martin misinterprets textual reference as ideational denotation — where the ideational denotation, also contrary to SFL theory, is of meanings transcendent of language.

[3] To be clear, Martin's unit of IDENTIFICATION, the entry condition to his system of IDENTIFICATION is 'participant'.  The switch to circumstances here thus creates a fundamental inconsistency in the model that is not addressed.  Martin's network for this discussion, Fig. 3.16, lacks an entry condition to disguise this anomaly.

[4] To be clear, given that the 'point of departure for this chapter has been participant identification', the reason for excluding nominal groups like that guy there from that discussion does not ring true. 

[5] Contrary to Martin's claim, the temporal demonstratives do not refer.  Halliday (1985: 294):

The temporal demonstratives now and then also function as cohesive items, but conjunctively rather than referentially.

[6] To be clear, 'reminding phoricity' is Martin's rebranding of Halliday & Hasan's (1976) co-reference, demonstrative and personal.

[7] This confuses experiential location with textual location.  As reference items, here and there only refer endophorically, anaphorically or cataphorically.  Examples provided by Halliday (1985: 294) include:

So here's a question for you.  How old did you say you were?

… she said: "but it wouldn't be all the better his being punished".  "You're wrong there, at any rate," said the Queen.

[8] Martin's paradigm is actually just part of the larger set of systematic distinctions devised by Halliday (1985: 295), reproduced in Halliday & Matthiessen (2014: 629) as:

 

[9] Trivially, these terms are in reverse order.

[10] To be clear, this is not a referential use of here.  See [7] above.

[11] As mentioned above in [5], temporal demonstratives do not refer, but can function in another cohesive system, conjunction.  In Martin's second example, [3:93], this is the function of the conjunctive Adjunct before then.  In Martin's first example, [3:92], however, now simply serves as a circumstantial Adjunct.